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Abstract
!is thesis examines the treatment of the theme of justice in the works, both poetry 
and prose, of Andrew Marvell and, in a "nal chapter, the justice of certain aspects of 
his behaviour. In order to do this, it seeks to locate particular works in the context of 
contemporary debates or discussions as to ancient rights, the ancient constitution 
(and competing theories as to the king’s power) and the disagreement between Hugo 
Grotius and John Selden on the subject of the legal status of the sea and, more 
generally, the laws of nature and nations. !e discussion of the justice of his be‐
haviour o$ers a reinterpretation of the Chancery pleadings and other records in a 
cluster of cases arising a%er Marvell’s death out of the collapse of a bank in which his 
friend, Edward Nelthorpe, was a partner.  It is argued that these records have, up to 
now, been misunderstood.
!e thesis concludes that Marvell’s work evinces an ambiguity about justice, 
with the poetry tending to give voice to his scepticism, while the sense that justice 
might be at least partly achievable is more likely to appear in the prose works. !e 
conclusion as to his actions is also a matter of some ambivalence: while the evidence 
does not show that he colluded in a fraud on the bank’s creditors, the suspicion that 
he behaved badly towards his wife is complicated by a lingering uncertainty that he 
had, in fact, married.
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Except where otherwise stated, Marvell’s poetry is quoted from Poems and Letters of 
Andrew Marvell, ed. H. M. Margoliouth, 3rd edn. by Pierre Legouis with E. E. 
Duncan-Jones, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), vol. I (referred to as Poems 
and Letters).
In quotations, any emphasis which is not described as added is original.
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Introduction
‘A good Cause …’
‘!ere is some consensus,’ Nicholas von Maltzahn tells us in the introduction to An 
Andrew Marvell Chronology, ‘that Marvell is an enigma’.1 Nigel Smith subtitles his 
biography ‘!e Chameleon’,2 with the implication that our di"culty in discerning the 
poet’s outline and features results from disguise rather than indeterminacy; a further 
implication may be that, though Marvell is probably glad of the concealment a#orded 
by the disguise, its adoption is more instinctive than deliberate. An early and clear 
expression of the current consensus came with the publication of the lectures 
delivered at York on the tercentenary of Marvell’s death. !ere, Balachandra Rajan 
talked about ‘the aesthetics of inconclusiveness’, while Robert Ellrodt, noting that 
‘Marvell’s poetic elusiveness is widely acknowledged’, added that he found the poet 
‘elusive in a very personal sense’.3 Reviewing this volume, William Empson, a critic 
who could be both surprisingly right and distressingly wrong about Marvell,4 
recoiled from the idea ‘that Marvell himself might be “not displeased” at $nding that 
his poems caused exasperation’5 because of the di"culty of pinning them down. For 
Empson, the two outstanding lectures in the series were those given by Christopher 
Ricks and John Carey: ‘both these authors evidently $nd Marvell transparent — they 
are not puzzled by him, let alone betrayed’ (p. 39).
1 Nicholas von Maltzahn, An Andrew Marvell Chronology (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 
p. 1.
2 Nigel Smith, Andrew Marvell: !e Chameleon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
3 Balachandra Rajan, ‘Andrew Marvell: 'e Aesthetics of Inconclusiveness’, in Approaches to Marvell: 
!e York Tercentenary Lectures, ed. C. A. Patrides (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 155–
73; Robert Ellrodt, ‘Marvell’s Mind and Mystery’ in Approaches to Marvell, ed. Patrides, pp. 216–33.
4 In chapter 5 below, it will be argued that he understood, as if by instinct, that Fred S. Tupper had 
misread the evidence as to whether Marvell had been married, yet he botched most of the details of 
the task of refuting Tupper.
5 William Empson, Using Biography (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984), p. 34.
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!e lectures by Ricks and Carey6 originally suggested the present enquiry, 
though it has now moved some distance from that starting point. Ricks concentrates 
on the use of re&exive imagery in Marvell’s poetry, whereby something is compared 
to itself or to an aspect of itself. Carey, dealing with Marvell’s ‘situations in which an 
agent $nds its actions shooting back upon itself ’ (Approaches to Marvell, p. 144), 
demonstrates that the re&exivity is not just a matter of imagery, but is characteristic of 
the way Marvell’s mind works. Subject and object are sometimes identi$ed, some‐
times transposed or confused. Empson acknowledged that, while Ricks and Carey 
were able to overcome the sense of bewilderment or worse with which critics like 
Ellrodt met the poetry, they presumably would not be able to elucidate every puzzling 
point (Using Biography, p. 39). !ey indicated, in other words, the possibility of 
admitting the elusiveness while guarding against the danger of taking it for inconclu‐
siveness.
One critic who made an attempt at achieving just this kind of balance is John 
Klause in !e Unfortunate Fall.7 Klause takes the view that Marvell is the opposite of 
a paradoxical thinker (he uses the term ‘categorical’, which he borrows from Lionel 
Trilling’s Sincerity and Authenticity8). Clearly, to claim that the author of the following 
lines from !e First Anniversary dislikes and mistrusts paradox is itself to &irt with 
the surprising and unexpected:
 For all delight of Life thou then didst lose,
When to Command, thou didst thy self Depose;
…
For to be Cromwell was a greater thing,
!en ought below, or yet above a King:
!erefore thou rather didst thy Self depress,
Yielding to Rule, because it made thee Less. (ll. 221–2, 225–8)
6 Christopher Ricks, ‘Its Own Resemblance’ in Approaches to Marvell, ed. Patrides, pp. 108–35; John 
Carey, ‘Reversals Transposed: An Aspect of Marvell’s Imagination’ in Approaches to Marvell, ed. 
Patrides, pp. 136–54.
7 John Klause, !e Unfortunate Fall: !eodicy and the Moral Imagination of Andrew Marvell (Hamden: 
Archon Books, 1983).
8 Klause, !e Unfortunate Fall, p. 162, n. 87.
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However, while the language is paradoxical, the force of the lines lies in surprise 
rather than in self-contradiction: to say that Cromwell was greater than a king but in 
assuming command he has diminished himself may confound our expectations but it 
does not present us with an apparent impossibility.9 !ere are, in short, two quite 
distinct kinds of paradox: one which alerts us to the possibility that things are 
unexpectedly not as they seem (in order to rule one must yield, and give up much) 
and another which claims that reality itself my be self-contradictory: that a social 
institution or a relationship (for example) is at once itself and its antithesis. Accord‐
ing to Klause, however attractive Marvell may have found the $rst kind of paradox, 
he was disturbed by the second. 
!e context in which Klause explores the categorist’s imagination is Marvell’s 
approach to the question of divine justice. In fact, however, Marvell has relatively 
little to say directly on the subject of theodicy.10 On the other hand, the broader 
category of justice — not con$ned to that of the deity — provides many opportunities 
to look at both types of paradox, and it is a subject that recurs throughout Marvell’s 
work, the prose as well as the poetry.
Justice seems to be important to human beings. Alan Ryan begins his intro‐
duction to a collection of writings on the subject, ranging from Plato and Aristotle to 
Rawls and Nozick, by saying that the issue they discuss is ‘what justice is and why it 
matters’.11 !ere seems little room for doubt that it does matter, though it may be 
di"cult to reach $rm conclusions as to how and why this is so. Ryan quickly goes on 
to say that ‘[t]he legitimacy of a state rests upon its claim to do justice’ (p. 1). !is is 
to say that people expect it to do justice and are liable to express outrage if it does not. 
9 Another instance where Marvell’s language is paradoxical but the situation which it describes is not 
can be found in ‘'e unfortunate Lover’, where, as the cormorants ‘famish him, and feast, / He both 
consumed, and increast: / And languished with doubtful Breath, / '’ Amphibium of Life and 
Death’ (ll. 37–40).  
10 See below, page 20.
11 Alan Ryan, Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 1 (emphasis added).
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In large part, then, justice is a matter of expectation: people expect and demand that 
certain institutions and individuals exercising some degree of power should behave in 
a certain way: even-handed, impartial, taking account of legitimate claims and rights, 
and in accordance with law (where the law is not itself thought to be unjust).
!e concept of justice gives rise to a number of di"culties or problems, three 
of which will be discussed in this introduction. In the $rst place, it is not easy to say 
what justice is, and when we try we may quickly $nd ourselves contemplating 
something of a paradox. It clearly has some relation to law. !e machinery by which 
the courts apply the law and adjudicate on questions arising out of it is o(en called 
‘the administration of justice’. J. S. Mill tells us that the term itself is related to the 
terms for ‘law’ and ‘right’.12 When he lists the activities and actions which may 
typically be labelled ‘just’ or, conversely, ‘unjust’, it appears that, while law and rights 
make up perhaps more than half of the story, important aspects of justice may come 
into con&ict with them:
1. It is generally unjust to deprive somebody of his or her rights, which typically 
include the rights to liberty and property. Rights for the most part are legal rights. 
Bentham, whose utilitarian principles Mill defended, ridiculed the idea that there 
could be rights antecedent to, or more fundamental than, positive law.
2. However, it may also be unjust for a person to hold rights which ought (according 
to some higher standard of justice, the law being imperfect) not to belong to him or 
her.
3. Each person should get what he or she deserves.
4. It is unjust to break faith, i.e. to fail to keep a promise or undertaking, or to induce 
someone to act to his or her detriment by raising false expectations by one’s conduct.
12 J. S. Mill, ‘On the Connection between Justice and Utility’ (chapter 5 of Utilitarianism), reprinted in 
Justice, ed. Alan Ryan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 56.
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5. Impartiality or even-handedness is just,but it is not required in all circumstances. It 
is most stringently required where somebody is exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial 
capacity, so again, the connection between law and justice is a strong one.13
!at is not to say, of course, that everything that the law demands is also a 
requirement of justice. Justice may insist that there should be some rule prescribing 
how a will is to be validly executed or governing the formation of a contract, yet it 
may be indi#erent as to which of various possible sets of rules on these topics is 
actually enacted. If the law invalidates a purported will signed by only one witness, or 
one with the signatures of two witnesses who did not sign in the presence of the 
testator, it is not because irregular attestation is inherently unjust but because it 
would be unjust not to apply the rules that have been promulgated (and which will 
presumably be enforced in comparable cases).
It may help us to deal with the conceptual problem posed by the idea of 
justice as being (a) analogous to law and in large part coinciding with it, and (b) 
potentially in con&ict with the law, and being called upon to overrule it, if we 
consider justice as an ideal principle to which positive law attempts to approximate. 
Branding a particular law unjust would then be an attempt to correct and improve 
law by making it conform more closely with the ideal. !e di"culty with this 
approach is that, for it to make sense, we must conceive of justice as a preexisting 
ideal, which might be said to manifest itself (with a greater or lesser degree of 
perfection) in particular laws, institutions and actions. If this were in fact the case, we 
might well ask what purpose is served by law, as distinct from justice? Why not 
appeal directly to the ideal, instead of to its fallible approximation? !e obvious 
answer would be that we do not have direct access to the ideal, but can grasp its 
requirements only by means of its manifestation in the form of law. If we can 
13 Mill, ‘On the Connection between Justice and Utility’, pp. 53–54.
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understand justice only in terms of law, however, how can we use the higher category 
to ‘correct’ the mistakes of the lower?
!e di"culty with conceptualizing justice as an ideal is well illustrated by 
Mill. On the one hand, there appears to exist something resembling an almost 
universal instinct for justice:
!e powerful sentiment, and apparently clear perception, which that word 
[i.e. ‘justice’] recalls with a rapidity and certainty resembling an instinct, have 
seemed to the majority of thinkers to point to an inherent quality in things; to 
show that the Just must have an existence in Nature as something absolute 
…14
However, while it may be the case that everybody, or an overwhelming majority of 
people, experience this possibly instinctual sense of justice,15 at the level of particular 
norms of behaviour, the ideal seems to have a minimal amount of undisputed 
content. As Mill puts it:
Not only have di#erent nations and individuals di#erent notions of justice, 
but, in the mind of one and the same individual, justice is not some one rule, 
principle, or maxim, but many, which do not always coincide in their dictates, 
and in choosing between which, he is guided either by some extraneous 
standard, or by his own personal predilections.16
Mill goes on to show that perfectly reasonable and persuasive claims about setting the 
appropriate punishment for an o#ence, or the relative merits of a progressive and a 
&at-rate taxation system, can lead to directly opposing conclusions, the proponents of 
each of which are entitled to rely on the justice of their cause. So, while virtually 
everybody feels strongly that justice (in the abstract) is of the highest importance, 
there may be, and o(en is, $erce disagreement as to what the application of this 
principle requires in any particular case. For Mill, this conundrum is not so di"cult 
14 Mill, ‘On the Connection between Justice and Utility’, p. 51.
15 'e existence of a general sense of justice is not easy to prove, and it is conceivable that there is a 
substantial body of people who do not share this ‘powerful sentiment’. It has been suggested that 
‘[p]erhaps the best evidence for the existence of a sense of justice is the persistent e-orts of scholars in 
many traditions (in many times and many places) to put into words the intuitive notion of a sense of 
justice”: Peter Strahlendorf, ‘Traditional Legal Concepts from an Evolutionary Perspective’, in !e 
Sense of Justice: Biological Foundations of Law, eds. Roger Masters and Margaret Gruter (Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992), pp. 128–60 (p. 128).
16 Mill, ‘On the Connection between Justice and Utility’, p. 64.
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to resolve. Faced with con&icting requirements of justice, each of equal validity, one 
must choose the most expedient. To this, one may rejoin that the proposition that the 
con&icting rules of justice are of equal validity or force is necessarily an assumption. 
We do not seem to have the criterion by which we might make a reliable judgment. 
Since judgment is at the heart of justice, this absence is perplexing.
!ere are at least two further respects in which justice can appear a deceptive 
principle or category. !e $rst of these is discussed by Wai Chee Dimock in Residues 
of Justice. In her introduction, writing about Aristophanes’s play !e Frogs, she says:
!e conceit of the scales, I suggest, is central to our idea of justice, central to it 
in a rather fundamental sense, not only as a $gure of speech but also as a 
$gure of thought. For it is this conceit, with its attendant assumptions about 
the generalizability, proportionality and commensurability of the world, that 
underwrites the self-image of justice as a supreme instance of adequation, a 
‘$tness’ at once immanent and without residue, one that perfectly matches 
burdens and bene$ts, action and reaction, resolving all con&icting terms into 
a weighable equivalence.17
Dimock implies that this assumption of commensurability requires that we treat 
particular cases as identical, though they may di#er considerably in their individual 
and distinguishing details, in much the same way as (according to Marx) the speci$c 
characteristics of myriad di#erent commodities become unimportant as compared 
with their exchangeability with the universal commodity, money. For her, justice’s 
assumption of or insistence upon commensurability leaves ‘residues’ and, in disre‐
garding those residues, ‘the language of justice … not infrequently dissolv[es] the 
world in the very act of describing it, converting it into a common measure, a 
common evaluative currency’ (p. 2). It is that common currency that makes adjudica‐
tion possible. Judgment is typically based on an assumption of equivalence. Alan 
Ryan twice refers to the example of a judge imposing on a series of ‘identical’ burglars 
sentences of di#erent lengths.18 It hardly needs to be pointed out that the assumption 
17 Wai Chee Dimock, Residues of Justice: Literature, Law, Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996), pp. 1–2.
18 Ryan, Justice, pp. 2, 5.
12
13
14
of identical burglars is made for the purposes of simplifying the illustration and that 
the burglars encountered in an actual court are likely to exhibit quite a broad range of 
culpability, recidivism, family circumstances and value of property stolen.
!e deposit of at least some of the ‘residues of justice’ results from friction. 
!e machinery of justice is not perfectly e"cient: being concerned in large part with 
commutative justice, it can be thought of as performing a kind of conversion and, as 
with all such machinery, not everything that goes into the process is incorporated 
without loss in the product that comes out at the other end. !e most visible forms 
that friction takes are those of delay and cost.
In spite of these obstacles, the court lists are full of people suing negligent 
surgeons, dangerous drivers and employers who have failed to put in place a ‘safe 
system of work’. Let us consider only those cases where the victim has died, and 
compensation is being sought accordingly. Such cases will o(en be pursued even 
though the cost to the bereaved family members is high: in time, anxiety, forgone 
opportunities (to ‘get on with their lives’) and even in money. !is is so even though 
anybody who can a#ord to make provision for his or her dependants cannot be 
expected to take into account the mere possibility that his or her departure from the 
world, when it eventually comes, will be occasioned by actionable negligence. !at is 
to say, a deceased person will either have been adequately insured or not, and in the 
latter case his or her dependants are likely to be less well able to a#ord to pursue an 
action for damages to the very end.
Why are people prepared to pay such a high price for just the possibility of 
justice? One possible answer might be found in evolutionary biology. In his book !e 
Language Instinct, Steven Pinker argues, largely on the basis of Chomskyan 
linguistics, that humans are born with an amazing capacity for learning spoken 
language. Chomsky’s Universal Grammar seems to be already wired in, while young 
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children have a remarkable ability to pick up the vocabulary of whatever language is 
spoken by those around them. Pinker (departing from Chomsky) argues that this 
instinct can only have evolved by natural selection. He describes it as a ‘module’ that 
equips humans for evolutionary success, and speculates as to what other modules 
might have evolved in similar ways. In his list of the kinds of module one might 
expect to have evolved, we $nd ‘13. Justice: sense of rights, obligations and deserts, 
including the emotions of anger and revenge’19.
In a later book, !e Blank Slate, Pinker expands on this suggestion, o#ering 
an explanation of the evolutionary pressures that might have led to the development 
of such a module: ‘People who are emotionally driven to retaliate against those who 
cross them, even at a cost to themselves, are more credible adversaries and less likely 
to be exploited’,20 and therefore better adapted to evolutionary success. On this view, 
we have an innate propensity to refuse to cut our losses when we feel we have been 
wronged but to ensure that the wrongdoer pays, even if he or she will never pay 
enough to compensate us for the additional e#ort on our part that this requires.
In his longest discussion of the topic, Pinker draws on the work of Robert 
Trivers on reciprocal altruism to argue that the sense of justice might more generally 
be called a sense of fairness and probably evolved as an important concomitant to 
human altruism. !e evolution of altruism poses interesting questions for evolution‐
ary biology, questions that have received a lot of attention since Trivers $rst published 
on the subject in 1971.21 Natural selection favours adaptations that bene$t the 
replicator (that is, the gene), if necessary at the expense of the group or the species. 
An organism which took most of the food supply for itself, leaving its fellows without 
19 Steven Pinker, !e Language Instinct: !e New Science of Language and Mind  (London: Penguin, 
1994), p. 420.
20 Steven Pinker, !e Blank Slate: !e Modern Denial of Human Nature (London: Penguin, 2002), 
p. 182.
21 Robert Trivers, ‘'e Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism’, Quarterly Review of Biology 46 (1971), 
pp. 35–57.
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adequate nutrition, could expect to outbreed the others, even though the species 
would be weakened as its overall numbers declined. !is being so, the evolution of 
altruism needs to be explained. It is clear that, when it does evolve, it is vulnerable to 
cheaters: that is, to those who take out more that they put in. If cheaters are not 
curbed, they will gain a clear evolutionary advantage and overrun the entire popula‐
tion, so that altruism will be selected out. According to Pinker (again drawing on 
Trivers), ever more sophisticated mechanisms of cheating and cheater-detection leap-
frog each other from generation to generation, in a kind of evolutionary arms race.22 
More subtle means of cheating mean that the general population has to get better at 
identifying sel$sh behaviour, which leads to the cheaters’ need to become yet more 
subtle. So, over the course of human evolution, people have become very good at 
spotting unfairness and have developed a propensity to feel strongly that it ought to 
be deterred and punished. Our acute sense of justice is, on Pinker’s hypothesis, a 
result of this process.
Pinker’s suggestion of an evolutionary ‘module’ for justice is an incidental 
hypothesis rather than fully formed theory and is mentioned here only as a demon‐
stration that the human being’s approach to justice can appear to an evolutionary 
psychologist as a problem requiring an explanation. !e argument of this thesis is not 
dependent on the truth of Pinker’s speculation. !e hypothesis is, however, useful as 
showing one way in which an argument can be constructed which might account for 
the coexistence of a powerful ‘sentiment’ as to the fundamental importance of justice 
with an evident reluctance to de$ne it except in wide, abstract terms (e.g. ‘to give 
everybody his or her due’) that leave plenty of room for dispute as to what is required 
in a particular case. If we can conceive (hypothetically) of ‘justice’ as something 
whose presence or absence we are innately equipped to recognize, then our lack of a 
detailed and comprehensive description of what it entails may come to seem less 
22 Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (London: Penguin, 1988), pp. 402–05.
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puzzling.
It may be, though, that this innate recognition will work better if our ‘sense of 
justice’ incorporates some degree of ambivalence. It is a truism that justice is imper‐
fect. Various examples of the friction mentioned above, the varying ability of di#erent 
actors to conceal either their actions or their motives, and the great variety of 
di#erent circumstances in which a dispute as to justice may arise, all make it virtually 
inevitable that comparable cases will not always be dealt with similarly. Take the 
example of three motorists, racing their cars along a deserted road at night. Curly is 
lucky: he does not collide with anybody and does not cause any injury, to himself or 
anyone else. He has, however, been driving on the wrong side of the road, well above 
the speed limit. Larry and Moe each hit somebody, causing their victims serious 
injuries which happen to be very similar. Larry panics and does not stop. When the 
police come, Curly and Moe con$rm that there was a third driver but they did not 
know his name or notice his registration number. Larry’s car is never found.
Moe is charged with dangerous driving causing serious injury; he pleads 
guilty. He spends several months in jail and loses his licence for three years. Curly 
acknowledges that he was driving the undamaged car but does not admit that he was 
racing and is not prosecuted.
Each of the two injured pedestrians brings a claim. Jack, who was struck by 
Moe’s car, issues proceedings in which Moe is the nominal defendant, but which are 
actually handled by solicitors appointed by Moe’s insurance company. !at Moe is 
liable is not in dispute but there is a lot of haggling about the amount of damages. 
Jack has su#ered and will continue to su#er severe pain. He has lost earnings and will 
have continuing medical expenses. !e amounts of damages under these heads are 
eventually agreed. However, Jack’s solicitor is not satis$ed. She points out that Moe 
was driving with a reckless disregard for life, and Jack, seeing the car hurtling towards 
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him at great speed, had been convinced that he was going to die immediately without 
having the chance to make up some minor quarrels with family members. According‐
ly, she argues, this is an appropriate case for an award of aggravated damages for 
mental distress. !e insurance company lawyers insist that, for several reasons,23 a 
claim for aggravated damages could not succeed at trial; but they are prepared to be 
generous with general damages to avoid going to court. Jack’s claim is settled.
In the meantime Jill, the other injured person, has had to bring her claim 
against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau, since Larry was never identi$ed or traced. Her 
losses are very similar to Jack’s: pain and su#ering, loss of earnings and medical 
expenses, all potentially continuing. She, like Jack, claims that she su#ered mental 
distress because of the obvious recklessness of the unknown driver. !e MIB, 
however, is not prepared to pay aggravated damages and Jill’s solicitor has nothing to 
threaten it with to force it to reconsider. !e net result is that Jill comes out of the 
case with £25,000 less in damages than Jack received. Justice has been done, but it is 
clearly not a very equal kind of justice.
In the $rst place, the behaviour of all three drivers was equally culpable, but 
only one has been punished. Curly has escaped punishment, legally and fairly, 
because he was fortunate enough not to hit anyone and he relied on his right to 
silence. Larry has escaped it by running away from the scene and hiding evidence. 
Neither of these circumstances makes the treatment of Moe any less just in the eyes of 
the law, but that is certainly not how Moe sees things. He feels that he has been le( to 
take all the blame, which ought to have been shared more evenly. Worse still, having 
served his sentence and waited out his driving disquali$cation, he is still being 
punished, because he is not allowed to drive. He cannot get insurance at price he can 
23 'e claim is in essence one of negligence, where aggravated damages are not available: Law 
Commission, Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages Law Com. 247 (1997), Part II, para. 
1.10. Jack’s lawyers have attempted to get around this by adding a claim of assault and by alleging 
recklessness as an alternative to simple negligence.
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a#ord. If his punishment might have been expected to have some chastening e#ect, 
that has been completely undermined by the resentment that he feels at the unequal 
treatment of the three drivers.
It would obviously be unjust to deprive Jack of some of the damages to which 
he is entitled simply because somebody else, who su#ered very similar injuries in the 
same circumstances, had no choice but to settle for less. Jill recognizes this, and her 
sense of resentment is nowhere near as sharp as Moe’s, but she cannot help wishing 
that justice could be a bit more fair.
!e purpose of this admittedly contrived example is to show that justice in 
individual cases (or the closest approximation of it that can be achieved) can seem 
less than even-handed when similar or connected cases are looked at as a group. Even 
if it were possible that the penalties imposed on Moe and the compensatory damages 
awarded against him could be precisely calculated to correspond exactly with the 
culpability of his actions and the degree of damage caused by them, the fact that 
Larry had escaped any punishment in identical circumstances must surely indicate 
that the justice achieved in the case is less than perfectly just. In the same way, even if 
the damages awarded to Jack could achieve the stated aim of damages — to restore, as 
far as possible, the injured person to the position he or she was in before the injury — 
the fact that Jill, with identical injuries, was ‘restored’ to a di#erent position, must 
give us pause. Yet, there does not seem to be any more satisfactory approach than 
dealing with cases individually.
To summarize, we have on the one hand a strong, and apparently universal 
sense of justice which may conceivably be an instinct that has evolved because it 
provides an evolutionary advantage. On the other, it is clear that justice has its 
discontents: it relies on an assumption of commensurability that leaves residues, its 
machinery is not free  of friction, in the way of costs and delays, and the more 
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comprehensive a view we take of it the less even-handed (or fair) it is likely to appear. 
!is being the case, we should not be surprised to $nd that the prevailing human 
attitude to justice is one of ambivalence. Typically, it is suggested, this ambivalence 
takes the form of, on the one hand, scepticism about the possibility of justice and, on 
the other, indignation or outrage at some of its more egregious failures. !e scepti‐
cism may be inevitable, given the evident imperfection of systems for the administra‐
tion of justice, while the strength of the countervailing ‘sentiment’ or sense of justice 
may be an evolutionary necessity without which reciprocal altruism (and thus human 
society) would be impossible. If this is so, then ambivalence about justice would seem 
to be unavoidable. One moment, we knowingly opine that the central $gures in a 
$nancial scandal will never be punished, that is simply how the world works; the next 
we vociferously insist that our neighbours should move their fence back to the 
boundary line and stop encroaching on our garden, otherwise we shall be happy to 
take them to court.
!e principal argument of this thesis will be that an ambivalence similar to 
that posited in the previous paragraphs is evident in the work, both poetry and prose, 
of Andrew Marvell. In general, the poetry tends to give voice to his scepticism, while 
the sense that justice might be at least partly achievable is more likely to appear in the 
prose works, though this is not to say that the division is clear-cut. It is not the case 
that the poems are never hopeful about justice, still less so that the prose works are 
never doubtful about it. !e method to be followed will vary somewhat, depending 
on the work, or category of work, under consideration.
Chapters 1 and 4 will attempt to locate two groups of works separated in time 
and by circumstances — the ‘political’ poetry of 1650, speci$cally ‘An Horatian Ode’ 
and ‘Tom May’s Death’, in chapter 1, and much of the prose of the 1670s, particularly 
!e Rehearsal Transpros’d and An Account of the Growth of Popery, in chapter 4 — in 
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the context of contemporary arguments and discussions about ‘ancient rights’ and 
‘ancient constitution’. Chapter 2 will again take a contextual approach, discussing the 
writings dealing with Anglo-Dutch relations in the light of the works of Hugo 
Grotius and John Selden concerning the legal status of the sea and, more generally, 
the laws of nature and nations. Chapter 3 deals with the lyric poetry, which is less 
easy to put in context, in part because of the di"culty of con$dently dating some of 
the poems but more fundamentally because, if their historical occasions were easily 
identi$able, we might be less likely to treat them as lyrics in the $rst place. Instead of 
direct contextualization of the lyrics, therefore, an attempt is made to relate the 
themes found in them with the questions discussed in the other chapters.
Finally, the $(h chapter tries to cast some light on the justice of Marvell’s 
behaviour by o#ering a reinterpretation of the Chancery pleadings and other records 
in a cluster of cases arising a(er Marvell’s death out of the collapse of a bank in which 
Marvell’s friend, Edward Nelthorpe had been a partner. It will be argued that Fred 
S. Tupper, who did Marvell scholarship a valuable service by discovering these 
records, partly undid his achievement by failing to understand their nature.
One signi$cant omission from the thesis is any more sustained discussion of 
Marvell’s beliefs on the question of divine justice than can be found in chapter 3’s 
treatment of the Hastings elegy and ‘!e Coronet’. While John Klause describes 
Remarks Upon a Late Disingenuous Discourse (1678) as Marvell’s ‘brief, informal 
theodicy’,24 Marvell is less concerned in that work to explore the question of God’s 
justice than to make the case (much as he had done earlier in Mr. Smirke and A Short 
Historical Essay) for a more tolerant and comprehensive national church. While he is 
scathing about !omas Danson’s assertion of supralapsarian predetermination (that 
God determined ‘Innocent Adam’s Will to the choice of eating the fruit that was 
24 Klause, !e Unfortunate Fall, p. 13.
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forbidden him’25), he does not otherwise argue against God’s ‘Predetermining 
In&uence’ (Prose Works, II, 469) over all our actions, but rather states that ‘this matter 
has been le( entire to every man’s best Judgment’ (Prose Works, II, 478), so there is 
no justi$cation for requiring members of the Church to hold a belief one way or the 
other.
‘… as well defended’
So far in this introduction, scepticism about justice has been taken to arise from the 
evident imperfectibility of its machinery. Perhaps more disturbingly, we may $nd that 
we have to deal with the scepticism with which Grotius engages in the ‘Preliminary 
Discourse’ (Prolegomena) to his great work De iure belli ac pacis libri tres. !ere, he 
appoints Carneades to act as representative of this scepticism:
… that we may not engage with a Multitude at once, let us assign them an 
Advocate. And who more proper for this Purpose than Carneades, who … 
could argue for or against Truth, with the same Force of Eloquence? !is Man 
having undertaken to dispute against Justice … found no Argument stronger 
than this. Laws (says he) were instituted by Men for the sake of Interest; and 
hence it is that they are di#erent, not only in di#erent Countries, according to 
the Diversity of their Manners, but o(en in the same Country, according to 
the Times. As to that which is called NATURAL RIGHT, it is a mere Chimera. 
Nature prompts all Men, and in general all Animals, to seek their own 
particular Advantage: So that either there is any, it is extreme Folly, because it 
engages us to practice the Good of others, to our own Prejudice.26
!e ideas of Carneades have not come down to us at $rst — or indeed at second — 
hand.27 !is hardly matters for Grotius’s purposes; the point for him is that the ideas 
are there to be refuted. Carneades’s case seems to be twofold: (a) that justice is 
impossible because it is dependent on laws, which are made by human beings, who 
are motivated by self-interest; and (b) that so far as the individual actor is concerned 
this is not a bad thing because only a fool would prefer the rights of another to his or 
25 !e Prose Works of Andrew Marvell, ed. Annabel Patterson and others (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003), II, 469
26 Hugo Grotius, !e Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), 
p. 79.
27 Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572–1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp. 55–6.
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her own interest. !e example given by Carneades (according to Lactantius), and 
much cited since, is of the survivor of a shipwreck who fails to save his own life, 
which he might have done by taking a plank from a weaker survivor who got to it 
$rst (and therefore has a prior right). Such a person would be ‘just, but foolish, in not 
sparing his own life while he spares the life of another.’28
!e shipwrecked individuals $ghting over a plank are in an approximation of 
the state of nature. It could be said, perhaps fancifully, that they get to write from 
scratch the rules governing ownership of property. Carneades’s point was that it 
would be an aberration if the rules made in such circumstances were to favour 
anybody other than the stronger party. Similarly, sovereign powers or ‘princes’ were 
in a state equivalent to that of nature. In particular, neither a sovereign prince nor a 
person in imminent danger of drowning at sea is answerable to any kind of higher — 
but still earthly — tribunal or arbitrator. Ultimately, they must judge their own 
conduct and that judgment will be tempered by interest.
Grotius’s answer to this bleak view is to say that there are rules or laws which 
govern human beings even in a state of nature. !ese laws are so self-evident that no 
reasonable being could in good faith deny them (and they include the obligation to 
hold to one’s agreements, which is the foundation on which all human-made law is 
built). Further, the laws of nature are enforceable, even without a tribunal to which 
the sovereign being (prince or shipwrecked sailor) is answerable. According to 
Grotius, war is the means of enforcement. A just war is always and only one whose 
objective is the redress of a wrong or the punishment of wrongdoing.29 For Grotius, 
war, which has obviously the potential to be an instrument of aggression and 
subjugation, is a double-edged sword. In writing about the law of war, then, Grotius 
was not merely seeking a way to regulate armed con&ict, but proposing that such 
28 Tuck, Philosophy and Government 5172–1651 p. 56, citing Lactantius, Works, I, 329. 
29 For Grotius’s ideas about the law of war, and its foundation in the laws of nature and nations, see 
chapter 2 below.
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con&ict could itself be, in the last resort, an instrument of regulation. !is goes some 
way to explaining why his major work has seemed, on the one hand, a conventional 
work on a well-worn theme30 and, on the other, a radical attempt to deal with the 
problem of Carneadean scepticism and its early modern adherents.31
!ere is an obvious di"culty in treating war as the means of enforcing laws 
and rights: the outcome of a war is less likely to depend on the justice of the combat‐
ants’ respective causes than on such matters as their strength, guile and strategic 
competence. Or, as Marvell wrote to !omas Rolt, his friend in Persia: ‘in this World, 
a good Cause signifys little, unless it be as well defended.’32 For this reason, Grotius 
cannot be regarded as having provided a completely satisfactory answer to the 
sceptics. He has, arguably at least, shown that there are rules of behaviour which are 
not determined by interest and which apply to all human beings, even where there 
are no courts or tribunals to hold them to account. !ese rules will sometimes be 
properly enforced but it is clear that this will not happen in every case. So, if Grotius 
has supplanted scepticism, he has replaced it not with assuredness but with ambiva‐
lence.
30 Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (Paris: Presses Universitaires Français, 
1983), p. 8; see below, chapter 2.
31 Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651, p. 196: ‘… Grotius’s primary targets were the 
contemporary sceptics, alluded to under the guise of their ancient precedessors.’ Tuck’s reading of 
Grotius has not proven universally persuasive: Johann P. Sommerville, ‘Selden, Grotius, and the 
Seventeenth-Century Intellectual Revolution in Moral and Political 'eory’ in Rhetoric and Law in 
Early Modern Europe, ed. Victoria Kahn and Lorna Hutson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 
pp. 318–43, disputes both that the Grotian account of natural law was minimalist and that it was 
intended to refute the scepticism of such writers as Montaigne and Charron.
32 Poems and Letters, II, 324.
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Chapter 1. ‘Ancient rights’: Cromwell’s return from 
Ireland and the death of !omas May
Ancient constitution, common law
Marvell uses the phrase ‘ancient rights’ in three poems, two of them dating from 1650 
and the third from 1653. !e use of the phrase suggests, initially at least, that a 
concern with questions of justice and right features in all three poems. !is chapter 
and the following one will argue that, on closer examination, this impression is 
con"rmed, but with quali"cations. !e two 1650 poems, ‘An Horatian Ode upon 
Cromwel’s Return from Ireland’ and ‘Tom May’s Death’, will be considered in this 
chapter, while that from 1653, ‘!e Character of Holland’ is the subject of the "rst 
part of the next.¹ !e phrase, while certainly one of approval, is imprecise and 
capable of being used in di#erent senses. Nigel Smith points out that ‘the concept had 
been used by nearly every political group during the Civil War’, adding that ‘it refers 
not to the theory of the divine right of monarchs, but to the place of the monarch in 
an ancient constitution’.² It will be argued here that, insofar as appeal was made to 
‘ancient constitution’ in the earlier part of the seventeenth century, it was more as a 
potential source of rights — necessarily ancient ones — than as evoking the notion of 
a framework of government in which the king, as well as the houses of parliament, 
had a place.
Corinne C. Weston implicitly recognizes that ‘ancient constitution’ is con‐
cerned with rights rather than with frameworks of government when she seeks to 
1 "e third poem is treated separately from the other two because it is concerned particularly 
with rights as against other countries and governments and because it more easily dealt with in the 
context of Marvell’s other works touching upon the subject of Anglo-Dutch relations. "e two earlier 
works deal with rights within the English polity.
2 Nigel Smith, ed. !e Poems of Andrew Marvell, Longman Annotated English Poets series 
(Harlow, Essex: Pearson, 2003), p. 275, n. to l. 38.
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locate its basis in prescription. She cites Coke upon Littleton as ‘explain[ing] that 
customs attain force of law by title of prescription’,3 referring to Coke’s commentary 
on a passage in which Littleton has written ‘that no custome is to be allowed, but such 
custome, as hath bin used by title of prescription, that is to say, from time out of 
minde.4 !e doctrine of Coke and Littleton was subsequently adopted by Henry Rolle 
and Matthew Hale. Weston illustrates the operation of prescription in constitutional 
matters with the examples of declarations by parliament:
Two related declarations of the Jacobean House of Commons, the Form of 
Apology and Satisfaction (1604) and the Protestation (1621) reveal the role of 
prescription in early Stuart thought. !e "rst dealt with the source of parlia‐
mentary privileges, the second, speci"cally, with the issue of freedom of 
speech in parliament; both re&ected the view that parliamentary privileges 
were the ancient and undoubted birthright and inheritance of English subjects 
and implied that these were held by an ancient right independent of the King, 
contrary to James’ emphatic claim that he and his ancestors were the source of 
the privilege. (p. 377)
It will be apparent that prescription is a mechanism better suited to blocking a claim 
based on alleged ‘rights’ which have been allowed to lapse, or which have not been 
exercised for a considerable period, than to building a structure of any complexity. 
!ere is a further di'culty with seeing these parliamentary declarations as constitut‐
ing a claim to rights acquired by prescription in that such rights would be useless 
against the king: nullum tempus occurrit regi. Weston’s sometime collaborator, Janelle 
Greenberg, attempts to answer this objection by relying on the distinction, originat‐
ing with Bracton, between essentials and accidentals: time could not run against the 
king in matters that went to the essence of his power but in many matters character‐
ized as ‘accidentals’ the king’s rights could be lost by prescription.5 It is, however, far 
from clear that a king’s power to legislate for and to raise money from his subjects can 
3 Corinne C. Weston, ‘England: Ancient Constitution and Common Law’, in !e Cambridge 
History of Political !ought 1450–1700, ed. J. H. Burns with the assistance of Mark Goldie (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 374–411 (p. 376).
4 Sir Edward Coke !e Institutes of the Laws of England: !e First Part, p. 113b, commenting on 
Sir John Littleton, Tenures, Bk. 2 c. 10 §. 170.
5 Janelle Greenberg, !e Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution: St. Edward’s ‘Laws’, in Early 
Modern Political !ought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 31.
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properly be regarded as ‘accidental’ to his function as a monarch.
!ere is another, more fundamental, objection to treating the passage from 
Coke cited by Weston as a basis for arguing that the English ancient constitution was 
grounded on prescription or customary rights. !e passage occurs in a work where 
Coke explains and enlarges upon Littleton’s "(eenth-century treatise dealing with the 
technical subject of ‘tenures’ or the various ways in which land could be held. !e 
particular tenure under discussion in the chapter in which the cited passage occurs is 
‘burgage’, which Littleton de"nes in these terms: ‘Tenure in burgage is, where an 
ancient burrough is, of which the king is lord, and they, that have tenements within 
the burrough, hold of the king their tenements …’6 It might be thought that, since the 
chapter deals with the operation of prescription in a context where there is a direct 
relationship of lord and tenant between the king and some of his subjects, it should 
be an easy matter to extrapolate this to relations between subject and king more 
generally. However, no indication is to be found in the examples given by Coke that 
he has the rights of the monarch in mind.
!e discussion of prescription arises in this context because Littleton says 
(§. 165) that di#erent boroughs have di#erent sets of customary laws in place, 
governing such things as inheritance. Coke distinguishes between prescription and 
custom, saying that prescription is usually individual, whereas custom tends to be 
claimed where no individual can show a prescriptive right. So, a tenant relying on 
prescription would plead that he and his ancestors ‘and all those whose estate he hath 
in the sayd mannor, have time out of minde of man had and used to have common of 
pasture, &c. in such a place, &c. being the land of some other, &c. as pertaining to the 
sayd mannor’, whereas a claim to a customary right might be made by a copyholder 
‘there is and hath beene such a custome time out of mind of man used, that all the 
copyholders of the said mannor have had and used to have common of all pasture, 
6 Littleton, Tenures. Bk. 2 c. 10 §. 162; Coke, Institutes I, p. 108b 
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&c. in such a wast of the lord, parcell of the sayd mannor’ (p. 113b). !e ‘some other’ 
over whose land the prescriptive claim was made might conceivably be the king but it 
was rather more likely (unless the king had retained land in an ancient borough for 
his own use) that it would be another of the king’s tenants, immediate or otherwise. 
In any case, there is nothing in the passage to suggest that Coke believed that his 
commentary had any implications for the structure of government of the realm. 
!ough the phrase had been used earlier, it is clear that Weston is correct in 
ascribing to J. G. A. Pocock a large share of responsibility for the fact that ‘the 
doctrine of the ancient constitution is recognised as a distinctive component of Stuart 
political thought’.7 For Pocock, the ancient constitution was founded upon immemo‐
rial customary law:
… belief in the antiquity of the common law encouraged belief in the exis‐
tence of an ancient constitution, reference to which was constantly made, 
precedents, maxims and principles from which were constantly alleged and 
which was constantly asserted to be in some way immune from the king’s 
prerogative action; and discussion in these terms formed one of the century’s 
chief modes of political argument.8
Glenn Burgess, who has modi"ed considerably Pocock’s ideas about an ancient 
constitution, continues to defend the proposition that the ancient constitution was a 
‘hegemonic doctrine’,9 but denies that that doctrine was constitutionalist. In Absolute 
Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution,10 he suggests that it is in a reliance on the law 
rather than in an idea (whether established or emerging) of constitutionalism that we 
are more likely to "nd an answer to the question how relations between the monarch 
and the subject were understood to be regulated without recourse to absolutism on 
the one hand or to resistance theory on the other. 
7 Weston, ‘England: Ancient Constitution and Common Law’, p. 375. See J. G. A. Pocock, !e 
Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical !ought in the Seventeenth 
Century reissue with retrospect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
8 Pocock, !e Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, p. 46.
9 Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, p. 136.
10 His earlier work, Glenn Burgess, !e Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to 
English Political !ought, 1603–1642 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), is much closer to Pocock’s ideas.
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According to Burgess, the idea that Coke, Selden, Davies and their common 
lawyer contemporaries regarded themselves as being governed in accordance with a 
constitution owes much to the work of Charles H. McIlwain, whose ‘understanding 
of the seventeenth-century constitution must be judged &awed because it was too 
inclined to require an antecedent set of principles that de"ned the nature of authority. 
… in truth English common lawyers were not as certain as McIlwain makes them 
sound that the laws were immutable.’¹¹ Burgess comments on the changing meaning 
of ‘constitution’:
… there is evidence of a sense in the seventeenth century that certain funda‐
mental or ancient laws could not be transgressed by royal action (these laws 
might even be termed constitutions), but this usage also lacks the modern 
sense of a single, de"ning pattern of government. … !ere was no clear and 
consistent subdivision of law into ordinary law and public, constitutional or 
even fundamental law. … Hence early seventeenth-century understandings of 
the legally limited nature of kingship were di#erent from the understandings 
later associated with ‘constitutionalism’, for they were not based on the view 
that there was a special category of laws and principles, not made by govern‐
ments, but regulating governmental activity. For early Stuart Englishmen, the 
whole body of laws was simultaneously above government and yet adminis‐
tered on the authority of government.¹²
For several centuries, the dominant meaning of ‘constitution’ has been OED sense 7: 
‘!e system or body of fundamental principles according to which a nation, state, or 
body politic is constituted and governed.’ In the earlier part of the seventeenth 
century, an Englishman was rather more likely to use ‘constitution’ to mean some‐
thing closer to OED sense 3a: ‘A decree, ordinance, law, regulation; usually made by a 
superior authority, civil or ecclesiastical; spec. in Rom. Law, an enactment made by 
the emperor.’ 
So, while the phrase ‘ancient constitution’ was employed by English writers 
prior to the 1660s, it did not generally refer to what we should now think of as the 
constitution of the English state. Conversely, many writers who have been identi"ed 
11 Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, p. 135.
12 Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, pp. 134–5. 
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by Pocock commenting on constitutional matters (or as regarding the common law as 
immemorial custom) do not employ the term. Coke’s own use of ‘constitution’ is 
unambiguously OED’s sense 3a:
hereby, as I think, it is su'ciently proved that the laws of England are of much 
greater antiquity than they are reported to be, and than any the constitutions 
or laws imperial of Roman Emperors.¹³
Wholly unambiguous uses of ‘ancient constitution’ are not easy to "nd in the earlier 
part of the seventeenth century. Milton’s !e Tenure of Kings and Magistrates uses it as 
follows:
If our Law judge all men to the lowest by their Peers, it should in all equity 
ascend also, and judge the highest. … Whence doubtless our ancestors who 
were not ignorant with what rights either Nature or ancient Constitution had 
endowed them, when Oaths both at Coronation, and renewd in Parlament 
would not serve, thought it no way illegal to depose and put to death thir 
tyrannous Kings.¹4
Here, the absence of the de"nite article is consistent with (though not conclusive as 
to) the hypothesis that Milton uses the phrase in its early sense. An ancient constitu‐
tion in the early sense would in e#ect be a lost statute (i.e. a statute so old that no 
direct record of it survived) but whose existence could be presumed because its 
e#ects were still visible — for example, the rights that it presumably had conferred 
were still enjoyed. To ground claims to particular rights — such as the right of both 
houses of parliament to participate in the legislative process, or the right of the 
subject not to be taxed except with the approval of the Commons — on ancient 
constitution would be an alternative to basing them on prescription; an alternative 
that would not be vulnerable to the objection that time does not run against the king. 
According to Howell A. Lloyd, ‘it entails no anachronism to describe as “cons‐
titutionalist” contemporary ideas to the e#ect that power ought to be exercised within 
13 Sir Edward Coke, La Tierce Part des Reportes (1602), cited in Wootton, Divine Right and 
Democracy, p. 145; also in Burgess, !e Politics of the Ancient Constitution, p. 74.
14 John Milton, !e Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, in Political Writings, ed. Martin Dzelzainis, 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political "ought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
pp. 3–48 (p. 21).
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institutionally determined limits’,¹5 but it is possible signi"cantly to qualify this 
statement. Writing about constitutional royalists (a category in which he includes the 
authors of the Eikon Basilike), David L. Smith remarks that ‘[s]ince the term was not 
used by contemporaries, there is the problem of projecting an anachronistic category 
back on to the evidence.’16 !e term that Smith has in mind is the composite one, 
‘constitutional royalist’ but it is also the case that ‘constitutional’ and ‘constitutionalist’ 
were not themselves widely used. Alan Cromartie makes it clear that he uses ‘consti‐
tutionalism’ to mean the ‘claim that ordinary law de"nes the monarch’s power’.17 
!ere is no a priori requirement that this ‘ordinary law’ be fundamental, in the sense 
either of ‘entrenched’ or ‘foundational’. It is useful to remind oneself that to speak of 
‘constitutionalism’ can lead one to assume that writers such as Coke were consciously 
describing the institutionally determined limits on the exercise of power when in fact 
they were doing something di#erent.¹8
In discussing the ancient constitution, it is harder to see clearly the distinction 
that has been suggested here between the earlier and later concepts of ‘constitution’ 
because, in the earlier sense, the rights that are being asserted or contested are o(en 
those of what we might now call the institutions of state: in particular, the king and 
the houses of parliament. Where the rights in question are those of the subject, until 
the 1640s, it is primarily against the king that they are likely to be claimed. !erefore, 
these may well appear to us as ‘constitutional’ questions, even if a ‘constitution’ in the 
later sense did not yet exist.
Already in the "(eenth century, however, Fortescue’s statement that the king 
15 Lloyd, ‘Constitutionalism’, p. 255.
16 David L. Smith, Constitutional Royalism and the Search for Settlement, c. 1640–1649 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 4.
17 Alan Cromartie, !e Constitutionalist Revolution: An Essay on the History of England, 1450–
1642 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 9.
18 For a possible explanation of what Coke was actually doing, see William Klein, ‘"e Ancient 
Constitution Revisited’, in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, ed. Nicholas Phillipson and 
Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 23–44.
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enjoyed a dominium politicum et regale¹9 had what we might term proto-
constitutional implications. Such implications may well appear more obvious to us 
than they would have to a contemporary. Accustomed as we are to the idea that legal 
limitations on the power of government are constitutional in nature, we "nd it easy to 
deduce from the existence, or just from the assertion, of such limitations an implied 
or nascent constitution. Alan Cromartie has made a strong case for thinking that, 
while Fortescue repeatedly talks about the ‘assent’ of the people to the laws by which 
they are governed, for him the crucial question is whether the king takes counsel, and 
not whether the people are represented in the legislature.20
It must be accepted, too, that the ideas of a framework of government and of a 
law that was fundamental and, at least in some respects, not alterable at the will of the 
monarch or parliament, were not unknown in the early part of the seventeenth 
century. !e cleric Roger Maynwaring was accused before the Commons of a ‘Plot 
and Practice, to alter and subvert the Frame and Fabrick of this Estate and Common‐
wealth’.²¹ Clearly, John Pym, who presented the charge, had a concept of ‘the Frame 
… of this … Commonwealth’, though when he used the word ‘constitution’ he seems 
not to have meant that frame but rather the act of constituting the monarchy.²² It is 
worth noting that Pym is keen to assert that the ancient right of the subject not to be 
taxed without the consent of the House of Commons dated from the very foundation 
of the kingdom and he speci"cally denies that it was introduced by any subsequent 
19 Sir John Fortescue, De laudibus legum Angliae, chs. IX–XIV; !e Governance of England chs. 
1–2. See In Praise of the Laws of England (c. 1470) in On the Laws and Governance of England, ed. 
Shelley Lockwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 17–24 and !e Governance of 
England in On the Laws and Governance of England, pp. 83–87.
20 Cromartie, !e Constitutionalist Revolution, pp. 24–30.
21 Harry F. Snapp, ‘"e Impeachment of Roger Maynwaring’, Huntington Library Quarterly 30, 3 
(May 1967), pp. 217–32 (p. 221); also cited by Burgess, !e Politics of the Ancient Constitution, p. 176.
22 Pym argued that ‘the law of England, whereby the subject was exempted from taxes and loans 
not granted by common consent of Parliament, was not introduced by any statute, or by any charter or 
sanction of princes, but was the ancient and fundamental law, issuing from the -rst frame and 
constitution of the kingdom’: J. P. Kenyon, ed., !e Stuart Constitution 1603–1688: Documents and 
Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 16–17.
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statute or charter.²³ 
Before the civil war, rather than a coherent ‘constitutionalism’ one sees a 
variety of ad hoc responses to the problem of a king who was evidently set on 
expanding his role and power in ways that appeared innovative to his subjects. 
Clearly, there were some, such as Pym, who thought in terms of a frame of govern‐
ment and a fundamental law, both dating from the foundation of the English 
monarchy. !ese ideas, however, played little or no part in the thinking of leading 
common law writers, such as Coke and Davies,²4 and do not seem to have been very 
o(en grouped together under the heading ‘ancient constitution’.
!e expression ‘ancient constitution’ was eventually used to refer to a consti‐
tution in the later sense, though this usage may not have become unambiguous until 
the Exclusion Crisis and the Glorious Revolution. It is clear from the works cited by 
Pocock that by the 1680s writers such as Petyt and Atwood were thinking in constitu‐
tionalist terms.²5
Invoking ancient rights
‘Ancient rights’, then, would refer primarily to rights whose origins were obscure, but 
which clearly had some origins (such as an ancient constitution or lost statute) 
because they continued to be enjoyed. Long and uninterrupted enjoyment of such 
rights was the key to establishing their existence, whether they were thought to date 
from the original institution of the kingdom, or to acquire their force from lost 
23 A statute could be repealed only in accordance with the legislative process, which would 
require the approval of the Commons, while a charter was capable of creating vested rights that could 
not easily be taken away. Pym’s point, therefore, is presumably that the right not to be taxed without 
‘common consent of Parliamennt’ is entrenched — he uses the term ‘fundamental law’ — and not 
capable of being changed, even by statute.
24 For Davies’s ideas on the foundation of the monarchy, see chapter 4 below.
25 See William Petyt, !e Ancient Right of the Commons of England Asserted (1680) and Petyt’s 
statement to the House of Lords on the question of the ‘original contract’ between king and people that 
James II was said to have broken, cited in Pocock, !e Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, 
pp. 229–30. See also William Atwood, !e Fundamental Constitution of the English Government 
(London, 1690). 
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statute or grant, or by prescription. If the king had ‘ancient rights’, these were a 
corollary to the rights asserted by parliament or people. Nobody doubted that the 
king had considerable powers, but there would be no need to speak of his rights 
unless others were relying on theirs.
!is is not to argue that the claim to ‘ancient rights’ on behalf of the monarch 
was a relatively recent development. Sir John Davies, in his !e Question Concerning 
Impositions (1656) twice refers to a statute of 11 Ric. 2, c. 9 (i.e. 1387–88), which 
provided ‘that no Imposition or Charge be layd upon Wooll, Wooll-fells, or Leather, 
other than the Custome or Subsidy granted in that Parliament’ but saving to the king 
his ancient rights.²6 According to Davies, what Parliament has saved is the king’s 
prerogative power to impose new charges or duties on imports or exports, without 
the need for parliamentary approval. Already, in the fourteenth century, Parliament 
acknowledges, as a participant in the legislative process (and therefore itself vested 
with certain rights and powers), that the king has the right to impose charges that 
would otherwise be contrary to the statute.
George Wither used of the expression (and its singular form) in poems as far 
apart in time and politics as Britain’s Remembrancer (1628) and A Suddain Flash 
(1657)27 and in both instances he was engaging in what may appear to later readers as 
a balancing act. In Canto 7 of Britain’s Remembrancer we "nd him urging that the 
parliament should ‘their ancient rights maintain, / By all just meanes …’ (ll. 2227–8), 
having immediately beforehand made clear that ‘just meanes’ excludes physical 
resistance:
26 Sir John Davies, !e Question Concerning Impositions, Tonnage, Poundage, Prizage, Customs, 
&c. (London: S. G., 1656), p. 138. See also p. 130. "is work, which according to its title page was 
written in ‘the latter end of [the] Reign’ of James I, will be discussed in the context of the king’s 
prerogative powers in chapter 4 below.
27 George Wither, Britain’s Remembrancer, Literature Online (Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey, 
1992) <http://lion.chadwyck.co.uk> [accessed 28 June 2012]; George Wither, A Suddain Flash Made 
visible, the fourth day a#er his Highnesse the Lord Protector had "rst waved the Title of KING, Literature 
Online (Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey, 1992) <http://lion.chadwyck.co.uk> [accessed 28 June 2012].
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What their forefathers unto them did leave,
Let them not su#er any to bereave
!eir children of. For, they may that deny
Ev’n to their King, provided, loyally
!ey do it, in resisting his demands
By legall Pleadings; not by force of hands. (ll. 2217–22)
Wither’s remarks on ‘ancient rights’ suppose that one could have rights in a meaning‐
ful sense without a corollary right to defend those rights against the king by force. As 
we shall see in chapter 4, Glenn Burgess employs a similar idea — that the king could 
be regarded as bound by the laws even though he could not be constrained by force 
from breaking them — to support his argument that ‘absolutism’ was not a signi"cant 
ideological force in early Stuart England.
Barely twenty lines a(er those quoted above, speaking of ‘all just freedomes of 
the Land / !at can be proved’ (l. 2237), Wither writes:
Let us not whisper them, as men that feare
!e claiming of their due, high treason were.
Nor let us (as we doe) in corners prate,
As if the Sov’raigne power, or the State
Encroacht injuriously; and so defame
!e government: disgrace the royall Name;
And nourish, by degrees, an evill spirit,
!at us of all our peace will dis-inherit.
But, let us, if we see our ancient right
Infringed; bring our grievances to light,
Speak loyally, and orderly, and plaine,
!ose things which for our owne we can maintaine:
So, Kings the truth perceiving; and their ends
Who did abuse their trust, will make amends
For all our su#rings: give our foes their doome;
And make us more secure for times to come. (ll. 2243–58)
!is was published in the year of the Petition of Right. At that time, for Wither, 
ancient rights belonged to the people (‘our’: Wither was not a member of Parliament) 
and were to be claimed and asserted rather than allowed to be lost through inaction. 
!e duty to assert these rights was, however, subject to two caveats. First, neither the 
people nor their representatives are entitled to resist the king; but this should not be 
necessary, since the king will perceive the truth and ‘make amends / For all our 
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su#rings’. !e second caveat explains why the king is sure to see the truth: the people 
are to claim only such rights as can be clearly shown to exist and not alleged rights 
based on ‘bare conjecturings’ (l. 2260). It is clear that Wither has in mind rights 
which — though ‘ancient’ and therefore presumably having their origins before ‘the 
time of memory’ — have an existence that is indisputable if the king is acting in good 
faith.
!e idea that resistance is never justi"ed, even in the defence of established 
rights, again surfaces in Canto 8:
For, altho
We may dispose of what pertaines unto
Our persons: yet, those dues which former ages
Have le( unto us for our heritages,
…
!ose dues we should preserve with all our might,
By pleading of our just and ancient right,
In humble wise; if so the Sov’raigne state
Our Freedomes shall attempt to violate.
But, when by peacefull meanes we cannot save it,
We to the pleasure of the King must leave it,
And unto God our Iudge: For all the pow'r
In us, consists in saying, !is is our. (ll. 1601–04, 1607–14)
!ese lines were republished in 1641, apparently in order to embarrass Wither, who 
had changed his mind about the permissibility of resisting the king.²8 However, he 
had not yet "nished with ‘ancient rights’, which were to make a reappearance in his 
poem on the occasion of Cromwell’s refusal to be crowned. In A Suddain Flash 
(1657), he wrote:
Conquest, is by our Law, the utmost Trial
!at can be had: and He, (without denial)
And his Adheres, have right in that respect,
To any Title which they will elect:
Yea, and may Change, Con"rm, or make the Lawes
Such, as their Safety, and the Common Cause
Shall now require: Provided, it accord
With their Trust, for whose sake they drew the Sword;
And with those ancient Rights, by God and Nature,
Conferr’d upon the Reasonable Creature:
28 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 163.
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Which, if they shall invade, their Swords now worn,
Upon !emselves, just vengeance will return:
For, that Pow’r, was conferred to provide
A form of Government so recti"de,
!at, neither Prince, nor Peers, nor People might
Intrench, herea(er, on each others Right: (ll. 1225–40)
!is is, among other things, an illustration that it was possible to appeal to conquest 
theory without necessarily embracing absolutism. In Wither’s view, conquest had 
conferred on Cromwell the right to assume whatever title he thought appropriate and 
also the right to change or completely replace the laws (or, if he should think "t, to 
con"rm the existing ones).²9 !at right is, however, subject to a proviso: any changes 
to the law have to be compatible with ‘those ancient Rights, by God and Nature, / 
Conferr’d upon the Reasonable Creature’. !e rights in question arise from natural law 
and the divine law³0 and are not overridden by conquest.
Other uses of the language of ancient rights lead to similar conclusions. One 
work in which the phrase is used no fewer than three times is a pamphlet published 
in 1642, arguing ‘that Kings are bound by those quali"cations of compact and 
condition that were made with them by the people, and ought to discharge and 
execute their Royall functions answerable thereunto’.³¹ !is is one of the works 
formerly attributed to Milton32 and the author’s assertion of the monarch’s account‐
ability does indeed sound Miltonic. He argues that the need to protect their ‘ancient 
Rights and Liberties’ would have justi"ed the Isrealites in ‘the taking up of Armes 
29 As in principle it had done on William, Duke of Normandy, nearly six centuries earlier. 
Pocock argues that many writers in the common law tradition felt compelled to deny that William had 
truly been a conqueror because ‘[t]o admit a conquest was to admit an indelible stain of sovereignty 
upon the English constitution’: J. G. A. Pocock, !e Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study 
of English Historical !ought in the Seventeenth Century, reissue with retrospect (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 53. Wither’s address to Cromwell shows that he found it 
possible to believe that a conqueror was subject to some constraints as to what laws he could 
introduce. 
30 Presumably Wither did not distinguish between the two. If he did not, as will be seen in 
chapter 2, he di.ered from Grotius but was in agreement with Selden.
31 J. M., A reply to the Answer (printed by His Majesties command at Oxford) to a printed booke 
intituled Observations upon some of His Maiesties late answers and expresses (London: Matthew 
Walbanke, 1642), p. 1. "e "omason copy, E.245(35), is dated 3 February.
32 Martin Dzelzainis, ‘Milton’s Politics’, in !e Cambridge Companion to Milton, 2nd ed., ed. 
Dennis Danielson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 70–83 (pp. 70–1).
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against these Malignant Counsellors’ of Rehoboam (p. 5). !e English people, 
likewise, enjoy ‘ancient rights and priviledges’ which they should ‘labour to 
maintaine’. !ey should not be prepared to give them up merely because ‘other 
Nations are not so happy as wee’ (p. 8). !irdly, he asserts that Parliament, too, 
exercises ancient rights and hopes ‘that the King may not usurpe upon 
liberty’ (p. 34).
Lest the impression be given that the the king was always and necessarily a 
party to any controversy concerning ancient rights, it should be pointed out that 
William Prynne made use of the concept in his attack on the army’s proposal, in its 
Remonstrance of 20 November 1648, for the dissolution of the (as yet unpurged) 
parliament and its replacement by ‘a selected company of politick Mechanicks, 
pragmaticall Levellers, and Statesmen of the General Councel of the Army’. According 
to Prynne, this would amount to:
… engrossing all mens ancient Rights, Liberties, priviledges of election without 
consent or title, into the hands of those who never had a right unto them, the 
people; who are no Free-holders, no Free-Burgesses, free-Citizens, or men 
capable of Votes by Law: and these people no other then the Army themselves 
and some of their levelling Confederates:³³
!ough the rights may be ‘all mens’, they belong to the speci"c categories people 
listed and emphatically not to the army and its ‘levelling Confederates’. !is suggests 
that, while the right to elect Members to the House of Commons may be exercised 
only by those exercising the limited franchise, yet that right exists for the bene"t of 
the people in general.
!ese uses of the phrase are consistent with the argument that, while Nigel 
Smith is right to say that ‘the concept had been used by nearly every political group 
during the Civil War’, the terms of that debate were set by those who sought to assert 
33 William Prynne, !e Substance of a Speech made in the House of Commons by Wil. Prynn of 
Lincolns-Inn, Esquire; on Munday the Fourth of December, 1648. Touching the Kings Answer to the 
Propositions of both Houses upon the whole Treaty (London: Mich. Spark, 1649), pp. 98–9 (Wing 
P4093).
37
38
39
the rights of the subject or those of parliament. !e usefulness of the concept to the 
di#erent sides in the war can be seen in the fact that appeal is made to it (just once in 
each case) in both the Eikon Basilike and Eikonoklastes. In the later work, the passage 
containing the phrase is not a direct answer to that in the earlier, indicating that 
Milton’s use of the term was not prompted by, or an immediate echoing of, that 
ascribed to the king. In the Eikon Basilike, the phrase appears in the context of a 
prayer that is put in the mouth of the king:
If thou wilt restore me and mine to the Ancient rights and glory of my 
Predecessours. …
!en will I rule my People with Justice, and my kingdomes with Equity.³4
We see, therefore, that when a claim to ‘rights’ is ascribed to Charles, they are already 
in need of vindication or restoration. When Milton employs the term, it is in the 
context of an answer to the assertion in the Eikon that, under the rule of the king, the 
people had been governed by those laws to which they had themselves consented. 
Milton objects:
when the Parliament, and in them the people, have consented to divers Laws, 
and, according to our ancient Rights, demanded them, he took upon him to 
have a negative will, as the transcendent and ultimat Law above all our Laws; 
and to rule us forcibly by Laws to which we our selves did not consent, but 
complain’d of.³5
!e authors of the Eikon Basilike, and others who invoked ‘ancient rights’ in defence 
of the king, were implicitly responding to others who relied on ‘ancient rights’ as a 
defence against him — and tacitly recognizing that those others had at least some 
legitimate claims. When, in ‘An Horatian Ode’, Marvell uses the expression ‘antient 
Rights’ in a context that makes it clear that the rights at stake are those of the king, he 
is, on the one hand, using a phrase whose primary signi"cance is to suggest parlia‐
mentary or popular rights, but in such a way as to remind his readers that these are 
34 Eikon Basilike (1648), p. 221 (Wing E268).
35 John Milton, Eikonoklastes (London: "omas Newcomb, 1650), p. 204 (Wing M2113).
38
39
40
not the only rights in issue. One might say that such an approach is by its very nature 
‘balanced’, in that it suggests that con&icting rights may have to be reconciled.
‘Fit for highest Trust’: Cromwell, the Commonwealth and legitimacy
‘An Horatian Ode’ raises and explores questions of legitimacy and right on the one 
hand, and usurpation and might on the other. Since the sympathetic "gure of 
Charles I on the sca#old occupies a central place in the poem, which also o#ers 
apparently unequivocal, if not necessarily unmixed,³6 praise to Cromwell, it is not 
surprising that it has o(en been seen as attempting to reach a judgment as to the 
legality of the Commonwealth that has supplanted Charles, or at least its right to 
command obedience from his former subjects. !ose who wished to assert the 
legitimacy of the new regime had formidable obstacles to overcome, particularly if 
they wished to argue from within the framework of the existing law.³7
A number of di#erent approaches to the problem of legitimacy were adopted. 
Two contrasting ones were those of Marchamont Nedham, in !e Case of the 
Commonwealth of England Stated and John Milton, in !e Tenure of Kings and 
Magistrates and Eikonoklastes. Nedham argued that all regimes rested ultimately on 
conquest — the title of his second chapter is ‘!at the power of the sword is, and ever 
hath been, the foundation of all titles to government’³8 — and saw legality as of 
subsidiary importance in the replacement of one regime by another. Milton’s argu‐
ment was quite di#erent: according to him, a king was entrusted with governmental 
power by his people, who retained the right to withdraw that power even if he had 
not abused it:
36 "is distinction will be elaborated upon below, pp. 54–5.
37 As Norbrook puts it, the ‘execution was an extreme measure which involved overriding the 
law, and it thus provoked opposition not only from the king’s supporters but Levellers and other 
civilian politicians who feared the power of the army’: David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: 
Poetry, Rhetoric and Politics, 1627–1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 194.
38 Marchamont Nedham, !e Case of the Commonwealth of England, Stated, ed. Philip A. 
Knachel (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia for the Folger Shakespeare Library, 1969), p. 15.
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It follows lastly, that since the King or Magistrate holds his autoritie of the 
people, both originally and naturally for their good in the "rst place, and not 
his own, then may the people as o( as they shall judge it for the best, either 
choose him or reject him, retaine him or depose him, though no Tyrant, 
merely by the liberty and right of free born Men, to be govern’d as seems to 
them best.³9
A third approach was that of the writers, typi"ed by Anthony Ascham, John Dury 
and Francis Rous, who argued in favour of the Engagement to the new regime.40 John 
Wallace has claimed that these writers were not attempting to establish the legitimacy 
of parliament’s rule, but only to make the case for the lawfulness of submitting to it.4¹ 
Royalists maintained that the subjects of the late king now owed a duty of allegiance 
to his son and heir, and therefore had no right to o#er obedience to usurpers. 
Whether people could legitimately take the Engagement was a question of enormous 
and immediate importance but, according to Wallace, it had no direct implications 
for the lawfulness of the government. Arguably, Wallace’s concept of legitimacy is too 
absolute, in that it assumes that, unless a governing power has a clear entitlement 
against all the world, its claims are worth little. On the other hand, it could just as 
well be argued that, if people submitted to the government and engaged themselves 
not to oppose it, they would lose the right to withhold obedience. As a result, it 
would become a lawful government as against them, whatever claims Charles II 
might have against it and whether or not other sovereign powers recognized it. 
Indeed, Wallace acknowledges that some presbyterians and some Levellers had 
grounds for their suspicions that this was the aim of the oath:
the presbyterians, whose ministers were to o#er the sole vocal resistance, had 
much justi"cation for regarding the oath as an attempt to make an illegal 
government lawful. Lilburne regarded it as a trick … If this was the purpose 
39 Milton, Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, p. 13.
40 "e Engagers are discussed by Quentin Skinner, ‘History and Ideology in the English 
Revolution’, Historical Journal 8 (1965), pp. 151–78, esp. at pp. 162–71 and by John M. Wallace, 
Destiny his Choice: the Loyalism of Andrew Marvell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 
pp. 30–68.
41 He argues that ‘critics who have held that Ascham … confused might with right have not seen 
that Ascham, like Rous, rigorously con-ned himself to a right of obeying, and that the right to rule 
(supposedly confused with might) was no part of his argument’: Wallace, Destiny his Choice, p. 56.
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which the presbyterians attributed to the Engagement, it was not realized in 
practice, and the House appears to have been happy to settle for a much less 
positive and a'rmative reading of its oath of allegiance.4²
What Wallace sees as Ascham’s calculated avoidance of the question of the govern‐
ment’s right to command obedience, as distinct from the individual’s right to o#er it, 
is not an aspect of the latter’s thought that is emphasized by Skinner, who treats him 
as a conquest theorist.4³ Whether or not Wallace is right, Ascham’s position exempli‐
"es the di'culties involved in defending the lawfulness of the government.
It is clear from the foregoing that defence of the Commonwealth required one 
to step outside the ordinary law of the land and to appeal to principles which, their 
proponents claimed, had their basis in the law of nations (conquest theory) or in 
natural or divine law (a "duciary relationship between ruler and ruled). !ose alleged 
principles were disputed, and the activity of defending the Commonwealth and/or 
the regicide was of its very nature contentious.
Its focus on ‘ancient rights’44 may make it seem unlikely that Marvell’s ‘Hora‐
tian Ode’ is concerned only tangentially with the legitimacy of the Commonwealth 
government. Yet, it may be the case that Marvell (like Ascham as interpreted by 
Wallace) found this a di'cult or inopportune question to address head-on. An 
attempt will be made in this chapter to show that, though it is a question on which 
the poem touches, the the legitimacy of the government is not the central concern of 
the ‘Horatian Ode’, and that Marvell may have had reason, so as to further what was 
his central concern, to leave the question undetermined.
At least since the controversy between Cleanth Brooks and Douglas Bush in 
the 1940s and 50s, scholars and critics have disagreed strongly as to the degree of 
42 Wallace, Destiny his Choice, pp. 48–9.
43 ‘It was frequently claimed, for example, by Anthony Ascham — who has been regarded as the 
most signi-cant of these theorists — that the right to rule was “a thing always doubtful”, and that it 
“would be ever disputable in all Kingdoms, if those Governours who are in possession should freely 
permit all men to examine their Titles”’: Skinner, ‘History and Ideology in the English Revolution’, 
p. 163, citing Ascham’s A Discourse: Wherein is Examined, What is Particularly Lawfull during the 
Confusions and Revolutions of Goverments (1648) pp.  1–12. 
44 See the discussion of lines 37–40, beginning at p. 45 below.
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irony to be found in the Ode’s praise of Cromwell and the extent to which the irony 
negates the praise. !e quality that has been found in the poem perhaps more than 
any other is ‘balance’. John M. Wallace, who sees the poem as arguing, however 
conditionally, for the acceptance of Cromwell as a legitimate ruler, says that ‘a 
tentative suspension of "nal judgment would better describe the tone of the ode than 
the customary “impartiality”’, while Barbara Everett says that ‘Horace several times 
uses a phrase which de"nes Marvell’s style almost more aptly than his own: animus 
aequus, “a mind well-balanced”’. Blair Worden argues that the ‘poem does not merely 
resist a straightforward Royalist reading. It resists any partisan reading’, adding that 
‘elusiveness appears to be at its heart’.45 !e reading of the poem as balanced has more 
recently provoked some strong dissent, particularly from David Norbrook,46 but it is 
easy to see why it has persisted.
!e Ode’s elusiveness is probably best exempli"ed in the treatment of Julius 
Cæsar, as portrayed in Lucan’s Pharsalia and in May’s translation and continuation of 
that work. John S. Coolidge has pointed out that Cæsar’s is ‘the most ambivalent 
name in history’47 and the ambivalence is fully exploited by Marvell. !e poem’s 
opening lines echo Lucan’s description of the response of the youth of Ariminum on 
hearing that Cæsar was about to cross the Rubicon. In a poem on the occasion of 
Cromwell’s return from a victory abroad, this at least implies that there is reason to be 
wary of his intentions. On the other hand, the "rst explicit reference to Cæsar is not 
speci"cally to Julius Cæsar but to the generic "gure of an emperor, and sees him as a 
45 Wallace, Destiny his Choice, p. 103, Barbara Everett, ‘"e Shooting of the Bears: Poetry and 
Politics in Andrew Marvell’, in Poets in their Time: Essays on English Poetry from Donne to Larkin 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 32–71 (p. 48), Blair Worden, ‘Andrew Marvell, Oliver 
Cromwell, and the Horatian Ode’, in Politics of Discourse: !e Literature and History of Seventeenth-
Century England, ed. Kevin Sharpe and Steven N. Zwicker (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
University of California Press, 1987), pp. 147–80 (p. 172).
46 See David Norbrook, ‘Marvell’s “Horatian Ode” and the Politics of Genre”, Literature and the 
English Civil War, eds. "omas Healy and Jonathan Sawday (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990) 147–69 and Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, especially chapter 6, pp. 242–98.
47 John S. Coolidge, ‘Marvell and Horace’, Modern Philology 63 (1965), pp. 111–20 (p. 116).
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"gure, not of Cromwell, but of Charles:
!en burning through the Air he went,
And Pallaces and Temples rent:
And Cæsars head at last
Did through his laurels blast. (ll. 21–4)
!e Roman emperor was entitled to wear the laurel crown, and laurels were believed 
to be immune from lightning’s strike,48 so the dominant idea here is that the laurel 
has failed to protect Cæsar (Charles) from Cromwell, who has gone ‘burning through 
the Air’, like lightning. However, Marvell also makes use of a device that recurs in his 
poetry,49 the confusion of subject and object, to add an additional layer of meaning to 
the primary sense of the lines. As Barbara Everett puts it:
It has o(en been noted that Marvell leaves cruces, like that of the double 
Cæsar. Charles is, and Cromwell becomes, Cæsar. But whose head, precisely, 
here bursts through whose laurels? !e crux is in fact syntactical, and de‐
pends on the fact that blast in this last line may be either transitive or intransi‐
tive (as ‘Cæsar’s head’ is either subject or object) …50
In the primary meaning, blast is transitive, with ‘he’ (l. 21) as its subject and Cæsar’s 
(Charles’s) head as its object. However, Everett is right to point out that it is also 
possible to read the verb as intransitive, with Cæsar’s (Cromwell’s) head as its subject, 
blasting through the laurels and replacing the head of the king under them. Marvell’s 
employment of ambiguity at this point underlines what Coolidge has identi"ed as the 
ambivalence of the name Cæsar. In line 101, the double character of Cæsar is made 
explicit, when we are told that Cromwell will ‘ere long’ be a Cæsar to Gaul. Coolidge 
points out, too, that Julius is not the only Cæsar present in the Ode. In particular, 
Cromwell’s ungirding of his ‘Sword and Spoyls’ (l. 89) resembles Octavian’s resigna‐
tion of his o'ces and powers to the Senate, who promptly restored them to him, with 
the new title Cæsar Augustus.5¹ Cromwell’s submission, it is implied, may be in a 
48 Poems and Letters, I, 298, note to l. 24 and Poems of Andrew Marvell, ed. Smith, p. 274, note to 
l. 24.
49 See Introduction, above.
50 Barbara Everett, ‘"e Shooting of the Bears: Poetry and Politics in Andrew Marvell’, p. 46.
51 Coolidge, ‘Marvell and Horace’, p. 115.
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similar way temporary and tactical.
!e various elements in the Ode whose reconciliation in di#erent ways leads 
to various readings of the poem include:
(a) Unequivocal praise of Cromwell as a general and soldier, particularly in 
the later part of the poem, starting at line 73;
(b) Equivocal meditation on Cromwell’s ‘legitimacy’ and his suitability as a 
ruler;
(c) Sympathy for the king and, possibly, admiration for his conduct on the 
sca#old;
(d) Apparent regret for the overthrow of ‘ancient rights’ and, presumably, 
therefore a belief that the supplanting of the monarchy was an unjust usurpation;
(e) Allusions both to Lucan’s (and May’s) Julius Cæsar and to Horace’s 
Augustus;
(f) Other indications of irony at Cromwell’s expense, such as the reference to 
the Bergamot pear in line 32.52
Some of these elements appear to pull strongly in di#erent directions. For 
example, Blair Worden insists that the irony directed at Cromwell cannot be allowed 
to undermine the praise, otherwise the poem is rendered incoherent. According to 
him:
!e objection to that [Royalist] reading is not a contextual but a literary one. 
!e Royalist interpretation alerts us to the sharpness of individual lines, but 
deprives the ode of momentum and of any intelligible sequence of thought, 
not to say its gravity and depth. What is described as irony is mere sarcasm … 
Nothing reverberates.5³
Christopher Wortham makes a similar point when, having cited three passages, 
starting with lines 79–80, he comments that ‘[i]t takes a lot of contortion to read all 
52 William R. Orwen, ‘Marvell’s “Bergamot”’, Notes & Queries 200 (1955), pp. 340–1 points out 
the association of the pear with royalty, and hence to the implication that Cromwell was already 
cultivating his ambition before he le/ his ‘private Gardens’.
53 Worden, ‘Andrew Marvell, Oliver Cromwell and the Horatian Ode’, p. 172. See also, Blair 
Worden, ‘"e Politics of Marvell’s Horatian Ode’, Historical Journal 27, 3 (1984), pp. 525–47 (p. 540).
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of these instances of praise as being ironically directed.’54 Yet irony there is: in the 
reference to the Bergamot pear, in the implicit comparison at the beginning of the 
poem between the returning Cromwell and Julius Cæsar crossing the Rubicon,55 in 
the suggestion that Cromwell tricked Charles into making his escape attempt from 
Carisbrooke Castle and in the ambiguities of ‘yet’ and ‘still’ in lines 81–2, to take a 
few examples. Perhaps more fundamentally, the apparent attempt to legitimize 
Cromwell, which will be explored in detail below, is not easily reconciled with the 
suggestion that ‘Justice’ is wholly on the side of the ancient rights and the monarchy.
Lines 37–40, which contain both the poem’s "rst explicit reference to justice 
and its invocation of ancient rights, might be said both to encapsulate the argument 
of the poem as a whole and to represent the historical process with which the poem is 
attempting to deal.
!ough Justice against Fate complain,
And plead the antient Rights in vain:
But those do hold or break
As Men are strong or weak.
Barbara Everett has commented that the ‘syntax of the stanza concerning justice and 
fate is interestingly broken and involute, as though the thinking of the poem checked 
there in a knot before moving on again.’56 !e breach in the sentence stands for the 
catastrophic disruption that has occurred in the government of the country. !e part 
of the sentence that comes before the breach is calm, measured and, in its concern 
with ancient matters, suggestive of a prolonged period of stability. !e second part, 
though metrically regular, contrives to suggest the breaking up of the former stability 
and continuity, through the use of heavily stressed monosyllables. It is notable that 
the syntactic disruption is e#ected with such economy. All that is needed to render 
54 Christopher Wortham, ‘Marvell’s Cromwell Poems: An Accidental Triptych’, in !e Political 
Identity of Andrew Marvell, ed. Conal Condren and A. D. Cousins (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1990), 
pp. 16–52 (p. 21).
55 On the Ode’s use of Cæsar, and of Lucan’s Pharsalia, see in particular, R. H. Syfret, ‘Marvell’s 
“Horatian Ode”’, RES n.s. 12 (1961), pp. 160–72 and John S. Coolidge, ‘Marvell and Horace’.
56 Barbara Everett, ‘"e Shooting of the Bears: Poetry and Politics in Andrew Marvell’, p. 51.
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the sentence syntactically unexceptionable is the simple excision of the word ‘But’. 
!e rupture is not just a matter of syntax, however: even without ‘But’, the two halves 
of the statement do not "t easily together. !e words of the "rst half are unmistakably 
juridical: ‘Justice’, ‘complain’, ‘plead’, and ‘Rights’, together with the reminder that 
these last derive a considerable part of their force from their survival from ‘antient’ 
times. In the second part, the considered ‘!ough’ is replaced by ‘But’ and the blunt, 
forceful words that follow it have less to do with law than with might: ‘hold’, ‘break’, 
‘strong’ and, of course, ‘Men’, implying that human justice is neither infallible nor 
perfectible.
!e poem might be taken as depicting the defeat of justice and, indeed, has 
been so interpreted. Blair Worden, who "nds in it suggestions of both Machiavelli 
and Hobbes, comments:
Although Marvell’s treatment of Cromwell’s constitutional intentions raises a 
live issue in the summer of 1650, the vision of the poem is hardly a constitu‐
tional one. By 1650 the constitution was dead. It had been put to the sword in 
the winter of 1648–49 by Pride’s Purge and the regicide. Like Hobbes, whose 
Leviathan appeared in 1651, Marvell had moved beyond arguments about 
legality …57
If, however, Marvell has moved beyond arguments about legality, he does not seem to 
have found it possible to move beyond arguments about the related question of 
legitimacy. It will be argued here that the Ode describes a process of legitimation 
which Cromwell undergoes, but it is striking that the Ode’s account of Cromwell’s 
growing into legitimacy is couched in metaphorical terms whose correspondence to 
actual events is imprecise and elusive. In the early part of the poem, he has come 
from his private gardens from which, by industrious valour, he climbs. !at would 
suggest that he is, at the very least, an unsuitable person to supplant and replace a 
king. If, by the end of the poem, he has become ‘"t for highest Trust’ (l. 80) and the 
right person ‘to sway’ (l. 83), he must in the meantime have acquired a legitimacy 
57 Blair Worden, ‘"e Politics of Marvell’s Horatian Ode’, p. 532.
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that he lacked to begin with.
In 1977, Jim Swan pointed out that, rather unexpectedly, the Ode contains 
imagery associated with cæsarean section. Swan interprets this imagery psych‐
ologically, saying that the poem views power ‘from an ambivalent perspective of 
desire to be enclosed within a nourishing body politic and, at the same time, to 
escape or smash all such enclosures as con"ning and dangerous.’58 According to 
Swan:
Cromwell divides his "ery way ‘through his own side’ (15), like lightning, 
‘Breaking the clouds where it was nursed’ (14). !e "gures, oddly enough, 
suggest a birth by cæsarean section, though the oddness diminishes when we 
remember that Marvell is alluding to Lucan’s portrait of Julius Cæsar, whose 
aggressive and ambitious energies are blamed for the destruction of the 
Roman republic, energies which Lucan compares to lightning:
qualiter expressum ventis nubila fulmen
aetheris impulsi sonitu mundique fragore
emicuit … (i. 151–3)
As lightning by the wind forc’d from a cloud
Breakes through the wounded aire with thunder loud.
(!omas May’s 1635 translation)
Of course, politically speaking, Cromwell’s ‘side’ is his own party, but the 
simile — which Marvell has clearly adapted to his own purpose — suggests 
that Cromwell, like lightning, breaks out of an enclosing body where he has 
been nursed … (p. 3)
Swan goes on to point out that the term ‘cæsarean section’ does not derive from 
anyone named Cæsar, but from the lex cæsarea which provided that the procedure 
should be performed on a dying mother in order to save her child. Pliny’s Natural 
History associated the term with Julius Cæsar, and Philemon Holland, in his transla‐
tion of Pliny, added the idea that men who had been born in this manner were 
fortunate and particularly active. Given the presence in the Ode, as has already been 
noted, of the "rst two Cæsars, and Pliny’s association of the surgical procedure with 
Julius Cæsar, it is (as Swan points out) rather less surprising than it might at "rst 
appear, that such imagery should be found in the poem.
58 Jim Swan, ‘“Cæsarean Section”: "e Destruction of Enclosing Bodies in Marvell’s “Horatian 
Ode”’, Psychocultural Review 1 (1977) pp. 1–8, p. 1.
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However, while Swan presents a persuasive argument for recognizing the 
imagery of cæsarean section, he misses an important part of its signi"cance. Speci"c‐
ally, he pays little attention to the fact that it is through Cromwell’s own side that he 
divides his "ery way. If this is an image of cæsarean section, then perhaps the most 
noteworthy thing about it is that, according to it, Cromwell is self-delivered or self-
generating: his own sole parent. !e contrast with the king, whose right to govern 
depends on his descent from a line of ancestors, could hardly be clearer. What 
Cromwell lacks, and Charles has, is a right that can be traced back, if not to ‘antient’ 
times, then at least several hundred years.
It is clear, too, that if Cromwell is to acquire a legitimacy, Charles’s right must 
also be brought to an end. If Swan is persuasive in pointing out the cæsarean imagery 
of the Ode, a somewhat more tentative argument may be made that there is also 
imagery that associates Charles, too, with di'cult, obstructed birth. !ere have been 
two pieces in Notes & Queries, twenty-six years apart, arguing that there is a play on 
the word ‘case’ in ‘Caresbrooks narrow case’.59 It is clear that in its context, the 
primary meaning of the word is situation or predicament and that the case is narrow, 
or straitened, because it leaves Charles with no room to move. However, both Orwen 
and Dingley suggest that there is also an allusion to Charles’s reported attempt to 
escape through a window at the castle, and that ‘case’ therefore also means casement. 
!is argument is persuasive, though Orwen’s reading dismayed the reviewer in the 
Year’s Work in English Studies, who felt that such an interpretation entailed the royal 
actor’s participation in a broad farce.60 It seems strange, however, that someone 
should recognize a play on ‘case’ without at the same time acknowledging that, in the 
earlier part of the seventeenth century, puns on this word were very o(en indecent. 
59 William R. Orwen, ‘Marvell’s “Narrow Case”’, Notes & Queries, 200 (1955), p. 201 and R. J. 
Dingley, ‘“Caresbrooks Narrow Case”: A possible allusion in Marvell’, Notes & Queries, 28 (1981), 
pp. 49–51.
60 Arnold Davenport, ‘Earlier Stuart and the Commonwealth Period, excluding Drama’, Year’s 
Work in English Studies, 36 (1955), pp. 149–65 (p. 156).
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(Examples abound, and two should be enough to illustrate the point: in !e Shoe‐
makers’ Holiday, Sc. X [III.iv], 100–03, Margery says of the missing Jane that ‘If she 
has wanted, she might have opened her case to me or my husband, or to any of my 
men; I am sure, there’s not one of them, perdie, but would have done her good to his 
power’, while in !e Changeling, I.ii.37, Lollio a#ects to soothe Alibius’s worries about 
Isabella’s "delity with an ostensibly sympathetic ‘’Tis every man’s case’.)6¹ If we accept 
that Marvell might have had in mind such a secondary meaning — or tertiary, 
remembering ‘casement’ — we have the picture of the king trapped in a narrow ‘case’, 
through which he cannot be delivered, while the man who will replace him has 
delivered himself, by means of a restless, violent act of division or cutting, through 
his own side.
!is interpretation of ‘case’ may receive some support from the fact that, if it 
is correct, there appears to be a play on a word in the following line amounting, one 
might say, to a near-pun. !e word is ‘born’, and I use the term ‘near-pun’ because 
both it and ‘borne’ are forms of the past participle of the same verb, ‘to bear’. Accord‐
ing to the Oxford English Dictionary, since about 1775 ‘born’ has been used only in 
the passive voice and in the speci"c and limited sense of the verb related to parturi‐
tion. Between 1660 and 1775, though, ‘borne … was generally abandoned, and born 
… retained in all senses’ (OED ‘bear’, sense 44). !e Royal Actor, we are told, is born 
‘thence’ (l. 53) — that is, from ‘Caresbrooks narrow case’ — to the sca#old. !ere is 
little room for doubt that both senses of the word are present to some degree: ‘thence’ 
implies movement, and therefore the carrying of the king, but, on the other hand, the 
idea that he is ‘the Royal Actor’ by birth is di'cult to ignore. If the interpretation 
suggested here is right, as well as showing Charles’s being carried from Carisbrooke 
to the sca#old, Marvell also has the king undergoing a "gurative, troublesome birth, 
61 "omas Dekker, !e Shoemaker’s Holiday, ed. R. L. Smallwood and Stanley Wells, "e Revels 
Plays (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979); "omas Middleton and William Rowley, !e 
Changeling, ed. Joost Daalder, New Mermaids series, 2nd edition, (A. & C. Black, 1990).
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followed in very short order by a death which is both calm and bloody, violent and 
stage-managed. During this short life, Charles can accomplish nothing more than to 
be born(e). He is passive, whereas Cromwell is indefatigably active. !e latter can 
permit nothing to be done for or to him: he ‘Urged his active Star’ (l. 12) even before 
he came to deliver himself of himself.
Near the end of the poem, though, Cromwell has become ‘the Wars and 
Fortunes Son’ (l. 113): in its course, he has managed to acquire two parents. A case 
can therefore be made for the claim that the Ode shows Cromwell, through the 
coincidence of war and fortune, growing into a legitimacy as a ruler that he could not 
otherwise have hoped to enjoy. !is interpretation is consistent with the arguments of 
those, like Worden, who have argued that Marvell in the Ode is adopting a position 
very close to Marchamont Nedham’s when he described Cromwell in Machiavellian 
terms as ‘the only Novus Princeps that ever I met with in all the con"nes of history’.6² 
!e moment may have been right for such an argument. Nedham’s !e Case of the 
Commonwealth of England Stated (May 1650), which was published just a month 
earlier and also makes a Machiavellian case, does not mention Cromwell.6³
!ere is, however, at least one possible objection to the alignment of Marvell 
with Nedham. Unlike Nedham, Marvell seems to feel that the passing of the ancien 
régime, or at any rate of the ancient rights, is not an occasion for unmixed rejoicing. 
So, while the references to ‘industrious valour’ and to the parenthood of war and 
fortune are undoubtedly present in Marvell’s poem, they appear to be balanced by a 
recognition that the claims of the monarchy cannot be dismissed just by bestowing a 
Machiavellian title on Cromwell.
It might also be argued that, while War and Fortune are certainly impressive 
parents, they cannot be regarded as entirely reputable ones, particularly in a poem 
62 Mercurius Politicus (13 June 1650), cited in Worden, ‘Andrew Marvell, Oliver Cromwell, and 
the Horatian Ode’, p. 163.
63 As Norbrook points out: Writing the English Republic, p. 251.
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that makes so much of its allusions to Lucan’s Pharsalia. As Coolidge says:
!e determining fact about the wretched world that Lucan portrays is that the 
laws have been silenced by war (‘leges bello siluere coactae’), leaving the poem 
to be dominated by Fortune, particularly, of course, by the notorious Fortune 
of Julius Cæsar. It is the condition, almost the de"nition, of war in Lucan that 
Fortune replaces Justice. Cæsar "gures in the poem as the agent and bene"‐
ciary of that force in the world which is incompatible with law and to which 
the world is given over in time of war. He is “the Wars and Fortunes Son.” 
Lucan’s response to these conditions is a shrill, recurrent cry of pain.64
!e possibility should therefore be acknowledged that, by providing Cromwell with 
such a parentage, Marvell indicates that such legitimacy as he might enjoy is, at best, 
that of a Julius Cæsar.
!ere is yet another di'culty with reading the poem as an argument for the 
legitimacy of Cromwell’s government. While he had been the leading "gure in 
orchestrating the regicide, he had, at the time of his return from Ireland, no o'cial 
governmental function. Blair Worden expresses the ambiguity of his position in these 
terms:
Oliver Cromwell was the leading personality of the regime which emerged 
a(er the execution of Charles I in January 1649. To the surprise of his con‐
temporaries, his pre-eminence received no formal recognition. He was 
second-in-command of the army, but the army was the servant of the purged 
house of commons, the rump, of which he was one among many equal 
members and which was to hold power till he forcibly dissolved it in 1653.65
He had been the "rst president ‘pro tempore’ of the Council of State following the 
execution but had quickly relinquished that role. He was widely suspected of ambi‐
tion but, since it was not clear exactly how that ambition would be ful"lled, a 
discussion of the legitimacy of his rule would have been premature. It is — solely, 
except for the two reference to his "tness for a more exalted o'ce — in his capacity 
as a military leader and a soldier that the Ode praises him.66 He ‘could not cease / In 
64 Coolidge, ‘Marvell and Horace’, p. 113.
65 Worden, ‘"e Politics of Marvell’s Horatian Ode’, pp. 526–7.
66 Nicholas McDowell remarks that Cromwell ‘embodies the arts only of war and Machiavellian 
cunning from the beginning to the end of the “Ode”’: Nicholas McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance in the 
English Civil Wars: Marvell and the Cause of Wit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) p. 11 
(emphasis added).  
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the inglorious Arts of Peace’ (ll. 9–10), and it does not seem likely that he will learn 
how to do so in the future. What the Ode foretells for him is more war and more 
victory. Lines 105–12 predict, with an accuracy that may have come as a surprise to 
the author, Cromwell’s suppression of the Scottish threat; lines 101–04, less 
accurately, successful invasions of France, Italy and other ‘states not free’. On the 
other hand, the poem does not predict political or statesmanlike activity at home, of 
the kind that will be described in !e First Anniversary. Instead, Cromwell is exhort‐
ed to ‘keep thy Sword erect’ (l. 116).
Some of the more persuasive readings of the later Cromwell poems and of 
‘Upon Appleton House’ have focused on Marvell’s attempt to adopt the role of a 
tactful adviser, gently and discreetly indicating to powerful men the way they ought 
to act. In 1968, M. J. K. O’Loughlin suggested an interpretation of ‘Upon Appleton 
House’ in which he saw Marvell as demonstrating the inadequacy of either a solely 
active or a solely contemplative life, creating ‘a rich metaphoric texture which 
transforms this deliberative structure into a vision of historical process in which the 
opposed possibilities of retirement and involvement can be imaginatively 
“married”’.67 Since Fairfax’s circumstances at the time included rather more of 
retirement than of involvement, O’Loughlin detects in the section of the poem 
dealing with Fairfax’s garden, a ‘delicate accent of reproof which hovers over the 
hyperbolical language of celebration’ (p. 127), adding however:
the very tact of such a summons to involvement seems to manifest on the 
poet’s part what might be called the rhetorical equivalent of Fairfax’s political 
withdrawal. (p. 129)
In a similar vein, John Creaser writes that ‘the sweating and burdened hall at Apple‐
67 M. J. K. O'Loughlin, ‘"is Sober Frame: A Reading of “Upon Appleton House”’, in Andrew 
Marvell: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. George de F. Lord (Englewood Cli.s, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1968), pp. 120–42 (p. 124).
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ton implies not only that Fairfax is great but that he simply does not belong there’.68 
Derek Hirst and Steven Zwicker, too, suggest an interpretation of ‘Upon Appleton 
House’ that has Marvell assuming a didactic role though not, in their case, one that 
seeks to steer Fairfax back towards active involvement in public life. We shall return 
to their reading of the poem in chapter 3; for present purposes, it is su'cient to note 
that they show the poet, on the one hand, ‘attenuating’ or ‘extenuating’ Fairfax’s crises 
by presenting him as being impervious to the ‘excesses and misuses of retreat’ while, 
on the other, warning the retired general of the dangerous attractions of hermeticism: 
‘To school the patron under the eaves of his own house demanded both daring and 
unusual subtlety.’69
In the meantime, Hirst had arrived at a similar approach to !e First Anniver‐
sary, arguing that Marvell’s uncharacteristic adoption of millenarian language was 
part of an attempt to compete with the Fi(h Monarchists for in&uence over 
Cromwell.70 !ough they are not in agreement as to the content of the instruction, 
O’Loughlin and Creaser on the one hand, and Hirst and Zwicker on the other, are at 
one in seeing Marvell as seeking to in&uence a powerful man, while employing the 
tact and discretion that are necessary when a client undertakes the task of instructing 
a patron. Similarly — and evidently taking his cue from Hirst and Zwicker — Charles 
Larson argues that the third Cromwell poem should be seen not so much as an elegy 
for the deceased Lord Protector as a hortatory poem directed at his son Richard, with 
the aim of persuading him and the poem’s other readers that he could be an e#ective 
68 John Creaser, ‘“As one scap’t strangely from Captivity”: Marvell and Existential Liberty’, in 
Marvell and Liberty, ed. Warren Chernaik and Martin Dzelzainis (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 
pp. 145–72 (p. 153).
69 Derek Hirst and Steven Zwicker, ‘High Summer at Nun Appleton, 1651: Andrew Marvell and 
Lord Fairfax’s Occasions’, Historical Journal 36, 2 (1993), pp. 247–69, especially at pp. 257–60.
70 Derek Hirst, ‘“"at Sober Liberty”: Marvell’s Cromwell in 1654’, in !e Golden & the Brazen 
World: Papers in Literature and History, 1650–1800, ed. John M. Wallace, Publications from Clark 
Library Professorship, UCLA, 10 (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 
1985), pp. 17–53.
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successor to his father.7¹
!e ‘Horatian Ode’ too has been seen as a hortatory poem, though of a 
di#erent kind: John S. Coolidge sees its encomium of Cromwell as conditional praise, 
urging the leader towards the virtues that it ascribes to him: ‘If the ruler addressed 
falls o# from the terms in which — and on which — the poet praises him, the praise 
will come to read, as Marvell's “Ode” does to readers who dislike Cromwell, as cruel, 
quiet irony.’7² !e di'culty with reading the Ode, like the later Cromwell poems, as 
an appropriately deferential attempt to in&uence its subject, is that in 1650, so far as 
we know, Marvell did not have any reason to suppose that his advice would be heard, 
still less that it would be listened to. When he wrote ‘Upon Appleton House’ he was 
living in Fairfax’s household and entrusted with the tuition of his daughter. By the 
time he came to write !e First Anniversary, he had been in direct correspondence 
with Cromwell himself.7³ In 1650, he was not in a position of such proximity to 
power, so it is less likely that he then saw himself as occupying the role of tactful 
adviser. It is possible, though, that as an ambitious and well-educated young man, 
without much in the way of material wealth and with a distinct liking for privacy, he 
was already aiming at the performance of such a function. If so, he might, to borrow 
James Loxley’s phrase, have been ‘trying the mode on for size’,74 or simply practising.
At any rate, if we attempt to read the Ode as the utterance of a (would-be) 
client, exploring the possibilities open to his (prospective) patron, while tactfully and 
unobtrusively suggesting which course he considers it would be wiser to adopt, it 
becomes easier to resolve at least some of its apparent contradictions. As I have 
already suggested, the poem’s praise of Cromwell as a soldier and as a military leader 
is unequivocal. Furthermore, what might seem to be at best equivocal praise of a 
71 Charles Larson, ‘Marvell’s Richard Cromwell: “He, Vertue Dead, Revives”’, Mosaic 19.2 (1986), 
pp. 57–67.
72 Coolidge, ‘Marvell and Horace’, p. 119.
73 See Poems and Letters, II, 304–5.
74 See below, p. 62.
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statesman comes to seem more straightforward if it is applied to a general with no 
governmental role. !is is clearly true of the restlessness and arguably true also of the 
‘wiser Art’ (l. 48) with which, Marvell alleges or assumes, Cromwell induced the king 
to chase himself into a trap. !e di#erence could be said to be that between an 
admirable grasp of military tactics and an unfortunate command of duplicitous 
policy. As has also been noted, Cromwell’s predicted future holds further wars and 
new victories rather than legislative programmes and public administration. !is is 
particularly noticeable at the poem’s end, when the general is urged:
… for the last e#ect
Still keep thy Sword erect:
Besides the force it has to fright
!e Spirits of the shady Night,
!e same Arts that did gain
A Pow’r must it maintain. (ll. 115–20)
For John Carey, at least, the poem’s close is another example of ‘the self-defeating 
reversibility of our actions’: ‘Force does not establish power; it establishes, simply, the 
need to use force.’75 However, such a pessimistic interpretation of the couplet is 
di'cult to reconcile with the hortatory tone of the poem’s ending. One can see 
Marvell’s admonition as suggesting that the overthrow of Charles I has been an 
example of self-defeating reversibility only if one reads the poem’s "nal lines as 
implying that the new regime will expend so much of its e#orts on self-defence that it 
will be able to accomplish little else. If, however, we take the poem to be addressed to 
the present commander of the army, rather than to the presumptive future governor 
of the country, the advice hardly seems pessimistic at all. Clearly, the country will 
continue to need defence; what else should the successful soldier do but continue to 
provide it?
!e possibility should therefore be considered that the Ode is calculated to 
encourage the victorious general to remain in his present role and to refrain from 
75 John Carey, ‘Reversals Transposed: an Aspect of Marvell’s Imagination’, in Approaches to 
Marvell, ed. Patrides, pp. 136–54 (p. 147).
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assuming a new one. A government cannot be wholly concerned with warlike 
activities. Since, previously, Cromwell’s restlessness made him unsuitable for ‘the 
inglorious Arts of Peace’, it may be a mistake for him now to return to them, even in a 
capacity much more exalted than that which he formerly "lled. He should indeed be 
a Cæsar, but ‘to Gaul’ (l. 101), not to Rome: the conquering general Julius Cæsar, not 
the would-be emperor who crossed the Rubicon or, arguably, the formally and 
temporarily submissive Augustus, laying his ‘Sword and Spoyls … at the Publick’s 
skirt’ (ll. 89–90). In support of this interpretation of the poem one might also adduce 
the fact that the "rst of the two explicit assertions of Cromwell’s "tness for govern‐
ment (l. 80) is ascribed to the Irish, who might be quali"ed to judge his goodness and 
justice but who — particularly in defeat — are not in a position to pronounce upon 
the suitability of a potential ruler of England.76
!e advantage of this interpretation is that it exempts Cromwell from much of 
what might be taken as the poem’s submerged condemnation, which attaches largely 
to the Commonwealth or the Parliament. It is quite possible that a poem may praise a 
conquering general — particularly one who does not intend to rise above that role — 
without arriving at any conclusion as to the legitimacy of the regime that he serves. A 
country governed by a usurper still needs, and is entitled to, defence against external 
enemies. On this view, when Cromwell was ‘the force of angry Heavens &ame’ (l. 26), 
scourging his own country, and dividing his "ery way ‘thorough his own Side’ (l. 15), 
his actions may have been unjusti"ed, but (external) war and fortune have ensured 
that he found a role where his talents and abilities could be utilized for his country’s 
bene"t rather than to its detriment. Worden has pointed out the apparent contradic‐
76 Marvell’s lines about the defeat of the Irish have occasioned some puzzlement among critics. 
Jim Swan, whose remarks about cæsarean section were discussed above, summarized the reaction of 
many readers by commenting: ‘It is di0cult, but apparently necessary, to believe that Marvell wrote 
these lines without scathing irony’: Swan, ‘“Cæsarean Section”: "e Destruction of Enclosing Bodies in 
Marvell’s “Horatian Ode”’, p. 6. Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, pp. 246–7, identi-es ‘some 
wholly non-ironic praise of Cromwell … in an Irish Catholic source roughly contemporary with the 
‘Ode’.’
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tion between line 37, in which ‘justice has vainly protested against the fate that has 
advanced him’, and line 79, which ‘calls him “just”’.77 While this discrepancy might be 
accounted for on the hypothesis that the poem shows Cromwell growing into a 
legitimacy that he lacked at the outset, perhaps a more satisfactory explanation is that 
so long as he directs his warlike abilities against the threat of a foreign enemy, he acts 
justly; when he "ghts at home — even against ‘the Emulous’ (l. 18) — he is less 
entitled to claim that justice is on his side.
If it is correct, then, that the Ode seeks — however tentatively — to persuade 
Cromwell to continue in his military role and eschew a governmental one, part of the 
argument might be that, in the former capacity, he serves not merely the regime but 
the country, and so avoids the taint of illegitimacy that a#ects the former. At the same 
time, though, the legitimation from which Cromwell bene"ts in the course of the 
poem seems to attach to the Commonwealth also. In the early part of the poem, we 
are told that Justice has cause for complaint against Fate, and that ancient rights ‘do 
hold or break / As Men are strong or weak’ (ll. 39–40). !is at least implies that the 
Commonwealth is a usurpation, with justice clearly ranged against it. On the other 
hand, by the end of the poem, it is suggested that Cromwell’s submission to this 
usurped authority is a cause for rejoicing:
Nor yet grown sti#er with Command,
But still in the Republick’s hand:
…
He to the Commons Feet presents
A Kingdome, for his "rst years rents:
And, what he may, forbears
His Fame to make it theirs:
And has his Sword and Spoyls ungirt,
To lay them at the Publick’s skirt. (ll. 81–2, 85–90)
!e momentary uncertainty as to what, exactly, is forborne by Cromwell re&ects the 
uncertainty, in which the poet seems to have shared, about his intentions. Until the 
77 Worden, ‘Andrew Marvell, Oliver Cromwell, and the Horatian Ode’, p. 155.
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reader gets past the end of line 87, it seems that the object of ‘forbears’ might be the 
preceding ‘what’. !at would mean that Cromwell forbears to do what he might have 
done, either by right or by force. However, it immediately becomes clear that the 
object of the verb can only be his ‘Fame’ and that ‘what he may’ is an adverbial clause, 
meaning (as Nigel Smith explains) ‘in so far as he can’.78 For an instant, the picture of 
a supremely powerful, though forbearing, Cromwell is placed before us, only to 
resolve itself into that of a man who has as much control over his reputation as the 
average human has over his or hers.
!e passage on Cromwell’s forbearance is immediately followed by the 
metaphor of the falcon which ‘!e Falckner has … sure’ (l. 96). A continuous passage 
of 15 lines, then, more than a tenth of the poem, is devoted to Cromwell’s obedience 
to and control by the Parliament. !is makes it di'cult to argue that the thrust of the 
Ode is to praise Cromwell as a highly successful — as well as ‘good’ and ‘just’ (l. 79) 
— soldier and general, while carefully withholding such praise, and any recognition, 
from the government to which he was so obedient. It might be closer to the truth to 
say that Marvell hints at the regime’s illegitimacy, because to do so tends to urge 
Cromwell in the direction in which the poet wishes him to go, while refraining from 
explicit condemnation, in case Cromwell should in the event decide to take a 
di#erent course.79
If it is recognized that the poem treats Cromwell’s praiseworthiness and the 
regime’s legitimacy as separate questions whose answers are independent of each 
other, it begins to seem more likely that what the Ode says as to the second question 
is not so much equivocal or ambivalent as mutedly critical. Charles’s restraint while 
on the sca#old is noteworthy in this context. It is presented as an occasion for praise, 
78 !e Poems of Andrew Marvell, ed. Smith, p. 277, note to l. 87.
79 A later poem, George Wither’s ‘A Suddain Flash’ (see above, p. 35) makes great play of the 
poet’s uncertainty about Cromwell’s actual intentions, while making clear his approval of the 
Protector’s refusal of the crown. Wither, too, seems to be engaging in what Coolidge terms ‘conditional 
praise’.
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though there is initially a suspicion that that praise is partly grounded upon the king’s 
relinquishing of his entitlement:
He nothing common did or mean
Upon that memorable Scene:
But with his keener Eye
!e Axe’s edge did try:
Nor call’d the Gods with vulgar spight
To vindicate his helpless Right;
But bow’d his comely Head,
Down, as upon a Bed. (57–64)
However, to say that Charles did not call on heaven to vindicate his right is not the 
same thing as to say that he did not assert it, still less that he surrendered or re‐
nounced it. Marvell does not therefore go as far as the pro-Engagement writers cited 
by John Wallace. !ey had argued that Charles’s behaviour constituted an implied 
abdication, or perhaps a release of his subjects from their oath of allegiance, and from 
their corresponding duty to withhold obedience from the new regime.80 
Nevertheless, it is Charles’s restraint that Marvell chooses to stress and his reasons for 
doing so are worth examining. It is possible that he considers Charles’s silence 
praiseworthy merely because it is digni"ed: since it is unthinkable that it should have 
escaped the notice of an omniscient deity that the ancient rights of the English 
monarchy are about to be violated, Charles is not under a duty to say anything; if God 
wishes to intervene to prevent that violation, he will do so, irrespective of any plea 
that the king might make. At most, then, silence implies acquiescence, not in the 
regicide or in the destruction of the monarchy, but simply in the doing of God’s will.
!e reference to the assurance of the ‘forced Pow’r’ (l. 66) similarly presents 
the appearance of ambiguity, but this resolves itself on closer examination into a 
withholding of approval from the regime. To ‘assure’ means, among other things, to 
assign or transfer a property right, particularly a leasehold interest. On the face of it, 
to describe the power as having at "rst been ‘forced’ or usurped, but as subsequently 
80 Wallace, Destiny His Choice, pp. 79–84.
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having become ‘assured’, is to imply that a process of legitimation, analogous to that 
apparently undergone by Cromwell, has taken place. However, to draw this conclu‐
sion would be to overlook the fact that it is the anonymous, if memorable, 
‘Hour’ (l. 65), not the king, that e#ects the assurance. Indeed, these lines, taken in 
combination with the king’s refusal to call for vindication of his right, rather tend to 
make it clearer that his silence is not to be taken for acquiescence: the assurance, such 
as it is, did not proceed from him. Marvell is indeed presenting an ambiguous picture 
but that is not to say that the ambiguity is incapable of resolution.
It should, at any rate, now be clear that the Ode’s equivocations (to put it at its 
weakest) and ironies tend to undermine the government, not the general, though this 
distinction is blurred by the obvious possibility that the general and the government 
might soon become closely identi"ed. In this respect, the emphasis on Cromwell’s 
obedience is itself one of the most ambivalent elements in the poem. On the one 
hand, he is under the control and direction of a regime that is or may be unjust and 
lacking any lawful authority. On the other, precisely because he is under its control, 
he is not controlling it, and so cannot be held responsible for its illegal acts. He is, at 
worst, doing his duty and doing it well.
Whether Marvell expected or intended his poem to be read by Cromwell it is 
not possible to say. !e Ode evidently enjoyed some manuscript circulation, though 
perhaps not until several years a(er the occasion of its writing.8¹ What can be said is 
that the Ode is couched in terms which assume (perhaps "ctitiously) that it will be 
read by its subject. It is — explicitly so, in the case of the "nal eight lines — addressed 
to Cromwell. It either seeks to in&uence him or is framed as a poem would be if it 
sought to in&uence its subject.
81 Paul Hammond, ‘Dryden’s Use of Marvell’s Horatian Ode in Absalom and Achitophel’, Notes & 
Queries 35 (1988), pp. 173–4. McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance in the English Civil Wars, pp. 254–8, 
-nds evidence that Abraham Cowley, like Dryden, had read Marvell’s ‘Ode’. Like Dryden, Cowley read 
it as panegyric to Cromwell.
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‘Irrevocable Sentence’: Justice and the poet’s role
!e second of the poems in which Marvell uses the expression ‘ancient rights’ is ‘Tom 
May’s Death’ which is, if anything, more clearly concerned than even the Ode with 
the questions of justice. !e poem proposes, in the "rst place, that the poet has a role 
— in e#ect a role of last resort — in upholding justice when the judge and the 
churchman have been deterred from doing so by the threat or the actuality of 
violence. In the second, it considers the question of a "tting punishment for a poet 
who has refused to ful"l this role. It describes a parody of a kind of judicial process, 
presided over by the ghost of Ben Jonson, that ends with the imposition of sentence 
on May. A trial conducted by poets is a feature of Lucianic satire, and one that had 
been used by Jonson in Poetaster (1601).8² While the poem is evidently a satire, 
identifying its tone — in particular the extent to which the vituperation directed at 
May is leavened with humour — has presented some di'culty for critics. !e passage 
in which the phrase ‘ancient rights’ is used (lines 63–70) is probably the most 
frequently quoted and discussed, and has been described by John Carey as ‘wonder‐
fully public’. Carey adds, however, that, since the poem was not printed at the time, 
and we have no evidence of manuscript circulation, for all we know the poet was 
‘haranguing an empty room’.8³
!e question of the passage’s already ambivalent tone is further complicated 
by the fact that these ‘wonderfully public’ and hortatory lines are spoken by the 
persona of Jonson’s ghost, whose judgment might be thought to be less than infallible 
in that he places Lucan — of whom Marvell has made use with apparent approval in 
the Ode — in the company of ‘Polydore, … Allan, Vandale, Goth’ (l. 41) and pre‐
sumes to correct Virgil and Horace (ll. 35–6). !e poem contains a number of 
82 Poems of Andrew Marvell, ed. Smith, p. 118, citing Benne Klaas Faber, ‘"e Poetics of 
Subversion and Conservatism: Popular Satire, c. 1640–c.1649’ unpublished DPhil thesis, University of 
Oxford (1992).
83 John Carey, ed., Andrew Marvell: A Critical Anthology (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 
pp. 21–2.
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antirepublican utterances, most of them ascribed either directly or indirectly to 
Jonson. He is, in the "rst place, heard to sing of
… how a double headed Vulture Eats,
Brutus and Cassius the Peoples cheats. (ll. 17–18)
He berates the historian of the Parliament as ‘Malignant Poet and Historian 
both’ (l. 42) on account of his drawing ‘similitude[s]’ (l. 44) between Roman history 
and English, failing to see ‘How ill the measures of these States agree’ (l. 52). As has 
been pointed out,84 it is unfair to May to accuse him of drawing spurious parallels 
between ancient Rome and early modern England. Again, ‘Jonson’ accuses May of 
Apostatizing from our Arts and us,
To turn the Chronicler to Spartacus. (ll. 73–4)
!e reference to Spartacus, the leader of a revolt of slaves against Rome between 73 
and 71 B.C. (and very far from being a "gure of universal contempt, as the pro‐
nouncement of ‘Jonson’ seems to imply) is presumably intended to correspond with 
the generic "gure of a parliamentary leader rather than to an identi"able individual.85
!is evidence of hostility to republicanism has been regarded as being 
di'cult to reconcile with the Cromwellianism of the Ode. James Loxley found ‘stark 
and irreconcilable political di#erences’ between the two poems and concluded that 
Marvell produced such mutually contradictory pronouncements only because he was 
not yet committed to either to royalist or antiroyalist politics: ‘a convincingly Royalist 
poem’, he wrote, ‘can be produced by … someone who is simply trying the mode on 
for size.’86 David Norbrook also judged that the poems could not be interpreted 
univocally, arguing ‘that on the level of speech-acts, his poems of this period simply 
84 See, for example, Gerard Reedy, ‘“An Horatian Ode” and “Tom May’s Death”’, SEL 20 (1980), 
pp. 137–151 (p. 141): ‘"us May explicitly avoids, in his 1627 preface, the kind of Roman analogizing 
to English a.airs that Marvell takes him to task for later.
85 "ough Gerard Reedy, ‘“An Horatian Ode” and “Tom May’s Death”’, p. 147, suggests that the 
person meant is Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, who died in 1646 having attempted, with Denzil 
Holles, to impeach Cromwell in 1644.
86 James Loxley, ‘Prepar’d at Last to Strike in with the Tyde?: Andrew Marvell and Royalist Verse’, 
!e Seventeenth Century 10 (1995), pp. 39–62 (pp. 58, 57).
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do not show consistency: with great force, they make incompatible utterances.’ His 
conclusion is similar to Loxley’s: he suggests that the two poems might be seen as 
‘rival experiments’.87
Previously, some scholars and critics had attempted to remove the inconsist‐
ency by denying that ‘Tom May’s Death’ is Marvell’s. Such a rejection seems to be 
implicit in what, in 1990, Annabel Patterson called her ‘compromise position’, that 
‘Tom May’s Death’ had been included in the posthumous Miscellaneous Poems (1681) 
to disguise from the casual reader the Cromwellian character of that volume.88 
Opponents of the inclusion in Marvell’s oeuvre of the satire on May have been able to 
point to its removal from the so-called Popple manuscript. It was one of three poems 
to have been so deleted, and it now looks doubtful that the other two can have been 
Marvell’s. Although John Klause has suggested that Marvell may have added lines 
40–8 to another poet’s work, it is probable that most of ‘!yrsis and Dorinda’ was 
extant about 1635–1637, which would make it very early for Marvell.89 Elsie 
Duncan-Jones discovered that slightly di#erent manuscript versions of ‘Blake’s 
Victory’ had simultaneously been attributed to Marvell and to Roger Boyle, Earl of 
Orrery. She concluded that it was the work of a young poet who had given copies to 
Marvell, Boyle and Samuel Hartlib, in the hope that one of them would show the 
poem to Cromwell.90 She further speculated, on the basis of their odd positioning in 
87 David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, pp. 244, 280.
88 Annabel Patterson, ‘Miscellaneous Marvell?’, in !e Political Identity of Andrew Marvell, ed. 
Condren and Cousins, pp. 188–212 (p. 203).
89 Klause, !e Unfortunate Fall, p. 185, n. 28; Hilton Kelliher, Andrew Marvell: Poet & Politician 
1621–78 (London: British Library, 1978), pp. 48–9. Nicholas von Maltzahn -nds possible support for 
Marvell’s authorship of the additional lines in his liking for wine, as reported by Aubrey, and his 
association of drinking with death by drowning: Nicholas von Maltzahn, ‘Death by Drowning: 
Marvell’s Lycidas’, Milton Studies 48 (2008), pp. 38–52 (p. 41). Nigel Smith concludes that the 
hypothesis of Marvell’s reworking of an existing poem is ‘neither proven nor disproven with certainty, 
but the hints of M.’s presence are su0cient to keep the poem within the canon’: Poems of Andrew 
Marvell, p. 243.
90 Elsie Duncan-Jones, ‘Marvell, R. F. And the Authorship of “Blake’s Victory”’, English 
Manuscript Studies 1100–1700 5 (1995), pp. 107–26; see also Margarita Stocker and Timothy Raylor, 
‘A New Marvell Manuscript: Cromwellian Patronage and Politics’, English Literary Renaissance 20.1 
(1990) 106–62.
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Miscellaneous Poems that ‘Blake’s Victory’ and ‘!yrsis and Dorinda’ had been 
included in that volume to cover the removal of something that was deemed unpub‐
lishable in 1681. Similar considerations would not explain the inclusion of an 
inauthentic ‘Tom May’s Death’ between ‘!e Picture of Little T. C.’ and ‘!e Match’, 
though it remains to be answered why the May satire is to be found in such company. 
In any case, since Nicholas von Maltzahn persuasively argued that the removal of the 
poem from ‘Popple’ was the work of a Whig editor engaged in the posthumous 
repositioning of Marvell as an impeccable proto-Whig, the ‘Popple’ exclusion of that 
poem has largely ceased to be seen as a good argument against its attribution to 
Marvell.9¹
It is not the aim of this chapter to attempt either to reconcile ‘An Horatian 
Ode upon Cromwel’s Return from Ireland’ and ‘Tom May’s Death’ — though it is 
worth commenting that the reading of the Ode that has been suggested in this 
chapter is compatible with opposition to a republic — or to explain their irreconcil‐
ability, but rather to examine the part played in each of them by the related themes of 
justice and ‘ancient rights’. In the case of the May satire, that involves an attempt to 
tease out the nature of the o#ences with which May is charged and, "nally, the nature 
of the prescribed punishment.
It is notable how little agreement there has been among critics and scholars as 
to the essence of the case being made against May. For Elsie Duncan-Jones, the most 
serious charge against him is that he has fomented civil war, turning the English, 
unwittingly, into Guelphs and Ghibellines.9² In contrast, others, such as Annabel 
91 Nicholas von Maltzahn, ‘Marvell’s Ghost’, in Marvell and Liberty ed. Chernaik and Dzelzainis, 
pp. 50–74 (p. 65). On the reliability of the Popple manuscript for the purposes of attribution, see 
Warren Chernaik, ‘Appendix. Manuscript Evidence for the Canon of Marvell’s Poems’, in !e Poet’s 
Time: Politics and Religion in the Work of Andrew Marvell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), pp. 206–14. Chernaik questions whether the apparent attribution marks in ‘Popple’ are really to 
be taken as such (pp. 208–9).
92 Elsie Duncan-Jones, ‘Marvell: A Great Master of Words’, Warton Lecture on English Poetry, 
1975, Proceedings of the British Academy 61 (1975), pp. 267–90, p. 285. For an alternative gloss on the 
expression ‘as for the basket’, which Duncan-Jones interprets as ‘without our knowledge’, see Andrew 
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Patterson and John Coolidge, see him as someone who has been led, by his misplaced 
reliance on ‘Romane cast similitude’, to write bad history.9³ A case can also be made 
that the targets of the attack in the poem are not so much May’s actions (including his 
writings) as his supposed motives. !is is the charge preferred by Jonson’s ghost, 
when he says:
But the[e] nor Ignorance nor seeming good
Misled, but malice "xt and understood. (ll. 55–6)
May, according to his accuser, knows his behaviour is wrong, but Jonson implicitly 
acknowledges that others on the parliamentary side were more honestly ‘misled’, by 
inadequate knowledge of the facts or — a signi"cant admission — by the apparent 
goodness of the parliamentary cause. As David Norbrook points out, some critics 
who wish to minimize the ideological incompatibility between the Ode and ‘Tom 
May’s Death’ have stressed the extent to which both poems are ‘concerned with moral 
or personal rather than political issues.’94 In the case of the May satire, that would 
mean placing greater emphasis on the alleged ‘malice’ and dishonesty of May’s 
motives, than on his republicanism or his support for one faction or other in the 
parliament. In this way the evident Cromwellianism and possible republicanism of 
the Ode appears to be less starkly at odds with the attack on the republican historian 
— and, incidentally, Marvell may avoid the suspicion that his attack rebounds on his 
own head.95 On this view, Marvell excoriates May, not because of his political 
alignment, but rather because he made a choice analogous to that made by Marvell 
himself but, whereas Marvell made the choice scrupulously and with di'culty, he 
Marvell, !e Complete Poems, revised, ed. Elizabeth Story Donno (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1996), 
pp. 242–3, note to ll. 61–2. Donno suggests that the phrase may be related to ‘basket justices’ and thus 
to the idea of justice for sale.
93 Patterson, ‘Miscellaneous Marvell?’, p. 201; Coolidge, ‘Marvell and Horace’, pp. 112–13.
94 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 272.
95 Anne E. Bertho., !e Resolved Soul: A Study of Marvell’s Major Poems (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), p. 210, suggested that Marvell is so -erce in ‘Tom May’s Death’ because he 
recognizes that ‘a hit is close’. David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 272 points out that 
‘May becomes the whipping-boy for faults which critics are uneasily aware might otherwise be 
imputed to Marvell. "e latter displayed a transcendence of narrow partisanship … the former was a 
despicable traitor.’
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believes that May made it much too easily and without reference to his conscience.
!is reading is at worst (and, as we shall see, probably at best) half-right. 
Marvell does indeed place great emphasis on the badness of May’s motives, suggest‐
ing that the world has been ‘set on &ame’ merely ‘Because a Gazet writer mist his aim’ 
at the laureateship (ll. 59–60). By using Jonson as his spokesman, Marvell is able to 
criticize the hypocritical timeserver without thereby endorsing the attack that Jonson 
must necessarily make on the parliamentary cause. When ‘Jonson’ charges May with 
having turned ‘the Chronicler to Spartacus’ (l. 74), the point is not that Marvell 
believes that Cromwell or Fairfax or any of the parliamentary leaders can be so 
characterized, or even that ‘Jonson’ believes it — though he must do if the charge is to 
have any force. !e real point is that this is what May is supposed to believe. !e 
substance of the charge against May is not that he adhered to the wrong cause, or 
betrayed the right one, but that he betrayed his own conscience.
!e di'culty with this approach is that, while there is no shortage of textual 
evidence to support it, there is further textual evidence, of which it does not take 
account, that the satire in ‘Tom May’s Death’ is directed against republicanism as a 
political principle as well as against this particular ‘base’ republican. In James Loxley’s 
terminology, ‘this is the work which is most deeply structured by the isotopy of 
Royalism’.96 While the use of Jonson as spokesman, as has been suggested, may 
protect the poet from having to voice the poem’s antirepublican sentiments in his 
own persona, the choice of Jonson is not itself a neutral one. Loxley describes Jonson 
as ‘an iconic "gure’ (p. 56) for royalists.97 Norbrook, having noted the distancing 
96 Loxley, ‘Andrew Marvell and Royalist Verse’, p. 56.
97 But see Andrew Shi1ett’s comment that ‘in spite of [Jonson’s] services to James I and Charles 
I, he could be readily interpreted in what Annabel Patterson has termed the “vocabulary” of the Good 
Old Cause’, a conclusion that Shi1ett grounds on Jonson’s admiration for, and use of, Lucan: Andrew 
Shi1ett, Stoicism, Politics, and Literature in the Age of Milton: War and Peace Reconciled (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 125. Shi1ett also writes that Marvell follows ‘one special route 
among many others within the capacious Jonson tradition … [a] quiet protest against the vices of 
arbitrary rule’: Stoicism, Politics, and Literature, p. 118.
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e#ect that the use of this persona allows the poet, and the mild satire at the former 
laureate’s expense, adds:
!e fact that Jonson is chosen at all, however, is heavily weighted in ideologi‐
cal terms, for he had been the poet laureate, and charges of May’s in"delity 
and ingratitude centred on the idea that he had supported Parliament in 
bitterness because he had been turned down in favour of Sir William Dav‐
enant as Jonson’s successor.98
Indeed, Christine Rees argues that, in ‘Tom May’s Death’, ‘Marvell wants to discredit 
classical republicanism in principle’,99 on much the same grounds as Hobbes sought 
to do when he blamed the study of Greek and Roman history for the propensity to 
rebellion, complaining that classical writers ‘make it lawfull, and laudable, for any 
man’ to kill his king, ‘provided, before he do it, he call him Tyrant.’¹00 It is for this 
reason, according to Rees, that Marvell has Jonson describe Brutus and Cassius as 
‘the Peoples cheats’ (l. 18), notwithstanding the fact that Jonson’s Sejanus suggests 
that the author did not dissent from the ‘Republican myth’ that sees Brutus in 
particular as a principled patriot.
In short, if Loxley, Norbrook and Rees, and the majority of critics who have 
seen ‘Tom May’s Death’ as broadly royalist or antirepublican in sympathy, are right, 
the idea has to be abandoned that the principal charge against May is that he es‐
poused a good cause for very bad reasons. !ose very bad reasons are indeed the 
main focus of the satire but, according to the poem, the cause that they led him to 
adhere to was also bad.
If there remains some doubt as to the nature of May’s o#ence, a certain degree 
of ambiguity also attaches to the penalty. !e poem ends with the pronouncement 
and apparent execution of the ‘irrevocable Sentence’ (l. 97) that is passed on May:
98 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 274.
99 Christine Rees, ‘“Tom May’s Death” and Ben Jonson’s Ghost: A Study of Marvell’s Satiric 
Method’, Modern Language Review 71 (1976), pp. 481–8, p. 483.
100 "omas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 226.
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Nor here thy shade must dwell, Return, Return,
Where Sulphrey Phlegeton does ever burn.
!e[e] Cerberus with all his Jawes shall gnash,
Megæra thee with all her Serpents lash.
!ou rivited unto Ixion’s wheel
Shalt break, and the perpetual Vulture feel.
’Tis just what Torments Poets ere did feign,
!ou "rst Historically shouldst sustain. (ll. 89–96)
On the passing of this sentence, May promptly vanishes ‘in a Cloud of pitch’ (l. 99). 
Empson noticed the surprisingly playful tone of these lines: ‘Jolly enough in itself; he 
seems not to believe in any Hell at all.’¹0¹ He is right about the tone, though by 
introducing the possibility of hell, he appears to confound the Christian heaven in 
Elysium: it is ‘Jonson’, not God, who condemns May. !e poem’s conclusion indeed 
expresses scepticism, not as to the possibility of eternal punishment, but rather as to 
that of temporal justice. ‘’Tis just’ that May should be the "rst person historically 
(that is to say, in reality) to undergo the punishments that have previously been the 
subject of poets’ "ctions. !e listing of those torments, followed by the assertion of 
their justice, has the air of a straightforward and exactly calculated retribution. It is, 
however, a retribution that is less than perfect in one respect: it can never be carried 
out. Not only is May’s punishment imposed by the shade of one poet, but the entire 
episode occurs within the lines of a "ction composed by another. However "tting 
these punishments might be, they cannot be removed from the pages of "ction to 
those of history. !e ‘just’ redress of wrongs, in this case at least, remains in the realm 
of the ideal, not the actual.
!e scepticism about the possibility of attaining human justice that is implicit 
in the recognition that, while the poet may be able to "x the ‘just’ and appropriate 
sentence for the wrongdoer, this does nothing to make the execution of that sentence 
more likely, may lead us to view in a slightly di#erent light the poem’s best known 
and most o(en quoted passage, lines 63–70. !ere, it is asserted that ‘the poet’s time’ 
101 William Empson, Using Biography (Chatto & Windus, 1984), p. 38.
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— when the poet can best perform his or her function and do most good — is when 
the judge is threatened with violence and the churchman has been intimidated into 
silence. It is the judge’s role to adjudicate impartially on questions of right and 
entitlement, so the sword that glitters over his head threatens the very existence of 
justice. !e churchman should be able to speak the truth and, in particular, to 
distinguish good from evil; if he is ‘silenced’ (l. 64) then the truth is not being spoken 
and the distinction not being made. In these circumstances, it is le( to the poet to 
"ght ‘forsaken Vertues cause’, but with the important quali"cation that he is expected 
to do so ‘single’ (l. 66) and unaided. In such a "ght, the only victories that may 
reasonably be expected are moral ones.
So, while the passage may be ‘wonderfully public’ and a ringing call to the 
performance of a duty, it is emphatically not one that predicts that the poet’s actions 
will be e#ective to remedy the injustice that is castigated. !e ‘successful 
Crimes’ (l. 70) may be arraigned but that is not to say that they will be undone, or the 
o#ender punished. If good remains ‘wretched’, in spite of having been sought out and 
identi"ed by the poet, then the poet may well see his or her task as a thankless one. 
!at is not necessarily to say that what the poem has to say about the poet’s role in 
relation to justice is a counsel of despair. Marvell is far from suggesting that the poet 
should be deterred by the unlikelihood of success from the arraignment of ‘successful 
Crimes’ but it is clear that the poet who would "ll the role that Marvell prescribes 
must be willing to persist in the defence of ‘forsaken Vertues cause’ without the 
reward of seeing his or her e#orts come to fruition. !e poet may, and ought to, give 
things their proper names — say that this act, though successful, is a crime or that 
here good is wretched. He or she may, or ought to, go further than this and say that 
‘’Tis just’ that the crime should be punished in one way or that the condition of good 
should be alleviated in another. He or she cannot go further still, however, and see 
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that what is just is actually carried out.
Judgment and balance
If the interpretation of the ‘Horatian Ode’ that has been advanced earlier is correct, it 
becomes possible to see the two poems not as ‘incompatible utterances’ which exhibit 
‘stark and irreconcilable political di#erences’, but rather as companion pieces. If the 
Ode makes use of Lucan’s and May’s un&attering portrayal of Julius Cæsar in order to 
dissuade Cromwell from crossing an English or Welsh Rubicon, then the possibility 
arises that the grounds for objection to an Emperor Cromwell are republican. Cæsar, 
a(er all, would have replaced a republic with an empire, and it was for this reason 
that Lucan so objected to him. For Marvell, however, if ‘every Similitude must have, 
though not all, yet some likeness’,102 the converse is also true: the Roman and the 
English situations, though exhibiting certain resemblances, were not identical, and it 
would be a mistake to draw more parallels between them than were warranted. !e 
most likely explanation of the May poem, then, is that it was written in order to make 
it clear (perhaps, in the "rst place, to the poet himself) that it was possible to employ 
Lucan in order to make a case against imperial government by Cromwell, without 
necessarily embracing the republicanism of Lucan and his translator. !e preferable 
alternative to an autocratic Cromwell was not, according to these poems taken 
together, an English republic, but rather a country in which the ‘ancient rights’ of 
king and subject alike were respected and vindicated.
However, one point remains to be dealt with: if, as ‘Tom May’s Death’ seems 
to indicate, Marvell was opposed to republicanism, then his use of the republican 
discourse of Lucan and May in the ‘Horatian Ode’ surely requires some explanation. 
One possibility is that he chose to use this language because he expected it to carry 
102 Andrew Marvell, !e Rehearsal Transpros’d, ed. Martin Dzelzainis and Annabel Patterson, 
!e Prose Works of Andrew Marvell, ed. Annabel Patterson and others (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003) I, 117.
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some weight with his intended readership. It has been suggested above that the Ode 
demonstrates to Cromwell that a government under his leadership could enjoy only 
so much legitimacy as a Julius Cæsar. At the same time, the allusions to Lucan serve 
to remind the reader that that is not a legitimacy that would be recognized by repub‐
licans, hence reinforcing the poem’s argument against the assumption of power by 
Cromwell.¹0³ It will be remembered that Derek Hirst has suggested that, in !e First 
Anniversary, Marvell was to adopt the language of millenarians because it was a 
language that Cromwell had shown himself to be prepared to listen to, and ‘Oliver 
was notoriously vulnerable to voices sounding on his conscience.’¹04 A reading of ‘An 
Horatian Ode’ in the light of ‘Tom May’s Death’ may suggest that Marvell had 
employed a similar tactic some four years previously, and with the aim of in&uencing 
the same powerful man. If, in 1650, Cromwell really had been contemplating a march 
on London, as many suspected, a republican voice would indeed have been an 
appropriate one to sound on his conscience.
On this reading, the Ode "nally does appear to be ‘balanced’ a(er all, though 
not in the sense of tentatively suspending judgment, or being indecisively poised 
between several con&icting principles, proclaiming Quo me uertam nescio. It is 
balanced between di#erent claims, di#erent sets of ‘ancient rights’, which may come 
into con&ict with each other but which ultimately need to be reconciled: those of the 
king on the one hand and of the people on the other.
103 For the importance of Lucan to English republicans, see Norbrook, Writing the English 
Republic, especially chapter 1.
104 Hirst, ‘Marvell’s Cromwell in 1654’, p. 45.
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Chapter 2. Grotian concepts of justice in ‘!e 
Character of Holland’ and !e last Instructions to a 
Painter
Natural law, ius gentium and the ownership of the sea
Although it was not printed until 1665 and, as is quite usual with Marvell’s poems, 
there is no record of scribal publication, it is evident that ‘!e Character of Holland’ 
was written early in the "rst Anglo-Dutch war. !e Oxford edition puts it ‘probably 
… a#er the English victory over the Dutch $eet o% Portland, 18–20 February 1653’ 
while, consistently with that, David Norbrook says that it was ‘probably written to 
commemorate a day of thanksgiving on April 12, 1653’.1 Lines 107–17 make refer‐
ence to the incident that opened hostilities, the refusal of the Dutch Admiral Van 
Tromp to lower his $ag by way of salute to the English Admiral Blake, while ll. 143–4 
make it clear that peace has not yet been concluded. In other words, this is a satire 
directed against a hostile power during wartime, a fact that requires emphasis for 
three reasons. First, many critics have found in the poem a jingoistic or xenophobic 
tone which they think unworthy of Marvell. A very clear expression of this view can 
be found in the work of Annabel Patterson, who has described the poem’s mood as 
one of ‘unabashed jingoism’, adding that ‘it exhibits the lowest forms of the kind of 
insult that is based on stereotypes of national character.’2
!e second reason for stressing the fact that this poem was written during a 
war is that a case can be made that, notwithstanding the demeaning references and 
the bad puns, the primary and apparently serious purpose of the poem is to advance 
1 Poems and Letters, I, 309; David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric and 
Politics, 1627–1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 296.
2 Annabel Patterson, Marvell: !e Writer in Public Life (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 2000), pp. 73–
4.
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the argument that England has just cause for prosecuting the war against the United 
Provinces. !ird and "nally, Marvell wrote at least one poem during the second 
Anglo-Dutch war in which he appears to adopt quite a di%erent view of the relative 
justice of the belligerents’ causes. !e better our understanding of the earlier poem 
the more likely we are to see what Marvell was doing in the poem or poems of 1666 
and 1667, and how his views, both on the justice of war and on the rights of England, 
may have changed between the beginning of the "rst war and the end of the second. 
!is "rst part of this chapter will be mainly concerned with the second of these 
reasons; !e last Instructions to a Painter will be discussed in the second part.
While much of the poem’s language is riddling and in need of considerable 
explication,3 it contains two references that could hardly be clearer, in lines 26 and 
113 respectively. !ey are to two works by the Dutch author Hugo Grotius (Huig de 
Groot): Mare liberum (1609) and De iure belli ac pacis (1625). In the context of the 
war between England and the United Provinces, to mention the "rst of these works 
was implicitly to refer to the most comprehensive response to it, Mare clausum (1635) 
by the English jurist, John Selden. !e con$ict between the doctrines of the free or 
open sea and of the enclosed or appropriated one had been a cause of dispute 
between the two countries since the reign of James I of England. Marchamont 
Nedham’s English translation of Selden’s work had been published the previous year, 
under the title Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea (1652),4 so the con$ict 
between the two terms was a topical one at the time of Marvell’s writing the poem. 
Similarities of theme and argument indicate that this satire was participating in the 
same controversy as was Nedham’s translation of Selden’s treatise.
3 In a number of places, Marvell plays on Dutch terms. Richard Todd, for example, argues that 
the most signi'cant sense of the pun on ‘Half-anders’ (l. 53) has been missed: Richard Todd, 
‘Equilibrium and National Stereotyping in “!e Character of Holland”’, in On the Celebrated and 
Neglected Poems of Andrew Marvell, ed. Claude J. Summers and Ted-Larry Pebworth (Colombia and 
London: University of Missouri Press, 1992), pp. 169–191, at 190–91.
4 John Selden, Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea, trans. Marchamont Nedham, 
(London: William Dugard, 1652).
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In both of the works that Marvell speci"cally mentions, Grotius had argued 
that, with some very limited exceptions, it was not possible for individuals or peoples 
to own part of the sea.5 Selden’s response takes the form of two books, whose 
respective purposes are summarized with admirable clarity in the work’s subtitle:
In the First is shew’d, that the Sea, by the Law of Nature, or Nations is not 
common to all men, but capable of Private Dominion or Proprietie, as well as 
the Land
In the Second is proved, that the Dominion of the British Sea, or that which 
incompasseth the Isle of Great Britain, is, and ever hath been, a Part, or 
Appendant, of the Empire of that Island.6
!e di%erence between Grotius and Selden is founded on their di%erent conceptions 
of the ius gentium or law of nations.
!e discussion presented here is tangential to, and avoids dealing directly 
with, recent controversies as to Grotius’s and Selden’s roles in the development of, in 
the "rst place, international law and, in the second, radical and ‘minimalist’ seven‐
teenth-century theories of natural law and natural rights. As for the "rst of these 
controversies, Grotius used to be known as ‘the father of international law’ but his 
paternity of that discipline has been doubted at least since 1874, when !omas 
E. Holland delivered his lecture on Grotius’s debt to Alberico Gentili, the author of 
De iure belli (1598).7 Peter Haggenmacher, in his Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre 
juste, argues that Grotius did not wish to produce a general survey of natural law, still 
less a work on international law, but in essence a treatise, comparable to that of 
Gentili, on the law of war or ius belli, a topic with its origins in the twel#h century.8 
5 Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis libri tres (Paris: Nicolaus Buon, 1625) II.III.IX–XII; Hugo 
Grotius, !e Rights of War and Peace, ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005) pp. 460–6. 
!e latter is based on the 1738 translation into English, largely by John Morrice, of Barbeyrac’s French 
edition, Hugo Grotius, Le droit de la guerre et de la paix, trans. Jean Barbeyrac (Amsterdam: Pierre de 
Coup, 1729).
6 Selden, Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea, title page.
7 On Holland’s lecture, see Peter Haggenmacher, ‘Grotius and Gentili: A Reassessment of 
!omas E. Holland’s Inaugural Lecture’, in Hugo Grotius and International Relations, Hedley Bull, 
Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 133–176.
8 Peter Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
Français, 1983), p. 8.
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In Haggenmacher’s view, De iure belli ac pacis libri tres consists of three books on the 
law of war (the ius pacis indicating, not the law of peace in general, but only the law 
relating to the making of peace). In the "rst book Grotius asks whether war can ever 
be lawful and answers that it can; in the second, he discusses the just causes of war; 
and in the third, he examines the kinds of action that are permissible during war.
Richard Tuck, in contrast to Haggenmacher, is particularly interested in 
Grotius’s role in the development of political theories of natural rights, a story, as he 
later puts it, which had !omas Hobbes as its central character.9 Although Tuck pays 
particular attention to natural rights, he sees them as a feature — for him, the central 
feature — of Grotius’s theory of natural law.10 In Natural Rights !eories, he discusses 
Hobbes’s objection to the equation of ius with lex. For Hobbes, ius means ‘right’, 
whereas lex or ‘law’ signi"es a restraint on what people would otherwise be entitled to 
do.11 Rights, in this view, are not given by law but are circumscribed by it. !e same 
distinction was made by Dudley Digges, and Tuck ascribes similar views to Selden.12
Grotius has a di%erent view from Hobbes’s and Digges’s on the relationship of 
ius to lex. In De iure belli ac pacis, he says that ius has three distinct — though related 
— senses: "rst, ‘that which may be done without Injustice’, second, ‘a moral Quality 
annexed to the Person, enabling him to have, or to do, something justly’ and, third, 
equivalent to lex ‘taken in its largest Extent, as being a Rule of Moral Actions, obliging 
9 Richard Tuck, !e Rights of War and Peace: Political !ought and the International Order from 
Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 12. His history of natural rights theories is 
in Richard Tuck, Natural Rights !eories: !eir Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979).
10 ‘Rights have come to usurp the whole of natural law theory, for the law of nature is simply, 
respect one another’s rights’: Tuck, Natural Rights !eories, p. 67, describing Grotius, Introduction to 
the Jurisprudence of Holland.
11 !omas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 200, discussed in Tuck, Natural Rights !eories, p. 120.
12 Dudley Digges, !e Unlawfulnesse of Subjects, Taking up Armes against their Soveraigne (1644) 
sig. B3v, cited in Tuck, Natural Rights !eories, pp. 102–03. For the ascription to Selden of the theory 
that there was a time of complete freedom before the divine law became known to humankind see 
Natural Rights !eories, p. 93. According to Sommerville, Selden’s ideas on this point were much more 
conventional than Tuck takes them to be: J. P. Sommerville, ‘John Selden, the Law of Nature, and the 
Origins of Government’ Historical Journal 27 (1984) 437–47.
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us to that which is good and commendable.’13 Haggenmacher explains that, in the 
third meaning, Grotius equates ius with lex in the widest sense of the latter term, 
encompassing all rules that impose obligations, not only in relation to justice but to 
other virtues as well.14 It is clear that, in expressions such as ius gentium, ius naturale 
and ius belli, Grotius is using the term in this third sense, as the next paragraph 
begins by stating that ius naturale ‘is the Rule and Dictate of Right Reason, shewing the 
Moral Deformity or Moral Necessity there is in any Act, according to its Suitableness or 
Unsuitableness to a reasonable Nature’.15
In his Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651, Tuck summarizes Grotius’s 
general theory of natural law, which he describes as ‘minimalist’.16 On this view, for 
Grotius, the natural law consists only of those fundamental precepts which are 
evident to all human beings by virtue of our rational nature (‘Preliminary Discourse’, 
VIII, Rights, pp. 86–7).17 Such precepts are binding on all people, including those 
who have a wholly erroneous, or no, idea of God (‘Preliminary Discourse’, XI, Rights, 
pp. 89–90). Grotius, in line with the third of his stated methodological aims, that of 
distinguishing plainly between things which might seem to be the same but are not 
(‘Preliminary Discourse’, LVII; Rights, p. 131), posited a sharp distinction between 
the natural law (ius naturale) and the law of nations (ius gentium).
!e former has no human-made content, but was already in existence when 
13 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, I.I.III–IX (Rights, pp. 136–48). !e second sense is ‘a right’ as 
the term is now generally used, as in rights of property ownership, for example. Grotius’s discussion of 
the second sense is longer and more complex than that of either of the other two.
14 Haggenmacher, Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste, p. 465: ‘Dans sa troisième acceptation, 
ius devient synonyme de lex, ce mot étant pris ici dans un sens large, non technique, incluant toute 
règle obligatoire au point de vue non seulement de la justice, mais également d’autres vertus: raison 
pour laquelle Grotius préfère designer l’objet de ces normes comme rectum plutôt que simplement 
comme iustum, terminologie cicéronienne rappelant en meme temps l’idée aristotélicienne de la 
justice en tant que vertu générale.’
15 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, I.I.X (Rights, pp. 150–1).
16 See, in particular, Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572–1651 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 196–99, where he outlines Grotius’s ‘general theory of natural 
law’. For his characterization of the theory as ‘minimalist’, see Tuck, !e Rights of War and Peace, 
pp. 5–6.
17 See also ‘Preliminary Discourse’, XL (Rights, pp. 110–11) on how the content of the natural law 
is to be determined.
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humans entered the world. Whether its binding force as a law results from God’s 
command (this was Selden’s view18), or from the fact that, in the nature of things, it 
could not be otherwise, is not is not a question to which he gives a clear answer.19 In 
De iure belli ac pacis, Grotius scrutinizes the relationship between these two di%erent 
categories of law and argues that the law of war results from their interaction. In 
doing so, he touches on the origins and sources of the law of nations as something 
distinct from natural law. It is from this that the old idea of Grotius as ‘the father of 
international law’ developed. In contrast, Gentili, according to Haggenmacher, 
‘deliberately identi"es jus gentium with jus naturale, both being in turn an expression 
of divine will’.20
!e idea that Grotius was advancing a radically new and minimalist concep‐
tion of natural law has been dismissed by Johann P. Sommerville, who points out that 
what Grotius has to say on the subject of natural rights is substantially the same as 
what had already been said by scholastic thinkers such as Suarez and, indeed, by 
Aquinas himself. According to Sommerville:
Suárez, for example, talked of natural law as obvious "rst principles of nature 
and reason, and precepts drawn from them by ‘evident necessity.’ Like Suárez 
and others, Grotius held that the laws of nature were deducible from a few 
principles, but he did not argue that the conclusions which could be drawn 
from those principles were minimal in number …21
18 See Sommerville, ‘John Selden, the Law of Nature, and the Origins of Government’, pp. 442–3, 
and below, p. 80.
19 As Tuck points out, in the early work which was 'nally published as De iure praedae (1864), 
Grotius treated all laws as arising from the will of an agent: Richard Tuck, ‘Grotius and Selden’, in !e 
Cambridge History of Political !ought 1450–1700, pp. 499–529 (pp. 505–6). On the other hand, in De 
iure belli I.I.XVI, Grotius wrote: ‘… all Obligation beyond that, arising from the Law of Nature, is 
derived from the Will of the Lawgiver …’ (Rights, p. 174; emphasis added). We may conclude that the 
opinions of Grotius and Selden slightly diverged on this point. Whereas Grotius’s believed it was 
clearly the divine will that humans should be bound by the natural law, he did not think it a condition 
of the law’s e.cacy that that will should be manifested by a command.
20 Haggenmacher, ‘Grotius and Gentili’, p. 170.
21 Johann P. Sommerville, ‘Selden, Grotius, and the Seventeenth-Century Intellectual Revolution 
in Moral and Political !eory’, in Rhetoric and Law in Early Modern Europe ed. Victoria Kahn and 
Lorna Hutson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 318–43, at. p. 333. By separating the law 
of nations from that of nature, Grotius necessarily reduced the number of precepts contained in the 
latter, while in no way diminishing its importance. He made it clear that the law of nations depends on 
the law of nature: see below, n. 31.
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Whether Sommerville’s criticisms of the view that Grotius was putting forward a 
minimalist theory of natural law are justi"ed is a question beyond the scope of this 
thesis. It is enough for present purposes to comment that it is not surprising that 
Grotius has rightly or wrongly been taken to be restricting the ambit of natural law, 
since the thrust of his argument is o#en that particular aspects of the law belong, not 
to the law of nature (as had previously been claimed), but to the law of nations.22 !e 
principal example of this procedure is his discussion of the institution of private 
property, about which more is said below. Sommerville, following his opponents’ 
lead, treats Grotius’s theory of the law of nature in isolation, without paying attention 
to its relationship to the law of nations.
Before Grotius, this relationship had generally received little attention, 
perhaps because its two elements tended to be of interest to two di%erent kinds of 
thinker. !e law of nature was primarily the province of scholastics and theologians, 
while for the most part the ius gentium had the attention of lawyers and jurists. 
According to Richard Tuck:
By virtue of their intellectual origins, humanist lawyers found it virtually 
impossible to talk about natural rights, and extremely di(cult to talk about 
rights tout court. What was important to them was not natural law but 
humanly constructed law; not natural rights but civil remedies.23
Grotius approaches a description of the law of nations more systematically than any 
of his predecessors and most of his contemporaries. In at least one respect, however, 
his de"nition of the law of nations is ambiguous, and it is with this aspect of his 
thought that Selden’s Mare clausum is most clearly at odds.
Grotius describes the law of nations as deriving its authority and force from 
22 It might be added that his enumeration of the principles of natural law, while clearly not 
exhaustive, has every appearance of minimalism: ‘the Fountain of Right, properly so called; to which 
belongs the Abstaining from that which is another’s, and the Restitution of what we have of another’s, 
or of the pro't we have made by it, the Obligation of ful'lling Promises, the Reparation of a Damage 
done through our own Default, and the Merit of Punishment among Men’: ‘Preliminary Discourse’, 
VIII (Rights, p. 86).
23 Tuck, Natural Rights !eories, p. 33.
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the will of all, or at least of many nations. He added the quali"cation ‘of many’, he 
says, because, apart from the natural law (which, he admits, is sometimes called the 
law of nations) there is hardly any law which is common to all nations (I.I.XIV, 
Rights, p. 163). He acknowledges that what is accepted as being the law of nations 
di%ers from one part of the world to another. In spite of this acknowledgment, 
Grotius continues to speak in general of the law of nations as if it were a coherent and 
unitary body of universally binding law.24 Selden’s treatment of the law of nations in 
Mare clausum is formally very di%erent from this, however similar the two approach‐
es may be in substance. Where Grotius admits that there is ‘scarcely any’ human-
made law which is common to all nations, Selden is quite sure that there is none. For 
him, there are two di%erent categories of law which go by the description ‘the law of 
nations’. First, there is the Ius Gentium Primaevum, a phrase that Nedham translates 
as ‘the Primitive Law of Nations’ (I.III; p. 16). !is is binding on all nations, but it has 
no human-made content, and consists exclusively of those precepts which ‘are 
manifested by the light of nature or the use of right reason’ and those ‘declared and 
set down in those Divine Oracles that have been committed to writing’ (I.III p. 13).25 
For Grotius, this category of law is not part of the law of nations at all but consists of 
the natural law, probably with some elements of divine positive law included. Selden, 
on the other hand, does not "nd it necessary to distinguish between natural law and 
divine positive law. !is is unsurprising, given that he believes that all such law is 
‘law’ only because of God’s command and not because of any rational necessity. For 
24 It was because of Grotius’s insistence that the law of nations consisted of human-made positive 
law that he was to become so important to practitioners of public international law. Laws that came 
into existence by agreement between nations could be amended or augmented by the same means.
25 Selden’s classi'cation of the various kinds of law that create obligations and rights in peoples 
and individuals (I.III, pp. 12–16) is much more complex (and less ostensibly systematic) than that of 
Grotius. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to provide a full account of Selden’s ‘system’ in all its 
complexity and the discussion here has been restricted to those elements that give rise to property 
rights. In the case of Grotius, it is arguable that the fundamental distinction is between the natural law 
and law that derives its force from the will of a human or divine lawmaker. For Selden, the 
fundamental distinction, as regards the law of nations, is between law that is universally binding and 
law that is not, the 'rst of these categories containing both the natural law and other laws resulting 
equally from the divine will, but nothing else.
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Selden, ‘the light of nature [and] the use of right reason’ enable us to determine what 
the law is; but they do not give it its force as law. In short, Selden sees all law as 
voluntary law, that is, law based on the will of a lawmaker; this is why the system 
outlined in Mare clausum, unlike that of Grotius, does not make a distinction 
between natural law and law of nations.26
According to that system, in addition to the primary law of nations, there is 
also a secondary law of nations, which Selden prefers to call ‘intervenient’, because it 
arises from ‘Compact or Custom’, which, he says, intervene between nations, and its 
subject-matter includes ‘proclaiming War, Ambassie, Prisoners of War, Hostages, Right, 
Remitter upon return from Captivitie, Leagues and Covenants, Commerce …’ (I.III 
p. 15).27 !e basic di%erence between Grotius and Selden on this point is that the 
former appears to see the law of nations (which by his de"nition is human positive 
law) as universally binding, whereas the latter places the human positive law of 
nations (in his terms, the intervenient or secondary law of nations) in the category of 
laws which are binding only locally and contingently. !is di%erence between them 
has important consequences for their views on the origin and nature of private 
property rights, and in particular the question whether it is possible for such rights to 
subsist in the sea.
!e second of Grotius’s three books on the law of war has received more 
attention than the other two, probably because of its relative length — it takes up 
about half of the work as a whole — and its central position. It deals with the just 
26 Selden adhered to this categorization in his later work, De iure naturali et gentium iuxta 
disciplinam Ebraeorum (1640), about which Tuck writes: ‘the strong distinction between natural law 
and divine voluntary law, upon which Grotius set such store, was, of course, utterly obliterated and 
divine voluntary law reinstated as the source of natural law, though with the important proviso that 
only when God spoke universally to men did he lay down laws of nature’: Tuck, ‘Grotius and Selden’, 
p. 527. See also the paraphrase of Selden’s views on natural law in De iure naturali et gentium provided 
by Jason P. Rosenblatt, Renaissance England’s Chief Rabbi: John Selden (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), p. 161: ‘Natural law consists not of innate rational principles that are intuitively obvious 
but rather of speci'c divine pronouncements uttered by God at a point in historical time.’
27 From this it will be seen that, as well as the divine or natural law binding on all nations, Selden 
also recognizes a divine law binding only on part or parts of humankind.
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causes of war. In Grotius’s scheme, a just cause is always either the punishment or the 
redress of a legal wrong (iniuria), though it is not always the case that the party 
waging the war must necessarily be the one whose rights have been infringed.28 He 
says that three causes of war are generally cited: "rst, defence against the threat of 
injury; second, recovery of property or of a debt (which can arise from an injury 
already su%ered); and, third, punishment (II.I.II, Rights, pp. 393–6) It is clear that 
rights of property "gure prominently in at least the "rst two of these categories of just 
cause, and Grotius immediately goes on to consider the nature and origin of property 
rights. According to him, private ownership has its origins, not in natural law, but in 
the law of nations.
By the natural law, the "rst humans shared a common dominion over all 
things of an inferior nature, by which each could take or consume whatever he or she 
wished, so long as nobody else had taken it "rst. In time, they came to regard this 
common ownership as an inconvenience. At this point, according to Grotius, it must 
be supposed that there was either an express agreement that there should be a 
division of property or a tacit understanding that what each had already taken 
possession of should in future be treated as that person’s exclusive property (II.II.II, 
Rights, pp. 426–7). He straight away excludes the sea from the ambit of this agree‐
ment or understanding (II.II.III, Rights, pp. 428–32), repeating in a modi"ed form 
the main arguments that he had used in Mare liberum. It is his second argument that 
is most relevant for present purposes. According to him, the seas, which are un‐
bounded and incapable of being divided, cannot therefore be appropriated or taken 
into possession. Once the original division of the land had occurred, he argues, the 
only way that previously unoccupied land could be appropriated was by right of "rst 
occupation. He assumes that, at the time of that "rst division, most of the sea was still 
28 ‘Causa iusta belli suscipiendi nulla esse alia potest, nisi iniuria’; ‘!ere is no other reasonable 
[i.e. just] Cause of making War, but an Injury received’: Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, II.I.I (Rights, 
p. 393).
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unknown, and therefore could not have been included in it (II.II.III, Rights, pp. 431–
2). No one could subsequently establish a title to the sea, or to any unenclosed part of 
it, by right of "rst occupation, for the simple reason that no one was capable of 
occupying it (II.II.III, Rights, p. 430). !erefore, it was impossible that the sea could 
have been appropriated.
Selden is prepared to presume the existence of some such compact or agree‐
ment as Grotius posits. He proceeds from his classi"cation of the various types of law 
which might govern the dominion or dominium of the sea to a discussion of the idea 
of dominium itself, which he de"nes as the right of use, enjoyment, alienation and 
free disposing. He states that dominion is ‘either Common to all men as Possessors 
without Distinction, or Private and peculiar onely to som’ (I.IV, p. 16). Of the two 
kinds of ownership, common and private, he says that neither is forbidden or 
prescribed by the law of nature or by the divine law of nations, but both are permitted 
(p. 20); and he concludes that, if it is so that the world was the common property of 
humankind in the beginning, then there must have been some kind of general 
compact to introduce private ownership:
Nor can it otherwise bee conceived in the case of Partners or Co-heirs (such 
as all men seem to have been in the State of Communitie) how those things 
which com not under division, should not continue common as before. 
!erefore (I suppose) it must be yielded, that som such Compact or Covenant 
was passed in the very "rst beginnings of private Dominion or possession, 
and that it was in full force and virtue transmitted to posteritie by the Fathers, 
who had the power of distributing possessions a#er the $ood, So that wee 
may conclude no less concerning distribution by Assignment, then touching 
Seisure by occupation of things relinquisht at pleasure, that a general compact 
or Agreement was made or rati"ed, either expressly in words, or implicitly by 
custom.29
In support of this proposition, he cites De iure belli ac pacis, II.II.II, apparently with 
approval. However, he adds that even if it is accepted that the sea was excluded from 
the original distribution of territories, title to it could nevertheless be acquired 
29 Selden, Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea I.IV, p. 23.
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a#erwards by occupation and possession, in the same way as it is acquired to vacant 
or abandoned lands. !ere is nothing in either the divine or the permissive natural 
law to forbid this (Book I, chapters VI to VIII).
Although the two authors were at odds over the universality of the law of 
nations, they were largely in agreement as to how its content was to be ascertained: 
Grotius had said that this was to be done by an examination of custom or long use, 
and the testimony of legal experts (De iure belli ac pacis, I.I.XIV, Rights, p. 163). 
Using just such a method, Selden proceeds to a detailed examination of claims to sea-
dominion throughout history, from the Greeks and other ancient peoples, to the 
modern Venetians, Genoese, Spaniards and Portuguese and Baltic countries, and he 
concludes:
… nothing now, I suppose, hinder’s why wee may not determine, that the Sea 
is capable of Dominion as well as the Land, not only by the Law Natural-
Permissive, but also by the Law both Civil and Common of divers Nations, and 
in many places almost according to the Intervenient Law (which in cases of 
this nature is the surest demonstration of the Natural-Permissive) …30
!e di%erences between Grotius and Selden on the ownership of the sea are symp‐
tomatic of their di%erent approaches to the nature and origins of law. Grotius sees the 
natural law and the law of nations as entirely di%erent, though complementary, 
categories. Speci"cally, without the natural law requirement that people should be 
bound by their agreements, the law of nations, which has its origins precisely in the 
agreement of peoples, could not have become binding.31 Selden, who is much less 
concerned to show that the law of nations can be traced back to a solid foundation, 
treats the natural law as part of the law of nations. In this, he shows something of the 
unease with the idea of natural law that Tuck ascribes to the humanist lawyers. As 
30 Selden, Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea I.XIX p. 122.
31 Grotius, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, XVI (Rights, p. 93): ‘since the ful'lling of Covenants belongs 
to the Law of Nature … from this very Foundation Civil Laws were derived.’ But not only civil laws in 
the sense of municipal laws: ‘amongst all or most States there might be, and in Fact there are, some 
Laws agreed on by common Consent, which respect the advantage not of one Body in particular, but 
of all in general. And this is what is called the Nations …’, ‘Preliminary Discourse’, XVIII (Rights, 
p. 94).
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well as being an antiquarian researcher and parliamentarian,32 Selden was a practis‐
ing lawyer and successful advocate; Grotius, though he too practised at the bar and 
was appointed as Advocaat Fiscaal of the States of Holland, was primarily a political 
theorist. It has even been doubted that his formal education had a legal character,33 
though the likelihood is that, while his studies were predominantly humanist, he also 
studied law.34
Although Grotius considers historical examples, he is essentially an a priori 
thinker.35 He is happy to discuss a state of nature of which there is obviously no 
historical record, and to deduce the existence of a primitive (but universal) agreement 
as to the institution of private property. His concession that there is ‘hardly any’ 
universal law reveals a certain amount of discomfort: for the ius gentium to be truly a 
law, giving rise to rights that are good against all the world, and not just against the 
other parties to particular treaties, it would need the assent of the ancestors of all of 
modern humanity: hence Grotius’s unwillingness to extend his concession and admit 
that there is no law whose existence is recognized by all peoples. If there are modern 
countries who do not observe the ius gentium as it is generally understood, this may 
be the result of degeneration over time, rather than evidence that there never was a 
32 For the extraordinary breadth and depth of Selden’s interests, see generally David Sandler 
Berkowitz, John Selden’s Formative Years: Politics and Society in Early Seventeenth-Century England 
(Washington D.C.: Folger, 1988), Paul Christianson, Discourse on History, Law, and Governance in the 
Public Career of John Selden, 1610–1635, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) and Rosenblatt, 
Renaissance England’s Chief Rabbi: John Selden.
33 C. G. Roelofsen, ‘Grotius and the International Politics of the Seventeenth Century’, in Hugo 
Grotius and International Relations, ed. Bull, Kingsbury and Roberts, pp. 95–131 (p. 100). Roelofsen 
suggests (n. 23) that he might have been ‘a self-taught lawyer’.
34 According to Waszink’s edition, he graduated in law at Orleans, France: Hugo Grotius, !e 
Antiquity of the Batavian Republic, ed. and trans. Jan Waszink and others (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2000) 
p. 11.
35 Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis I.I.XII (Rights, p. 159): ‘Now that any !ing is or is not by the 
Law of Nature, is generally proved either a priori, that is, by Arguments drawn from the very Nature of 
the !ing; or a posteriori, that is, by Reasons taken from something external. !e former Way of 
Reasoning is more subtle and abstracted; the latter more popular. !e Proof by the former is by 
shewing the necessary Fitness or Un'tness of any !ing, with a reasonable and sociable Nature. But 
the Proof by the latter is, when we cannot with absolute Certainty, yet with great Probability, conclude 
that to be by the Law of Nature, which is generally believed to be so by all, or at least, the most 
civilized, Nations. For, an universal E/ect requires an universal Cause.’
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universal agreement in the "rst place.
Selden’s discomfort, in contrast, is with the idea of inferring the existence of 
this primitive agreement for which there is no direct historical evidence. So, he 
accepts only grudgingly Grotius’s argument that the existence of such an agreement 
must be presumed. Because he is sceptical of the existence of universal agreements he 
appears happy to treat merely bilateral or trilateral agreements as evidence of 
ownership (that is to say, of rights good against all the world) though in principle such 
agreements are incapable of imposing obligations on those who are not parties to 
them. So, he argues that ‘both the Phoenicians and Cilicians had dominion over the 
Romanes Sea, as appear’s by the League made betwixt them and Antiochus King of 
Syria …’36
‘Just Propriety’
Selden’s book was published in Latin in 1635. Charles I ordered that it should be 
enrolled in both the Exchequer and Admiralty Courts.37 It was cited, though not 
extensively, by counsel and some of the judges in the ship-money case, Rex v. 
Hampden (1637), in which most of the majority judges found it possible to decide the 
issues without explicit reference to it.38 !e book was made accessible to a wider 
readership in 1652, with the publication of Marchamont Nedham’s English transla‐
tion, dedicated to the Parliament of England. Sir John Boroughs’ !e Sovereignty of 
the British Seas, which had been completed in 1633, and had been helpful to Charles I 
in the dra#ing of the ship-money writs, had received its "rst publication in the 
36 Selden, Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea I.XIV p. 77. Selden is apparently treating 
this ‘League’ as evidence of dominion rather than as constitutive of it but, in that case, the origin of the 
dominion remains unexplained.
37 !omas Wemyss Fulton, !e Sovereignty of the Sea: An Historical Account of the Claims of 
England to the Dominion of the British Seas, and of the Evolution of the Territorial Waters: with special 
reference to the Rights of Fishing and the Naval Salute (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood 
and Sons, 1911), p. 369.
38 At least one of the judges who cited Mare clausum with approval (the case contains no 
disapproving references to the work) gave his opinion against the king. See chapter 4 below for a brief 
discussion of the judgment of Chief Baron Davenport.
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previous year.39 Clearly, the parliament did not wish to leave any room for doubt that 
claims to English dominion of the sea had survived the ‘late Tyrant’. !is show of 
intellectual force was not e%ective, however, to deter Van Tromp from refusing to 
salute Blake, and so starting the war. Steven Pincus has argued strongly that the 
parliament misunderstood the nature of the con$ict and that, at least as far as Van 
Tromp and the Dutch Admiralty were concerned, their action was not a denial of 
English rights.40
!is is the context in which Andrew Marvell wrote his poem, ‘!e Character 
of Holland’. !e satire consists of "#een verse paragraphs of which the eleventh and 
twel#h contain the main substance of Marvell’s charge, that England has just cause 
for prosecuting a war against the United Provinces. In the eleventh verse paragraph, 
the reader encounters a signi"cant phrase Marvell’s previous use of which has been 
discussed in chapter 1. When the phrase ‘ancient Rights’ occurs in the context of the 
word-play and national stereotyping characteristic of ‘!e Character of Holland’, it is 
not so immediately obvious as it is in ‘An Horatian Ode upon Cromwel’s Return from 
Ireland’ and ‘Tom May’s Death’ that justice is what is at stake, but a closer examina‐
tion will show that the poem is dominated by considerations of rights in general and 
property rights in particular.
!e repeated ‘fell’ in lines 5 and 8, connects the ‘slow alluvion’ of the Ocean 
with the ‘just Propriety’ which the Dutch are said to enjoy in the accumulation of tiny 
quantities of sand, earth and sea-shell that the English are content to throw away. !e 
phrase ‘just Propriety’, it hardly needs to be pointed out, is double-edged. On the one 
hand, it might be thought that the Dutch would be entirely within their rights to lay 
claim to what they gain by alluvion — even if this alluvion is so ‘slow’ as to be 
39 Sir John Buroughs, !e Soveraignty of the British Seas: Proved by Records, History, and the 
Municipal Lawes of this Kingdome (London: Humphrey Moseley, 1651).
40 Steven C. A. Pincus, Protestanism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the making of English foreign 
policy, 1650–1688 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 71–2. See further, p. 98 below.
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imperceptible, and the claim unreasonably punctilious. On the other hand, that 
which is converted into property by means of their mad labour is, appropriately to 
their alleged ‘character’, the ‘indigested vomit of the Sea’ (l. 7).
However, even the ostensibly innocent sense of ‘just Propriety’ is itself 
double-edged. In Roman law, alluvion was the right of the owner of land abutting a 
river to the property in any accretions which were deposited by the river’s $ow.41 
Grotius uses alluvion as an illustration of his argument about private ownership of 
land, stating that modern Roman lawyers had misrepresented (as he saw it) rights of 
private property as arising by operation of natural law, rather than as a creation of the 
law of nations:
!e Roman Lawyers, in order to prove the Laws used by them to be those of 
Nature, o#en alledge this Saying, !at it is most agreeable to Nature, that he 
should have the Pro"t of any !ing who has also the Disadvantage of it; 
wherefore, since the River does o#en wash away Part of my Land, it is but 
reasonable that whensoever it makes any Addition it should be mine. 
(II.VIII.XVI; Rights of War and Peace, p. 652)
Grotius rejects this ‘natural’ theory of alluvion, explaining it instead as a positive right 
granted by the public (which will usually be the owner of any river powerful enough 
to move bits of land around and, where the case is not clear, should be presumed to 
be so) to the owners of the land abutting it. Alluvion, then, in the Grotian view of 
property rights, depends on the river’s being owned. It is the presumed intention of 
the river’s owner (i.e. the public) that is e%ective to transfer ownership to the 
landowner who bene"ts from the alluvion.
It is not clear that the use of the term in ‘!e Character of Holland’, line 5, is 
necessarily an allusion to De iure belli ac pacis. It is impossible to be sure that Marvell 
had read that work by 1653 if, indeed, he read it at all.42 It is at least clear that he was 
41 Grotius, !e Rights of War and Peace, p. 648, n. 2 (Barbeyrac’s note).
42 !ere is no known English version of De iure belli ac pacis earlier than Clement Barksdale’s, 
!e Illustrious Hugo Grotius of the Law of Warre and Peace (1654) !omason E.1445. !is is a 
considerably abridged translation which reorders the material and completely omits the passages on 
alluvion, quoted above. !at is not conclusive against Marvell’s having read De iure belli, since he was 
capable of reading it in Latin.
87
88
89
aware that it deals with the just causes of war.43 As has already been mentioned, Book 
II, the longest of the three, is the part of the work in which just causes are discussed. 
If Marvell had read attentively the opening chapters of that book, he would have seen 
that Grotius employs the concept of alluvion to support an important part of his 
argument as to the origin and sources of rights of private ownership.
Editors have usually taken Marvell to be using ‘alluvion’ in its physical sense, 
meaning ‘$ood’ or ‘inundation’.44 It is striking, however, that he uses the term in a 
context where property rights — particularly the ‘just Propriety’ of the Dutch in 
newly-formed land that displaces part of the sea — are very much in issue. It would 
be appropriate, then, if ‘alluvion’ in this context were to be understood in its legal 
sense, but it is not very likely that Marvell would have encountered that usage in an 
English work.45 Although Bracton used the term in a passage evidently borrowed 
from the Institutes of Justinian,46 it was not until the decision of the House of Lords 
in Gi"ord v. Lord Yarborough (1828) 5 Bing. 163–70, that there was an authoritative 
statement that the concept of alluvion is recognized in English law. Holdsworth’s 
History of English Law contains only three brief mentions of alluvio. In the third of 
these, the topic is described as ‘obscure’, while in the second Yarborough is cited as 
43 ‘!e Character of Holland’ ll. 113–18, discussed below, p. 99.
44 Complete Poems, p. 262; Poems of Andrew Marvell, p. 250; but compare Poems and Letters, I, 
309.
45 !e judgement of Artegall as between Bracidas and Amidas in !e Faerie Queene, V.iv 
indicates that the concept was not unknown to English writers; the word itself is not used by Spenser, 
however. Even in its physical, as distinct from its legal, senses the term is not exactly common in 
English works prior to Marvell’s use of it. !e OED gives three earlier instances. !e Latin word is 
more frequent, as in James Howell, A German Diet, or, !e Ballance of Europe (1653) where it is 
quoted from Ammianus Marcellinus and translated as ‘encroachments’.
46 Henry de Bracton, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae (c. 1265) Book 2, cap. 2, cited by 
Best, C.J. in Gi"ord v. Lord Yarborough (1828) 5 Bing. 163–70, at 166: ‘Item, quod per alluvionem agro 
tuo 0umen adjecit, jure gentium tibi acquiretur. Est autem alluvio latens incrementum; et per 
alluvionem adjeci dicitur quod ita paulatim adjicitur quod intelligere non possis quo momento 
temporis adjicatur. Si autem non sit latens incrementum, contrarium erit.’ (Similarly, that which the 
river adds to your land by alluvion becomes yours under the law of nations. Alluvion is imperceptible 
accretion; and that is said to be added by alluvion which is added little by little so that it is not possible 
to discern the accretion from one moment to another. If, on the other hand, the accretion is not 
imperceptible, the case is otherwise [i.e. it is not alluvion].)
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establishing ‘that English law had taken over via Bracton the Roman rules’.47 !e 
OED gives no example of the legal sense earlier than the second volume of Hume’s 
Essays: Moral, Political and Literary (1742), where it is treated as a term purely of the 
civil law.48 De iure belli ac pacis is, therefore, a plausible source for Marvell’s use of the 
term. At least it can be said that, if we are to "nd in his poem an allusion to Grotius’s 
discussion of the topic, it is a rather neat one: the implication that the Dutch were 
taking the bene"t of ‘th’Ocean’s slow alluvion’, while at the same time denying the 
ownership, public or otherwise, of the sea, would be consistent with a broader charge 
that the poem makes against the United Provinces, one of hypocrisy and selective 
reliance on Grotius’s principles.
Even if the Dutch have a legitimate claim to ‘th’Oceans slow alluvion’, they go 
beyond the mere insistence on their rights to the utmost, and wrong the ocean itself, 
in that they encroach on the area that should properly belong to it. !e ocean in turn 
pursues its claim to satisfaction for this injury by invading the reclaimed land:
Yet still his claim the Injur’d Ocean laid,
And o# at Leap-frog ore their Steeples plaid:
As if on purpose it on Land had come
To shew them what’s their Mare Liberum (ll. 23–6)
To put it another way, if, as Grotius claims, the sea is open to all and owned by none, 
what business can his countrymen have in displacing part of it with ‘new-catched 
Miles’ (l. 18), which they then claim as their own? !e language of the vindication of 
injured rights, and in particular property rights, is continued when we are told that 
‘!e Fish o#-times the Burger dispossest’ (l. 29, emphasis added).
!e "rst four verse paragraphs of the poem describe the process of the 
formation of the land of Holland, both as a physical process — the mad labour of 
47 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 17 vols. (London: Methuen, 1903–1966) 
XIII, 527, 548, XVI, 68.
48 Two earlier works on Scottish law, each with the title !e Institutions of the Law of Scotland, by 
James Dalrymple, Viscount of Stair (1681) and Sir George Mackenzie (1684) likewise refer, in English, 
to alluvion as a civil law concept.
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"shing the land to shore combined with the natural washing up of tiny quantities of 
soil by the sea — and as the systematic infringement or denial of property rights. 
!ere follow six verse paragraphs in which a satiric description of the origin and 
nature of the constitution of the United Provinces (verse paragraphs 5 and 10, lines 
37–54 and 93–100) frames a disparaging account of the multiplicity of religious 
beliefs and practices that were tolerated there (verse paragraphs 6, 7 and 9, lines 55–
80 and 85–92), which in turn frame the eighth verse paragraph, about which more 
will be said below. Taken together, the "rst ten verse paragraphs of the poem lead to a 
point where Marvell has laid the groundwork for his main allegations against the 
United Provinces.
!e opening lines of the "#h verse paragraph constitute a striking example of 
Marvell’s tendency to treat the targets of his satire betwixt jest and earnest. !e "rst 
line is a pithy expression of a theory of the origin of governmental power which, in 
the second, is turned into a jibe at the government of the United Provinces:
 !erefore Necessity, that "rst made Kings,
Something like Government among them brings. (ll. 37–8)
‘!erefore’, the "rst word of the paragraph, refers back to the chaos represented by the 
games of leap-frog (l. 24), ‘Level-coyl’ or lever le cul (l. 28) and duck and drake (l. 36) 
which are played in all seriousness by the Dutch and the ocean, as the latter attempts 
to obtain redress for its injured rights. !e origin of government, this implies, lies in 
the necessity of regulating the enjoyment of rights and, particularly, in preventing the 
exercise of self-help remedies when those rights are infringed. However, in this case, 
the rights of the ocean must not merely be regulated, they must be wholly excluded, 
since they would otherwise threaten the existence of the ‘land’ itself. !at the ocean is 
capable of su%ering injury is not a notion that can be taken literally, of course. It is a 
comic inversion of the idea that rights subsist in the sea, treating those rights as 
though they were enjoyed by the sea, instead of being exercisable over it. By denying 
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the existence of such rights, the Dutch in e%ect confer rights on the sea, and immedi‐
ately proceed systematically to infringe them. Marvell’s metaphorical use of the 
language of rights in this context implies that this particular state is founded on 
injustice, that is to say on the refusal to recognize and enforce rights that belong 
outside the land itself. !e character of the government that emerges is determined 
by the kind of necessity that gave rise to it:
Who best could know to pump an Earth so leak,
Him as their Lord and Country’s Father speak.
To make a Bank was a great Plot of State;
Invent a Shov’l and be a Magistrate.
Hence some small Dyke-grave unperceiv’d invades
!e Pow’r, and grows as ’twere a King of Spades.
But for less envy some joynt States endures,
Who look like a Commission of the Sewers. (ll. 45–52)
!is government is no less unjust to its own people than to the outside world, and 
may also be unstable, according to this. Line 51 is somewhat obscure. On the face of 
it, ‘endures’ might be transitive (puts up with or su%ers something) or intransitive 
(survives for a long time). Since it is in the singular and is preceded by the phrase 
‘some joynt States’, it is most likely that ‘endures’ is transitive, with ‘joynt States’ as its 
object and the dyke-grave from the previous sentence as its subject. !e sense of lines 
48–52 would then be that a dyke-grave grew to be the monarch, because of his 
importance in the defence of the country from the encroachments of the sea. 
However, so as not to provoke resentment of his elevated status (‘for less envy’), he 
tolerates the sharing of his power by the States. !e States themselves resemble a 
Commission of the Sewers, a body which in English law was entrusted with the duty 
of maintaining sea walls and embankments, and given the power to raise taxes for 
that purpose.49 In comparing the States to a body of this kind, Marvell seems to imply 
that their legitimate area of concern is petty, being restricted to the preservation of 
49 See Stuart A. Moore, A History of the Foreshore and the Law Relating !ereto (London: Stevens 
and Haynes, 1888), p. 566.
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sea defences, while their capacity to impose burdens on the public is disproportion‐
ately great.
!ere is a possibility that here, and again in the short eighth verse paragraph, 
Marvell is being humorously dismissive of a book that, according to Richard Tuck, 
was one of Grotius’s best-known works at the time. !e work is De antiquitate 
reipublicae Batavicae, an English translation of which had been published in 1649.50 
!is was an early work in which Grotius had made extravagant claims about the 
continuation among the Dutch, from before the rebellion of Civilis in AD 69 up to 
the end of the sixteenth century, of a form of government which might fairly be 
described as aristocratic republican.51 According to Grotius, the Dutch had never 
submitted to the attempt by Philip II of Spain to abrogate their ancient constitution, 
and were therefore justi"ed in throwing o% Spanish rule.52 Indeed, he argues that the 
predecessors of the modern Dutch had never submitted to external government, 
citing Tacitus as having shown that the Batavians at the time of Civilis had been allies 
and not tributaries of the Romans, equal in rights, though obviously not in strength 
(pp. 39–45). It was because the Romans started to infringe their allies’ rights that 
Civilis led a rising against them. Tacitus, he tells us, does not reveal the outcome of 
the con$ict, permitting Grotius to assume that the Batavi maintained their indepen‐
dence (pp. 55–6). A#er the Romans and up to ‘the "rst installing of the 
50 Hugo Grotius, De antiquitate reipublicae Batavicae (Leiden: 1610); Richard Tuck, Philosophy 
and Government p. 164. !e English translation is Hugo Grotius, A Treatise of the Antiquity of the 
Commonwealth of the Battavers which is now the Hollanders, trans. !omas Woods (John Walker, 
1649) !omason E.1303[2].
51 He summarized the argument of the work in these terms: ‘continually during more than 1700 
years, the Battavers … have used the same Government, the Soveraignty whereof hath alwayes 
remained in the States hands, and so is it at this present. So that neverthelesse, a Principality hath 
belonged thereunto, sometimes in a greater and sometimes in a lesser manner of administration’: 
Antiquity of the Commonwealth of the Battavers, pp. 130–1.
52 In De iure belli, II.IV.XIV (Rights, pp. 503–4) he was to argue that that submission to a 
conqueror could permanently deprive a people of the right to recover their freedom by force, citing 
King Agrippa in Josephus: ‘It is glorious to engage and draw in the Cause of Liberty, but this should have 
been done long ago. For when people have been over-powered, and have for a great While submitted, to 
shake o" the Yoke then, is to act like Madmen and Desperadoes, and not like Lovers of Liberty’. !e 
argument as to the lawfulness of the rebellion against Spanish rule is to be found in !e Antiquity of 
the Commonwealth of the Battavers, pp. 117–22.
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Earls’ (Comites) there is a period of about "ve hundred years in respect of which ‘the 
Histories are very defective’ (p. 63). Grotius relies on the paucity of evidence to justify 
his dissent from the view that the Franks had ruled over part of the territory of 
modern Holland (pp. 66, 69), again stressing the continuity of Batavian indepen‐
dence.53
!e installation of the ‘Earls’ he describes sympathetically in a manner which 
might have suggested to a more hostile observer a process by which ‘some small 
Dyke-grave unperceiv’d invades / !e Pow’r, and grows as ’twere a King of Spades’:
It is thus then, !at before the time of Dederick, who was counted the "rst of 
the Earls of Holland, there were in Holland many Princes that had their 
Authority not over the whole Nation, but each of them over some one part 
thereof: As those had whereof Tacitus and Caesar doe make mention of: !ese 
Princes were called by the names of Graven or Gra#ones, which we in English 
call Praetors, and now the Dutch Graven, … which to speak properly, is 
nothing else but Judges, from whence we call those that are the O(cers and 
Controllers of the Causies and of those Bancks that doe check the Rivers and 
the Sea, we call them Dyke-graven, that is Causie-Judges or Causie-Earls. And 
with good reason were those Princes so called, because that their Principall 
O(ce was as is aforesaid to administer the Law …54
According to Grotius’s account, before the appointment of the "rst ‘Earl’ of Holland, 
there were many such o(cials whose function was a mixture of the judicial and the 
administrative, and each of whom had jurisdiction over only a part of the country. 
!eir role was limited, and so were their powers. !e fear of external aggression, 
particularly from the Vikings,55 prompted the nobles and the magistrates of the cities 
to think about appointing a prince with authority over the whole country, but 
without full monarchical powers:
… they thought it good a#er the example of their fore-fathers, who had Kings, 
yet their liberty not infringed, to ordaine a Prince, over the whole body of the 
Common-Wealth; which they intituled not with the Title of King, as being 
53 He uses a more questionable strategy to obscure the early days of the ‘Earldom’: see the 
Introduction to the recent Biblioteca Latinitatis Novae translation: Grotius, !e Antiquity of the 
Batavian Republic, pp. 20–1.
54 Grotius, !e Antiquity of the Commonwealth of the Battavers, pp. 70–1.
55 According to Woods’s translation, the aggressors were ‘People of Norway’ (p. 75); Grotius’s 
original calls them Normanni. !e Biblioteca Latinitatis Novae version describes them as Vikings: 
Grotius, !e Antiquity of the Batavian Republic, p. 83.
93
94
95
such a one as was not employed any other-way then in the chiefest and 
absolute Authority, but entitled him by that accustomed and usuall name or 
Title of Gravii, that is Judge or Earl, yet with this di%erence, that he was not 
called Earl with an addition of any Quarter thereunto, but simply, as being 
Judge himself over the other Judges. Unto this command (out of all question) 
he was chosen that was the very principall, both for Nobility and power 
amongst all other Princes: this was Dederick who in the old Records was 
called the Friese.56
Whether or not he had this particular work of Grotius’s in mind, Marvell is dismis‐
sive of the notion that the Dutch can enjoy a compromise between monarchy and 
democracy. !e Dutch, he concludes, ‘Half-anders, half wet, and half dry / Nor bear 
strict service nor pure Liberty’ (ll. 53–4). As before, there is an implication that the 
nature of their governmental system is determined by the character of the land itself: 
it is because they are half wet and half dry that their governmental system has 
characteristics of both liberty and servitude. Marvell’s jibe could well be taken for a 
direct contradiction of the opinion expressed by Grotius at the very start of his book, 
that the best government is that of the nobles with, as he puts it, ‘a Principality 
attached’, because government of this kind achieves a balance between the excesses of 
democracy and monarchy. (Unsurprisingly, Grotius concludes that the ancient 
Batavian government was of exactly this type.)57
As against the hypothesis that he is making fun of the arguments in De 
antiquitate reipublicae Batavicae, it must be admitted that Marvell does not explicitly 
mention that work, as he does both Mare liberum and De iure belli ac pacis. He does, 
however, mention Civilis, the leader of the Batavian people in their "ght against the 
Roman empire in AD 69:
Nor can Civility there want for Tillage,
Where wisely for their Court they chose a Village.
How "t a Title clothes their Governours,
!emselves the Hogs and all their Subjects Bores!
 Let it su(ce to give their Countrey Fame
!at it had one Civilis call’d by Name,
Some Fi#een hundred and more years ago;
56 Grotius, !e Antiquity of the Commonwealth of the Battavers, pp. 75–6.
57 Grotius, !e Antiquity of the Commonwealth of the Battavers, p. 34.
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But surely never any that was so. (ll. 77–84)
Tacitus’s Histories IV is the source for most of what is known about Civilis. He also 
features prominently, however, in De antiquitate reipublicae, where Grotius reinter‐
prets Tacitus, using Civilis as a central "gure in the opening stage of his argument 
about the Batavian system of government. According to this reinterpretation, Civilis 
was not a monarchical ruler, but rather a leader who governed jointly with an 
assembly of the nobles:
Yet the History of Civilis approveth that the Battavers had this manner of 
Government, to the end that the wars might orderly be decreed against the 
oppression of the Romanes; for that end (saith he) hee assembled together the 
Princes of the Nations, and the ablest of the common people. Wherein 
appeareth then that the Battavers used the government of the Nobles, and yet 
in such sort, that there was a Principality annexed thereunto, which was either 
continually under the name of a King, or temporally under the name of a 
Generall …58
As has already been mentioned, Richard Tuck says that this was Grotius’s best-known 
work, and it had appeared in English just four years before Marvell wrote ‘!e 
Character of Holland’. !at being the case, a mention of Civilis in a poem that also 
makes two express references to Grotius, is likely also to call attention to De antiqui‐
tate reipublicae. Grotius’s argument, that the character of Civilis’s rule demonstrates 
the republican nature of the ancient Dutch system of government, is closely juxta‐
posed with another, which also draws on Tacitus. !e second argument is that, as the 
Batavi, unlike the other Germanic peoples, lived in walled and fenced towns,59 they 
must have had powerful local magistrates and that this was conducive to a govern‐
ment of the nobility:
… these fenced Cities could not consist without Magistrates, that those 
Magistrates next unto the Princes had very great Authority in their publike 
Assemblies: And that the simple common people busied themselves, some 
with tilling of the Land, others with feeding of Cattle, and others with "shing, 
and with Merchandize, and other occupations belonging thereunto, that they 
very willingly committed the charge of the Government unto the Magistrates 
58 Grotius, !e Antiquity of the Commonwealth of the Battavers, pp. 34–5.
59 !e Woods translation uses the term ‘cities’, while the Bibliotheca Latinitatis Novae translation 
says ‘towns’.
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!ese two arguments are contiguous on the page — in the Latin version there is not 
even a paragraph break between them. !e "rst, based on the nature of Civilis’s 
leadership, starts on page 32 and ends on page 35 of Woods’s English translation, and 
the second, inferring a ‘government of magistrates’ from the fact that the Batavi were 
supposed to live in towns, begins where the "rst ends and continues to page 38.61
Line 78 of Marvell’s poem, which claims that the Dutch ‘wisely for their Court 
… chose a Village’, is primarily a reference to the fact, noted in Margoliouth’s, 
Donno’s and Smith’s editions, that the Hague was denied the status of a town so that it 
would not have a vote in the States.62 It is possible, however, to see in the lines a 
secondary meaning: a dismissive allusion to Grotius’s theory of the republican 
character of the ancient Batavian constitution. !e use of the word ‘Civility’ in line 77 
seems designed to underline the juxtaposition of the idea of a village for a court, in 
the following line, with the reference to Civilis, in the next verse paragraph. !e 
adjective civilis is de"ned in Lewis and Short’s Latin Dictionary as meaning ‘of or 
pertaining to citizens’.63 So, while the main thrust of the allegation that the Dutch 
‘had one Civilis call’d by Name, / Some Fi#een hundred and more years ago; / But 
surely never any that was so’, is that they are lacking civility and civic virtues, there 
appears to be a further implication that neither Civilis nor any of what might loosely 
be called his successors had in truth been a leader of citizens. Similarly, line 78 can be 
read as containing a secondary meaning equally dismissive of Grotius’s argument, the 
‘Court’ being a denial that the government was republican and the ‘Village’ that the 
Batavi had lived in towns.
A second person named Civilis makes an appearance in De antiquitate 
60 Grotius, !e Antiquity of the Commonwealth of the Battavers, pp. 37–8.
61 !e corresponding passages in the 'rst edition are on pp. XIII–XIV and XIV–XV respectively.
62 Poems and Letters, I, 311, note to line 78; Complete Poems, p. 264; Poems of Andrew Marvell, 
p. 253.
63 Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1922).
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reipublicae Batavicae. According to Grotius, he was a Batavian of royal blood who 
was appointed Governor of Great Britain during the reign of Julian the Apostate. !is 
allegedly occurred at a time when the rule of the Roman empire in Britain was under 
threat, and the Batavi had helped the Romans to retake London (pp. 61–2). If it is the 
case that Marvell was making fun of Grotius’s partisan and republican history, his 
reference to ‘one Civilis call’d by Name’ (emphasis added) might be interpreted as a 
rejection of the notion that there was a second Civilis, one who governed Britain on 
behalf of the Roman Emperor.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the "#h to the tenth verse paragraphs 
of Marvell’s poem can be described as forming an asymmetrical bow-like structure or 
curve, with paragraphs "ve and ten describing the government and constitution of 
Holland and the United Provinces (those of the former determining the character of 
those of the latter). Paragraphs six, seven and nine deal with the role played by 
religion in that country and the short eighth paragraph deals with Civilis, whom 
Grotius had made a central support of his argument about the continuing republican 
nature of the Dutch government. !e movement through this bow is from the general 
to the particular: paragraph six is a sardonic attempt to deduce the Dutch approach 
to religion from what is already known about the character of the country:
How could the Dutch but be converted, when
!’Apostles were so many Fishermen?
Besides the Waters of themselves did rise,
And, as their Land, so them did re-baptize. (ll. 57–60)
Paragraph seven deals in abstract terms with what is conceived as an actual historical 
process by which Amsterdam is said to have grown into the ‘Staple of Sects and Mint 
of Schisme’ (l. 72), while paragraph nine presents a very physical and particularized, 
if comically exaggerated, description of Dutch religious practice. In a similar move‐
ment from the general to the particular, paragraph "ve sets out the principles on 
which the Dutch government must logically have been founded (given the premises 
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as to the inherent injustice of the very process of land-formation itself, set out in the 
"rst four paragraphs), while paragraph ten paints a satirical picture of the realities of 
the present-day constitution of the United Provinces. !at state is depicted as a 
lumbering colossus, ‘Stagg’ring upon some Land’ (l. 96), while its constituent parts 
"ght among themselves, attempting to ‘Cut out each others Athos to a Man’ (l. 98).
Having described the United Provinces as warring internally in breach of 
their treaty obligations to each other,64 Marvell has now laid the groundwork for his 
main accusation:
 But when such Amity at home is show’d;
What then are their confederacies abroad?
Let this one court’sie witness all the rest;
When their whole Navy they together prest,
Not Christian Captives to redeem from Bands:
Or intercept the Western golden Sands:
No, but all ancient Rights and Leagues must vail,
Rather than to the English strike their sail … (ll. 101–8)
Van Tromp’s refusal to strike his sail to the English admiral was the incident that 
started the war. !e striking of the $ag or sail had been sought under both of the 
Stuart monarchs as an acknowledgment of English dominion, that is to say, owner‐
ship, of the sea.65 Van Tromp, an Orangist sympathetic to the English royalist cause, 
was unwilling to acknowledge that the dominion of the sea belonged to the Parlia‐
ment of England: as far as he and the Dutch Admiralty were concerned, that right 
remained vested in the crown. According to Steven Pincus, it was only belatedly that 
the English Parliament understood the nature of the con$ict — that it was not about 
England’s rights as against other countries, but about the legitimacy of the claims of 
the English commonwealth as against those of the English king.66 To Marvell in 1653, 
64 Grotius relates that the Treaty of Utrecht, 1579, established ‘a Community or Fellowship both 
of Warre, Peace and forraign Alliances and Confederacies, as also of all other a/airs’ between the seven 
provinces, Gelderland, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht Friesland, Overijssel and Groningen: Grotius, !e 
Antiquity of the Commonwealth of the Battavers, pp. 138–9.
65 Fulton, !e Sovereignty of the Sea, passim, especially pp. 276 /.
66 Pincus, Protestantism and Patriotism, p. 72.
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however, it appeared that the Dutch action was a breach of ‘ancient Rights and 
Leagues’. As such, it constituted iniuria, and amounted to a justi"cation of English 
belligerence against the United Provinces.
To the allegation of iniuria, Marvell next adds one of per"dy, with the poem’s 
second explicit reference to Grotius:
 Was this Jus Belli & Pacis; could this be
Cause why their Burgomaster of the Sea
Ram’d with Gun-powder, $aming with Brand wine,
Should raging hold his Linstock to the Mine?
While, with feign’d Treaties, they invade by stealth
Our sore new circumcised Common wealth. (ll. 113–18)
‘Cause’, in this context, means ‘just cause’: by "ring on Blake, Van Tromp opened the 
hostilities, and did so without any justi"cation that Grotius would have recognized. 
!e reference to the Dutch admiral as ‘Burgomaster of the Sea’ contrasts with the 
designation of his English counterparts as ‘Guardians of the Sea’ (Custodes Maris).67 
!e English, who assert that the sea can be possessed and owned, place it in the 
custody of their admirals; the Dutch, who deny that it can be possessed, are therefore 
taken to invest their admiral with an authority equivalent to the judicial and adminis‐
trative functions exercised by the chief magistrate of a town. If the story had been 
true of his ‘sweeping’ the Channel with a broom at his mast-head,68 then Van Tromp 
might fairly have been accused of exceeding that authority. !e implication is that the 
Dutch intend to go further than merely challenging the English dominion of the sea 
and to establish, without the slightest claim of right, their own. Here, as in the earlier 
allusion to Grotius, Marvell is turning that author’s arguments against his country‐
men; implying that while they may appear to rely on those ideas up to a certain point, 
they inevitably go beyond that point and act in a way that is not justi"ed by them. 
67 Selden, Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea, II.XVI p. 306. Compare this line with the 
description of Sir William Coventry as ‘Keeper, or rather chanc’llor of the sea’ in !e Second Advice To 
a Painter, l. 26.
68 Poems and Letters, I, 312, note to l. 124.
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!is is also the point of the references to ‘feign’d Treaties’ in line 117. (‘Treaties’ in this 
context means the process of treating or negotiating, as opposed to what is now its 
usual sense, the concluded and rati"ed results of such negotiation, referred to in this 
poem as ‘Leagues’.)
In the penultimate chapter of De iure belli ac pacis (III.XXIV.III),69 Grotius 
states that to ask for or agree to a peace conference (colloquium), is tacitly to promise 
that you will not injure the other party while negotiations are continuing. It is 
permissible to use the negotiations to divert the other party from preparations for 
war, or to build up one’s own strength, but not to attack. So, to ‘feign a parly, better to 
surprize’ — as Marvell would later accuse the court of Charles II of doing, in !e last 
Instructions to a Painter, l. 232 — is a serious breach of the law of nations, not least 
because it damages the trust that must be placed in ambassadors if the right of 
embassy is to be continued to be observed.
If the Dutch, then, are making use of ‘feign’d Treaties’ to ‘invade by stealth / 
Our sore new circumcised Common wealth’, they are acting in a way wholly incom‐
patible with Grotian principles of justice. !e invasion complained of is not, however, 
an invasion of English land, but of what in later centuries would be called the 
territorial waters. In this context, one might suspect the presence of a play on the 
word ‘circumcised’. A note in Margoliouth’s edition points out that this is a reference 
to Genesis 34:25.70 !e conduct of the Dutch is implicitly likened to that of Jacob’s 
sons, Simeon and Levi, who treacherously attack Hamor, Shechem and their people 
while the latter are still ‘sore’ from the circumcision they have been persuaded to 
undergo as a condition for intermarriage with Jacob’s family. Marvell’s implication 
would therefore be that the Dutch led the English to believe that an alliance was in 
prospect, but only in order to catch the latter o% their guard. However, it could be 
69 ‘So he that demands, or admits of a Parley, silently promises, that during the Parley, both 
Parties shall be secure’: Rights, p. 1634.
70 Poems and Letters, I, 312, note to line 118.
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argued that this is a similitude which requires further likeness. In other words, 
Margoliouth’s explication does not make it clear in what sense the commonwealth 
can be said to be ‘new circumcised’.
It is the fact that the alleged invasion does not involve an incursion onto land 
that suggests the presence of a pun. !e word ‘seisin’ denotes a kind of possession, 
particularly one conferring legal title.71 ‘Circumcised’ would then appear to be a 
homophone of ‘circumseised’,72 meaning ‘owning, by virtue of possession, that which 
is round about’, in this case the surrounding sea.
Substantially the same allegation of treacherous invasion is made by Nedham 
in his dedicatory introduction to Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea, which is 
addressed to the Parliament of England, where he alleges that the Dutch are guilty of:
… neglecting, slighting and slender protecting (to say no more) of your two 
Ambassadors, and at length in the louder language of the Cannon, during a 
Treatie of Peace for a more strict League and Union; when Tromp proclaimed 
to all the world, that their infamous design was by Treacherie to surprise and 
destroy our Fleets at Sea …73
Nedham also argues that it is equally possible for English waters to be invaded as 
English land:
And what greater extremitie than to invade a Neighbor’s Territorie, and 
prosecute the Invasion by a design of Conquest: !e Sea is indeed your 
Territorie no less than the Land … so that the Netherlanders having enter’d 
your Seas, in de"ance of your Power, are as absolute Invaders, as if they had 
enter’d the Island itself. It is just as if Hannibal were again in Italy, or Charls 
Stuart at Worcester; and the late a%ront given near Dover, was like to the one’s 
braving it before the walls of Rome, and as if the other had com and knockt at 
the gates of London, or rather at your very Chamber-door; for, that insolent 
Act was don in that place, which our Kings heretofore were wont to call and 
71 !e development of the concept of seisin is discussed by S. F. C. Milsom, Historical 
Foundations of the Common Law, 2nd edition (London: Butterworths, 1981), pp. 19–122.
72 ‘Seisin’ was pronounced as ‘season’, and indeed Spenser rhymes the two words (!e Faerie 
Queene, VI.iii.335), while Fulke Greville (‘Sonnet XXVII’, l. 3) and Elijah Fenton (‘!e Fair Nun’, l. 13) 
both rhyme ‘seisin’ with ‘reason’. !is pronunciation would not necessarily preclude the possibility that 
‘circumcised’ and ‘circumseised’ are homophones: a search of the Literature Online database shows 
that, while the most common rhyme word for ‘circumcised’ is ‘baptized’ and one also 'nds ‘surprised’, 
Samuel Colvil rhymes it with ‘freezed’: Mock Poem, Or, Whiggs Supplication, (1681) I.1004.
73 Selden, Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea, cv.–c2r.
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account their Chamber.74
!at Marvell is consciously echoing Nedham is not clear, but they are certainly 
participating in the same argument. !ere is at least one further parallel between 
Mare clausum and Marvell’s poem. Line 136, with its reference to ‘our armed Bucen‐
tore’, draws a comparison between the English commonwealth and the Venetian 
republic, the recognition of whose rights over the Adriatic Sea was, according to 
Selden, the clearest possible evidence that such rights were allowed under the law of 
nations.75 Selden concludes his discussion of the Venetian claim to the Adriatic with 
a description of the ceremony to which Marvell refers, and an explanation of its 
signi"cance:
But the Dominion of Venice over the Sea, is of far greater Antiquitie; to 
signi"e which, they have an annual cerimonie, instituted, they say, by Pope 
Alexander the third, I mean the use of the Ring, which every year, upon 
Ascension daie, the Duke, in solemn manner, rowed in the Bucentoro, accom‐
panied with the Clarissimos of the Senate, casts into the midst of the water, for 
the perpetuating (saith Paulus Merula) of their dominion over the Sea; 
signifying by that love-token, that hee betroth’s the Sea to himself in the 
manner of a lawful Spous, using such a form of matrimonie, Wee take thee to 
our wedded wife, O Sea, in token of a true and perpetual Dominion. What 
should hinder then, but that wee may conclude, that the Venetians were 
looked upon, not onely by themselvs, but by their neighbor Princes, as Lords 
of that Sea, by as unquestionable and full a title, as of their Land and Citie? 
(p. 104).
Finally, it is arguable that the poem’s ending can be interpreted as an allusion to 
Selden’s work. Its last four lines introduce the three deities, Neptune, Jove and Pluto:
For while our Neptune doth a Trident shake,
Steel’d with those piercing Heads, Dean, Monck and Blake.
And while Jove governs in the highest Sphere,
Vainly in Hell let Pluto domineer. (ll. 149–52)
Richard Todd believes that ‘an insistence on triplication has begun to muddy 
Marvell’s clearly diptychal view of his subject matter’ and suggests that ‘it is hard to 
allegorize the triple personages (Neptune, Jove and Pluto) with any real precision, 
74 Selden, Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea, dr.–dv. For the description of part of the 
territorial waters as the King’s chamber, see II.XXII pp. 365–6.
75 Selden, Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea, I.XVI pp. 99–104.
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although their portrayal in a group may be traced back indirectly to Plato (Laws, 828 
B–D)’.76 However, the reference may be explicable in terms of a passage in Mare 
clausum.77
We have already seen that, in Book II, Selden had engaged in an exhaustive 
historical review of the rights claimed by England over the seas surrounding it. His 
method in Book I, where he dealt with the more general question of the recognition 
of such rights by the law of nations, was very similar. He would, he said, draw his 
examples from two ages, the fabulous and the historical.78 !e sole item in the 
category ‘fabulous’ is the division of the world a#er the defeat of the Titans. Citing 
Lactantius’s De falsa religione I.II to the e%ect that such fables were a disguised 
version of actual events, he suggests that the allotment to Jupiter, Neptune and Pluto 
of heaven, the sea and hell respectively in fact refers to an ancient division of the 
world, including the sea, among human beings:
!ey write, that in the fabulous time afore-mentioned, the Titans beeing 
subdued, the Brother-Deities, Jupiter, Pluto, and Neptune, divided the world 
by Lot; and that Heaven was allotted unto Jupiter, Hell to Pluto, the Sea to 
Neptune. But omitting those Tri$es, whereby the vulgar su%ered themselvs 
with patience to be cozen’d, … som of the Antients have taught, that the Truth 
it self which lay couched in this Fable, was quite another !ing. !ey say that 
these were not gods, but men. Also that Jupiter was not King of Heaven, but of 
the Eastern part from whence the Light "rst dawn’s upon mortal men; by 
which means also it seemed the higher part, and therefore was called Heaven: 
And that Pluto was King of the West, which point’s at the Sun’s setting and 
Night, and whence it is said to be lower and Hell. Lastly, that Neptune was 
Lord of the Sea and the Isles scattered therein. !us it appear’s here, that a 
private Dominion of the Sea, no otherwise then of the Land, arose from 
Humane distribution. (pp. 47–8)
It will be apparent that Selden has in mind here the Grotian compact by which 
private property was "rst instituted and the point of his relating the story is that he 
admits that an agreement of this kind must have been reached, in some very ancient 
76 Todd, ‘National Stereotyping in “!e Character of Holland”’, p. 185.
77 !is is the view taken by Andrew Fleck, ‘Marvell’s Use of Nedham’s Selden’, Notes & Queries 54 
(2007) pp. 422–5.
78 Selden, Of the Dominion, Or, Ownership of the Sea, I.VIII pp. 46–7.
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time now known to us only by way of fable. In this, as has already been mentioned,79 
Selden accepts Grotius’s premises. He departs from Grotius, however, in reading the 
ancient story as evidence that the subject matter of the agreement comprehended the 
sea as well as dry land.
It is tempting, therefore, to read Marvell’s reference to the three deities as an 
allusion to this passage from Mare Clausum. As against this, there are a number of 
di%erent sources (starting, as Todd says, with Plato) which might have suggested to 
Marvell their inclusion at the end of the poem.80 !e main thing that their presence 
implies is appropriateness: each of them has his proper sphere, with Jupiter’s being 
‘the highest’ (l. 151) while Pluto domineers ‘in Hell’ (l. 152), while ‘our 
Neptune’ (l. 149) by implication controls the extensive realm between these two. !is 
is an interpretation that is supported by the passage from Plato’s Laws to which Todd 
refers. !ere, the Athenian stresses the danger of confusing things that do not belong 
together, and the importance of keeping separate the festivals of the gods of the 
underworld and those pertaining to the heavenly gods.81
At any rate, it can be said that the last word of the poem, ‘domineer’, also 
recalls dominium, which means that the relationship between ownership and the 
other senses of ‘propriety’ is the dominant idea at the end of the poem, no less than at 
the beginning. !e literal meaning of ‘domineer’ — to act tyrannously or arrogantly 
— is operative too: in so far as the Dutch seek to exercise rights outside their allotted 
sphere, or to prevent England from exercising hers, they do so ‘vainly’.
‘!e Character of Holland’, then, is a poem in which Marvell consistently 
makes allegations of injustice against the United Provinces, in its origin and constitu‐
79 Above, p. 82. See also Tuck, Natural Rights !ories, pp. 86–7.
80 See, in particular, Milton’s ‘A Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle, 1634’ lines 20–1, where 
Neptune ‘Took in by lot, ’twixt high, and nether Jove, / Imperial rule of all the sea-girt isles …’. Milton, 
Carey’s note tells us, is referring to Homer, Iliad, XV, ll. 187–93 (which is presumably also one of 
Selden’s sources): John Milton, Complete Shorter Poems, 2nd ed., ed. John Carey (Harlow, Essex: 
Longman, 1997) p. 181.
81 Plato, !e Laws, trans. Trevor J. Saunders (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970, rpt. 1975) p. 322.
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tion on the one hand and in its commencement and conduct of the war on the other. 
In doing so, he relies on ideas of justice drawn from the two works of Grotius that are 
mentioned in the poem, and in particular from the later of these, De iure belli ac 
pacis. In e%ect, he accuses the Dutch of hypocrisy, in that they fail to observe the 
Grotian principles on which they ostensibly rely. !at is not to say, however, that 
Marvell himself accepted those principles. In his advancement of arguments similar 
to those to be found in Selden’s Mare clausum, and in the introduction to Nedham’s 
translation, he appears to reject, in particular, the Grotian doctrine of mare liberum, 
the proposition that the sea cannot be possessed.
‘!ey feign a parly’
At more than 200 lines longer than ‘Upon Appleton House’, !e last Instructions to a 
Painter is not only Marvell’s longest poem but it is many times the length of most of 
his other poems, satirical and otherwise. As Marvell usually chose to work on a much 
smaller canvass than that of !e last Instructions, it is not surprising that, until fairly 
recently, critics have tended to see the longer satire as a form in which he was not at 
his best, and the poem itself as lacking in unity. !e most extreme version of this 
dismissive view is put forward by Legouis, to whom the poem appeared to be a kind 
of ‘rimed chronicle’, in which ‘Marvell tells nine or ten months of the history of 
England, diplomatic negotiations, parliamentary debates, naval operations, intrigues 
of the bed-chamber or the lobby, and his narrative seems to be written day by day, as 
the events impress him immediately.’82 It was to counter this prevalent view that 
Michael Gearin-Tosh defended the poem’s structure as a series of portraits, progress‐
ing through ‘low portraits, two high portraits, one of an enemy, the other of a hero 
betrayed — and now the betrayer, and in an inversion of the state painting style.’83 
82 Legouis (1968), p. 168.
83 Michael Gearin-Tosh, ‘!e Structure of Marvell’s “Last Instructions to a Painter”’, Essays in 
Criticism 22 (1972), pp. 48–57, 56.
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Decorum required that a low style be used to represent ‘this race of drunkards, pimps 
and fools’ (l. 12), whereas the foreigners, De Ruyter and Douglas, Dutch and Scottish 
respectively, ‘deserved the style which the English court had forfeited’ (p. 52).
Most of the commentary on this poem can be seen as belonging to one of two 
categories, each of which is re$ected in a particular thematic strand in the poem. !e 
"rst of these is the theme of ‘poetic picture, painted poetry’, in part drawing on a 
deliberate misinterpretation of Horace’s admonitions on decorum. !is is the strand 
of criticism to which Earl Miner belongs, along with Gearin-Tosh himself, and which 
is perhaps best exempli"ed by Annabel Patterson.84 !e other strand is that dealing 
with ‘sexual misconduct’. To this strand belong Steven Zwicker, Barbara Riebling 
(who argues that the abuse of sexual power, particularly rape, represents the abuse of 
political power) and, for the most part, David Farley-Hills (who advances a surpris‐
ingly persuasive case for seeing a version of the "sher-king story as the governing 
myth in the poem).85 James Grantham Turner has shown one way in which these 
strands might be interwoven, by drawing attention to the signi"cant presence in the 
poem of a scheme of allusion to Aretino’s ‘Postures’.86
Before the narrative part of the poem commences, the reader is presented 
with three portraits, one each of Henry Jermyn, Earl of St. Albans (ll. 29–48), Anne 
Hyde, Duchess of York (ll. 49–78) and Barbara Villiers, Countess of Castlemaine 
(ll. 79–102). Although the portrait of the Duchess contains elements of sexual 
misconduct, it is mainly representative of the poem’s ‘grotesque picture’ strand:
Paint her with Oyster Lip, and breath of Fame,
84 See, for example, Annabel Patterson, Marvell and the Civic Crown, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1978), p. 127.
85 Steven N. Zwicker, ‘Virgins and Whores: !e Politics of Sexual Misconduct in the 1660s’, in 
!e Political Identity of Andrew Marvell, ed. Condren and Cousins, pp. 85–110; Barbara Riebling, 
‘England De0owered and Unmanned: !e Sexual Image of Politics in Marvell’s “Last Instructions”’, 
Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900 35 (1995), pp. 137–57; David Farley-Hills, !e Benevolence of 
Laughter: Comic Poetry of the Commonwealth and Restoration (London: Macmillan, 1974), chapter 4.
86 James Grantham Turner, ‘!e Libertine Abject’: !e “Postures” of Last Instructions to a 
Painter’, in Marvell and Liberty, ed. Chernaik and Dzelzainis, pp. 217–48.
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Wide mouth that Sparagus may well proclaim:
With Chanc’lor’s Belly, and so large a Rump.
!ere, not behind the Coach, her Pages jump. (ll. 61–4)
!is might be thought to be rather more grotesque than either the Earl with his 
‘Drayman’s Shoulders, butchers Mein, / Member’d like Mules, with Elephantine 
chine’ (ll. 33–4) or the Countess, who merely ‘grows old’ and ‘stooping stands’ (ll. 80, 
93). Castlemaine, on the other hand, is the main representative of the ‘sexual miscon‐
duct’ theme. !e others have engaged in their share of that, too,87 but Castlemaine 
outdoes them: it is only at the advanced age of 26 that she begins to distrust her ‘o#-
try’d Beauty’ and ‘now "rst, wisht she ere had been a Maid’ (ll. 88, 90). If two of the 
introductory portraits correspond to two of the poem’s thematic strands, that 
suggests that there is a third strand present, exempli"ed by Henry Jermyn.88
But Age, allaying now that youthful heat,
Fits him in France, to play at Cards and treat.
Draw no Commission, lest the Court should lye,
!at, disavowing Treaty, ask89 supply. (ll. 37–40)
Jermyn has been sent to Paris to negotiate with Louis XIV but (according to the poet) 
he has not been accredited as an envoy, in order that the court can mendaciously 
claim that no negotiations are taking place, and so persuade Parliament to raise 
money as if for the continuance of war.90 !is is a dishonest as well as a dangerous 
strategy, as is emphasized by the narrowly avoided rhyme-word, ‘cheat’. !e word 
itself does not appear in line 38, but it is present in lines 114, 122, 179, 314 and 584: 
87 Lines 62 and 64, which have just been quoted, seem to contain an element of sexual innuendo 
that is no less noticeable for being vague. In contrast, the allegations about Castlemaine’s relations with 
her footman are quite clear.
88 ‘In the 'rst part of the poem Marvell sketched three court leaders (ll. 29–104), and he then 
generalizes the attack by exposing their manoeuvres in the Commons (ll. 105–334)’: Gearin-Tosh, 
‘!e Structure of Marvell’s “Last Instructions to a Painter”’, p. 53.
89 MS Eng. Poet. d 49 has ‘asks’: Michael Gearin-Tosh, ‘Marvell’s “Last Instructions”: Textual 
Errors and their Poetic Signi'cance’, Studia Neophilologica 42 (1970), pp. 309–18 (p. 309).
90 Legouis claims that Jermyn’s written instructions from Clarendon ‘answer the innuendo of 
l. 39’: Poems and Letters, I, 351, n. to l. 29. !e dra1 instructions say that, if Jermyn should 'nd the 
French king amenable, and willing to o/er assurances that the Dutch too will agree to peace, ‘wee shall 
be contente speedily to send over Ambassadors’: T. H. Lister, Life and Administration of Edward, First 
Earl of Clarendon, (London: Longman, 1838) III, 443. !is suggests that Jermyn was to carry out 
negotiations only in a preliminary, conditional manner. 
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dishonest dealing is pervasive in this poem. !ere is also the suggestion (which will 
be con"rmed in line 368) that Jermyn is playing, not merely at cards, but also at 
negotiations, that is that the process of peace-making is not being taken seriously, 
either by St. Albans or his masters. Abuse of the process of negotiation is the court’s 
characteristic mode of doing business. It is a tactic that is dishonourably employed 
abroad, in the court’s dealings with France and Holland, and at home, in its attempt 
to pass an excise bill through Parliament, where the court faction, led by Henry and 
William Coventry, ‘feign a parly, better to surprize’ the Parliamentary opponents of 
the proposed new tax. It is worth noticing that Henry Coventry is a leading "gure in 
dishonest negotiations at home as well as abroad.
A signi"cant part of the grim humour of the satire lies in the gradual revela‐
tion that in its foreign dealings no less than in the domestic sphere, the court, though 
acting in bad faith, is doing so against English interests instead of in furtherance of 
them, as might be expected. So, once Clarendon has raised ‘Eighteen hundred 
thousand pound’ (ll. 332, 492; the repetition underlines the outrageousness of the 
"gure) by way of a land tax, the Parliament is prorogued and St. Albans receives new 
instructions:
!e Count forthwith is order’d all to close,
To play for Flanders, and the stake to lose. (ll. 367–9)
!e secret instructions of Henry Coventry at Breda are of the same nature. He and 
his fellow-ambassador, Denzil Holles, are initially instructed to urge on the Dutch the 
idea that ‘Treaty does imply / Cessation’ (ll. 453–4), that is, that the very act of 
entering into negotiations indicates a willingness to reach agreement. !is is true, in 
one sense, in that to negotiate without any intention of settling the dispute would be 
to mislead the other party, and would therefore be a mark of bad faith. However, by 
adding the scriptural comparison, ‘as the look Adultery’, the envoys are to attempt to 
force on this unobjectionable proposition an interpretation that it will not bear, 
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suggesting that the mere commencement of negotiations is as good as a concluded 
pact, and that the act of opening discussions in itself imposes on the parties a moral 
obligation to reach agreement. !at the English are not prepared to be bound by the 
same conditions that they urge on the Dutch is con"rmed a few lines later, when we 
are told that, if this gambit is not e%ective to persuade the Dutch to recall their $eet, 
the ambassadors are ‘to return home straight infecta re’ (l. 460).
Both sides would have been well aware that treaty did not, in practice, in‐
evitably imply cessation. Oliver St. John had summarized the results of his mission of 
1651 (the same one celebrated by Marvell in ‘In Legationem Domini Oliveri St. John 
ad Provincias Foederatas’): ‘!e Embassie was, to renew the antient Amity and 
intercourse between the two Nations: While we treated upon these, we were recalled, 
re infecta, and the whole Embassie became fruitlesse.’91 Inconclusive negotiations 
between Holland and England were nothing new.
!at is not the end of the matter, however: there is still the question of Henry 
Coventry’s coded instructions. !ese, quite simply, are that if the Dutch ‘won’t recal / 
!eir Fleet, to threaten, we will give them all’ (ll. 461–2). In other words, the English 
ambassadors are charged with a preposterous task: they are to feign a parley, better to 
surrender. Only now does the full irony of the situation become apparent. !e 
dubious proposition that Holles was to put forward turns out to be nothing less than 
the truth: in this instance, treaty really does imply cessation, because the English 
court is set on making peace at all costs. Furthermore, the contingent instruction to 
come home infecta re is now seen to be super$uous if not absurd, since it is hard to 
imagine any circumstances in which unconditional surrender could be le# uncon‐
cluded. It seems that the court is in such a panic that it is not able to behave consis‐
tently, and resorts to unconscionable tactics almost as a matter of course, even when 
91 !e Case of Oliver St. John, Esq. Concerning his Actions during the Late Troubles (1660), 
!omason Collection E1035.5, p. 5.
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there is nothing to be gained.
A further indication of the court’s bad faith lies in the fact that the designation 
of the two ambassadors at Breda is hardly any less misleading than that of Jermyn in 
France. St. Albans is an ambassador in e%ect (until, at any rate, Louis exploits his lack 
of credentials by ‘bluntly’ asking for his ‘Character’, l. 442) though not in name, 
whereas the so-called ‘Plenipotentiary Ambassadors’ (l. 452) are hedged around with 
speci"c (though mutually inconsistent) instructions, so that their powers are signi"‐
cantly more restricted than their commissions would indicate to the Dutch. !e 
poem’s "rst reference to their mission describes Coventry and Holles as ‘Chain’d 
together … Like Slaves’ (ll. 369–70). !e name ‘Plenipotentiary Ambassadors’ is 
indeed abhorred, but not by verse (l. 451) which manages to accommodate it rather 
neatly in a decasyllabic line, with barely noticeable irregularity. In truth, it is Claren‐
don and, by implication, the king who abhor the name. It seems that they cannot bear 
to invest an envoy with full powers, even where the ultimate purpose of the embassy 
is complete capitulation and allowing the negotiators to use their discretion could not 
possibly result in a worse outcome than the one envisaged.
!ree lines earlier, we have encountered a line which at least disturbs the 
verse, even if it is not abhorred by it: ‘Two Letters next unto Breda are sent’ (l. 449). 
!e reader cannot be entirely con"dent as to how the line should be read. Is ‘Breda’ to 
be stressed on the "rst or second syllable? Does a beat fall on either syllable of ‘unto’? 
Surely ‘Two’ is emphasized — this is the line that introduces the duplicity of 
Coventry’s instructions — but what then of ‘letters’? !e fact that there are three 
groups of syllables that can be treated as double o)eats (‘letters’, ‘unto’, ‘da are’) 
suggests that one might be tempted to hear a predominantly falling triple metre:
  \  \  x    \   \  x   \ x x    \
Two letters next unto Breda are sent
Read like this, the line would have only four beats, and would apparently be an 
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intrusion from a di%erent poem. Alternatively, however, one can scan the line in a 
way which, though somewhat irregular, better "ts the poem’s metre:92
  \  \  x    \   \  x   x \ x    \
Two letters next unto Breda are sent
!is would require a brief pause a#er “next”, perhaps suggesting that the narrator is at 
once fatigued and bemused at having to relate yet more pernicious folly. In any case 
the rhythmic uncertainty re$ects the precariousness of the position of those who 
have to negotiate with Henry Coventry.
None of this is to claim that the other two parties, France and Holland, 
conduct their negotiations with strict probity. !e Dutch incursion into the Medway 
takes place while the negotiations are proceeding at Breda; and Louis, when asked to 
restrain the Dutch, fails to keep his promise to St. Albans (ll. 427–48). On the 
spectrum of per"dious behaviour, the French are the worst o%enders, the Dutch are 
relatively innocent and the English tend to follow the example of the former rather 
than the latter, just not so e%ectively. In a sense, England’s behaviour provides the 
excuse, if not the justi"cation, for Louis’s betrayal. If Clarendon and the king shared 
the belief ironically imputed to St. Albans, that ‘the Golden Age was now restor’d, / 
When Men and Women took each others Word’ (ll. 47–8), they surely would not be 
behaving in such a way as to make such a restoration seem more remote than ever. 
Further, if St. Albans had been properly accredited, he would have had some hope of 
obtaining from Louis something more reliable than his ‘Word’ (l. 435). Grotius had 
argued that a promise made by one sovereign to another, as between equals, is 
binding according to the law of nature.93 !is is one respect in which he departed 
92 I am grateful to John Creaser for suggesting this scansion of the line. !e notation used is that 
proposed by Derek Attridge, Poetic Rhythm: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), esp. Chapters 4 and 5.
93 Grotius, De iure belli, II.XI.V.3 (Rights, pp. 709–10). !e position as to promises made by a 
sovereign to his own subjects, and to foreigners who are not sovereign, is more complex: see De iure 
belli II.XIV (Rights, pp. 802–16). Grotius distinguishes between promises made by the sovereign as 
sovereign and those made as a private person. !e former are not subject to the civil law but may 
nevertheless be binding according to the law of nature, as where they give rise to rights in a person 
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from the raison d’état view of the obligations of princes that had been very in$uential 
in the sixteenth century.94 Louis presumably believes, in line with raison d’état, that 
anyone who relies on his word is taking an unwarranted risk and ought to know 
better. !e English behaviour suggests that they share Louis’s view of the duties of 
princes — but they take his word nevertheless.
!e Dutch breach of faith is used by Marvell speci"cally to highlight the 
hypocrisy of the English court, in the passage which draws parallels between its 
behaviour towards the Parliament and that towards the other parties to the peace 
talks:
Pleas’d with their Numbers, yet in Valour wise,
!ey feign a parly, better to surprize:
!ey, that e’re long shall the rude Dutch upbraid,
Who in a time of Treaty durst invade. (ll. 231–4)
John M. Wallace has argued against Marvell’s authorship of the Second and !ird 
Advices partly on the ground that the author of the earlier poems wants simply the 
immediate cessation of the war, whereas Marvell can see that peace is not a panacea, 
and that the situation is more complex.95 On closer examination, it appears that the 
view of the war that emerges from !e last Instructions is twofold. On the one hand, 
the unconscionable way in which the court has conducted its dealings with Holland 
would make it impossible that the war could be continued with justice, even if the 
court had been willing to continue it at all. On the other, and from a more pragmatic 
point of view, Marvell can see that the court may be led to water, but it cannot be 
made to prosecute a naval "ght for which it very obviously has no stomach. !e 
relying on the promise.
94 Richard Tuck cites Giovanni Botero’s Ragion di stato as warning that ‘he who treats with 
princes should put no trust in friendship, kinship, treaty or any other tie which has no basis in interest 
…’: Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p. 66. Tuck’s view is that Grotius’s work, along with that of 
Hobbes and others, constituted ‘not … resistance to the culture of raison d’état, but rather … its 
remarkable transformation …’ (Philosophy and Government, p. xiv). !ough Tuck may well be correct 
to emphasize the extent to which the practical e/ect of Grotius’s work was to provide a justi'cation for, 
rather than a restraint upon, the exercise of state power, it is nevertheless clear that Grotius was much 
more concerned with the form of legality than were the writers in the raison d’état tradition.
95 Wallace, Destiny his Choice, pp. 152–5.
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pretence of belligerence, which has served merely as an excuse for milking the 
taxpayer, should be dropped. According to Wallace, though:
!e Last Instructions is not a peace poem at all … and if a year had not passed 
since the writing of the two Advices … one could assert categorically that all 
three of them could not have been the work of the same man. !e treaty when 
it came caused widespread dissatisfaction, and the $ippancy the two Advices 
was revealed the following year by the historical result of implementing their 
craven demands for a cessation of the war. Nowhere had they insisted that 
only an honourable peace was to be sought … (p. 155)
However, by the time Marvell had "nished !e last Instructions it was far too late to 
seek an honourable peace. !e peace that had been negotiated by Henry Coventry 
was already in place (ll. 821–4, 849–50) and a resumption of hostilities would 
necessarily have amounted to a breach of that agreement. Wallace, then, can hardly 
mean that Marvell thought it still possible to achieve an honourable peace at the time 
of writing !e last Instructions. Presumably his argument is that, had Marvell been 
writing a year earlier, he (unlike the author of !e Second Advice to a Painter) would 
have insisted that only an honourable peace should then have been sought. However, 
if Marvell believed that the war was unjust on the English side (at least) in 1667, there 
is no reason to assume that he thought di%erently in 1666. In heaping ridicule on the 
manner in which Peter Pett is treated as a scapegoat, he asks ‘Whose Counsel "rst did 
this mad War beget?’ (l. 769). !is implies that, with the bene"t of hindsight at least, 
he thought that the war had been a bad idea from the start. It is quite possible that he 
would have agreed in 1666 that it should be stopped as soon as possible.96
‘Monk looks on’
Ephim G. Fogel, like Wallace, has argued that the Second and !ird Advices express a 
view of the war and the combatants that is inconsistent with that put forward by 
Marvell in !e last Instructions. One of his arguments is based on the alleged dispari‐
96 Patterson, Marvell: !e Writer in Public Life, p. 87, points out that lines 313–30 of !e Second 
Advice question the justice of the war.
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ty between the treatment of Lord Albemarle in !e !ird Advice and in !e last 
Instructions. Broadly speaking, Fogel regards the Advice as derisive of the general and 
the Instructions as broadly sympathetic towards him.97 !is section, while primarily 
concerned with Monck’s behaviour during the "nal moments of Archibald Douglas, 
will incidentally attempt to show that, contrary to Fogel’s position, both satires 
display an ambivalent but generally unfavourable attitude towards Albemarle and 
cannot be regarded as mutually inconsistent on this point.
!e ambivalence of !e !ird Advice is relatively obvious. Albemarle is 
presented initially as fearsomely brave but as having lost some of his youthful skill as 
a soldier:
[He] swoll’n with sense of former glory won,
!ought Monck must be by Albemarle outdone.
Little he knew, with the same arm and sword,
How far the gentleman outcuts the lord. (ll. 39–42)
!ough outnumbered, he engages De Ruyter’s $eet in battle and "ghts "ercely (ll. 51–
70). Undoubted courage, however, is not enough (ll. 71–2). !e poet likens Albemar‐
le to ‘an old bustard, maimed, yet loath to yield’ (l. 91) and suggests that the tearing of 
a ‘large collop’ (l. 125) from a buttock unaccustomedly turned towards the enemy is 
Fortune’s ‘Gentle correction for his "ght so rash’ (l. 128). ‘Gentle’ is obviously a 
matter of degree, and the precise degree to which the poem itself attempts the ‘Gentle 
correction’ of Albemarle is a question requiring "ne judgment. !e ambivalence is 
evident also in the linking of Monck with Cromwell, in pointing out that they had 
each at di%erent times ‘displaced’ (l. 102) the Rump Parliament, and the suggestion 
that the injury to the general’s ‘rump’ might be seen as revenge for that displacement 
(ll. 129–30).
Lady Albemarle is portrayed, John Wallace says, ‘as so lewd and ignorant a 
woman that her hostile narrative about the government might appear to be discredit‐
97 Ephim G. Fogel, ‘!e Case for Internal Evidence: Salmons in Both, or Some Caveats for 
Canonical Scholars’,  Bulletin of the New York Public Library 63 (1959), pp. 223–236, 292–308.
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ed before it began’. If the poem has o#en been regarded as unworthy of Marvell’s 
abilities, it is at least in part because ‘point of view is so badly handled’98 that the 
criticism of the court loses some of its force in being put into the mouth of a witness 
who, as she speaks, undermines her own credibility. On this view, however, if the 
poem is a failure, it is at least an ambitious one. By leaving the attack on the handling 
of the war and other aspects of the court’s behaviour to somebody whose own 
reliability is doubtful, the satirist avoids raising false hopes that the situation will 
easily be remedied. In the envoi, Lady Albemarle is compared to Cassandra (l. 447), 
implying that she is telling the truth but fated not to be believed;99 indeed, the poet 
urges the king to believe her, thereby going some way towards assuaging the reader’s 
doubts. !e suggestion may be that the satirist’s own position is not much better: he 
is likely to be believed, but his lines may inspire laughter rather than a serious attempt 
at repairing the damage he describes.
Among other things, the Duchess suggests that her husband’s talents have not 
been put to their best possible use in giving him a naval command:
One valiant man on land, and he must be
Commanded out to stop their leaks at sea! (ll. 204–05)
In summary, the poem acknowledges Albemarle’s bravery and recognizes that there is 
at least an argument for attributing the mishandling of the Four Days’ Battle to age 
and understandable misjudgment and, because of decisions taken by others, to his 
being out of his element.
If !e !ird Advice is a little less unequivocally derisive of Albemarle than 
Fogel has taken it to be, !e last Instructions is considerably less laudatory than it 
might appear. !e reader "rst encounters the general at line 596 where he is initially 
98 Wallace, Destiny his Choice, p. 154.
99 On the Duchess as truth-teller, see Martin Dzelzainis, ‘Presbyterian Sibyl’: Truth-telling and 
Gender in Andrew Marvell’s !e !ird Advice to a Painter’, in Rhetoric, Women and Politics in Early 
Modern England, ed. Jennifer Richards and Alison !orne (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 
pp. 111–28.
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presented as a sympathetic "gure. He is le# behind to do his best with insu(cient 
ammunition and unpaid, mutinous men when the ‘feather’d Gallants’ (l. 597) $ee 
back to London at the approach of the Dutch. He had, we are told, o#en complained 
of the inadequacy the defences but, instead of ‘succour’, had received ‘Confusion, 
folly, treachr’y, fear, neglect’ (l. 610). His anger, grief and frustration at the capture of 
the Royal Charles is compared to the reaction of a helpless tigress who sees, from the 
far side of the river, her cubs taken by ‘Robbers’ (l. 624). So far, Albemarle is present‐
ed as a perspicacious and conscientious "gure, let down by the greed and incompe‐
tence of his superiors. !e comparison with the tigress, however, suggests that 
frustration may lead him to act in an ine%ectually destructive way:
At her own Breast her useless claws does arm;
She tears herself since him she cannot harm. (l. 627–8)
Recent discussion of the poem has tended to concentrate on the passage describing 
the death of Archibald Douglas.100 A number of commentators have suggested that 
that sacri"ce is excessive, or that there is an element of self-indulgence to Douglas’s 
acquiescence in it. So, Elsie Duncan-Jones asked whether Marvell was not hinting ‘at 
the self-love and self-congratulation, not to say narcissism, that might be part of a 
heroic suicide, however sanctioned by naval tradition?’101 John Creaser frankly sees 
the young man’s death as a waste:
A#er all, his death, however courageous, was stubborn and futile. Had he not 
disdained to save his ‘precious life’ (l. 671) with the ‘known art’ (l. 672) of 
swimming, the Dutch would have been no better o% and the ‘sad 
Stream’ (l. 692) would not have needed to drink his ashes. Even in the heroic 
calm with which he approaches death, there is a trace of the potential narcis‐
sism which made him swim from the peeping nymphs, since the ‘secret 
Joy’ (l. 675) that he feels comes from the presumed admiration of his 
100 Chernaik and Dzelzainis note that ‘this was one of the two passages most frequently cited in 
papers delivered at the 1996 conference’ on Marvell and Liberty: Marvell and Liberty, ed. Chernaik 
and Dzelzainis, p. 15.
101 Elsie Duncan-Jones, ‘Marvell: A Great Master of Words’, Proceedings of the British Academy 
41 (1975), pp. 267–90 (p. 278).
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general.102
Paul Hammond similarly takes up Duncan-Jones’s suggestion of narcissism, noting 
that Marvell’s ‘descriptions of his hair and cheek contribute nothing to any martial 
image, but present a doubly narcissistic movement as the “yellow locks” seek them‐
selves, and also court his own cheek”’. Hammond adds that, in line 676, ‘Monck’s gaze 
is the homosocial gaze of soldier on soldier’.103 
It is worth pointing out, however, that if the decision to sacri"ce the young 
soldier’s life was ‘stubborn and futile’, the blame for that decision must attach, not to 
Douglas himself, but to the general who ‘looks on’ while it is within his power to stop 
it. Creaser’s remarks draw attention, as Hammond’s do not, to the fact that Monck’s 
relationship to Douglas was not simply that of fellow-soldier but rather that of 
commanding o(cer to subordinate.
!e rigidity of the rule that, without orders to do so, a soldier should not leave 
his post in any circumstances was a commonplace. It is the "rst speci"c duty men‐
tioned by Aristotle, in the "rst chapter of the book in Nicomachean Ethics that deals 
with ‘justice and injustice’:
Law requires us to do the acts of a courageous person — not, for example, to 
desert our post, run away or throw down our weapons — as well as those of a 
temperate person — such as not to commit adultery or wanton violence — 
and those of an even-tempered person — not to hit or slander anyone, for 
instance.104
Grotius treats the rule as a special case, an exception to the general principle that 
human laws should not require a person to su%er death rather than breach them:
I do not deny, but that some Acts of Virtue may by a human law be com‐
manded, though under the evident Hazard of Death. As for a Soldier not to 
quit his Post; but it is not easily to be imagined, that such was the Intention of 
the Legislator; and it is very probable that Men have not received so extensive 
a Power over themselves or others, except in Cases where extreme Necessity 
102 John Creaser, ‘“As one scap’t strangely from Captivity”: Marvell and Existential Liberty’, 
Marvell and Liberty, ed. Chernaik and Dzelzainis pp. 144–172 (pp. 155–6).
103 Paul Hammond, ‘Marvell’s Sexuality’, !e Seventeenth Century 11 (1996), pp. 87–123 
(pp. 105–06).
104 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. and ed. Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), p. 82 (1129b).
117
118
119
requires it. For all human Laws are, and ought to be so enacted, that there 
should be some Allowance for human Frailty. (De iure belli, I.IV.VII; Rights, 
p. 357).
(!is occurs in an important passage in which Grotius considers the question 
whether the law can compel a person to submit to being killed rather than o%er 
resistance to the sovereign power. See also De iure belli, III.IV.XIII (Rights, p. 1288), 
where he again refers to the rule that a soldier should not quit his post.)
As Douglas’s commanding o(cer, Albemarle was in a position to order the 
soldier to swim to safety. !e fact that he did not do so indicates that (unless he was 
guilty of appalling inadvertence) he took a deliberate decision that the young Scot 
should be sacri"ced. As Marvell relates the story, Douglas is fully aware that the 
general is present and can see his situation. By doing nothing, Albemarle makes his 
will as clear as if he had signalled a direct order: Douglas is to remain on the ship. 
!is being the case, we can conclude that when ‘secret Joy in his calm Soul does 
rise’ (l. 675) it is not simply or primarily a narcissistic pleasure in the fact that his 
courage is evident to his commanding o(cer. In large part, it arises from his aware‐
ness that his impending death will not be the result of a stubborn and pointless 
adherence to standing orders. If Douglas had been completely free of narcissistic self-
regard and had simply acted in the strictest accordance with his duties, he would not 
have behaved any di%erently. To the extent that he was motivated by narcissism, it 
reinforced his obedience to duty. If indeed his life was thrown away to no good e%ect, 
the fault did not lie with him.
Monck’s reasons for allowing Douglas to be burned alive are not di(cult to 
guess at. It is true that, on a strict calculation of material advantage and disadvantage, 
the Dutch were no worse o% for Douglas’s death. Monck, however, presumably 
reasoned that the expectation that no soldier on the English side would remain at his 
post would encourage the Dutch to continue upriver to London, con"dent that they 
would meet no serious resistance. !e terrible death of just one soldier who refused 
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to abandon ship would at least be a step towards undermining that con"dence. 
Douglas’s life was the biggest but not the only sacri"ce that Albemarle made to the 
objective of discouraging the Dutch advance. He was responsible, too, for a decision 
to sink ships in the river in an attempt to block the invaders’ progress.
Albemarle gave his report to the House of Commons on the ‘miscarriages at 
Chatham and Sheerness’ on 31 October 1667. In it, he blames Peter Pett for failure to 
supply tools and for not having moved the Royal Charles away, though ordered to do 
so nine or ten weeks previously. He says that he, Albemarle, ordered the sinking of 
ships both inside and outside the chain. At "rst, he was advised by Pett and the 
‘masters of attendance’ that three ships outside the chain would be enough, then that 
another two were needed. !en Sir Edward Spragge found another passage which the 
pilots and masters of attendance had not previously thought deep enough to allow 
great ships to pass, but which was in fact deep enough. He ordered the sinking of ‘the 
Sancta Maria, a great Dutch prize, to be sunk in the deepest place between the two 
foresaid ships; and I judged it so necessary to be done that I charged Commissioner 
Pett, and the masters of attendance, on peril of their lives, to do it by morning’. 
Instead, ‘by the carelessness of the pilot, and masters of attendance’, she was run 
aground. Albemarle states that, if she had been sunk where he ordered, the Dutch 
would not have been able to get through.105 It appears to have been partly as a result 
of Albemarle’s report that Pett was brought before the bar of the House of Commons.
Marvell, it is clear, deplores what he portrays (!e last Instructions, ll. 765–90) 
as the grossly unjust treatment of Pett, who is made to carry all the blame for the 
catastrophe.106 He also deprecates a similar decision to sink ships further upriver in 
the !ames:
105 Anchitell Grey, Debates of the Houses of Commons, From the Year 1667 to the Year 1694, 10 
volumes (London: T. Becket and P. A. De Hondt, 1769), I, 23–7
106 For Pett’s treatment, see Poems and Letters, II, 370, n. to l. 767, citing Henry Savile; !e 
Poems of Andrew Marvell, p. 388, n. to l. 767.
119
120
121
O(cious fear, however, to prevent
Our loss, does so much more our loss augment.
!e Dutch had robb’d those Jewels of the Crown:
Our Merchant-men, lest they should burn, we drown.
So when the Fire did not enough devour,
!e Houses were demolish’d near the Tow’r.
!ose Ships, that yearly from their teeming Howl,
Unloaded here the Birth of either Pole;
Furrs from the North, and Silver from the West,
From the South Perfumes, Spices from the East;
From Gambo Gold, and from the Ganges Gems;
Take a short Voyage underneath the !ames.
Once a deep River, now with Timber $oor’d,
And shrunk, lest Navigable, to a Ford. (ll. 709–22)
Making a loss greater in order to limit it and sinking ships ‘lest they should burn’ are 
perfect examples of what Carey called ‘the self-defeating reversibility of our actions’. 
!at is not necessarily to say, however, that in this instance the reversibility was 
inevitable. As the parliamentary representative of a sea-faring constituency, Marvell 
evidently feels chagrin at the end to which these well-travelled merchant ships have 
come. !e passage contains no suggestion that he thought the sacri"ce necessary or 
worthwhile.
Albemarle’s actions are not necessarily as open to criticism as those that 
Marvell describes. He sank a few ships, including a captured Dutch prize, in an 
attempt to stop the Dutch from breaking through the chain. ‘O(cious fear’, in 
contrast, is said to have ordered the wholesale scuttling of English merchantmen, 
doing the enemy’s work for it out of panic. As line 711 makes clear, the Dutch had 
already reached Chatham when the merchantmen were sunk further upriver, so the 
failure of Albemarle’s tactic should have been apparent. It may be, therefore, that 
Monck’s decision is distinguishable from the later one, though the parallels between 
them are nevertheless suggestive. To someone who was familiar with Monck’s role 
and actions in the Chatham disaster, !e last Instructions can hardly have seemed an 
unequivocally favourable appraisal. At best, it leaves open the possibility that the 
sacri"ce of Douglas’s life and of the ships was a necessary, though high, price to pay 
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for the safety of the capital. !e probability, however, is the other way.
Marvell implies that the Dutch pulled back, not because they were deterred by 
Douglas’s awful display of heroism, or Albemarle’s strategic response to their incur‐
sion, but because they were sated with easy pickings:
 Now (nothing more at Chatham le# to burn)
!e Holland Squadron leisurely return:
And spight of Ruperts and of Albemarles,
To Ruyter’s Triumph lead the captive Charles.
!e pleasing sight he o#en does prolong:
Her Masts erect, tough Cordage, Timbers strong,
Her moving Shape; all these he does survey,
And all admires, but most his easie Prey. (ll. 723–30)
!e case is not clear beyond doubt, but seems that the likelihood is that Monck’s 
actions (and, in the case of Douglas, his inaction) were not e%ective to impede the 
Dutch invasion and were not the cause of their withdrawal.
In terms of strict legality, the treatment of Douglas cannot be regarded as an 
injustice. !e captain was under a duty to obey orders and Albemarle had both a 
right to command him and a duty to defend the shipyard. Accordingly, Albemarle’s 
tacit order that the young soldier should allow himself to be burned to death did not 
amount to iniuria, though it can hardly be denied that it was damnum. 
!e tendency of recent scholarship has been to accept the Second and !ird 
Advices as the work of Marvell. To the extent that it answers one of Fogel’s reasons for 
denying the attribution of the !ird Advice to Marvell, the present argument is 
consistent with that tendency. Annabel Patterson favours Marvell’s authorship, "rst, 
on the basis of the authority of the Popple manuscript (Bodleian MS Eng. Poet d. 49) 
which, she argues, is a collection of Marvell’s verse assembled by people who knew 
what they were doing ‘as if for a new edition’.107 !e second part of her argument is 
based on internal evidence, such as verbal echoes, the reworking of rhymes that 
107 Annabel Patterson, ‘Lady State’s First Two Sittings: Marvell’s Satiric Canon’, SEL 40 (2000), 
pp. 395–411 (p. 398).
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Marvell had used in earlier poems and the use of characteristic devices, such as the 
introduction of a second speaker (the European king in !e First Anniversary, the 
panicking sailor who curses Noah ‘and all his race’, in !e Second Advice).108 Nigel 
Smith argues, mainly on the basis of ‘detailed attention to diction, prosody and 
rhyming’, that the two satires ‘contain’ (not necessarily exclusively) the work of 
Marvell.109 !e ‘computational approach’ of John Burrows supports both the authori‐
ty of the Popple manuscript and the attribution of the Second and !ird Advices to 
Marvell.110
It is clear that the two poems share some of the concerns of !e last Instruc‐
tions with such questions as the justice of the war and of the behaviour of the court 
generally, and the ‘dominion’ of the sea. !e passage beginning with line 317 of !e 
Second Advice is described by both Patterson and Smith as bringing into question the 
justness of the war.111 !e passage is a litany of the various ways in which the war has 
failed to achieve its objectives, and generally been counterproductive, the "rst being:
If to espouse the ocean all the pains,
Princes unite, and will forbid the bains. (ll. 319–20)
!e espousal of the ocean is the ceremony by which the Doge of Venice each year 
threw a wedding ring into the sea, as Nedham’s translation of Selden has it, ‘for the 
perpetuating (saith Paulus Merula) of their dominion over the Sea’.112 As we have 
seen, Marvell alludes to this ceremony in ‘!e Character of Holland’ line 136, where 
he speaks of ‘our armed Bucentore’ (and reference has already been made to it in !e 
108 One parallel that does not seem to have been noticed between !e Second Advice and !e last 
Instructions is the innuendo that Clarendon has su/ered a ‘rupture’ or hernia: Second Advice, ll. 117–8; 
!e last Instructions, ll. 473–4. !e latter work further implies that the Chancellor might have 
undergone a drastic remedy.
109 Poems of Andrew Marvell, p. 322.
110 John Burrows, ‘Andrew Marvell and the “Painter Satires”: A Computational Approach to 
their Authorship’, Modern Language Review 100 (2005), pp. 281–97.
111 ‘!e other motive, and the second major indecorum of !e Second Advice, is to question the 
justice of the war’: Patterson, !e Writer in Public Life, p. 87; ‘!e questioning of the justness of the 
war in !e Second Advice … reads almost like a list of the committee’s 'ndings’: Poems of Andrew 
Marvell, p. 325.
112 See above, p. 102.
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Second Advice, ll. 73–4). To say that ‘Princes unite, and will forbid the bains’ (i.e. 
‘banns’: they will object that the marriage would be unlawful) is probably to acknowl‐
edge that the opinion and practice of sovereigns is already tending to favour the 
Grotian theory of Mare liberum over the Seldenian Mare clausum. To present this as 
in part a consequence of the Second Dutch War may be to suggest that misguided 
English belligerence in the short term has contributed to an enormous long-term 
loss, that of the right and ability to control and exploit the oceans. If the Second 
Advice is Marvell’s, these lines suggest that he had come to the conclusion that 
English claims to sea-dominion, which he seemed to favour in ‘!e Character of 
Holland’, could no longer be sustained.
In this respect, they are consistent with !e last Instructions, the ending of 
which shows that England no longer has the means to maintain her dominion over 
the sea: one of her great ships has been seized as prize, two others have been burnt 
and in any case, even without this damage in$icted by the enemy, the $eet would be 
out of commission. !e Royal Charles, ‘that fatal Pledge of Sea-Command’, is now 
held by De Ruyter, while the other Charles’s claim to such command is merely the 
inscription on the most tri$ing coin in circulation:
!e Court in Farthing yet it self does please,
A female Stewart, there Rules the four Seas.
But Fate does still accumulate our Woes,
And Richmond here113 commands, as Ruyter those. (ll. 761–4)
Even the sea-god that could once be called ‘our Neptune’ seems now to have changed 
sides (!e last Instructions, ll. 543–6, 749–50).
Similarity in di"erence
Separated as they are by fourteen years that included the succession of the Protec‐
torate to the ‘Common wealth’, the collapse of the former and the Restoration of the 
113 Poems and Letters prints ‘here’ rather than ‘her’, following the original publication in Poems 
on A"airs of State of 1689.
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Stuart monarchy, it is not surprising that these two poems, both of them dealing with 
hostilities between England and Holland, should have marked dissimilarities as well 
as similarities in their attitudes to Anglo-Dutch relations. Both poems charge the 
Dutch with unconscionable behaviour — speci"cally, that they ‘invade’114 English 
waters under cover of diplomatic negotiations — but while the earlier poem recounts 
this alleged per"dy in a tone of outrage, the later one suggests that the English are in 
no position to criticize, their king and his advisers being guilty of similar dishonesty.
A comparison of the two poems does not, without further evidence, reveal 
whether Marvell was persuaded by Grotian arguments. In ‘!e Character of Holland’, 
he seems to be using Grotius primarily as a means of accusing the Dutch of 
hypocrisy, and himself to endorse Selden’s counterarguments as to the possibility of 
owning the sea. By the time he comes to write !e last Instructions, his main target is 
the English court, against whom he levels charges that owe more than a little to 
Grotius’s precepts as to what may lawfully be done during war.
114 ‘!e Character of Holland’, l. 117, !e last Instructions, l. 234.
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Chapter 3. !e problem of justice in Marvell’s 
pastoral and lyric poetry
‘Translated, and by whom’
In chapter 1, it was suggested incidentally that ‘Tom May’s Death’ is su!ciently 
consistent with ‘An Horatian Ode’ to remove any serious doubt as to their being the 
work of a single author. Nonetheless, those who would like to deny Marvell’s author‐
ship of the later poem can draw some support from the fact that it contains a number 
of examples of what might be called typically Marvellian #gures, but which appear in 
a looser or more di$use form than they do elsewhere in Marvell’s poetry, giving the 
poem more the appearance of an imitation of Marvell than of the genuine Marvellian 
article. So, the translator translated, not being precisely a re%exive #gure, does not 
seem so tightly self-enclosed as ‘the Mower mown’.1 May is translated (l. 26), in the 
sense of being carried across, by Death; the mower, more economically, is mown by 
Death’s ‘charmingly absurd colleague’2 — himself.
Another example can be found in the use of syllepsis and similar #gures. 
What Rosalie Colie calls the failure of parallelism in ‘'e Picture of little T. C.’ (‘Nip 
in the blossome all our hopes and 'ee’, l. 40)3 is, as she points out, itself paralleled by 
a ‘simpler example of a grammatical pivot’ in ‘Tom May’s Death’: ‘By this May to 
himself and them was come’ (l. 25). 'is, however, is not the only example of such a 
device in ‘Tom May’s Death’: there is a second, when Jonson accuses May of ‘Aposta‐
tizing from our Arts and us’ (l. 73). Colie is right to describe the #rst example from 
1 On the related questions of re$exivity and self-enclosure in Marvell’s poetry, see Christopher 
Ricks, “‘Its Own Resemblance’, in Approaches to Marvell, ed. Patrides, pp. 108–35.
2 John Creaser, ‘Marvell’s E&ortless Superiority’, Essays in Criticism 20 (1970), pp. 403–23 
(p. 408).
3 Rosalie L. Colie, ‘My Ecchoing Song’: Andrew Marvell’s Poetry of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1970), pp. 85, 93. 'e two following quotations are also from p. 93.
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‘May’ as ‘simpler’; in ‘Little T. C.’ the #gure, grammatically suspect though it may be, 
ful#ls an important function. As Colie says:
‘Nip in the blossome all our hopes and 'ee’ plays, with degrees of 
metaphor as well as with ‘nip’ as a syntactical pivot: the line begins as a 
cliché and gains power as we realise that T. C. is taken, throughout the 
poem, as a ‘%ower,’ and that both girl and %ower are taken as symbols of 
transience.
Just at the moment that it impinges on the reader’s consciousness that the nipping ‘in 
the blossome’ of all our hopes must, if it occurs, entail the nipping of the %ower-girl 
too, the implication is made unavoidably explicit, with ‘and 'ee’. 'e e$ect is to 
underscore the sense of potential loss and to admonish the reader against a eu‐
phemistic, or simply a careless, interpretation of the cliché, just as the interpretation 
is on the point of being made. It is also to make concrete the indeterminate phrase ‘all 
our hopes’.4 On the face of it, the device does not seem to be doing anything nearly so 
useful when it occurs in ‘Tom May’s Death’. Of May’s coming ‘to himself and them’, 
Colie justly remarks that it ‘allows a rather doggerel wit, #tting the kind of inferior 
accomplishment Marvell attributes to May’. 'e e$ect is funny, apt in its awkward‐
ness, enacting May’s initial disorientation and the shock of coming to himself and — 
the real shock — to them, but it could easily be experienced as a disappointment a(er 
‘Little T. C.’ (and ‘May’, it will be remembered, does come immediately a(er ‘Little 
T. C.’ in the folio).
'e second time that the device occurs in ‘Tom May’s Death’, it is spoken by 
Marvell’s ‘Jonson’. Its articulation by a character in a dramatic setting gives to the 
#gure a new quality: Jonson is attempting to be severely judicious, but in the end is 
unable to withhold an expression of personal a$ront (‘and us’) at May’s apostasy. (It is 
for this reason that this second example is treated as syllepsis and not merely as 
belonging to the more general category, zeugma. 'e contrast between the abstrac‐
4 Compare ‘On Paradise Lost’, ll. 33–4 where, by keeping ‘things divine … inviolate’, Milton 
likewise preserves himself. 
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tion of ‘Arts’ and the concrete ‘us’ emphasizes the double character of Jonson’s 
objection.) Gerard Reedy believes that the personal animus is not merely ‘Jonson’s’ 
but Marvell’s own.5 One possible reason why Marvell might well have felt anger 
towards May has been outlined in the #rst chapter, that is, that the latter had seemed 
to make too easily a decision which had cost the former much di!culty. On the other 
hand, one might take the view that Marvell manages to be precise and controlled in 
his depiction of Jonson’s sense of betrayal, and that the use of ‘and us’ is a good 
example of this.
'is may give some inkling as to why ‘May’ was placed a(er ‘Little T. C.’ in the 
folio. 'e two poems have a thematic similarity which is merely #gured in their 
sharing of an unusual grammatical device. ‘Little T. C.’ too looks at the idea of a 
retributive justice, and #nds it unsatisfactory and carrying the potential for great 
injustice. 'e girl is warned to
Gather the Flow’rs, but spare the Buds;
Lest Flora angry at thy crime,
To kill her Infants in their prime,
Do quickly make th’Example Yours;
And, ere we see,
Nip in the blossome all our hopes and 'ee. (ll. 35–40)
As Colie points out, what Marvell has achieved in this poem is paradoxical almost to 
the point of self-contradiction: a carpe "orem poem that enjoins discrimination. 'e 
paradox is one of the elements contributing to a sense of shock and discomfort that 
the poem produces. Another such element is the fact that Marvell considers as a real 
possibility the death of a young child. However, these elements alone are not enough 
to account for the powerfully disturbing e$ect of the poem. What is most shocking is 
the suggestion that a young child might have the same liability as an adult to be 
punished for the harm she innocently does. To a twenty-#rst-century reader, at least, 
this is immediately experienced as unjust, but a little re%ection makes it clear that the 
5 Gerard Reedy, S.J., ‘“An Horatian Ode” and “Tom May’s Death”, SEL 20 (1980), pp. 137–51.
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true situation is even worse: the death of a child, and with it ‘all our hopes’, bears no 
necessary relation to the harm done by him or her, innocently or otherwise.
‘Ev’n Beasts must be with justice slain’
Similar ideas about the nature of justice play a part in ‘'e Nymph complaining for 
the death of her Faun’. 'is, more than any other poem of Marvell’s, seems to o$er the 
reader a multitude of possible, yet mutually inconsistent, interpretations. It contains 
unmistakable references to Canticles, raising the expectation that it is a religious 
allegory.6 'e appearance of ‘Troopers’ in the #rst line, in conjunction with the killing 
of an ino$ensive creature, adds to this the possibility of its being a political allegory.7 
'e poem, however, includes elements pointing #rmly away from an allegorical 
reading. Its recollection of classical laments for dead pets is one such indicator. 
However, the main di!culty for those who would read the poem as allegory is that all 
such readings seem to be incomplete or contradicted by another element in the 
poem. For example, as Le Comte points out, the nymph’s denial that the troopers can 
derive ‘any good’ (l. 6) from the fawn’s death poses a problem for an interpretation 
that sees the fawn as standing for Christ.8 Geo$rey Hartman acknowledges that it is 
an error to seek ‘a sustained allegory’ in this poem and proposes instead that it is a 
‘brief ’ one for a process by which detachment from the world is achieved in stages, 
when a ‘love that has turned from temporal ful#lment to temporal consolation 
becomes a disconsolateness which is love still, but removed from this world.’9 
Graham Parry says that the poem’s political allegory ‘cannot be subjected to a clear 
6 Karina Williamson, ‘Marvell’s ‘'e Nymph Complaining for the Death of Her Fawn”: A Reply’, 
Modern Philology, 51 (1954) pp. 268–71, responding to Edward S. Le Comte, ‘Marvell’s “'e Nymph 
Complaining for the Death of Her Fawn”’, Modern Philology 50 (1952), pp. 97–101.
7 Yvonne L. Sandstroem, ‘Marvell’s “Nymph Complaining” as Historical Allegory’ SEL 30 (1990) 
93–114 provides one such allegorical reading.
8 Le Comte, ‘Marvell’s “'e Nymph Complaining for the Death of Her Fawn”’, p. 98.
9 Geo&rey Hartman, ‘“'e Nymph Complaining for the Death of her Fawn”: A Brief Allegory’, 
Essays in Criticism 18 (1968), pp. 113–35 (p. 119). Hartman sees ‘the progress of the soul’ as an 
example of this process, which is a general one. 
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exposition’ because it is concealed by a ‘pastoral apparatus’ the signi#cation of which 
is inconsistent because it is changing: ‘Pastoral poetry is opening into political poetry, 
but the change is not complete, and Marvell here seems to be feeling his way.’10
'e title contains the #rst of the poem’s many ambiguities. 'e ambiguity of 
the word ‘Faun’ has attracted some discussion.11 Of more interest for present purpos‐
es is ‘complaining’. It indicates, primarily, the obvious fact that the poem is a lament, 
but it also has a legal meaning,12 and it becomes very clear that, as well as lamenting 
her slain pet, the nymph also claims that its killing was the denial or violation of a 
right:
It cannot dye so. Heavens King
Keeps register of every thing:
And nothing may we use in vain.
Ev’n Beasts must be with justice slain;
Else Men are made their Deodands.
'ough they should wash their guilty hands
In this warm life-blood, which doth part
From thine, and wound me to the Heart,
Yet could they not be clean: their Stain
Is dye’d in such a Purple Grain.
'ere is not such another in
'e World, to o$er for their Sin. (ll. 13–24)
'ere are a number of points to be made about this. In the #rst place, the nymph is 
attempting to discover whether and how the wrong committed by the troopers can be 
put right. So far as she can see, it cannot. She protests that she does not wish the 
killers ill (ll. 7–8), and it soon becomes clear that at least part of the reason for this is 
that their punishment would be ine$ectual to undo the wrong they have done: ‘'ere 
10 Graham Parry, ‘What is Marvell’s Nymph Complaining About?’, Critical Survey 5 (1993) 244–
51 (p. 249).
11 See John J. Teunisson and Evelyn J. Hinz, ‘What is the Nymph Complaining For?’, ELH 45 
(1978), pp. 410–28 (pp. 415–6).
12 ‘Complain’ in one form or another occurs 11 times in Miscellaneous Poems, including the title 
of the poem under discussion. In several places the meaning is either unequivocally legal (‘Horatian 
Ode’, l. 37) or, as here, the word carries an important though secondary legal signi/cance. Haber has 
argued that ‘Remedies themselves complain’ (‘Damon the Mower’, l. 30) is Marvell’s version of 
'eocritus’s pun on pharmakon, which means both ‘remedy’ and ‘poison’: Judith Haber, Pastoral and 
the Poetics of Self-contradiction: !eocritus to Marvell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
p. 10. One may suspect the presence of a legal pun too, since both ‘remedy’ and ‘complain’ have a legal 
signi/cance.
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is not such another in / 'e World, to o$er for their Sin.’ 'e second thing to note is 
that the nymph attempts to posit an exact equivalence — what might be called a 
quantitative concept of justice — between the killing by a pet of a human and that by 
a human of a pet. ‘Deodand’ was a term applied to a chattel (a term that could 
include a tame animal) which had occasioned the death of a human, and which was 
therefore ‘forfeit to the king, to be applied to pious uses’.13 Critics have sometimes 
been surprised that the childish vocabulary of the nymph should include such a 
technical word. It is indeed a surprise that she uses it, but this is not an e$ect that 
Marvell achieves at the expense of verisimilitude. Blackstone, as quoted in Elsie 
Duncan-Jones’s note, goes on to remark that ‘Deodands are granted out to lords of 
manors … to the perversion of their original design.’ Deodand was experienced, 
inevitably, as a tax;14 but was a particularly objectionable one because its imposition 
was arbitrary and unpredictable, being occasioned by accidental death. It was not, in 
other words, a term that would be remote from the lives of farm labourers and others 
who worked with dangerous implements.
'e lines quoted above successively depict the failure of a number of di$erent 
models of justice. 'e inverted application of the concept of deodand to the human 
killers produces an absurd result which casts doubt on the e!cacy (and fairness) of 
its actual application. 'e absence of ‘such another … to o$er for their Sin’ suggests 
that reparation (and still more so retribution) may too o(en be the adding of one 
wrong to another rather than the cancelling out of the original wrong by its opposite. 
'e nymph chooses to die too, but without any sense that her death atones for the 
killing of the fawn. In this she resembles Astraea rather than Christ15 — leaving 
13 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 1st ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1765; facsimile rpt. University of Chicago Press, 1979) Vol. 1, pp. 290–3, quoted by Duncan-Jones in 
Poems and Letters, I, 251, note to l. 17.
14 Blackstone’s discussion of the subject occurs in a chapter with the title ‘Of the King’s Revenue’. 
See also below, p. 148, on the subject of escheat.
15 Hartman, ‘“'e Nymph Complaining for the Death of her Fawn”: A Brief Allegory’, p. 119, 
sees the fawn, not the nymph, as resembling Astraea because it undergoes an apotheosis; Margarita 
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behind a world in which justice has failed, rather than allowing herself to be sacri‐
#ced in order to restore it. 'is may suggest one possible reason for the apparent 
proliferation of arguments or themes in the poem. Marvell is concerned, perhaps 
primarily, with the abstract idea of justice, and the di$ering possible interpretations 
are concrete, though incomplete, workings out of the central problem. 'us the lines, 
‘'ere is not such another in / 'e World, to o$er for their Sin’ quite obviously call 
Christ to mind, yet there is no sustained allegory of Christ’s passion and death, nor is 
there an obvious parallel between the killing of a fawn (a small matter, except to the 
nymph) and the sins of humankind. Christ is evoked because his su$ering was the 
type of an act of restorative justice, such as the nymph cannot imagine as now being 
possible.
It may be the case that the nymph is overreacting outrageously to the kind of 
minor event that happens every day. But if she is right in asserting that reparation for 
the fawn’s death is impossible, then the trivial nature of the actual occurrence is no 
real consolation. If justice is not available in such a small matter, it may not be 
available in larger ones either. 'e troopers’ action has been ‘wanton’: arbitrary, 
unpredictable and without good cause. 'is is one of the reasons why the event 
described in the poem does not seem trivial, despite the reader’s not sharing the 
nymph’s emotional attachment to the animal.16
'is, it hardly needs to be said, is not put forward as a full account of the 
poem. For one thing, only the frame of the story has yet been discussed. 'e framed 
Stocker /nds allusions to the returning Astraea of Virgil’s Eclogue IV in the ‘Letter to Doctor 
Ingelo’ (Margarita Stocker, ‘Remodeling Virgil: Marvell’s New Astraea’, Studies in Philology 84 (1987), 
pp. 159–79) and in the picture of Maria at the end of ‘Upon Appleton House’ (Margarita Stocker, 
Apocalyptic Marvell: the Second Coming in Seventeenth-Century Poetry, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 
1986), pp. 137–64). If Astraea is indeed a presence in ‘'e Nymph complaining’, it is the departing 
goddess who ‘terras … reliquit’ in Ovid’s Metamorphosis Bk. 1, rather than Virgil’s returning one.
16 'e starting point for the Jungian reading of Teunissen and Hinz is the conviction that the 
‘emotional impact generated by the poem … must be in proportion to the instance used to evoke it, 
and generally speaking grief over the death of a pet is not a subject for high tragedy and, if treated in 
that way, would normally produce only bathos.’ (‘What is the Nymph Complaining for?’, p. 410.)
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narrative, the story of Sylvio’s gi(, his betrayal of the nymph and his replacement as 
the object of her love, would appear to be the real substance of the poem, and it is 
related only tenuously to the theme of justice that is the subject of this thesis. Yet, 
though tenuous, the relationship is real. Sylvio, in the nymph’s view, has done her an 
injury. She may have had no right to prevent him from taking his heart, but his 
actions have (she implies) given rise to a legitimate expectation that he would not do 
so. He has beguiled her. She does not say how; possibly the memory of her own 
credulity is too painful for her to make more than a glancing reference to it. 'e 
whole course of the courtship (or whatever it was) is related in twelve lines out of the 
poem’s 122, and the #rst two of these immediately reveal that it did not go well. 'e 
end of the a$air is brie%y told:
But Sylvio soon had me beguil’d
'is waxed tame, while he grew wild
And quite regardless of my Smart,
Le( me his Faun, but took his Heart. (ll. 33–6)
'e nymph, it seems, is bravely trying to be objective, to assign to Sylvio’s breach with 
her the importance it properly bears in the overall scheme of things. But, as she 
exaggerates the importance of the fawn’s slaying, she understates that of Sylvio’s 
betrayal. Indeed, it is arguably because she has played down the latter that she 
attaches an excessive importance to the former. 'is draws attention to the relation‐
ship between the two losses, that is to say, to the extent to which the fawn has been a 
substitute for Sylvio’s love. If the death of the fawn, whatever its signi#cance in the 
history of the universe, is no minor matter to the nymph, then neither is Sylvio’s 
breach of faith, despite her almost dismissive allocation of four lines to its narration.
But, as we have seen, the nymph complains for the death of her fawn; that is, 
she pleads for justice and redress. Has she any reason to expect redress for Sylvio’s 
beguiling? Part of the huntsman’s deception, it is implied, is that he has presented the 
fawn as one thing — a token of love — while intending it as something else entirely 
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— compensation for the withdrawal of love; or rather, since love can never be 
guaranteed, for the withdrawal of his presence:
Said He, look how your Huntsman here
Hath taught a Faun to hunt his Dear.
…
And quite regardless of my Smart
Le( me his Faun, but took his Heart. (ll. 31–2, 35–6)
It has to be admitted that we hear only the nymph’s side of the story, and that Sylvio 
may be innocent of the cynical calculation here ascribed to him. What is beyond 
doubt, however, is that the nymph believes him to have been false from the 
beginning. 'e #rst word she uses to describe him is ‘Unconstant’ and she continues 
with a reference to the time, at the beginning of the relationship, ‘when yet / I had not 
found him counterfeit’ (ll. 25–6). In the nymph’s view — the only view we have — he 
has been consistently untrue throughout the entire duration of the relationship.
A(er his departure, if the nymph wishes to minimize her losses, she has little 
choice but to take Sylvio’s o$ering in the spirit in which she believes it was intended. 
'e responsibilities that he has assumed towards her have been regarded by him, 
without her knowledge, as being in the nature of contractual obligations, capable of 
being discharged by payment of compensation. It may be signi#cant that the only 
unambiguous reference to the fawn as a gi#17 occurs in the context of the nymph’s 
speculation about its possibly proving false:
Had it liv’d long, I do not know
Whether it too might have done so
As Sylvio did: his Gi(s might be
Perhaps as false or more than he. (ll. 47–50)
'e gi( is false indeed, though not necessarily in the way she imagines. If it had been 
what it appeared to be, a love token, it would have been no part of a bargain and a 
genuine gi(. In the context of rights and obligations in which it is actually given and 
17 ‘Gave’ in line 29 is etymologically related to ‘gi0’ but unlike that word does not necessarily 
imply a voluntary donation independent of any obligation or consideration.
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received, the term is misleading.
'e troopers’ wanton action, then, deprives the nymph of the compensation 
she ought to have had for the loss of Sylvio. Even before that happened, though, there 
were indications that the compensation was not entirely commensurate with the loss 
she had su$ered. She says:
But I am sure, for ought that I
Could in so short a time espie,
'y Love was far more better then
'e love of false and cruel men. (ll. 51–4)
Here, Marvell appears to be using a familiar device to suggest that we should not take 
at face value the nymph’s comparison between what she has lost and what she has 
found. Like several other speakers in his poetry, she is unable to distinguish between 
subject and object. ‘'y Love’ is, on the face of it, a subjective genitive: the love the 
fawn for the girl who feeds it and allows it to play in her garden. ‘'e love of false and 
cruel men’, on the contrary, is primarily an objective genitive, since men who are ex 
hypothesi ‘false and cruel’ cannot be supposed to feel much love. 'e di$erence 
between the two formulations is stressed by the use of the possessive pronoun ‘'y’ 
in one and not in the other. In e$ect the nymph says that it is better to be loved by the 
fawn than to love false and cruel men, a statement plausible enough in itself but 
which is rendered doubtful by the attempt to suggest that the fawn’s love and that of 
the men are comparable.
'e nymph’s attempt to make a judgment of value is compromised by her 
inability properly to distinguish between the terms of the comparison. A capacity for 
judgment may not be something that we expect to #nd in the nymph; she is, a(er all, 
the complainant, and we should be surprised to #nd her acting as a judge in her own 
cause. She is not impartial, but it does not follow that she is not right, or that the 
wrongs which have been committed against her are not serious injustices. If Sylvio’s 
compensatory ‘gi(’ is not of equal value to his heart, then the nymph has already 
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been the victim of an injustice before the troopers have come along and deprived her 
of even that consolation. 'e implication is that as there is no equivalence between a 
fawn and a heart — as, indeed, the two are not comparable because di$erent in kind 
— it may well be that the very possibility of a compensatory justice, relying as it does 
on incomplete resemblances and perceived rather than real equivalences, is as 
illusory and deceptive as a pun. At law, compensation for an injury has generally 
taken the form of damages. A broken limb, the incapacitation of a breadwinner, a 
sullied reputation are all converted by the legal process into sums of money. 'e 
relationship between the injury and the damages awarded is necessarily an arbitrary 
one and the awards themselves (except when made by a jury) are frequently ungener‐
ous. A major part of the administration of justice is taken up with the attempt to 
equate the incommensurable.
In its linking of the two stories, the poem lies at the meeting point of the 
public and private spheres.18 'e nymph is forced to distinguish between the public 
injustice done to her by ‘wanton Troopers’ (a phrase that encapsulates the idea of 
armed force unchecked by any rational discipline or control; or, to put it another way, 
the disjunction of might and right) and the private, domestic hurt occasioned by 
Sylvio, even while she stresses the relationship between these two injuries. Having 
made the distinction, she describes the public wrong in terms that suggest it to be the 
more serious injustice, the wrong that she asserts to be irreparable, while relegating 
the private wrong to the level of an old story, quickly told. 'e reader, as we have 
seen, suspects that the hurt felt by the nymph is much greater at the private than at 
the public wrong. However, the law would take a relative attitude to the two events 
remarkably similar to that expressed by the nymph. 'at is to say, it would be more 
likely to take notice of, and o$er a remedy for, a wanton act of destruction of private 
18 Everett, ‘Poetry and Politics in Andrew Marvell’, passim, is concerned with the relationship 
between public and private in his poetry. See also the remarks of Worden and Carey on the 
ambiguously public character of, respectively, ‘An Horatian Ode’ and ‘Tom May’s Death’, below, p. 145.
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property than a breach of faith in an a$air of the heart. (It is true that, until the 
nineteenth century, there existed a legal remedy for breach of promise of marriage. Its 
application was limited, however, and the world in which such a remedy would be 
useful seems remote from the nymph’s.) Is it possible that Marvell is suggesting that, 
in its inability to deal adequately with the personal sources of much of the hurt 
su$ered by human beings and its tendency instead to concentrate its e$orts on 
providing a remedy for public wrongs, the law adopts a perspective as distorted as the 
nymph’s? Whether or not it is, it seems clear from this poem that even the lesser and 
more publicly amenable injury is likely to go without an e$ectual remedy; a fortiori 
the greater and more private.
So, Astraea-like, the nymph prepares to depart from a world without justice. 
One must be careful not to make too much of this resemblance. What the nymph 
plans to do, once she has bespoken the fawn’s grave, is die. Astraea, in contrast, did 
not die but became a star, and eventually returned to earth. 'e resemblance lies 
solely in the fact that it is the absence of justice in the world that leads the nymph to 
wish to leave it. In a poem which already suggests a connection between her and 
Diana (l. 104) and, probably, draws a comparison between her and Niobe (l. 116) the 
addition of another classical allusion might appear to be confusing rather than 
elucidating. However, it can be argued that the recognition of the presence of Astraea 
in the poem helps to clarify the relevance of Diana and Niobe, given that the resem‐
blances between them and the nymph are not entirely obvious. She does not, as Leo 
Spitzer has pointed out, resemble Niobe in boastfulness, and according to D. C. Allen 
she is not a mother.19 'e signi#cance of Niobe, in this context, if the argument of 
this chapter is correct, is as a demonstration that the gods can be excessive and 
19 Leo Spitzer, ‘Marvell’s “Nymph Complaining for the Death of her Faun”: Sources versus 
Meaning’, MLQ 19 (1958), pp. 231–43 (p. 242); Don Cameron Allen, Image and Meaning: Metaphoric 
Traditions in Renaissance Poetry, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960), p. 112. For 
Teunissen and Hinz, however, she stands for the mother of mothers, the magna mater: ‘What is the 
Nymph Complaining for?’, pp. 420–2.
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unjustly vindictive in their punishments. 'e nymph’s relation to this image is an 
ambivalent one. Like Niobe, she is the victim of unjust treatment but, in her case, the 
treatment is not intended to punish her; at any rate, she has not disclosed any 
wrongdoing on her part that would merit punishment.
On the other hand, unlike Latona, she appears not to be vindictive. She says 
that she does not wish the troopers ill, and that she will pray that heaven 
‘forget’ (l. 10) the fawn’s murder. In part, as has been suggested above, this is because 
she cannot believe in the possibility of atonement or reparation. It should not, 
however, be mistaken for an indication of a generously forgiving nature. In fact, her 
use of ‘forget’, where ‘forgive’ is expected and more appropriate, may be a deliberate 
rejection of the possibility of forgiveness.20
 She immediately goes on to assert, in e$ect, that heaven cannot forget: its 
‘King / Keeps register of every thing’ (ll. 13–14). It may be the case that, by choosing 
to pray for something that she knows to be impossible, rather than for something that 
she believes that God can readily grant, she is dissembling her vengeful feelings. 
Alternatively, it may be that she has no ill wishes to waste on the troopers because she 
has reserved them for Sylvio.
 One of the best-known incidents involving Diana is the punishment of 
Actaeon (Metamorphoses, Bk. 3). He, having been turned into a stag by the goddess, 
is torn apart by his own hounds, in another example of a punishment that is clearly 
excessive. It may be inferred that the nymph regards Sylvio, the self-described 
‘Huntsman’ (l. 31), as a suitable candidate for similar treatment. By placing an 
o$ering in her shrine, the nymph is attempting to invoke the goddess, in a context 
where a huntsman has o$ended. 'at it is the Actaeon episode from the Metamor‐
20 Christine Rees, 'e Judgment of Marvell (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), p. 73, takes it as 
an indication of her lack of both learning and experience: ‘she turns to the language of religion, a 
language familiar yet distinctively hers in its ingenuous vocabulary and its awkward syntax. … But she 
gets it a little wrong, by substituting “forget” for the more exemplary Christian “forgive” …’
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phoses that the reference to Diana is intended to bring to mind is a reasonable, 
though not inevitable, inference from the poem’s apparent debt to Ovid. Sarah Annes 
Brown has described ‘'e Nymph complaining’ as ‘a profoundly Ovidian poem’.21 
'is is a di!cult proposition to demonstrate conclusively. While Cyparissus’s killing 
of a stag (Metamorphoses Bk. 10, ll. 106–42) is one of the tales which has been seen as 
a possible source for the events described in ‘'e Nymph complaining’, and Niobe 
and the Heliades are also to be found in the Metamorphoses, it would be dangerous to 
conclude on those grounds only that Marvell’s poem makes direct reference to Ovid’s. 
As Brown puts it, such stories ‘represent part of the furniture of the Renaissance 
mind, … they had been treated so very frequently by artists of all kinds that by 
Marvell’s time they were very common coin.’22 She therefore attempts to establish the 
Ovidian character of Marvell’s poem by showing that Marvell and Ovid share certain 
qualities of mind, such as the liking for re%exivity noted, in Marvell’s case, by 
Christopher Ricks, a fondness for witty inversion and a preoccupation with the 
process of metamorphosis.23
If Brown is right about the relationship of ‘'e Nymph complaining’ to the 
Metamorphoses, this may help to elucidate the nature of the nymph’s slender yet 
apparently real resemblance to Astraea. 'at goddess’s position in the Metamorphoses 
is an ambiguous one. Explicit reference to her occupies just a line and a half: et virgo 
caede madentis / ultima caelestum terras Astraea reliquit (Bk. 1, ll. 149–50). Neverthe‐
less, her star turn at the beginning of the poem might be said to mirror the apotheo‐
sis of Julius Cæsar at its end. Her return to earth is not mentioned by Ovid but it is 
clear from Virgil and others that it coincides with the beginning of Augustus’s reign 
21 Sarah Annes Brown, ‘Ovid and Marvell’s 'e Nymph Complaining for the Death of her Faun’, 
Translation and Literature 6 (1997), pp. 167–85 (p. 168).
22 Brown, ‘Ovid and Marvell’s 'e Nymph Complaining for the Death of her Faun’, p. 167.
23 Sidney Gottlieb, while agreeing as to the poem’s Ovidian nature, sees the Heroides rather than 
the Metamorphoses as its model: Sidney Gottlieb, ‘“'e Nymph complaining for the death of her 
Faun”: Marvell’s Ovidian Study in Hysteria’, Huntington Library Quarterly 62 (1999), pp. 273–94, esp. 
at pp. 288–9.
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— in e$ect, Julius Cæsar and Astraea have changed places, or Cæsar’s departure from 
the world coincides with the return of Justice. To put it another way, although she is 
hardly mentioned in the Metamorphoses, Astraea can be seen as a kind of presiding 
absence over the events described in that poem. Certainly, the injustice of the gods is 
one of its recurring themes.
If the punishments of Niobe and Actaeon appear excessive to an objective 
observer, it is because they are #xed by the injured parties themselves. Both Latona 
and Diana are, in e$ect, judges in their own respective causes; it follows that their 
actions can more properly be characterized as revenge than punishment. It may be 
that the nymph is aware that the injustice that she deplores in the world is also part of 
her own constitution; that her desire for justice does not prevent her from harbouring 
vengeful wishes that she may not be able to refrain from acting upon, and that this 
fact reinforces her belief that justice is beyond reach. If even she, well-meaning as she 
tries to be, is capable of injustice, how can she hope for justice from the world at 
large?
Another prominent classical reference in ‘'e Nymph complaining’ might 
seem to undermine, or at least complicate, the reading presented here. 'e nymph’s 
tears are likened to those of ‘'e brotherless Heliades’ (ll. 99–100).24 'e story of 
Phaethon (the brother of whom the Heliades have been deprived) has, on the face of 
it, less to do with justice and injustice than have those of Actaeon and Niobe. It is an 
analogue of the Fall, in which Phaethon’s desire for knowledge of his identity, his 
pride, and his aspiration to ful#l a role which is beyond his capability, lead both to his 
own death and to the near-destruction of the earth’s fertility, the creation of deserts 
and extremes of climate. It would be possible to regard Phaethon’s death as #tting 
24 It is not entirely clear that the tears are hers rather than the fawn’s. Certainly, the fawn weeps: 
l. 95. However, ‘these’ (l. 100) should probably be taken to mean ‘mine’, in the same way as ‘this warm 
life-blood’ (l. 19) apparently refers to the nymph’s. If the fawn’s tears are being compared to those of 
the Heliades, then it is suggested that the bereaved are not distinguishable from the dead or dying: the 
injury to the latter is felt by the former. 
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punishment for his pride, for his disregard of Phoebus’s pleas, and for his arrogantly 
in%ated view of his own capacities. On the other hand, he is a young man who has 
just discovered that his parentage really does give him reason to be proud. Further, it 
is clear that the main reason for his death is not that he deserves to be punished, but 
that it is necessary to prevent further destruction. As Ovid relates the story, Phoebus 
complains that no one deserves to die for not being able to control his (that is, 
Phoebus’s) horses. In Sandys’s translation, the sun-god says:
Some other now may on my Chariot sit.
If all of you confesse your selves un#t;
Let Jove ascend: that he (when he shall trie)
At length may lay his murd’ring thunder by.
'en will he #nde, that he, who could not guide
'ose #re-hoof ’d Steeds, deserv’d not to have dy’d.25 
'e necessity of Phaethon’s death is hard to deny, but that does not in itself render it 
just. In any case, by referring, not directly to Phaethon, but to his grief-stricken 
sisters, Marvell makes it clear that such a necessary death, whether or not just in 
itself, may entail unmerited su$ering on the part of the blameless.
‘Fame and Interest’
It might be argued that the attitude of the nymph bears some resemblance to that of 
the garland-maker in ‘'e Coronet’, in that it is partly her own failure that persuades 
her of the unattainability of human justice, while his inability to avoid the ‘wreaths of 
Fame and Interest’ (l. 16) prevents him from weaving a chaplet that will ‘redress that 
Wrong’ (l. 4) that the Saviour has su$ered as a result of his sins. ‘'e Coronet’ has 
been seen as combining Calvinist ideas about the absurdity of attempting to earn or 
merit salvation with a meditation on the enormous di!culty of creating a religious 
art that is untainted by impure motives, including pride in one’s achievement and the 
25 George Sandys, Ovid’s Metamorphosis Englished, Mythologiz’d and Represented in Figures, ed. 
Karl K. Hulley and Stanley T. Vandersall (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970) p. 90 (Book 2, 
ll. 389–94).
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desire for public admiration.26 It is surprising that more has not been written about 
the place of justice in the poem. John Klause, in his book on the subject of theodicy 
in Marvell’s work, spends relatively little time on a discussion of one of the few works 
in which Marvell explicitly writes about justice in the context of relations between 
humankind and the divine.27 It is noteworthy that the poem’s speaker desires not to 
praise Christ, or to glorify him, or indeed to worship him; but speci#cally ‘to redress 
that Wrong’ (l. 4) that he has done Christ by his sins. He wishes to remove an 
injustice by making reparation for the part that those sins have played in Christ’s 
su$ering and death. 'at su$ering is represented by the crown of thorns to which the 
poem’s speaker has contributed. 'e speaker initially conceives the coronet of the 
poem’s title as the equivalent opposite of the crown of thorns.28 It is striking that it is 
in his very act of atonement to the Father for the sins of humankind that Christ 
sustains the wrong with which the garland-maker is preoccupied.
Christians believe that Christ su$ered and died to atone to God for those sins. 
In addressing the questions of sin and atonement, it is usual to think of the Father as 
the injured party and of Christ as the one who has made reparation. 'e garland-
maker sees Christ from a less familiar point of view: as himself the injured party. In 
terms of human justice, it is possible to think of a number of situations in which 
somebody other than the debtor pays a debt — for example, when the creditor 
assigns it to a third party. 'e original creditor is satis#ed, but the debtor still owes 
the debt, only now it is owed to the third party. 'e garland-maker is applying the 
same principle to relations between us and two of the persons of the Trinity. On the 
26 See, in particular, Annabel Patterson, ‘Bermudas and 'e Coronet: Marvell’s Protestant 
Poetics’, ELH 44 (1977), pp. 478–99, esp. at p. 491.
27 Klause, !e Unfortunate Fall, pp. 119–21, which deals, not with the ideas of justice that are 
evident in the poem, but with the di&erence between the ‘categorical’ and the ‘paradoxical’ approaches 
to salvation.
28 Brunner speaks of ‘an element of poetic justice’ in the intended substitution of the coronet for 
the crown of thorns: Larry Brunner, ‘“So Rich a Chaplet”: An Interpretation of Marvell’s 'e Coronet’, 
!e Cresset 44 (September 1981), pp. 21–4 (p. 21).
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face of it, this is a reasonable thing to do, as our sins can indeed be said to be the 
e$ective cause of Christ’s su$ering. However, as a result, the speaker #nds himself in 
something of a trap. According to Christian doctrine, Christ’s sacri#ce was necessary 
in the #rst place because humans are not capable of making atonement on our own 
behalf. If the speaker could not redress the wrong that he had done to the Father, why 
should he suppose that he will be able to redress exactly the same wrong when it is 
done to the Son? He #nds that he cannot, recognizing that because of his mixed 
motives he is quite incapable of o$ering an adequate remedy for the injury. 'e skill 
and care (l. 24) which are a necessary condition of his weaving ‘So rich a Chaplet … / 
As never yet the king of Glory wore’ (ll. 11–12) are also a source of pride which 
undermines the value of that achievement.
It is not merely the lure of ‘Fame’ that taints and undermines the speaker’s 
e$orts. 'ere is also ‘Interest’, which Annabel Patterson perceptively identi#es with 
‘his hopes of being able to “redress” his previous errors by acts of poetic devotion’.29 
His very wish to o$er recompense for Christ’s su$ering is itself in part the result of 
the serpent’s insinuation of sinful motives into what might appear to be the least 
sel#sh of acts. Speci#cally, the speaker is compelled to recognize that his attempt to 
‘redress that Wrong’ is motivated, not purely by a desire to make up for the su$ering 
of Christ, but also by his wish to free himself from the obligation to which his sins 
have subjected him. In short, he #nds that he has been attempting to acquire rights as 
against God.
So long as it is assumed that the obligation that the sinner owes to Christ is 
equivalent to that for which Christ atoned to the Father, the sinner is caught in a 
paradox: on the one hand, the very obligation by which he is bound is precisely that 
he should attempt to atone for his sins while, on the other, if he should succeed in 
ful#lling his obligation, he would be discharged from it and would no longer owe 
29 Patterson, ‘Bermudas and 'e Coronet: Marvell’s Protestant Poetics’, p. 491.
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anything to Christ; but to wish to be in this state — or to imagine that it is attainable 
— is itself sinful.
It is a paradox that can be resolved only by Christ himself. 'erefore, the 
speaker directs a prayer to him that o$ers two alternative suggestions:
Either his slipp’ry knots at once untie,
And disentangle all his winding Snare:
Or shatter too with him my curious frame:
And let these wither, so that he may die,
'ough set with Skill and chosen out with Care. (ll. 20–4)
With the #rst possibility, the speaker recognizes that it is open to Christ to purify his 
motives and thereby make him capable of weaving a chaplet that would not ‘debase … 
Heavens Diadem’ (ll. 17–18). He recognizes, with the second, that it may not please 
Christ to do this, but rather to destroy the serpent and coronet together. In that case, 
the speaker’s crown of %owers will adorn the Saviour’s feet, not his head — it will not 
supplant the crown of thorns. In either event, he will not have been able to o$er, by 
his own unaided e$ort, atonement for the injury to Christ.
We might, at this point, be drawn to the conclusion that the garland-maker’s 
error is to apply the terms of imperfect human justice to relations between us and 
God, or to treat human and divine justice as similar in  kind. To seek to redress 
Christ’s wrong is, as has been suggested above, to conceive of him as the assignee of a 
debt. 'e very fact that this leads Marvell’s speaker into a trap must indicate that the 
comparison between the two orders of justice is misconceived. Human justice may 
derive from God’s justice but it is a debased and defective copy, that can tell us very 
little about theodicy. 'e di!culty with this argument is that our human idea of 
justice is the only idea of justice that we have and we cannot hope to grasp even an 
approximation of divine justice without reference to the human variety. Richard 
Baxter, in his Aphorismes of Justi%cation (1649), is aware of the di!culty:
I know mans guilt and obligation to su$er, is but Metaphorically called 
his debt. 'erefore when we would search into the nature of these 
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things exactly, wee must rather conceive of God as the Lawgiver and 
Governour of the World, then as a creditor, lest the Metaphor should 
mislead us. Yet because it is a common & a Scripture phrase, and 
conveniently expresseth our Obligation to beare the penalty of the 
violated Law, I use it in that sense. But here we are cast upon many and 
weighty and very di!cult Questions. Whether Christ did discharge this 
debt by way of solution or by way of satisfaction?30
Baxter goes on to explain that to discharge a debt by way of solution is to pay back 
exactly the thing that is owed. 'is the creditor has no choice but to accept, and the 
debt is automatically discharged. To discharge by way of satisfaction, on the other 
hand, is to pay an equivalent which is acceptable to the creditor. In this case, the 
creditor has a discretion whether or not to accept the payment. It is clear that Christ’s 
atonement belongs to the second category: the thing that was owed was our complete 
obedience to the divine law, and we remain disobedient notwithstanding that 
atonement.
Baxter similarly likens the sinner to a tenant who has built up arrears of rent 
which he will never be able to pay, and Christ’s atonement to the action of the 
landlord’s son who pays the debt and reinstates the tenant at a peppercorn rent.31 'e 
substitution of a peppercorn for the original rent is a metaphor for Christ’s introduc‐
tion of a new covenant. Baxter’s examples demonstrate that the attempt to understand 
divine justice in terms of our human conceptions is not necessarily hopeless and, 
incidentally, that the dilemma of Marvell’s garland-maker can be resolved if it is 
recognized that, through Christ’s forbearance (and only through that) our obligation 
to him may be considerably less onerous than the obligation that he satis#ed on our 
behalf. 
‘Lawful Form’
If the argument that has been presented here is correct, certain of Marvell’s private, 
lyric poems — ‘Little T. C.’, ‘'e Nymph complaining’ and, indirectly, ‘'e Coronet’ 
30 Richard Baxter, Aphorismes of justi%cation, with their explication annexed (1655), pp. 16–7.
31 Baxter, Aphorismes of Justi%cation, pp. 83–4.
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— exhibit a scepticism about temporal justice that one would not expect to #nd in 
poems written in praise of a public #gure. Such poems will usually #nd it necessary to 
present the person being praised — the most obvious example in Marvell’s work is 
the Cromwell of !e First Anniversary — as someone capable of restoring or uphold‐
ing justice. ‘An Horatian Ode’ is unusual in this respect, since (as has been argued in 
the #rst chapter) it praises Cromwell not in his capacity as putative future ruler but 
rather in that of obedient military leader. ‘Tom May’s Death’, which (as, again, has 
been argued in chapter 1) seems to participate in the same argument or discussion as 
the Ode, is starkly pessimistic about the possibility of attaining justice. 'e Ode has 
been described as ‘the most private of public poems’, while Carey’s remarks about 
‘Tom May’s Death’ bring out the ambiguity of its ‘wonderfully public’ quality.32
A poem that seems to be carefully positioned in the middle of the public-
private spectrum is ‘Upon Appleton House’. In the early 1650s Marvell was tutor to 
the daughter of 'omas, third Baron Fairfax, who had been Cromwell’s predecessor 
as general of the army but had retired to his estate following the killing of the king. As 
many scholars and critics have pointed out, the poem contains a meditation on the 
active as against the retired life.33 However, it also seeks to show that Fairfax and his 
family have acted justly and can be expected to continue to do so. 'e justice theme is 
#rst encountered in the dilemma that confronts William Fairfax arising from the 
nuns’ attempt to frustrate his marriage to Isabel 'waites:
What should he do? He would respect
Religion, but not Right neglect:
For #rst Religion taught him Right,
And dazled not but clear’d his sight.
Sometimes resolv’d his Sword he draws,
But reverenceth then the Laws:
For Justice still that Courage led;
32 Worden, ‘Marvell, Cromwell, and the Horatian Ode’, p. 150; Carey, Andrew Marvell: A Critical 
Anthology, pp. 21–2, cited in chapter 1 above.
33 See, in particular, the works by O’Loughlin, Creaser and Hirst and Zwicker discussed in 
chapter 1.
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First from a Judge, then Souldier bred. (stanza XXIX)
On the face of it, this would suggest that there is a simple con%ict between respect for 
religion, or its appearance, on the one hand and right on the other, the latter encour‐
aging William to insist on the ‘promis’d faith’ of Isabel 'waites, the former tending 
to make him accept the nuns’ dispensation with it (ll. 196–7). 'e Catholic Church’s 
claim to be able to free people from the obligations of their oaths and promises was to 
remain a substantial ground of Marvell’s antipathy to that religion. In An Account of 
the Growth of Popery (1677), he wrote that the Pope ‘by his Dispensation annuls 
Contracts betwixt man and man, dissolves Oaths between Princes, or betwixt them 
and their People, and gives allowance in cases which God and nature prohibites.’34 
'e binding quality of oaths and contracts was, for writers such as Grotius and 
Hobbes, the foundation on which systems of law and justice rested. 'e Pope’s 
practice of dispensing with such obligations could therefore be seen as endangering 
the very existence of justice. Accordingly, ‘right’ would entitle William Fairfax to 
insist that the marriage should go ahead, while ‘religion’ maintained that Isabel’s 
promise to him was no longer binding.
However, the con%ict between religion and right is not as straightforward as 
this reading suggests. It is signi#cant that it is his reverence for the laws that dissuades 
William from marching into the convent with his sword drawn (ll. 229–30). 'is 
clearly suggests that considerations of right, rather than of religion, are causing him 
to hesitate. Conversely, respect for religion might actually require him to frustrate the 
nuns’ perversion of it. 'is would be consistent with Marvell’s presentation of the 
nuns as distorting scripture and with his later insistence that:
'ough many a Nun there made her Vow,
’Twas no Religious House till now. (ll. 279–80)
In this case, the presentation of William’s dilemma can be seen as Marvell’s attempt to 
34 Andrew Marvell, An Account of the Growth of Popery and Arbitrary Government in England, 
ed. Nicholas von Maltzahn, in Prose Works, II, 229–30.
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imagine the situation of a conscientious Christian living before the Reformation. To 
such a person, at least some of the abuses and doctrinal errors of the Church would 
presumably have been apparent, but he or she would lack a legitimate basis on which 
to prefer the authority of his or her own conscience to the teachings of the Church. In 
such circumstances, reverence for ‘the Laws’ (l. 230) might be the best way to 
reconcile the claims of conscience with outward obedience to the Church. In 
William’s case the dilemma is resolved when:
'e Court him grants the lawful Form;
Which licens’d either Peace or Force,
To hinder the unjust Divorce. (ll. 234–6)
With this judgment, religion and right are no longer in con%ict, and William Fairfax 
is prepared to invade the nunnery and recover or rescue Isabel 'waites. Subsequent‐
ly (though not, as Marvell suggests, immediately), at the dissolution of the monaster‐
ies, the convent ‘To Fairfax fell as by Escheat’ (l. 274). 'e Fairfax family, then, has 
been well compensated for the inconvenience of the abduction. By compressing the 
timescale, Marvell is able to make the change of ownership appear a direct conse‐
quence of the nuns’ dishonourable and unjust attempt to ‘intercept’ (l. 248) both 
Fairfax’s line and his future wife’s fortune.
'e story of William’s dispute with the nuns may be #ctional: Lee Erickson 
calls it ‘a founder’s myth, apparently invented by Marvell’, pointing out that Clements 
Markham’s biography of Lord Fairfax — which is cited by Margoliouth as establishing 
the facts — in turn relies on Marvell’s poem as its sole source for the circumstances of 
the dispute.35 Erickson further states that there is no record of any case in which a 
court granted ‘the lawful Form’ to William Fairfax, though Isabel had been a ward of 
the King, under the age of 16, at the time of her marriage. Speci#cally, he says that no 
35 Lee Erickson, ‘Marvell’s Upon Appleton House and the Fairfax Family’, English Literary 
Renaissance 9 (1979), pp. 158–68 (p. 160). See also, Poems and Letters, II, 279, 282, n. to l. 84 and 
Clements R. Markham, !e Life of the Great Lord Fairfax (London: Macmillan, 1870), pp. 3–4.
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relevant Chancery proceedings have been found.36
Whether the episode is purely Marvell’s invention or he adapted a family 
tradition to his purposes,37 it is signi#cant that the house is said to have fallen to the 
family ‘as by Escheat’.38 'e expropriation is e$ected, not by the well recognized legal 
process but by a procedure analogous to it. To determine the precise nature of the 
analogy, it is necessary to distinguish between two di$erent but related meanings of 
the term. A. W. B. Simpson makes a distinction between escheat propter defectum 
sanguinis and escheat propter delictum tenentis.39 Both refer to what was originally a 
feudal ‘incident’: the right of a feudal lord to take possession of land theretofore held 
by a tenant. In the #rst case, the right arose when the tenant died without heirs, in the 
second when the tenant was adjudged guilty of felony. 'e second type was abolished 
in 1870 while the #rst survived until 1925. However, as the feudal system declined, 
the signi#cance of escheat changed.
In the #rst place, as it came to be more e!cient to pay soldiers and agricultur‐
al workers in money than in land, the feudal incidents (such as escheat and wardship 
— bene#ts that accrued to the lord irregularly, as on the death of a tenant) assumed a 
much greater importance than the services that the system had been designed to 
secure.40 In the second, as the feudal pyramid gradually collapsed, more and more 
tenants came to hold directly of the monarch, without any intermediate (‘mesne’) 
lords. 'e result was that, by the Tudor period, the Crown was the principal bene#‐
ciary of escheat and wardship which, however, were not economically signi#cant 
because they were easily avoided by the straightforward device of conveying land to 
36 Erickson, ‘Marvell’s Upon Appleton House and the Fairfax Family’, p. 160, n. 13.
37 Brian Patton, ‘Preserving Property: History, Genealogy, and Inheritance in “Upon Appleton 
House”’, Renaissance Quarterly 49 (1996), pp. 824–39 (p. 827), cites George Johnson as saying that ‘the 
care with which the family records of the Fairfaxes were preserved is almost without parallel.’
38 J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths, 2002), 
p. 239, n. 68, notes that ‘escheat’ derives from eschier, to fall.
39 A. W. B. Simpson, A History of the Land Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp 
19–20.
40 Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, pp. 227–8.
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uses.41 Henry VIII successfully attacked, both by legislation and in the courts, the 
employment of uses to deprive him of the bene#t of the feudal incidents. 'e Statute 
of Uses (1536) was contemporaneous with the beginning of the dissolution of the 
religious houses — and Robert Palmer has argued that it took the precise form it did 
for reasons closely connected with the dissolution.42 Henry’s assault on the use 
resulted in a great increase in Crown revenue from escheat and wardship. It will be 
apparent that, like deodand in ‘'e Nymph complaining’, escheat in the second sense 
was a form of quasi-punitive con#scation: Blackstone mentions escheat in the 
paragraph immediately following his discussion of deodand, as ‘[a]nother branch of 
the king’s ordinary revenue’.43
Marvell glances at both meanings of ‘escheat’. 'e nuns are incapable of 
producing legitimate heirs, even though ‘Virgin Buildings o( brought forth’ and 
though William Fairfax believes he knows ‘what Fruit their Gardens yield / When 
they it think by Night conceal’d’ (ll. 86, 219–20). O!cially, the nuns are sexually 
abstemious, but the poet regards them as enjoying an unnaturally unproductive 
erotic life. 'e lands belonging to convents and other religious bodies were held by 
corporations, which were incapable of dying and therefore had no need of heirs. In 
feudal times, this resulted in a loss of revenue for the feudal lords of these lands, since 
the incidents that ordinarily arose on the death of a tenant never fell due. A series of 
statutes in the thirteenth century had sought to deal with the problem, culminating in 
the Statute of Mortmain (1279). In practice, religious bodies continued to accumulate 
substantial landholdings, since the king frequently gave dispensations from the 
41 Baker, Introduction to English Legal History, pp. 252. 'e avoidance of incidents was a side 
e&ect, rather than the main reason for the popularity of conveyances to uses, which also provided a 
means of working around the inability of landowners to dispose of real property by will.
42 Robert C. Palmer, Selling the Church: !e English Parish in Law, Commerce, and Religion, 
1350–1550 (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 231–6.
43 Blackstone, Commentaries, I, 292. Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, rpt. 1990), p. 222, shows that escheat, too, was 
susceptible to abuse: ‘From the perceived unfairness of the system — once the lords had begun to 
abuse it — evolved the aphaeretic form cheat.’
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legislation.44
By the time of the dissolution in the second half of the 1530s, the feudal 
system had long since faded away (though, as we have seen, the feudal incidents were 
about to become signi#cant again). When Henry VIII and 'omas Cromwell set 
about divesting the religious houses of their assets, they employed a variety of 
methods, among which escheat did not play a signi#cant part. 'ere is thus a 
complicated irony in Marvell’s statement that, so far as Nunappleton is concerned, 
the dissolution operated ‘as by Escheat’ (emphasis added).45
In the #rst place, the nuns’ inability to produce legitimate heirs (re%ecting the 
actual tenant corporation’s similar inability, as well as its ‘immortality’) meant that 
over the preceding centuries many potential escheats must have been inde#nitely 
postponed. In the second, however, the nuns have particularly laid themselves open 
to escheat in the other sense, the consequence of felony. William Fairfax calls them 
‘such 'eeves … / As rob though in the Dungeon cast’, and claims that only death 
will restrain them from further cheating and the( (ll. 207–08). It is arguably just, 
then, that the nuns should be ‘in one instant dispossest’ (l. 272), but does it necessari‐
ly follow that the Fairfax family is entitled to bene#t from the expropriation? Perhaps 
that ‘as by’ raises a doubt. Perhaps, on the other hand, it attempts to quell one. If ‘'e 
Nymph complaining’ suggests, among other things, that Marvell has doubts about 
the principle of deodand, it is conceivable that he had similar doubts about other 
types of con#scation. So, it might be the case that ‘as by’ is meant to distinguish the 
Fairfax appropriation as being more just rather than less so than the process of feudal 
origin to which it is compared.
44 Corinne Comstock Weston and Janelle Renfrow Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns: !e 
Grand Controversy over Legal Sovereignty in England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
p. 26.
45 'ere is a further irony in the fact that 'omas Fairfax, by barring the entail on his estate, had 
avoided (or rather, as it turned out, postponed) the danger of its passing out of his family for want of 
male heirs: see Lee Erickson, ‘Marvell’s Upon Appleton House and the Fairfax Family’, English Literary 
Renaissance, 9 (1979), pp. 58–68.
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'e third factor that complicates the irony is the fact that, by the time of the 
dissolution, the person to whom any lands could be expected to fall by escheat was 
the king, because mesne feudal lords were by now very rare. It cannot be assumed 
that Marvell was even aware of the feudal origins of escheat, so it is not necessarily 
the case that he is imagining Fairfax as being in the position of the nuns’ immediate 
feudal lord. But why otherwise would he present Fairfax as enjoying a right that 
would ordinarily be the king’s? At the time that Marvell’s poem was written, there no 
longer was a king. Moreover, feudal tenures and services had been ended by the Long 
Parliament — and would not be revived at the Restoration: Military Tenures Aboli‐
tion Act 1660 (12 Car. II, c. 24). Escheat, however, was not abolished. Commission‐
ers were appointed to collect this revenue for the bene#t of the Commonwealth. 
Marvell was thus writing at a time when escheat had been su!ciently detached both 
from its feudal origins and its association with the Crown to survive the abolition of 
monarchy and feudal tenures, about a time when its importance as a source of royal 
revenue, independent of its feudal origins, was being established.
In any case, it is clear from the researches of Erickson and, later, of Brian 
Patton that the convent did not fall directly to Fairfax, whether as by escheat or 
otherwise.46 It was surrendered to the Crown on 5 December 1539,47 and subse‐
quently granted to ‘Robt. Darkenall, of the Household’48 who eventually seems to 
have sold it to Sir William Fairfax.49 In 1562/3, a dispute as to Sir William’s estate was 
arbitrated by 'omas, Lord Wharton, and two other arbitrators.50 'omas Fairfax 
46 Patton, ‘History, Genealogy, and Inheritance in “Upon Appleton House”’, p. 832, esp. n. 3.
47 'is suggests that the priory was not considered one of the smaller religious houses that were 
con/scated by statutory authority. Nineteen women were granted pensions, including one Janet or 
Jane Fairfax: Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII, Vol. XIV p. 232.
48 Letters and Papers, XV, 563 and XVII, 1, 163.
49 Calendar of Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record O&ce … Edward VI, Vol. V. (1926), 
p. 266..
50 William Brown, F.S.A., ed. Yorkshire Deeds Vol. II, Record Series Vol. L for the year 1913 
(Yorkshire Archaeological Society, 1914), p. 129. Markham suggested that 'omas, the eldest 
surviving son of Sir William, inherited Nunappleton from his mother, Isabel 'waites, but it is not 
clear what evidence he had to support this suggestion.
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(the grandfather of the Lord General) was awarded Nunappleton but the bulk of the 
lands in dispute went to his brother Gabriel. 'ere is no reason why Marvell should 
have been aware of any of these dealings, all but the last of which took place a century 
before he wrote ‘Upon Appleton House’. 'e poem’s narrative simpli#es and distorts 
the actual sequence of events, but the extent to which Marvell was aware of the 
simpli#cation and distortion remains obscure.
'e William of the poem can foresee that the nuns’ occupation and enjoy‐
ment of the house will be brought to an end, and relatively soon:
‘But sure those Buildings last not long,
‘Founded by Folly, kept by Wrong.
…
‘Fly from their Ruine. How I fear
‘'ough guiltless lest thou perish there. (ll. 217–8, 223–4)
It is unlikely that his foresight extends to the dissolution of the monasteries, but it has 
probably occurred to him that, if the ‘Ruine’ were to occur, by whatever means, he 
and his heirs would be potential bene#ciaries. To the extent that (within the poem’s 
#ctional narrative, though not in actuality) the transfer of ownership to Fairfax was 
virtually automatic, it was predictable. 'erefore, awareness that by bringing about 
the destruction of the convent, he might accomplish his own unjust enrichment, 
would provide another reason why respect for ‘right’ would cause him to hesitate. 
Conscience compels him to examine carefully his own motives in taking an action 
which, to a disinterested post-Reformation observer, is patently in accordance with 
the requirements of both justice and religion. 'e court’s ‘Form’, among other things, 
relieves him of the role of a judge in his own cause.
William Fairfax behaves conscientiously in deciding upon his course of 
action. John Mark Heumann argues that the point of the nunnery episode is that 
Marvell’s patron, like his ancestor, faces a crisis of conscience. Whereas William 
opted to take action, it is not necessarily the case that a similar choice is the appropri‐
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ate one for the Lord General in his particular circumstances.51 Of course, William did 
not simply opt for activism, he did so a(er deliberation and only a(er the court’s 
judgment assured him that he had right on his side in doing so. Once he is sure that 
he is right to act, he does so decisively and e$ectively. As one who was ‘First from a 
Judge, then Souldier bred’, he thus combines the qualities of his ancestors in some‐
thing approaching the optimal proportions.
By analogy, 'omas Fairfax ought also to act conscientiously and with 
deliberation. As has been noted in chapter 1, it has appeared to several 
commentators, M. J. K. O’Loughlin and John Creaser in particular, that Marvell is — 
with tactfully appropriate deference — indicating to his patron that it is time to 
emerge from his retirement. 'is is particularly so as the poem was written at a time 
when a Scots invasion of England was imminent, and Fairfax’s previous objections to 
an attack on Scotland had lost their force.52 One must be careful not to posit too stark 
a contrast between these commentators on the one hand and Hirst and Zwicker (who 
see the tutor as ‘attenuating’ or ‘extenuating’ his patron’s crises) on the other. 'e very 
delicacy of Marvell’s attempt to in%uence his patron makes the task of teasing out the 
precise direction in which he sought to in%uence him itself a delicate one. On any 
view, it is clear that Fairfax’s conscience must be the arbiter of his actions. Like his 
ancestor William, Fairfax recognizes that his own motives may require careful 
scrutiny and that he as well as the cause of justice might bene#t from a course of 
action which would in all likelihood bring him glory, and possibly political power. As 
in the case of William Fairfax, the poet acknowledges that a choice which might 
appear straightforward from an objective point of view may genuinely perplex the 
person who is faced with making it, who has to attempt to take into account his own 
motives.
51 John Mark Heumann, ‘Prophecy, Casuistry and Epideictic in Marvell’s Upon Appleton House 
XXVI–XXXV’, Cahiers Elisabéthains 44 (1993), pp. 33–43.
52 Hirst and Zwicker, ‘High Summer at Nun-Appleton, 1651’, p. 255.
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And yet there walks one on the Sod
Who, had it pleased him and God,
Might once have made our Gardens spring
Fresh as his own and %ourishing. (ll. 345–8)
'is falls some way short of being an assertion that Fairfax’s duty is clear. ‘Might 
once’ not only recognizes the impossibility of knowing in advance where ‘Heavens 
choice may light’, but also the possibility that the moment has now passed when 
Fairfax might have made a di$erence. What might have ‘pleased … God’ remains a 
mystery, to Fairfax no less than to everybody else. 'e best that Fairfax can do is to 
examine his conscience before deciding what pleases him.
In chapter 1, the possibility was examined (but not #nally endorsed) that such 
consistency as there is between ‘An Horatian Ode’ and ‘Tom May’s Death’ lies partly 
in the recognition that it is quite possible for two people to adhere to allied causes, 
one of them acting in accordance with principle and conviction, the other uncon‐
scionably. ‘Upon Appleton House’ explores the converse proposition, that conscience 
may lead di$erent people, in similar circumstances, in completely di$erent 
directions, one towards action and the other into retirement. In William Fairfax’s 
case, conscience was the arbiter between claims of justice and religion, which initially 
appeared to con%ict, but which were eventually brought into agreement. In the case 
of the Lord General, its task is to arbitrate between duty and ambition. 'e complexi‐
ty, indeed ambiguity, of the treatment of ambition in the poem, is an indication of 
how hard a judgment that might be — and 'omas Fairfax, unlike his ancestor, 
cannot rely on a court to relieve him of the responsibility of decision.
First, we are told that Fairfax ‘did, with his utmost Skill, / Ambition weed, but 
Conscience till’ (ll. 343–4). 'e contrast would seem to be clear: conscience is to be 
cultivated, ambition rooted up and destroyed. In the following stanza this appears to 
be con#rmed, when Fairfax’s garden gives the impression that it ‘quarrell’d’ (l. 365) 
the ambition of the archbishop, owner of nearby Cawood Castle. However, to ‘weed’ 
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ambition is not necessarily to treat it as a weed — it might be to pull up the weeds 
(such as presumption) that surround it, and to give it space to grow freely. 'at the 
poet is not wholly critical of ambition in all circumstances is made clear at the end of 
the poem, where Fairfax’s estate is urged to
Employ the means you have by Her,
And in your kind your selves preferr;
'at, as all Virgins She preceds,
So you all Woods, Streams, Gardens, Meads. (ll. 749–52)
'e woods, streams, gardens and meadows of Nunappleton do not automatically 
surpass the various wonderful places that are listed in the following stanza. If they are 
to do so they must actively ‘preferr’ themselves, as the poet exhorts them to do. 'e 
complexity of Marvell’s views on ambition and preferment may be seen in stanza 
LXXIV:
'e Oak-Leaves me embroyder all,
Between which Caterpillars crawl:
And Ivy, with familiar trails,
Me licks, and clasps, and curles and hales.
Under this antick Cope I move
Like some great Prelate of the Grove, (ll. 587–92)
In the light of Marvell’s earlier association of prelacy with the kind of ambition that 
may provoke a quarrel (ll. 365–6) and of his known dislike of bishops,53 it is some‐
thing of a surprise to #nd the speaker referring to himself as a prelate. 'e word is 
related to ‘prefer’, deriving from the past participle of praeferre, to carry before. 'e 
speaker resembles a ‘Prelate of the Grove’ (emphasis added) because he presents the 
appearance of having been preferred by the grove, which has crowned him with oak 
— classically the reward for civic virtue. 'e sense of these lines is thus very close to 
that of the beginning of ‘'e Garden’, where the poet jokingly berates those who are 
ambitious to be
53 See, in particular, ‘'e Loyall Scot’, ll. 83–235 and A Short Historical Essay, Touching General 
Councils, Creeds, and Impositions in Matters of Religion, ed. Annabel Patterson, in Prose Works, II, 
115–76, passim, esp. at pp. 125–6
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Crown’d from some single Herb or Tree.
Whose short and narrow verged Shade
Does prudently their Toyles upbraid; (ll. 4–6)
Ambition is mocked, but ambivalently: the speaker’s recommendation, in ‘'e 
Garden’, of a complete withdrawal from all society cannot be taken literally, however 
attractive it might temporarily appear, and it is clear from the Lovelace poem that the 
loss of ‘the civic crown’ is not something about which Marvell is sanguine. 'e 
implication of the references to the subject in ‘Upon Appleton House’, taken together, 
is that ambition will usually be a dangerous temptation, but not invariably so, and 
that the need to discern when it is appropriate and when not calls for the develop‐
ment of an acutely discriminating conscience.
'e theme of justice is not central to ‘Upon Appleton House’, but it neverthe‐
less plays an important part, as being incidental to the theme of conscience, which is 
central. 'e story of William Fairfax’s incursion, in ful#lling its primary purpose of 
assuring Marvell’s patron that he was right in not lightly taking decisions on matters 
of conscience, at the same time demonstrated that his family’s acquisition of its 
Nunappleton estate was not merely formally legal but also just (though, as we have 
seen, Marvell’s compression of the historical timescale complicates this lesson). 'ere 
are two signi#cant recurrences of the theme later in the poem. 'e #rst of these is the 
incident in which an unnamed mower inadvertently slaughters a rail:
'e Edge all bloody from its Breast
He draws, and does his stroke detest;
Fearing the Flesh untimely mow’d
To him a Fate as black forebode. (ll. 397–400)
On the face of it, the mower’s fear seems absurd.54 'e rail, rather like the nymph’s 
fawn, is an insigni#cant creature whose death can surely not have such dispropor‐
tionate repercussions as the death of a man. 'e disproportion, like 'estylis’s casual 
greed, is one of the factors contributing to the comedy of the episode. Yet the 
54 With ‘Flesh’ as its singular subject, ‘forebode’ is evidently in the subjunctive mood: he is afraid 
lest ‘the Flesh untimely mow’d’ should ‘To him a Fate as black forebode.’
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situation is the converse of that in ‘'e Picture of little T. C.’ where the e$ect is not at 
all comic. 'omas Corns #nds the ‘ancient, though illogical impulses of sympathetic 
magic’ behind the advice to the young girl to ‘spare the Buds’ in the hope that she too 
will be spared.55 Another way to look at it, as has been suggested above, is to view the 
feared outcome as retaliation or punishment for the girl’s putative destruction of the 
budding %owers. 'e fact that the girl is too young to be held responsible, and that 
the mower is ‘unknowing’, will not necessarily save them. 'e situation is analogous 
to the law of deodand where, as we have seen, a tame animal or an inanimate item of 
property could be deemed to be ‘responsible’ for causing a death, and therefore liable 
to con#scation.
'e mower is in a situation similar to those of William Fairfax and the Lord 
General, though the resemblance is not exact in all respects. He is unlike them in that 
his reason for self-examination is not particularly creditable: he does not repent his 
action for its own sake but because of the injury to himself that he fears may result. 
Nevertheless, his crisis can be viewed as, in part, one of conscience, as he is led to 
consider the possibility that he may have merited punishment. A dismissive rejection 
of his qualms is implicit in 'estylis’s appropriation of the dead bird and her inten‐
tional but unre%ective killing of its companion. (It is possible that ‘quick’ in line 405 
might be read as an adverbial quali#cation of ‘lights’; however, that meaning is at best 
incidental, as the verb already carries its own connotation of speed. 'e primary 
function of ‘quick’ is that of an adjective qualifying ‘another’.) On this view, 'estylis 
represents those who would impatiently reject the conscientious hesitations of 
'omas Fairfax or his ancestor as dangerous vacillations in the face of an obvious 
duty or right. His ascription to her of sel#sh and destructive behaviour makes it 
harder to believe that the poet shared such impatience at Fairfax’s retirement.
55 'omas Corns, Uncloistered Virtue: English Political Literature, 1640–1660 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 224
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'e second return to the justice theme is in stanzas LXVIII–LXX. Here, 
‘Treason’s Punishment’ (l. 560) is presented as the impersonal and unintended, but 
inevitable and #tting, consequence of a natural process, the woodpecker’s search for 
food and shelter for its o$spring. 'at the universe is so ordered that justice will be 
done, and serious wrong punished, sooner or later, through the working-out of what 
amounts almost to a law of nature is suggested but it is not explicitly asserted. 
Instead, the next stanza begins: ‘'us I, easie Philosopher, / Among the Birds and 
Trees confer …’ (ll. 561–2). 'e hypothesis of universal and automatic justice is ‘easie’ 
philosophy, the result of conference with birds and trees. Even if the hypothesis is a 
correct one, it is comforting only when viewed from a distance: ‘the Oake seems to 
fall content’ (l. 559, emphasis added) but, for all the remote observer knows, the tree 
may already be dead.
‘Without Redress or Law’
'e unsatisfactory nature of such possibly deceptive consolations arises too in ‘Upon 
the Death of Lord Hastings’. 'is is one of the relatively few Marvell poems that can 
be easily dated. Its subject, the son of the Earl of Huntingdon, died of smallpox at the 
age of nineteen in June 1649. Later that year there appeared Lachrymae Musarum, a 
collection of elegies on the young nobleman. Marvell’s poem is the #rst of a number 
that seem to have been added to the volume at a late stage. 'e poem has attracted 
less critical attention than one might expect. Writing in 1981, Michael Gearin-Tosh 
complained that ‘[w]hether because of Empson or not, “Lord Hastings” is still 
dismissed as prentice work even in full-scale studies of Marvell.’56 Gearin-Tosh’s 
attempt to awaken critical interest in the elegy was only partly successful. It prompted 
a ‘Supplementary Note’ from Jeremy Maule, who elucidated two interpretive cruces: 
the use of the expression ‘at this measure’ in line 19 and the transition from Hy‐
56 Michael Gearin-Tosh, ‘Marvell’s “Upon the Death of the Lord Hastings”’, Essays and Studies 34 
(1981), pp. 105–22 (p. 105).
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menaeus to Aesculapius in lines 43–50.57
Perhaps the critical reticence results from the fact that substantial passages in 
the poem remain obscure, notwithstanding the light that Gearin-Tosh and Maule 
have been able to throw on them. For example, Gearin-Tosh is no doubt right to 
explain lines 27–32 in terms of the entertainment (or festive detention) of Philip of 
Castile by Henry VII but, even with this information, it remains di!cult to work out 
to whom the deceased Lord Hastings is being compared and the precise terms of the 
comparison. Presumably Philip enjoyed his sojourn with Henry, but he was the 
victim of a kind of trick, and he was detained only temporarily. It is surely unlikely 
that Marvell wished to suggest that either of these things was true of Hastings’s stay in 
heaven. Similarly, the references to Hymenaeus and Aesculapius remain riddling and 
elusive notwithstanding Maule’s erudite commentary. 'e elegy’s obscurities persist, 
surviving their explication.
One reference whose obscurity has been frankly admitted is that to ‘the 
Geometrick yeer’ in line 18.58 A few attempts have been made to explain this term, 
few of them satisfactorily persuasive. Margoliouth suggests that an antithesis is being 
posited between the solar year (measured by the sun) and the geometric one (mea‐
sured by the earth).59 'is is an attractive idea but, quite apart from the strangeness 
of the suggestion that the standard of measurement applied in heaven is provided by 
the earth, it does not explain why that standard should produce such widely varying 
results when applied to the ‘Phelgmatick and Slowe’ on the one hand and to Hastings 
on the other. S. K. Heninger, Jr. o$ers an alternative explanation:
'e gods allot to each man a geometric year, a prototypical pattern for 
time which comprises all the components of time, such as the four 
57 Jeremy Maule, ‘Marvell’s Hastings Elegy — A Supplementary Note’, Review of English Studies 
37 (1986), pp. 395–9.
58 Nicholas McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance in the English Civil Wars: Marvell and the Cause of 
Wit, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 213, suggests that Marvell echoes the term 
‘Geometrically proportionate’ in John Hall’s contribution to Lachrymae Musarum. 
59 Poems and Letters, I, 240, n. to l. 18.
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seasons, and therefore the full range of possible experience. When a 
man has completed this pattern, regardless of how many earthly years 
have passed, he has ful#lled the period that the gods allow. ‘'ose of 
growth more sudden, and more bold’ complete the pattern more 
quickly than the ‘Phlegmatick and Slowe’, and therefore they ‘are 
hurried hence’ — whatever their passing years may be, ‘as if already 
old’.60
Heninger is clearly right to the extent that the point of the passage is that the short 
life of the vigorous, active man is somehow commensurate with the prolonged 
existence of the person who tries, by not actually doing anything, to fool heaven into 
thinking that he has hardly lived. What is not so clear is how, exactly, this commensu‐
rability relates to geometry. Earlier, Heninger has argued that an emblem in which 
the four seasons are depicted in the quarters of a circle set within a rectangle ‘is 
manifestly a representation of the year as a geometric form.’61 It would perhaps be 
more accurate to say that it is a representation of the year that makes use of such 
geometric forms as a rectangle, a circle and right angles. Heninger reproduces the 
emblem, by Barthélemy Aneau. It is not part of Heninger’s argument that Marvell 
was familiar with this particular emblem, but rather that Aneau drew on ideas that 
had wide circulation at the time and of which Marvell was clearly aware. 'e di!cul‐
ty with this argument is that, if Aneau’s uni#cation of the four seasons with the life of 
man was widely conceived as being in some sense geometric, one might reasonably 
expect to encounter references to ‘geometric’ years, days or hours in other places 
besides Marvell’s elegy. Legouis explicitly states that he did not do so62 and it does not 
appear that any of Marvell’s other editors has been more fortunate.
'e word ‘For’ with which line 17 begins makes it clear that the reference to 
the geometric year is an explanation, illustration or ampli#cation of the argument of 
the earlier part of the verse paragraph:
60 S. K. Heninger, Jr., ‘Marvell’s “Geometrick yeer”: A Topos for Occasional Poetry’, in 
Approaches to Marvell, ed. Patrides, pp. 87–107 (pp. 99–100).
61 Heninger, ‘Marvell’s “Geometrick yeer”’, p. 98.
62 Poems and Letters, I, 240, n. to l. 18.
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Alas, his Vertues did his Death presage:
Needs must he die, that doth out-run his Age.
'e Phlegmatick and Slowe prolongs his day,
…
While those of growth more sudden, and more bold,
Are hurried hence, as if already old. (ll. 9–11, 15–16)
As has already been mentioned, this amounts to a claim that there is a commensura‐
bility or equivalence between the extended life and the abruptly curtailed one. When 
we are told in the #nal two lines of the verse paragraph that, in heaven, ‘'ey number 
not as here, / But weigh to Man …’ (emphasis added), it becomes clear that the poet is 
suggesting that this equivalence is not an accident but the result of precise calculation 
on heaven’s part.
For practical reasons, much geometry is plane geometry, that is to say, the 
geometry of #gures in two dimensions. A line (which has only one dimension), is as 
much a geometric #gure as is a rectangle or a circle but one quickly reaches the limits 
of what can usefully be said about the properties of single lines. Add a second line, as 
close as you like and parallel to the #rst, and we are already dealing with two dimen‐
sions. Two-dimensional #gures have the advantage that they can easily be drawn on a 
piece of paper. Many three-dimensional #gures can be described using plane ones, 
notably the parabola, the ellipse and the hyperbola, which can be conceived as the 
cross-section obtained when a plane intersects a cone — a double cone in the case of 
a hyperbola. When Marvell wrote, the idea of a #gure with more than three dimen‐
sions would have seemed absurd. In short, a great deal of work can be done in 
geometry using just two dimensions.63 
Since it is clear from its context that Marvell’s use of the term ‘Geometrick 
63 Descartes used the phrase ‘ordinary geometry’ to mean ‘the use of straight lines and circles 
traced on a plane surface’: !e Geometry of René Descartes, trans. David Eugene Smith and Marcia L. 
Latham (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1925) p. 13. 'e original French reads: ‘la 
Geometrie ordinaire, c’est a dire, en ne se seruant que de lignes droites & circulaires tracées sur vne 
super/cie plate …’ (p. 12). Commenting on Descartes’s then unusual use of powers of two and three, 
Smith and Latham remark: ‘At the time this was written, a2 was commonly considered to mean the 
surface of a square whose side is a, and b3 to mean the volume of a cube whose side is b; while b4, b5, 
… were unintelligible as geometric forms’ (p. 5, n. 6).
161
162
163
yeer’ is as an illustration or ampli#cation of the idea that the long and the short lives 
are somehow of equal value, it is surprising that the possibility does not seem to have 
been considered that he is thinking in dimensional terms. 'e expression suggests 
that we should conceive of a life as analogous, not to a line, which has a single 
dimension (length), but to a #gure such as a rectangle, which has two. 'e second 
dimension may conveniently be thought of as depth. If the short but deep life and the 
long but shallow one are represented by rectangles, both #gures (according to the 
assertion made in the poem) will have the same area. 'is equivalence will have come 
about, not by chance, but as a result of the way that they ‘number’ and ‘weigh’ in 
heaven. Heaven, that is to say, practises a kind of distributive justice in determining 
the lifespans of mortals. Someone like Hastings is compensated for the shortness of 
his life by its intensity and richness (to vary the metaphor of depth). Conversely, the 
‘Phlegmatick and Slowe’, though he lives longer, gains nothing of value from his 
attempt to beguile heaven.
It may be objected that, because a line is itself a geometric #gure, Marvell 
cannot have been using ‘Geometrick’ as, in e$ect, another term for ‘two-dimensional’. 
Strictly speaking, this objection has a point; but since, as has already been stated, 
hardly any useful geometry can be carried out using just one dimension, and a great 
deal can be done using two, it does not seem at all fanciful or unlikely that Marvell 
should think of plane #gures as being characteristic of geometry.
Whether or not the notion of a heavenly distributive justice in the allocation 
of lifespans is to be taken as literally true, its primary function is presumably as a 
consolation for the bereaved. It is a consolation that, as the poem progresses, is found 
to be wanting. Hastings himself requires no assurance that his treatment has been 
just: he #nds that, in the next life, he ‘better recreates his active Minde’ (l. 32) and he 
64 Poems and Letters, I, 240, n. to l. 40.
65 See Gearin-Tosh, ‘Marvell’s “Upon the Death of the Lord Hastings”’, p. 117, Maule, ‘Marvell’s 
Hastings Elegy — A Supplementary Note’, p. 398.
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has the comfort of seeing the names of his family-members ‘enroll’d’ in ‘th’ Eternal 
Book’ (ll. 37–9). 'is book, being genuinely eternal, contains not only the names of 
those who are already in heaven, but also those of everyone who will join them there 
in the future. Hence, it can include the name of Hastings’s mother, whom he prede‐
ceased.64 However, as in the case of the Heliades, the young man whose life has been 
cut short is not the only one who is a$ected by the death. If Hastings has no grounds 
for complaint that he has been unjustly treated by heaven, the recognition of this fact 
may not bring much comfort to those who are le( behind to grieve. In Hastings’s 
case, these included a #ancée and a distinguished prospective father-in-law. He had 
been about to marry the daughter of Sir 'eodore Turquet de Mayerne, the royal 
physician.
Among the gods, only Hymenaeus and Aesculapius are unhappy at Hastings’s 
presence in heaven. Hymen is frustrated at the preemption of the young man’s 
marriage, while Aesculapius ‘Himself at once condemneth, and Mayern’ (l. 48) 
because of their inability either to heal him or, if that proved impossible, to bring him 
back to life. Aesculapius, or Asklepios, the great healer, was said to have been slain by 
Zeus’s thunderbolt because he had raised people from the dead. In some versions of 
the story, Zeus killed him because he thought it necessary to prevent him from 
bestowing immortality on humans in general, though in other versions Zeus acted 
out of resentment.65 Jeremy Maule implies that Marvell’s juxtaposition of Aesculapius 
and Hymenaeus indicates that he is alluding in particular to Apollodorus’s telling of 
the tale,66 which is one of those in which Zeus is actuated by jealousy or resentment.
In any case, Mayerne is seen as a modern Aesculapius — Gearin-Tosh tells us 
that the physician was %attered to have been painted by Rubens in front of a life-sized 
67 Gearin-Tosh, ‘Marvell’s “Upon the Death of the Lord Hastings”’, p. 201.
68 'ere is some uncertainty as to whether the ‘he’ of the /nal verse paragraph is Mayerne or 
Aesculapius. Klause takes it to be the latter (!e Unfortunate Fall, p. 77) while Gearin-Tosh believes it 
to be part of the humiliation of Mayerne that he is forced to rely on herbs in his unsuccessful attempt 
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statue of the demigod.67 So, when Marvell writes ‘… how Immortal must their race 
have stood, / Had Mayern once been mixt with Hastings blood!’ (ll. 51–2), he implies 
that the death of Lord Hastings, even at such an early age, is a necessary death in the 
same way that Aesculapius’s was. All deaths are necessary, if the human race is to be 
able to renew itself — and, if the prevention of human immortality had indeed been 
necessary, the necessity could not have been vitiated by the baseness of Zeus’s motives 
— but some deaths may appear to come before their due time. 'e ambivalent and 
implicit recognition of necessity in lines 51–2 modi#es the suggestion earlier in the 
poem that it is mere jealousy (l. 22), or a wish to preserve its own distinguished state, 
that causes heaven to ensure that, ‘Lest He become like 'em’ (l. 24), no one eats 
from the tree of life as well as from that of knowledge.
'e necessity of Hastings’s death is no consolation to Mayerne, who ‘wept, as 
we, without Redress or Law’ (ll. 57–8).68 As well as the poet himself, ‘we’ can be taken 
to include Mayerne’s daughter, Hastings’s mother and surviving family and, perhaps, 
the other contributors to Lachrymae Musarum. 'e unavailability of ‘Redress or Law’ 
appears to re%ect the helplessness of justice in the face of necessity, but the next line 
seems to withdraw the apparent concession of lines 51–2 that this death, at this time, 
was indeed necessary: ‘For Man (alas) is but the Heavens sport’ (l. 59).
'e elegy might be said to exhibit an unresolved ambivalence about the 
relationship of justice to necessity. John Klause suggests that this is the only work in 
which Marvell permits his misgivings about divine justice to be voiced.69 'e poem 
70 Marvell (1928) p. 34, Marvell (1968) p. 15.
71 Warren Chernaik, !e Poet’s Time: Politics and Religion in the Work of Andrew Marvell 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 18.
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mingles a Christian with a pagan frame of reference. Aesculapius, Hymenaeus and 
the gods who ‘cannot their Joy conceal’ (l. 40) clearly belong to the latter, while ‘th’ 
Eternal Book’ in which the names of the elect are enrolled belongs to a very di$erent 
idea of heaven. If the reference to the inscription of Lady Huntingdon’s name in that 
book seems disturbing, it is partly because of its incongruity in the predominantly 
pagan context. ('ere are two other reasons: in the #rst place, there might appear to 
be an element of vicarious presumption in the assertion that the countess’s salvation 
is a certainty while, in the second, to use the occasion of her son’s early death as a 
memento mori seems, to a twenty-#rst century reader, to verge on the brutal.)
While the coexistence of Christian and pagan elements in the same poem is 
not unknown in Marvell’s work, it is unusual enough to require comment. Legouis 
emphasizes that the Horatian Ode contains ‘nothing Christian’.70 While it deals in 
part with ‘'e force of angry Heavens %ame’ (l. 26), the Ode contains nothing that 
cannot be read in purely classical terms. Warren Chernaik sees the exclusion of 
Christian elements from the Ode as a strength:
'e classical, secular framework, here as in ‘To his Coy Mistress’, 
permits a dramatic tension which the introduction of explicitly Chris‐
tian terms would subvert: the Roman historical parallels and the classi‐
cal ethical values implicit in the presentation of Charles and Cromwell 
are in keeping with the ideas of an amoral Fortune and a Fate indi$er‐
ent to human ideas of justice and merciless to human weaknesses.71
'is can in part be seen as a kind of decorum, in that it keeps apart elements that do 
not belong together. Christianity, as a monotheistic religion that makes claims to 
universality, leaves no room for the gods of ancient Greece or Rome. A poem that is 
to accommodate those gods, must either leave Christianity entirely out of the picture 
or mute its references to that religion. Even in ‘Clorinda and Damon’ — a dramatic 
dialogue between two pastoral #gures, one of whom has undergone a conversion to 
72 St. Augustine is aware of this possible objection to God’s benevolence and o&ers an answer: 
‘For God would never have created a man, let alone an angel, in the foreknowledge of his future evil 
state, if he had not known at the same time how he would put such creatures to good use, and thus 
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Christianity — there is a notable lack of pagan reference, apart from a glancing 
mention of Flora (l. 5) and the presence of Pan, who is identi#ed with Christ. 
However, Marvell does not choose to observe this decorum in all his poetry. As we 
have already seen, ‘'e Nymph complaining’ combines veneration for Diana (l. 104) 
and the implied presence of Zeus (in the mention of the Heliades, l. 99) and Latona 
(in the allusion to Niobe, l. 116) with an appeal to ‘Heavens King [who] Keeps 
register of every thing’ (ll. 13–14).
‘'e Garden’ does something similar. At the beginning of that poem, we 
encounter Apollo and Pan (the latter, in this case, not a surrogate for Christ but the 
pursuer of the nymph Syrinx, ‘for a Reed’: l. 32). At its end, the poet refers to the 
Garden of Eden (stanza VIII) and to ‘the skilful Gardner’ (l. 65). It is arguable that 
‘'e Garden’ is a special case; at least, in this poem, the con%ict between Christian 
and pagan is submerged and inconspicuous, to a much greater extent than it is in the 
other two poems. Although they are described as ‘Gods’ (l. 27), it is not for their 
divinity that Pan and Apollo are of interest to the poet but because of the metamor‐
phosis of their quarry into plants.
'e mixture, in the Hastings elegy, of two incompatible conceptions of the 
nature of divinity allows it to make contradictory claims about the behaviour of 
‘heaven’ towards humans. On the one hand, it is strictly and scrupulously just: ‘'ey 
… weigh to Man the Geometrick yeer’ (ll. 17–18). On the other, it is capricious and 
aloof: ‘For Man (alas) is but the Heavens sport’ (l. 59). Nor is it always clear that 
justice is exclusively associated with the Christian element in this shared heaven, and 
caprice with the pagan. 'e trees of life and knowledge (ll. 20–1) are mentioned in a 
context in which it is initially suggested that a base or petty motive might lie behind 
the denial of immortality to humankind; it is only later, with the introduction of 
Aesculapius, that a concession is made that human mortality may be a necessity. Even 
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then, though, it is not conceded that what is necessary is necessarily just.
It is likely that Zeus killed Aesculapius (as he did Phaethon) because he 
thought it necessary. No necessity can be imagined for the creation of a race of beings 
many or most of whom would (admittedly through our own fault) ultimately be 
condemned to eternal punishment.72 No blame could attach to God for the sins of 
humankind, or for the consequent damnation of vast numbers of humans, because to 
sin is a choice that we make voluntarily. Yet God, with his foreknowledge of every‐
thing that will happen, might have prevented the damnation of so many. If he had not 
been prepared to do so by making us better able to withstand temptation, he might 
have avoided the problem entirely by refraining from creating us in the #rst place.73 
God’s behaviour towards humans, starting with our creation, is perfectly just, though 
it leads indirectly to a great deal of su$ering that cannot be said to be necessary;74 
Zeus’s actions towards such as Aesculapius and Phaethon are presumably necessary, 
though otherwise unjust.75 If that is so, the elegy seems to suggest that, from the 
human point of view, the certainty of God’s justice is not in itself a great comfort, 
76 'is is particularly noticeable in the volume of York Tercentenary Lectures (ed. Patrides, cited 
above, n. 1), mentioned in the opening paragraphs of the Introduction, above. Lamont, in seeking to 
remove any doubt as to Marvell’s religion, remarked that in other respects ‘[i]nconclusiveness is 
[Marvell’s] secret weapon; it even infects those who write about him’: William Lamont, ‘'e Religion 
of Andrew Marvell: Locating the “Bloody Horse”’, !e Political Identity of Andrew Marvell, ed. 
Condren and Cousins, pp. 135–55.
77 Klause, !e Unfortunate Fall, p. 77.
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since necessity and justice alike may lead to the early death of a young man and the 
disconsolate grief of his family and friends. On this view, it might be preferable to be 
governed by a group of capricious gods who occasionally make us their ‘sport’ but are 
for the most part indi$erent to human actions, than by one God, who sees everything 
we do and always acts towards us with justice.
Words such as ‘elusive’ and ‘inconclusive’ have o(en been applied to Marvell’s 
poetry.76 'ey seem particularly apt to ‘Upon the Death of Lord Hastings’. It is clear, 
at least, that justice — divine justice in particular — is a central theme in the poem, 
though less clear how the questions that it raises on that subject are to be resolved. 
Klause may well be right to say that, in the Hastings elegy (and nowhere else), 
‘Marvell let[s] his anger and frustration over the problem of evil run unchecked’.77 
'is is not certain, however. 'e poem is written in the persona of one of the 
bereaved, as the ‘we’ in line 58 makes explicit. Perhaps, then, the elegy should be read 
as incorporating a warning that extreme grief may lead us, if we are not on our guard, 
to question or deny God’s goodness and justice. In that case, the mélange of Christian 
and prechristian ideas of the divine may be taken as an indication of the speaker’s 
confusion; it may be that his thinking has been distorted by grief, so that he fails to 
perceive that the di$erent conceptions of the fundamental nature of the world that he 
simultaneously holds are mutually incompatible.
Seen in this light, the resemblances between the elegy and ‘'e Nymph 
complaining’ are remarkable. Not only do we #nd in each a Christian reference in a 
predominantly pagan context, but the references themselves are strikingly similar: 
one is to the book in which the names of the elect are enrolled, the other to the 
78 Spitzer, ‘Marvell’s “Nymph Complaining for the Death of Her Faun”: Sources versus Meaning’, 
p. 240.
79 Hartman, ‘“'e Nymph Complaining for the Death of Her Fawn”: A Brief Allegory’, p. 124.
168
169
170
‘register’ maintained by the King of Heaven. Both poems make explicit, if brief, 
reference to justice and legal process: ‘'e Nymph complaining’, ll. 16–17, ‘Upon the 
Death of Lord Hastings’, l. 58. Both deal with the death of a young person: in Hast‐
ings’s case, a death which has already occurred, in the nymph’s, a death that is about 
to. Both poems present formidable problems of interpretation, so that it is tempting 
to try to read one in the light of the other.
In each case, the possibility needs to be examined that the speaker’s employ‐
ment of an eclectic conception of divinity is be taken as an indication that his or her 
reliability is questionable. In the elegy, this seems likely to be true, since the speaker 
says in terms that the world lacks justice, and is at best undecided as to whether this 
is the responsibility of the Deity. Such a view would contradict Marvell’s (few and, in 
one case, much later) explicit statements on the subject of divine justice and it seems 
impossible to dismiss the possibility that a certain distance is being maintained 
between the poet and the persona in which he speaks. 'e case of the nymph is more 
complicated. In the #rst place, she is more obviously distanced from the poet than the 
speaker of the elegy, in that she speaks in the voice of a naive young woman or girl. 
'ere are already indicators, apart from the failure to keep the pagan apart from the 
Christian, that what she has to say may not be trustworthy. Some of these have been 
discussed above — her apparent confusion of ‘forget’ and ‘forgive’, for example. And 
yet (as has also already been discussed) one does not doubt the broad outlines — or 
many of the details — of the picture that she presents of duplicity and wanton cruelty. 
It may be, then, that while caveats against too easy an acceptance of the speaker’s 
worldview are, in the elegy, submerged and unobtrusive, and in the nymph’s com‐
plaint they are visible on the surface, those in the latter are, a(er examination, to be 
discounted in a way that is impossible in the case of the former. If this is so, the two 
poems would appear to be paradoxically complementary: in the elegy, we have a 
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poem that is optimistic in import but deeply pessimistic in tone, while the charming 
and graceful tone of the lament disguises its pessimistic import.
On the other hand, it might be argued that, if the combination of Christian 
and prechristian elements in the same poem is not a device to undermine the 
nymph’s reliability, it cannot consistently be maintained that it does perform this 
function in the Hastings elegy. One answer to this is that, in the elegy, the di$erent 
ideas of heaven are closely related to the question of heaven’s justice, so that the 
speaker’s inconsistent (if ultimately pessimistic) beliefs about justice derive from, or 
are analogous to, his contradictory ideas about the nature of heaven. If the latter are 
mistaken, it is all the more likely that the former are, too. In ‘'e Nymph complain‐
ing’, on the other hand, the relationship is much less clear, and alternative explana‐
tions have been suggested for the coexistence of pagan with Christian elements. For 
example, according to Leo Spitzer, the location of the poem ‘at the point of con%u‐
ence of two powerfully literary currents, Ovidian and Christian’,78 is characteristic of 
Marvell’s metaphysical wit, one of the features of which is the bringing together of 
disparate elements. For Geo$rey Hartman, likewise, the disparate elements should 
not appear mutually contradictory, but reconciled:
'e poet needs a world in which metamorphosis is possible … 'is is 
the world of Pan, the reconciler of man and nature — in Marvell’s 
conception, the reconciler of all things, even of Pagan and Christian. … 
'e poet is himself a Pan who has created through the accepted magic 
of poetry a middle-world pointing to the ultimate reconciliation of 
Pagan and Christian. His consciousness, like the nymph’s love, stands 
ideally beyond the division into sacred and profane.79
It is doubtful whether such reconciliation can be said to occur in the Hastings elegy 
but, if it does, it would appear to be a reconciliation in which the requirements of 
necessity and the indi$erence to human su$ering of the ancient gods carry more 
weight than the justice of the one God of Christianity.
80 Klause, !e Unfortunate Fall, pp. 13, 77; Gearin-Tosh, ‘Marvell’s “Upon the Death of the Lord 
Hastings’, p. 122.
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Whatever the import of the Hastings elegy, its tone of near-despair cannot be 
ignored. It is because of this that Klause can see the elegy as angry, frustrated and 
de#ant and Gearin-Tosh can comment that ‘[w]e can have no con#dence in there 
being another world, and certainly not a better one than this.’80 While a strong 
argument can be made that, notwithstanding its penultimate line, the elegy seems 
rather to assume God’s justice than to question it, it does so, if at all, in such a way as 
to imply that just treatment may be no easier to bear (and perhaps markedly less so) 
than indi$erence punctuated by occasional caprice. ‘'e Nymph complaining’, on the 
other hand, disposes of the idea that a world in which injustice prevails is in any way 
preferable to or easier to live in than one that is governed justly.
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Chapter 4. !e law and the king’s prerogative
Contignation thwarted
(a) Absolutists and their opponents
In a discussion of justice in seventeenth-century England, the relationship between 
the king and his subjects is of central importance. !ere has been controversy among 
scholars and historians of the period about the degree of ideological disagreement 
that existed as to the nature and characteristics of the relationship. On the one side, 
there are historians such as Johann Sommerville, who argue that deep ideological 
con"ict existed between three main groups: #rst, absolutists (among whose number 
are to be included the #rst two Stuart kings of England) who believed that the king’s 
will was law; second, those who held that the monarch was accountable to the people, 
usually as the result of a original contract between ruler and ruled; and, third, those 
(‘ancient constitutionalists’) for whom the king’s power to act was bounded by 
ancient or immemorial customary law.¹
Opposing Sommerville are the historians who believe that prior to 1640 there 
was a high degree of consensus among Englishmen as to the nature of their polity. A 
leading #gure is Glenn Burgess, who claims that there were very few absolutists in 
early Stuart England — and that neither James I nor Sir !omas Fleming (Chief 
Baron of the Exchequer, whose judgment in Bate’s Case has been much discussed by 
both sides in the scholarly debate) should properly be counted among the few who 
did exist. Burgess de#nes ‘absolutist’ narrowly, as someone who argues that the king 
is legibus solutus or ‘free of the laws’.² He particularly denies that a recognition that 
1 J. P. Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640 (London: Longman, 1986). In 
Part One of that work, these three groups are given a chapter each.
2 Glenn Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996).
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the subject is never entitled to resist the king, even when the latter is acting in a way 
forbidden by law, is enough to make one an absolutist. !ere was practically universal 
agreement, he says, that the king could not lawfully be resisted. But if force of arms 
could not legitimately be used to control the monarch’s behaviour, might there not be 
other methods of making the king answerable to the injured subject? !e king could 
not be sued directly in what were regarded as his own courts. His immunity from suit 
could be justi#ed on the ground that he was the ‘fountain of justice’, one of whose 
responsibilities was to provide his subjects with courts, judges and the entire mecha‐
nism by which they could complain of their grievances and obtain their 
entitlements.³ Burgess argues that in the end it is not true to say that the king is free 
of the laws, because he is expected (and bound by his coronation oath) to observe 
them, even if there is no direct means of compelling him to do so.
It will be seen, then, that the question whether there was fundamental ideo‐
logical disagreement as to the nature of the monarchy and the king’s rights and (at 
least in the broad sense) duties, is not an easy one to answer de#nitively. It is not 
uncommon to #nd apparently con"icting statements made by the same person in 
di%erent circumstances. A good example of this is provided by the case of Sir John 
Davies, Attorney General for Ireland under James I. !e statement by Davies, in Le 
Primer Report des Cases et Matters en Ley (1615) that ‘the Common Law of England is 
nothing else but the Common Custome of the Realm’, a phrase he also uses in !e 
Question Concerning Impositions,4 makes him an important #gure for Pocock and 
other proponents of the doctrine of an ancient constitution.5 Elsewhere,6 Davies 
3 See, for example, Chedder v. Savage (1406) Y.B. Mich. 8 Hen. IV, fol. 13, pl. 13, cited in 
J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th edition (London: Butterworths, 2002), p. 97, 
where it was held that ‘the king has committed all his judicial powers to various courts’.
4 Sir John Davies, !e Question Concerning Impositions (1656), p. 135, Wing D407A
5 See Pocock, !e Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law, pp. 32–3; Paul Christianson, 
‘Ancient Constitutions in the Age of Sir Edward Coke and John Selden’, in !e Roots of Liberty: Magna 
Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law, ed. Ellis Sandoz 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993), pp. 89–146 (p. 107); see also J. W. Tubbs, !e 
Common Law Mind: Medieval and Early Modern Conceptions (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
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made a pronouncement that Sommerville regards as particularly clear in its abso‐
lutism.
When, as a parliamentarian, Sir Edward Coke attacked the king’s supposed 
power to imprison without cause shown, he was quickly reminded that he had earlier, 
as a Privy Councillor, defended it as a power that the king enjoyed at common law.7 
!e fact is that ‘absolutists’ and ‘constitutionalists’ alike agreed that the king needed 
— and had — discretionary powers that permitted him to act outside the ordinary 
law. True, they disagreed as to whether this area of unfettered discretion was accord‐
ed to the king by the law itself or was antecedent to the law — whether, for example, 
it was a power that a much earlier king had reserved to himself and his successors 
when he #rst agreed to govern by law (if, indeed, such an agreement had ever been 
made).8 Absolutists and common lawyers alike were vague about the extent and 
subject matter of the discretionary power. In describing it, both sides typically made 
reference to the good of the commonwealth or the salus populi.9 From both points of 
view, the vagueness made sense. To the absolutist, the king was empowered to do 
anything that he deemed necessary for the common good; his powers were limited 
only by his own determination of what that good required. To the common law judge, 
accustomed to deciding on a case by case basis the issues that came before him, a 
comprehensive de#nition of the prerogative powers would be undesirable because 
discretionary powers existed precisely to deal with situations where the ordinary, 
promulgated law would not permit the king to act in the best interests of the king‐
dom.
!is is not to say that attempts to enumerate the prerogative powers were 
Press, 2000), chapter 4, for a critical view of Pocock’s reading of Davies.
6 In !e Question Concerning Impositions, discussed below, pp. 179–80.
7 Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640, pp. 163–5.
8 *at such a reservation of power had taken place was the view of Sir John Davies: Sommerville, 
Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640, p. 37, citing Davies’s !e Question Concerning 
Impositions, pp. 30–1.
9 See Sir *omas Fleming’s judgment in Bate’s Case, discussed below, pp. 186–7.
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unknown. Francis Bacon, like Ellesmere immediately before him, had a foot in each 
of two of the camps, having been trained as a common lawyer and later become Lord 
Chancellor. In his A preparation toward the union of laws of England and Scotland, 
having listed the king’s prerogatives (with every appearance of exhaustiveness) under 
such headings as ‘!e King’s prerogative in matters of trade and tra&c’ and ‘!e 
King’s prerogative in the persons of his subjects’, he goes on to speak of a ‘twofold 
power of the law’ and a ‘twofold power in the king’.¹0 !e law has power to direct the 
king, but not to correct him. It is not clear in what respect this ‘power of the law’ is 
‘twofold’ but the underlying idea seems to be the familiar one that the king is obliged 
(or at least ought) to follow the law but that this obligation (to put it at its strongest) is 
unenforceable. It will be seen that the controversy between Sommerville and Burgess 
is more di&cult to resolve because, given that the king cannot personally be held to 
account before the courts, there is little point in lawyers and judges spelling out what 
they consider to be the nature of his duty: whether it is a binding (though unenforce‐
able) legal obligation or simply something that is to be expected of so bene#cent and 
wise a person as the king.
Bacon’s ‘twofold power in the king’ consists of, #rst, ‘His absolute power, 
whereby he may levy force against any nation’; and, second, ‘His limited power, which 
is declared and expressed in the laws what he may do.’¹¹ !is seems to imply that the 
absolute power is wholly concerned with matters of war, peace and foreign relations. 
Such a power would arguably be wide enough to permit the extraparliamentary 
raising of money at home for the purposes of external defence (or attack). Earlier, 
under the heading ‘!e King’s prerogative in war and peace’, Bacon had stated ‘!e 
King hath power to command the bodies of his subjects for service of his wars, and to 
muster, train and levy men, and to transport them by sea or land at his pleasure.’
10 !e Works of Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, Viscount St. Alban, and Lord High Chancellor of 
England 10 vols., (London: F. C. & J. Rivington and others, 1819), vol. iv, pp. 287–381 (pp. 303–4).
11 Works of Francis Bacon, vol. iv, p. 304
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It was not unusual for lawyers’ descriptions of the absolute prerogative to be 
frustratingly imprecise. It would seem that, even when they are attempting to be 
detailed and thorough, as Bacon appears to be, they are motivated by a self-contra‐
dictory aim: to de#ne without limiting, so to speak. !e scholarly disagreement 
between Sommerville and Burgess has been in part made possible by the di&culty in 
deciphering such pronouncements as Sir !omas Fleming’s, in Bate’s Case and 
elsewhere, on the absolute prerogative.¹²
In the circumstances described above, it is not surprising that ideological 
con"ict as to the nature of the king’s discretionary powers should have failed to reach 
crisis point until the king attempted to use those powers for a purpose for which, on 
any theory of royal power, they were not intended. When Coke defended the power 
to imprison without cause shown, it was because it was always foreseeable that 
circumstances might render it necessary that such a power be exercised for ‘matter of 
state’ — in e%ect, it was a measure against treason.¹³ When he condemned it, it was 
because it was apparent that the king was using it to compel reluctant subjects to pay 
the forced loan. By resorting to the power for this purpose, the king implied that 
those unwilling to pay were comparable to traitors.
Similarly, the king justi#ed the imposition of ship money on the ground that 
he deemed it necessary for the naval defence of the country. !e necessity was far 
from obvious to many of the subjects who were being asked to pay. In both cases, the 
king showed every appearance of abusing the power which hardly anybody denied 
that he had. In Sommerville’s words, the years 1626–7 (when the imprisonments 
without cause occurred) ‘witnessed … the most "agrant violations of English liberties 
perpetrated by a monarch in over a century’.¹4 It was when the question arose as to 
12 See below, pp. 186–7.
13 Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640, pp. 163–4.
14 Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England,1603–1640, p. 222. Burgess comments that the 
loopholes hidden by the consensus that ‘the king was limited but there was no earthly forum in which 
his transgression of the limits on him could be legally judged … were neither apparent nor important 
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how (if at all) that kind of abuse could be restrained that the ideological di%erences 
began to bite. !ere was no pressing reason why anybody should have to decide 
whether he was absolutist, contractualist or ancient constitutionalist until the king 
began to use his discretionary powers for unjusti#ed purposes. !is is not to say that 
the ideological disagreements perceived by Sommerville are merely our ex post facto 
interpretation of the various nuances inevitably to be found in a general consensus as 
to the nature of the monarchy and the polity. It is clear, in particular, that many 
churchmen (Maynwaring and Sibthorpe being the most obvious examples)¹5 held 
views that the typical common lawyer found repugnant.
In summary, there was a degree (as to the extent of which there is room for 
argument) of ideological con"ict about the origin or basis of the king’s discretionary 
power to act independently of the law. On the other hand, there was broad agreement 
across the ideological divide that a strict de#nition of the extent or area of operation 
of that power would not be helpful. In arguing against the view that the doctrine of 
the ancient constitution was the dominant politico-constitutional theory of early 
seventeenth-century England, Sommerville points out that a number of Coke’s fellow 
common law judges — Fleming in Bate’s Case, Berkeley in R. v Hampden and Davies 
in !e Question Concerning Impositions (1656) — ‘displayed a clear bias towards 
absolutism’.¹6 Perhaps this shows the narrowness rather than the breadth of the 
ideological gulf between common lawyers and absolutists. A'er all, Coke himself had 
defended the power of imprisonment.
(b) !e ancient constitution
!e various ideas to which the term ‘ancient constitution’ could be applied have 
until the English found themselves with a king patently willing to exploit them’: Burgess, Absolute 
Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, p. 25.
15 ‘I give you those particular relations for an example of what was then the Doctrine a-la-mode 
at that time in most of your Pulpits and which you here attempt to bring <again> in fashion’: Marvell, 
!e Rehearsall Transpros’d: !e Second Part, ed. Martin Dzelzainis and Annabel Patterson, in Prose 
Works, I, 313.
16 Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640, p. 108.
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already been discussed in chapter 1. If the arguments in that chapter are persuasive, 
Sommerville is almost certainly right to deny that the doctrine of the ancient 
constitution was the dominant ideology in early Stuart England.
It may be that the Protectorate, with its Instrument of Government, had 
shown Englishmen that government in accordance with a constitution was at least a 
possibility. !is was a lesson that many were willing to forget in the a'ermath of the 
Restoration, until the problem of a king who seemed unwilling to be bound by what 
was understood to be the law again became pressing.
(c) Contract
If the ideological divide between absolutists and the common lawyers could be 
plastered over with little di&culty — so long as the king exercised self-restraint — 
what of Sommerville’s third group, the contractualists? !e #rst thing to be said about 
this group is that it covered a wide spectrum: it managed to encompass those who 
held both authoritarian and libertarian views¹7 on the subject’s relationship to his 
monarch. Both Milton and Hobbes had their precursors among the contractualists of 
the early seventeenth century.¹8 As Sommerville points out, the putative original 
contract between monarch and people¹9 was not extant, so its presumed content was 
a matter of speculation, deduction and inference.²0 It was reasonable to suppose that 
17 *ese terms may seem anachronistic and are applied here somewhat loosely. In !e Rehearsall 
Transpros’d: !e Second Part, (Prose Works, I, 325) Marvell contrasts ‘Clemency of Government’ with 
‘the sanguinary course’: see below p. 199.
18 To some degree, each of them has a precursor in Selden! Jason P. Rosenblatt has traced the 
in-uence of Selden on Milton’s divorce tracts, on parts of Paradise Lost and on Samson Agonistes: 
Rosenblatt, Renaissance England’s Chief Rabbi: John Selden, chapters 3, 4 and 6. *ere is no obvious 
English source for Milton’s .duciary conception of the relationship between king and subject (as to 
which, see note 24 below) but it clearly owes something to earlier contractualists. For Selden as a 
forerunner of Hobbes, see Tuck, Natural Rights !eories, chapter 6 and Tuck, !e Rights of War and 
Peace, chapter 4.
19 Hobbes, atypically, would write of a contract between the people inter se, not with the 
sovereign: in Leviathan, chapter 17, he de.nes a commonwealth as ‘One Person, of whose Acts a great 
Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the 
end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and 
Common Defence’ (*omas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), p. 121, emphasis added).
20 Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640, p. 64.
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whoever had originally held power had, in agreeing to share it, made exceptions and 
reservations, the better to be able to deal with unforeseen contingencies. So, if one 
believed that power had originally vested in the people, who had then agreed to 
choose a king, the exceptions and reservations would tend to bene#t the people and 
to limit the power of the king. Conversely, if one believed that, by divine gi', the law 
of nature or the law of nations, kings had originally had unfettered power and had 
subsequently agreed to govern according to laws and limitations,²¹ the exceptions and 
reservations would tend to be in the king’s favour, at the expense of the people. On 
the other hand, it was possible to believe that power had originally been the people’s, 
but that they had agreed to give it up permanently and unconditionally. Hobbes was 
to o%er an explanation as to why all people, in all commonwealths, could be pre‐
sumed to have done this, even though it might appear to have been contrary to their 
interests.
!e second thing to be said about the contractualists is that there appears to 
have been an overlap of membership with both of the other groups. Again, Sir John 
Davies is an instructive, if not necessarily typical, case. It was mentioned above that 
he is an important #gure for Pocock and the proponents of an ancient constitution 
(having described the common law as ‘the common custom of the realm’) who also 
made absolutist-sounding pronouncements in his !e Question Concerning Imposi‐
tions. It is time to look more closely at what he said there.
According to Davies, under the law of nature there had been no private 
property but everything had been held in common. Private property, which in turn 
led to contracts and trading, was introduced by the law of nations. Kings were 
21 One lawyer who believed this, as we are about to see, was Sir John Davies. Perhaps the most 
in-uential advocate of this view was James I who put forward the doctrine that has been characterized 
by Paul Christianson as ‘constitutional monarchy created by kings’. According to this doctrine, kings 
had had unfettered power in their ‘.rst originall’ but had assumed by ‘paction’ the obligation to govern 
in accordance with fundamental laws: Christianson, ‘Ancient Constitutions in the Age of Coke and 
Selden’, pp. 93–4.
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likewise an institution of the law of nations ‘as the #rst and principal cause of making 
Kings, was to maintain property and Contracts, and Tra&que, and Commerce 
amongst men’. For Davies, the law of nations existed before kings, who in turn existed 
before the laws of particular nations, such as the common law in England:
[A]ll these things, namely Property, and Contract, and Kings, and Customes, 
were before any positive Law was made; then came the positive Law, and 
limited the Law of Nations, whereas by the Law of Nations the King had an 
absolute and unlimited power in all matters whatsoever. By the positive Law 
the King himself was pleased to limit and stint his absolute power, and to tye 
himself to the ordinary rules of the Law, in common and ordinary cases, … 
retaining and reserving notwithstanding in many points that absolute & 
unlimited power which was given unto him by the Law of Nations, and in 
these cases or points, the Kings Prerogatives do consist; so as the Kings 
Prerogatives were not granted unto him by the people, but reserved by himself 
to himself, when the positive Law was #rst established;²²
He goes on to make the familiar distinction between the king’s absolute power, 
‘which is not bound by the positive Law; and an ordinary power of Jurisdiction, 
which doth co-operate with the Law’.
!is is at the same time contractualist — in its reference to a reservation by 
the King to himself — and capable of being called in aid by Sommerville as tending 
towards absolutism. !e king’s absolute power is uncontrolled by the ordinary laws of 
the land, including the common law and the ecclesiastical law. However, Davies’s 
work does not support an argument that the king was an absolute ruler in Burgess’s 
sense of the term. His purpose in !e Question Concerning Impositions had been to 
assert that the king had an unfettered power to levy impositions similar to Customs 
duties on imports and exports. !at power, he repeated, had been acknowledged and 
recognized by a statute passed in the reign of Richard II but it had not been granted 
either by common law or statute, as it had existed prior to both. Further, although 
there was a sense in which this power was ‘absolute’, its area of application was limited 
to international trade; it was clearly not a general power for the king to do as he 
22 Davies, !e Question Concerning Impositions, pp. 30–1 cited in part by Sommerville, Politics 
and Ideology in England, 1603–1640, p. 37.
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wished.
In any case, even the king’s absolute power is not wholly ‘free of the laws’ in 
that it accords with, and was originally conferred by, the law of nations, which Davies 
sees as having been at #rst universally binding, and still in force to the extent that it 
has not been modi#ed by more local laws.²³ As Sommerville remarks, the passage 
shows that not all common lawyers believed that the common law was necessarily 
superior to and independent of concepts of law having their origin in continental 
Europe. Davies, we see, had a developed and coherent legal theory, but it is not one 
that #ts easily into a framework of either ‘absolutism’ or ‘ancient constitution’. Insofar 
as it is contractualist, it is clearly distinguishable from the ideas of Hobbes and 
Milton, who think in terms of an agreement of the people to be governed,24 whereas 
Davies posits an agreement by an ancient king to govern in accordance with laws. 
We know of no more thoroughgoing contractualist in early Stuart England 
than John Selden,²5 who was #rst of all a common lawyer. In so far as there were 
constitutionalists Selden was one of those, too, in that he believed that the king’s 
prerogative was within the law, not outside it, and he accorded to the law an impor‐
tant role in the government of the country.²6 In a much-quoted remark from his 
Table Talk, he also made it clear that his contractualist views were compatible with an 
authoritarian politics not far removed from absolutism. He is reported to have said:
23 Davies, !e Question Concerning Impositions, pp. 4, 20–21.
24 As Martin Dzelzainis makes clear, Milton conceives of the relationship between the king and 
the people as a trust rather than a contract, because the people may end it at will, without any default 
or misconduct on the part of the king. It does, however, bear some family resemblance to contractual 
theories, as evidenced by Milton’s use of terms such as ‘mutual Covnant’: Milton, Political Writings, 
pp. xvii–xviii.
25 See Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640, p. 64.
26 See the comments attributed to Selden on the subject of the prerogative in Table Talk (London: 
Joseph White, 1786), p. 125: ‘the King’s prerogative is not his will, or what divines make it, a power to 
do what he lists. … [It is] the law that concerns him in that case.’ See Tuck’s brief comments on this 
passage: Richard Tuck, ‘“*e Ancient Law of Freedom”: John Selden and the Civil War’, in John 
Morrill, ed. Reactions to the English Civil War 1642–1649 (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1982), pp. 137–161 (p. 147). Paul Christianson characterizes Selden as a proponent of the mixed 
monarchy version of the ancient constitution: Christianson, ‘Ancient Constitutions in the Age of Coke 
and Selden’, pp. 102–4 and 111–14.
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If our fathers have lost their liberty, why may not we labour to regain it? 
Answer. We must look to the contract, if that be rightly made, we must stand 
to it. If we once grant that we may recede from contracts, upon any inconve‐
niency that may a'erwards happen, we shall have no bargain kept.²7
On Selden’s view, a variety of ‘constitutional’ arrangements, including absolutism, is 
possible, depending on what the contracting parties agreed to. A people who 
submitted to an absolute government would presumably be acting under some form 
of duress (even if it were only that arising from the Hobbesian ‘warre of every man 
against every man’²8), but that would not be enough to vitiate the agreement. !is is 
not to suggest that Selden thought of the English monarchy as an absolute one, but 
only that he believed that absolutism could be a legitimate type of government.
Selden had a particularly uncomplicated approach to the relationship between 
rights and remedies. From his point of view, it made little sense to speak of liberties 
of the subject (or of obligations of the king) which were unenforceable. If the 
prerogative is within the law, it must also be controlled by the law, where necessary. 
So, in a conference between the Commons and the Lords on the Petition of Right 
(1628), he argued for the following principle:
In all cases, my Lords, where any right or liberty belongs to the subjects by 
any positive law, written or unwritten, if there were not also a remedy by law 
for the enjoying or regaining this right or liberty, when it is violated or taken 
from him, the positive law were most vain and to no purpose. And it were to 
no purpose for any man to have any right in any land or other inheritance if 
there were not a known remedy, that is, an action or writ, by which in some 
court of ordinary justice, he might recover it. And in the case of right or 
liberty of person, if there were not a remedy in the law for regaining it when it 
is restrained it were of no purpose to speak of laws that ordain it should not 
be restrained.²9
27 John Selden, Table Talk, p. 37. A slightly di/erent version (‘If our fathers had lost their liberty 
…’, emphasis added) is quoted by Richard Tuck, ‘Grotius and Selden’, in !e Cambridge History of 
Political !ought 1450–1700, ed. J. H. Burns, pp. 499–529 (p. 528). As Tuck makes clear, Selden’s 
argument on this point is identical with Grotius’s in De iure belli, I.III.VIII (Rights, pp. 261–2).
28 See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 88–90. Tuck points out that Francis Bacon had endorsed ‘the view 
ascribed by Plato to Clinias in !e Laws that “humanity is in a condition of public war of every man 
against every man”’, and conjectures that Hobbes may have dra0ed Bacon’s Considerations Touching a 
War with Spain (1624): Tuck, !e Rights of War and Peace, pp. 126–7.
29 Commons Debates, 1628, ed. Robert C. Johnson, Mary Frear Keeler, Maija Jansson Cole and 
William B. Bidwell (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977–8), ii, 342, cited in Glenn Burgess, 
Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 205–6.
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Whether it was possible to control those of the king’s actions which might be 
damaging to the subject depended as much on the availability of a remedy as on 
broad questions as to the nature of the constitution. In the case of arbitrary or 
irregular imprisonment, the remedy of habeas corpus was available — though it was 
not always e%ective to secure the release of a prisoner detained without apparent 
good cause, as is demonstrated by the examples of Selden himself in 1629 and 
Sha'esbury in 1677.³0 When the general property rights of the subject were invoked, 
it was usually in order to oppose measures in the nature of taxation, and such judicial 
decisions as Bate’s Case (1606) and the Ship-Money case, R. v. Hampden (1637)³¹ 
established — in the short term at least — that various methods of raising money 
without parliamentary approval were open to the king. In the latter case, it was held 
that the king was entitled by virtue of his prerogative powers to raise money to 
defend the kingdom when its safety was threatened. !e existence and seriousness of 
the threat were questions to be determined by the king alone. If he concluded that a 
measure such as ship-money was necessary, the judges did not have authority to look 
behind his determination. So, at least, the majority of the judges in R. v. Hampden 
decided.
!ese cases show two things. First, it does not follow that because the king 
was immune from suit that there were no procedures by which his actions could be 
challenged. A writ of habeas corpus, for example, was directed to the jailer who, in a 
case where the prisoner was detained on the king’s orders, would defend the impris‐
onment by saying it was authorized by the royal warrant. !e court could then rule 
30 David Sandler Berkowitz, John Selden’s Formative Years: Politics and Society in Early 
Seventeenth-Century England (Washington, London and Toronto: Folger Books, 1988), pp. 243–4, 
251–9. K.H.D. Haley, !e First Earl of Sha#esbury, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 428–30; see 
also Marvell, Account, pp. 371–2 and below, p. 221. Sha0esbury was imprisoned by order of the House 
of Lords rather than on the king’s authority; however, the Attorney General accepted (Haley, p. 429) 
that he could be released at the king’s pleasure, without reference to the Lords.
31 William Cobbett, Cobbett’s Complete Collection of State Trials, (London: R. Bagshaw, 1809), 
III, cols. 825–1316.
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on the validity and e&cacy of the warrant. Hampden’s case came before the Court of 
Exchequer when proceedings were taken to recover the sum of 20s. that had been 
assessed against him. Formally, then, many of the king’s actions were justiciable. 
!ere is a striking illustration of what this meant in the minority judgment of the 
Chief Baron, Sir Humphry Davenport, in Hampden. He agreed with the majority that 
the king had power to raise money when it was required for the defence of the 
kingdom, and that the king’s determination of this question was #nal. He neverthe‐
less held that the ship-money writs were unlawful on a number of grounds, two of 
which are particularly signi#cant. First, in purporting to confer a power on the sheri% 
to assess the sums due, they attempted to make him a judge in his own cause. Second, 
a writ of scire facias issued in the name of the king, could not be e%ective to enforce a 
payment that, on the king’s own case, was not due to him as a tax would have been.³² 
!e Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, Sir John Brampston, agreed with the 
majority on every point except that relating to the e%ectiveness of the scire facias, but 
in his judgment that point was decisive in Hampden’s favour.³³ In other words, two of 
the judges, admittedly in the minority, were prepared to hold that, even while 
exercising his absolute prerogative in a matter a%ecting the salus populi, the king 
could be defeated by defective pleading,³4 while one of those additionally held that he 
was bound by the rules of natural justice.
!e second thing that these cases show is that, while aspects of the prerogative 
might be justiciable, important questions were o'en in practice decided against the 
subject and in favour of the king. In the cases mentioned, the king had his own way: 
32 Cobbett, State Trials, iii, cols. 1202–16, esp. at cols. 1210–11 as to the sheri/ ’s power of 
assessment and 1212–13 as to the e/ectiveness of the scire facias. See Conrad Russell, ‘*e Ship Money 
Judgments of Bramston and Davenport’, EHR 77 (1962), pp. 312–18, on the second of these grounds.
33 Cobbett, State Trials, iii, cols. 1250–51.
34 As Russell points out, this was not a mere technicality, but arose from the king’s attempt to 
enforce the payment as if it were a tax payable to him while characterizing it as a service, i.e. the 
provision of a ship, and not as a tax, which would have required the approval of parliament: Russell, 
‘*e Ship Money Judgments’, pp. 315–6.
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the courts permitted him to act as he had wished to, but in the very process of doing 
so, determined that he was acting lawfully, not extralegally. Was he above the law, or 
was the law "exible and accommodating enough to permit him to act as he pleased 
while remaining within it? It is clear that there was neither a general rule providing 
that the king was obliged to comply with the law in all respects nor one to the e%ect 
that he was free to disregard it in any way he saw #t. 
!ere seems little room for doubt that, so far as the law was concerned, 
notwithstanding his immunity from suit and his position as the source from which 
justice "owed, the king was not an absolute monarch. Not everybody agreed with the 
lawyers, however, and in the early Stuart period the ranks of those who disagreed 
were likely to include in"uential clergymen and the monarch himself.³5 An aggrieved 
subject, who believed him- or herself to be the victim of injustice on the king’s part, 
might have a prospect of obtaining redress, or might not, depending on whether the 
case could be brought before a court by means, for example, of habeas corpus. 
However, because not all controversies were justiciable and because, even in those 
that were, the law o'en allowed the king a wide discretion, there were signi#cant 
areas in which there was no e%ective means of restraining the king from acting in a 
manner detrimental to the interests or welfare of the subject, should he wish to do so. 
Burgess insists, however, that it does not follow that because the king is irresistible, he 
is an absolute monarch. !ere are other constraints on his actions besides the 
possibility of legitimate resistance. In particular, there are his duty to God, and the 
terms of his coronation oath.
35 Burgess argues that some of the apparently absolutist pronouncements of James I are 
consistent with a legalist position, for example, in his argument with Coke, leading to the latter’s 
dismissal as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, in 1616. Here, according to Burgess, the king was 
merely concerned to ensure that the prerogative should not be ‘indirectly impaired’, that is to say that 
limits should not be placed on the king’s powers in proceedings between private parties, in which the 
Crown was not represented: Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, pp. 154–5.
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Absolute and ordinary prerogatives
!e king’s discretion mainly operated in the area of his prerogative powers. One 
pronouncement which has been discussed by most of the writers on this subject at 
greater or lesser length is the judgment of Sir !omas Fleming in Bate’s Case (1606). 
!is case concerned the king’s right to impose duties on the importation of currants. 
It was a forerunner of the Ship-Money case, establishing that the king had a discre‐
tionary power to impose duties in the nature of taxes without parliamentary consent 
in certain circumstances (in Bate’s Case, where foreign trade was concerned and, in 
the Ship-Money case, for the defence of the kingdom). !e Chief Baron said that the 
prerogative powers were of two kinds, ordinary and absolute. !e exercise of the 
ordinary prerogative was regulated by law. It was, according to Fleming, ‘for the pro#t 
of particular subjects, for the execution of civil justice, the determining of meum’. !e 
absolute prerogative was free of such regulation, and ‘is only that which is applied to 
the general bene#t of the people and is salus populi’. Fleming’s de#nition does not 
make it clear what falls within the scope of each branch of the prerogative, but he 
con#nes the absolute prerogative to matters which a%ect the safety and wellbeing of 
the realm.³6 !e absolute prerogative does not appear to be concerned with doing 
justice in individual cases (though presumably it may override the requirements of 
individual justice where necessary) but ‘is most properly named policy and govern‐
ment’.
Fleming resorted to the absolute/ordinary distinction in two other judgments, 
the Case of Monopolies (1601) and Calvin’s Case (i.e. the case of the post nati) (1608). 
!e latter case has cast some doubt on whether, in Bate’s Case, Fleming said that the 
exercise of the absolute prerogative is ‘guided by the rules which direct only at 
36 On the distinction between the ordinary and absolute prerogatives, see Weston and 
Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, pp. 11–17. Weston and Greenberg cite and discuss Fleming’s 
judgment in Bate’s Case at p. 14, as does Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, 
pp. 80–1, from where the preceding extracts from Fleming’s judgement are quoted.
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common law’ or whether that phrase was preceded by a ‘not’ which has been omitted 
from the report: in Calvin’s Case, he said that the king’s ‘absolute power hathe no law 
to dyrecte him’.³7 Perhaps he is making a distinction between direction and guidance: 
the exercise of the ordinary prerogative is directed by the law, that of the absolute is 
merely guided by it. It seems clear at any rate that Fleming is positing the existence of 
a (none too precisely de#ned) province of ‘policy and government’ where the king’s 
discretion is unfettered.
!e monopolies case is perhaps Fleming’s most suggestive and revealing 
discussion of the prerogatives. It is in the nature of a monopoly that it bene#ts an 
individual and has a direct impact on the interests both of that individual and others. 
On the face of it, such a grant would seem to fall squarely within Fleming’s idea of the 
ordinary prerogative, and therefore to be governed by the common law. Fleming, 
however, treats the grant in this case as an exercise of the absolute prerogative 
because it has an impact on trade with other nations, something peculiarly within the 
monarch’s discretion.³8 Fleming declared that privileges ‘merelie contrarie to the lawe 
or [which] doe wholly contradict or crosse the law … are not good’ and added that 
generally ‘the K[ing] cannot grante a bene#tt to the Iniurie of another personne’.³9 
!e implication is that considerations falling within the ambit of the absolute 
prerogative, such as the regulation of foreign trade, could justify actions that would 
otherwise be illegal.
!e king’s power to dispense with particular laws, though it would o'en be 
used ‘for the pro#t of particular subjects’, seems clearly to fall within the ambit of his 
absolute prerogatives, in that the exercise of the king’s discretion could not be 
controlled. As Weston and Greenberg explain:
37 Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, p. 82.
38 Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, p. 83.
39 Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, p. 85, citing S.P. 12/286/47, fols. 1b–
2.
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Since the rationale of a royal discretionary authority was that the king as 
supreme governor must have a reserve of power with which to govern, he 
might on occasion disregard positive law. !e primary weapon in such 
situations was the dispensing power by which statute law was set aside 
whenever this course was, in his judgment, dictated by equity or the public 
welfare.40
Because of this, exercise of the power could not be controlled by parliament, and !e 
Sheri$ ’s Case (1487) established that a statutory provision intended to exclude the use 
of the dispensing power could itself be dispensed with.4¹ !is particular aspect of the 
prerogative was of considerable practical importance and the result of its exercise 
was, as Weston and Greenberg put it, ‘a very real and concrete authority of the king 
over statute law’.4²
!e ambiguity of the king’s prerogatives generally is encapsulated in the fact 
that, while his authority over statute law was real and concrete, it was not unlimited. 
Not all statutes could be dispensed with in all circumstances. !ose directed against a 
public nuisance lay outside its scope (the king could pardon a nuisance that had 
already occurred, but not so as to permit its being continued), as did enactments that 
vested rights in individuals. Where the activity proscribed by a statute was conceived 
as being malum in se as opposed to malum prohibitum (wrong by its very nature 
rather than wrong merely because the law forbade it), a dispensation was not allowed 
by law.4³ Whether a prohibited action was inherently wrong was a question on which 
king, courts and parliament might sincerely disagree, but it is likely that the category 
represented a potentially large gap in the king’s power to render statute law 
nugatory.44 In e%ect, then, there were areas of public life where the king’s authority 
40 Weston and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, p. 15.
41 Weston and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, pp. 23–4.
42 Weston and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, p. 32.
43 Weston and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, pp. 23–5; see also Cromartie, !e 
Constitutionalist Revolution, pp. 213–14.
44 *is may be something of an oversimpli.cation. Coke suggested that anything that is malum 
in se is necessarily proscribed by the common law, leaving things that are mala prohibita to be the 
peculiar province of statute: 4 Inst., 63, cited by Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart 
Constitution, p. 172. However, he also recognized that many statutes were declaratory of the common 
law. Such statutes would be outside the scope of the dispensing power.
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was wholly unconstrained, but there were others where he had little discretionary 
power.
!e growth of arbitrary government: Marvell in 1677
!e legal limits of the prerogative could not be known with certainty until they were 
tested, as they were in R. v. Hampden, for example. If, as happened in that case and in 
some of the habeas corpus cases already mentioned, the disputed questions were 
generally resolved in the king’s favour, it might be concluded that the king was 
e$ectively free of the law, even while formally subject to its terms. At any rate, the 
constraints upon his actions did not operate in all areas, and not at all when the safety 
of the kingdom was in question. How, then, could the king be stopped from abusing 
his power, if he had a mind to do so?
Marvell answered this question in two rather di%erent ways, in works that 
were published a little more than four years apart. In the later of the two, An Account 
of the Growth of Popery, and Arbitrary Government in England (1677), he asserts that 
the king’s capacity to act to the detriment of his subjects is severely circumscribed, 
and he appears to imply that if the ordinary courts cannot prevent the king from 
exceeding his legitimate powers, then parliament ought to be able to. In !e Re‐
hearsall Transpros’d: !e Second Part (1673) — which unusually for a work of his 
(and uniquely among his controversial writings) appeared under his own name 
during his lifetime — he had given a more moderate and traditional answer to the 
question. !ough an assertion that either of these books was written in order to set 
out a constitutional doctrine would be implausible,45 it could be said that the king’s 
powers, and the defence of the subject from their abuse, are central to both. !e 1673 
work was written partly to defend its author against several hostile replies to the #rst 
part of the Rehearsal Transpros’d (1672), including Parker’s Reproof to the Rehearsal 
45 See page 209 below.
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Transprosed (1673), and partly by way of general rejoinder to the Reproof, in which 
Parker claimed, among other things, that Marvell had misrepresented his views.46 In 
!e Rehearsal Transpros’d, Marvell had ridiculed Parker’s doctrine !at it is absolutely 
necessary to the peace and government of the World, that the supream Magistrate of 
every Commonwealth should be vested with a power to govern and conduct the 
Consciences of Subjects, in a$airs of Religion.47 In the Account, however, the question 
of the king’s powers is even more central, and more urgent, and Marvell engages with 
it from the start. His second paragraph begins:
For if #rst we consider the State, the Kings of England Rule not upon the same 
terms with those of our neighbour Nations, who, having by force or by 
address usurped that due share which their people had in the Government, 
are now for some Ages in possession of an Arbitrary Power (which yet no 
prescription can make Legal) and exercise it over their persons and estates in 
a most Tyrannical manner. But here the Subjects retain their proportion in 
the Legislature; the very meanest Commoner of England is represented in 
Parliament, and is a party to those Laws by which the Prince is sworn to 
Govern himself and his people. (p. 225)
!e degree of power that the kings of ‘our neighbour Nations’ are said to exercise 
over their people is not something that derives of necessity from the nature of the 
relationship of monarch and subject: on the contrary, it has been usurped and, 
however long may be the period during which it is exercised, it cannot be rendered 
legitimate. !e rights of the people are, to use a term from a later period of constitu‐
tional history, imprescriptible. According to Marvell, a like usurpation has not 
occurred in England, though (he has said in his #rst paragraph), there has been for a 
number of years a ‘design’ that it should. By implication, if such a design were to 
succeed, the result would be equally illegal in England as it is in other monarchies. 
46 See !e Second Part (Prose Works, I, 367) on the necessity for a rejoinder to the Reproof: ‘Is 
here again no Reference so much as to one passage, no shadow of proof? Gentle Reader, What shall we 
do with this Man, that puts us continuously upon such tedious tasks in things so notorious?’ In 
addition to the Reproof and to Henry Stubbe’s Rosemary and Bayes (1672) which is critical of both 
Parker and Marvell, the hostile replies to !e Rehearsal Transpros’d included A Common-place-Book 
out of the Rehearsal Transpros’d (1673), Richard Leigh, !e Transproser Rehears’d (1673), S’too him 
Bayes (1673) and Edmund Hickeringill, Gregory, father-greybeard, with his vizard o$ (1673)
47 Rehearsal Transpros’d (Prose Works, I, 92) quoting Samuel Parker, Discourse of Ecclesiastical 
Polity (1669), p. 28.
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Marvell follows this with an extraordinary list of things that the king cannot do:
No money is to be levied but by the common consent. No man is for life, limb, 
goods or liberty at the Soveraigns discretion: but we have the same Right 
(modestly understood) in our Propriety that the Prince hath in his Regality; 
and in all Cases where the King is concerned, we have our just remedy as 
against any private person of the neighbourhood, in the Courts of Westmin‐
ster Hall, or in the High Court of Parliament. His very Prerogative is no more 
than what the Law has determined. His Broad Seal, which is the Legitimate 
stamp of his pleasure, yet is no longer currant, than upon the Tryal it is found 
to be Legal. He cannot commit any person by his particular warrant. 
(pp. 225–6)
Annabel Patterson describes this litany as ‘an astonishing series of negative proposi‐
tions which must have given Charles, if he read them, rather a start’.48 It is 
remarkable, too, that the list is not balanced by any comparable recital of the things 
the king does have power to do (though later in the Account there will be a discussion 
of one of these things: the conclusion of treaties and alliances with other countries). 
On the contrary, even the king’s prerogative is mentioned in such a way as to empha‐
size its limitations rather than its extent: it is ‘no more than what the Law has 
determined’. !is formulation does not necessarily amount to a denial that the king 
enjoyed an absolute as well as an ordinary prerogative. As we have seen, it could be 
argued that, in R. v. Hampden, the judges determined, or set the boundaries of, the 
absolute prerogative so widely that the king could e%ectively do what he liked. As 
against that, it could be objected that such wide boundaries are really no boundaries 
at all. Whichever view one takes, Marvell emphasizes that the prerogative is subject to 
and de#ned by the law and his use of ‘determined’ certainly implies the #xing of 
limits, particularly in the context of his emphasis on the restrictions on the king’s 
actions.
In place of the balancing positive list of powers that might have been 
expected, Marvell gives us a description of the bene#ts that the king derives from his 
monarchy: his person is sacred and inviolable, and no personal blame is imputed to 
48 Annabel Patterson, Marvell: !e Writer in Public Life (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 2000), p. 146.
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him for ‘whatsoever excesses are committed against so high a trust’. He enjoys a vast 
revenue and more money is readily forthcoming if he should have extraordinary 
occasion for it. !ere are ‘so many pro#table O&ces’ at his disposal that it is surpris‐
ing that the nation can provide enough honest men to #ll them (p. 226). !e ironies 
in this passage are obvious. Not the least of them is the implication that, restricted 
though the king’s powers might be, it remained possible that the high trust placed in 
him could be abused (even if the blame for that abuse would not attach to the king 
personally but to his ministers). As to the country’s readiness to supply the king’s 
extraordinary occasions, much of the later part of the Account tells how parliament 
resisted being rushed into voting extra money, until it could be sure that the king 
intended to ally the country with Holland against France, rather than the other way 
around.
Having enumerated on the one hand the limitations on the king’s powers and, 
on the other, the bene#ts that go with his o&ce, Marvell summarizes the situation of 
English monarchs as being ‘in nothing inferiour to other Princes, save in being more 
abridged from injuring their own subjects’. !e king ‘enjoys a capacity of doing all the 
good imaginable to mankind, under a disability to all that is evil’ (pp. 226–7). 
‘Disability’ is pointed, in that the term was generally applied to persons who, because 
of their status, were placed by law under certain restrictions (OED sense 2). John 
Rastell de#nes the term as ‘when a man by any act or thing, by himself or his Ances‐
tor done or committed, or for any other cause, is disabled or made incapable to do, to 
inherit, or to take bene#t or advantage of a thing, which otherwise he might have had 
or done’.49 !e examples he gives of persons under a disability include those attainted 
of treason or felony and their descendants, and aliens, who are disabled from suing in 
the king’s courts. !e application of the term to the king implied that he was someone 
49 [John Rastell,] Les termes de la ley or Certain di%cult and obscure words of the common lawes 
and statutes of this realme now in use, expounded and explained (London: J. Streater, 1659), p. 118. 
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who, by virtue of his position, lacked some of the capacity enjoyed by most of his 
subjects. !e suggestion was not lost on Roger L’Estrange, who wrote in the Preface 
to !e Parallel, or an Account of the Growth of Knavery:
For the main dri# and bent of his Discourse is only the paring of the Kings 
nails, clipping the wings of his Prerogative, advancing a pretended Soveraignty 
in the people, and cutting his Majesty o% from the most essential privileges of 
all Government50
and in the pamphlet itself:
he [the author] employes his Utmost Skill to represent his Majesty only 
Passive in all his Administrations, and so to lessen the Indubitable Fame of his 
Royal Prudence, and Courage among his People.5¹
What Marvell has put forward is a version of the maxim that ‘the king can do no 
wrong’, a "exible and ambiguous principle that usually carried the implication that, as 
other persons have no enforceable rights against the king, his actions, however 
damaging, will not constitute an injury to anybody who su%ers as a result of them. 
!e phrase could be used rather di%erently, as a basis for preferring the less harmful 
of two possible interpretations of an action on the king’s part.5² Marvell’s sense is that 
the king lacks the capacity to do harm — it is not that it is impossible for the king to 
injure the subject but rather that it is unlawful for him to do so. Marvell, indeed, 
quotes the maxim, but quali#ed in such a way as almost to reverse the accepted 
meaning: ‘Nothing is le' to the Kings will, but all is subjected to his Authority: by 
which means it follows that he can do no wrong, nor can he receive wrong’ (p. 226). 
!e last clause is rather a non sequitur — if it is true that the king has no capacity to 
injure his subjects, that does not necessarily imply that he cannot himself su%er 
50 Roger L’Estrange, !e Parallel or, An Account of the Growth of Knavery, Under the Pretext of 
Arbitrary Government and Popery. With Some Observations upon a Pamphlet Entitled An Account of the 
Growth of Popery, etc. (1679), sig. A2.
51 L’Estrange, !e Parallel, p. 9.
52 Sir George Crooke, one of the judges in the minority, uses it in this way in his ship-money 
judgment. conceiving the writs to be ‘much to the prejudice of the subjects’, he treats them not as the 
acts of the king but rather the results of ‘misinformation’: Cobbett, State Trials, iii, col. 1136. On the 
other side, the Solicitor General, Sir Edward Littleton, used the phrase in his argument that the king 
must be exempt from the general rule that nobody should be a judge in his own cause: State Trials, iii, 
col. 944.
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injury. L’Estrange objects to the doctrine that a distinction can be made between the 
king’s person and his authority. As a person, the king is ‘lyable to Wounds, Distem‐
pers, Emprisonment, and Death’;53 the author of the Account is seeking to persuade 
his readers that an injury done to this vulnerable person is not done to the ‘the king’ 
— whose authority remains inviolable — but merely to the holder of the o&ce for the 
time being. Such attempts to separate the individual from the o&ce were highly 
objectionable to royalists, because they recalled arguments from the Civil War, in 
which the king’s ‘authority’ was used to legitimate attacks on his person.54
L’Estrange’s suspicions as to the intent of the author of the Account would 
appear to be con#rmed by the latter’s treatment of the Test Bill of 1675. !e proposal 
was for an oath to be taken by all holders of public o&ce, including members of 
parliament, by which they would be required to swear that ‘I do abhorre that Traiter‐
ous position, of taking Armes by his Authority against his Person, or against those 
that are Commissioned by him in pursuance of such Commission’ (p. 281). !is 
proposal was lost when parliament was prorogued,55 but Marvell makes it clear that 
he would have regarded its adoption56 as a disaster both in point of principle and in 
practical terms. He argues that
… it were di&cult to instance a Law in this or other Country, but that a 
private Man, if any king in Christendom assault him, may having retreated to 
the Wall, stand upon his Guard … (p. 283)
Here, Marvell adopts a position that is perhaps surprisingly close to Hobbes (but also 
53 L’Estrange, !e Parallel, p. 9.
54 Heylyn accused the Presbyterians of having adopted, during the civil war, the ridiculous 
position that it was possible to ‘destroy Charles Stuart, without hurting the king’: Peter Heylyn, Aerius 
redivivus, or, !e History of the Presbyterians (1670), p. 447, cited by Weston and Greenberg, Subjects 
and Sovereigns, p. 47. *e Account’s association of the maxim that the king could do no wrong with the 
distinction between his person and his authority, recalls John Sadler’s claim that it was only when 
acting in accordance with law that the king could do no wrong: see Cromartie, !e Constitutionalist 
Revolution, p. 277, citing John Sadler, Rights of the Kingdom; or, Customs of Our Ancestors (1649). 
Cromartie discusses Sadler as an in-uence on John Locke.
55 Prose Works, II, 281, n. 295.
56 As he points out, the same oath was already required of nonconformist ministers by the Five 
Mile Act (p. 281).
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to Grotius), namely that our duty not to resist the sovereign cannot extend so far as to 
deprive us of our most basic right, that of self-preservation.57 He immediately goes 
further, however, in accusing the Lord Chancellor (the future Lord Nottingham, 
Heneage Finch) of bad faith when he rejects ‘that ill meant distinction between the 
[king’s] Natural and [his] Politique Capacity’. Finch, he says, ‘is too well read to be 
ignorant that without this Distinction there would be no Law nor Reason of Law le' 
in England’ (p. 283). Marvell is being understandably oblique here, as these are 
dangerous grounds to venture on even in an anonymous pamphlet. He does not make 
it clear why English law and ‘Reason of Law’ are dependent on this distinction. 
However, the implication must surely be that the king is resistible if and when he acts 
outside the law, even if his unlawful actions do not entail an immediate threat to the 
survival of the resisting subject: that is to say, that his authority or more precisely the 
authority of the law will legitimize resistance to his person.
Marvell quickly passes on to the next aspect of his objection to the test oath, 
namely that the pledge not to resist those who hold the king’s commission is an 
absolute one, and would prevent the oath-taker from resisting in any circumstances, 
however illegal, unreasonable or arbitrary the actions purportedly taken on foot of 
the commission.58 !is, it is suggested, is Marvell’s strongest argument against the 
oath (in the sense that it is most likely to command agreement among a wide range of 
readers), and it is interesting that he does not let it stand alone but introduces in 
parallel the clearly more controversial question of the separation of the king’s 
authority from his person.
57 See Tuck, Natural Rights !eories, pp. 124–5 as to Hobbes. In De iure belli, I.IV.VII (Rights, 
p. 358) Grotius questions whether ‘those who .rst entered into civil Society, from whom the Power of 
Sovereigns is originally derived[,] … pretended to impose on all Citizens the hard Necessity of dying, 
rather than to take up Arms in any Case, to defend themselves against the higher Powers’. He is 
inclined to presume that they did not, though as a general rule ‘those invested with the sovereign 
Power, cannot lawfully be resisted’ (Rights, p. 372).
58 *at the king’s immunity from legal process did not extend to those acting illegally on foot of 
his ‘commission’ had important implications for the legal control of governmental .at: Sommerville, 
Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640, pp. 101–2.
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It might also be said that he confuses the issue by prefacing his discussion 
with a reference to Walter Tyrell, who is reported to have killed William II by 
accident. By mentioning this story, he must be taken to imply that the proposed oath 
would prevent a subject from raising the defence of accident if he were unfortunate 
enough to cause the death of his monarch. !is, surely, is a red herring: the point at 
issue is not accidental slaying but conscious resistance, and the test oath could hardly 
be thought to include an undertaking not to be the cause of an accident. At any rate, 
the reference to Sir Walter, in the context of taking arms against the king’s person, 
makes it clear that the author envisages his death (albeit unintentional) as a possible 
outcome.
It would appear that Marvell goes out of his way here, even to the point of 
making his argument seem less compelling than it needs to, to include the suggestion 
that the king may legitimately be resisted in appropriate circumstances. (!e fact that 
the test legislation had, on this occasion, already been lost may have meant that he 
thought it more urgent to make the point about resistance, however obliquely, than to 
present the most persuasive argument possible against the test.)
What Marvell has o%ered, then, is a description of the relations of govern‐
ment in which the monarch is relegated to a restricted and relatively powerless role. 
To L’Estrange, this idea is republican in tenor: ‘And it is no wonder, that the Secretary 
to a Common-wealth should write with the Spirit of a Re-publican’. !e remainder of 
the Account bears out L’Estrange’s assessment that the author’s aim is ‘the paring of the 
Kings nails, clipping the wings of his Prerogative’.59
Marvell reports60 that in May 1677, the Commons resolved to make an 
address to the king in which they humbly besought him:
59 L’Estrange, !e Parallel, sig. A2.
60 *e passages quoted in the following paragraph are taken from part of the Account that ‘lightly 
rewrites a summary’ of the parliamentary debates, ‘of which other copies survive in British Library, 
Add. MS 72603, fols. 48–59, and Stowe MS 182, fols. 56–66’: Nicholas von Maltzahn, ‘Introduction’, 
Prose Works, II, 212.
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To enter into a League o%ensive and defensive with the States General of the 
United Provinces, against the growth and power of the French King, and for 
the preservation of the Spanish Netherlands, and to make such other Al‐
liances, with such other of the Confederates, as your Majesty shall think #t 
and useful to that end (p. 356)
In spite of the objections of some members, the Commons voted against the removal 
from the address of the reference to the proposed treaty with the Dutch (p. 365). !e 
king had no doubt that an attempt was being made to encroach on his exclusive 
sphere of competence. In his speech in reply to the address, he said
Should I su$er this fundamental Power of making Peace and War to be so far 
invaded (though but once) as to have the manner and circumstances of Leagues 
prescribed to Me by Parliament its plain that no Prince or State would any 
longer believe that the Soveraigntie of England rests in the Crown (pp. 367–8)
Having delivered his speech, he immediately told them that they should adjourn until 
16 July and, in spite of several members’ ‘o%ering … modestly to have spoken’, the 
Speaker declared the House adjourned.
Marvell, in keeping with his pose as the ‘Relator’ of a ‘naked Narrative’6¹ (or 
perhaps because reticence is the only way he can avoid explicit criticism of the king), 
does not reveal his own view as to whether parliament’s address constituted an 
encroachment on the king’s exclusive powers. He does, however, make it clear what 
he thinks of the Speaker’s actions. It had always been the case, he says, that adjourn‐
ments had been made either on the House’s own authority or by special commission 
under the king’s broad seal (p. 368). In this case, where the adjournment had 
followed the king’s merely signifying his pleasure, all the members were ‘astonished at 
so unheard of a violation of their inherent Privilege and Constitution’ (p. 369). 
Writing anonymously, Marvell does not identify himself as one of the members so 
astonished, but he does present the violation of the House’s privilege and constitution 
as a matter of fact rather than one of opinion. !e contrast between his apparent 
indignation at the actual infringement of the Common’s rights and his equanimity at 
61 Prose Works, II, 241; see below, p. 215.
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the alleged infringement of the king’s leaves little room for doubt as to his views.
‘!e rigor of that Power’: Marvell in 1673
!e position adopted by Marvell in 1677, which L’Estrange could describe as 
manifesting ‘the Spirit of a Re-publican’, is quite di%erent from a description of the 
king’s powers that he had o%ered only four years earlier, in !e Rehearsall Transpros’d: 
!e Second Part. !ere he summarizes what he calls ‘mine own opinion in this matter 
of the Magistrate and Government’ in the following terms:
!e Power of the Magistrate does most certainly issue from the Divine 
Authority. !e Obedience due to that Power is by Divine Command; and 
Subjects are bound both as Men and as Christians to obey the Magistrate 
Actively in all things where their Duty to God intercedes not, and however 
Passively, that is either by leaving their Countrey, or if they cannot do that 
(the Magistrate or the reason of their own occasions hindring them) then by 
su%ering patiently at home, without giving the least publick disturbance.6²
!is denies any right of resistance in the subject6³ (something that, if Burgess is 
correct, should hardly surprise us), but goes further than that in denying any 
temporal restrictions on the absolute power of the king; Marvell subsequently speaks 
of ‘the rigor of that Power which no man can deny him’. However, he de'ly changes 
the terms of the debate. What the king may do ought to be beyond dispute, since it is 
certain that his power ‘is founded upon his Commission from God’ (p. 324). What he 
should do, which Marvell terms ‘the modester Question’, is a more appropriate subject 
of debate among ordinary mortals, though by entering on it they may still be 
‘medling with matters above them’. Human laws are powerless to impede the king 
from acting as he wishes, but it does not follow that, in a sense wider than the legal 
one, he has a right to do so.
But whoever shall cast his eye thorow the History of all Ages, will #nd that 
nothing has always succeeded better with Princes then the Clemency of 
Government: and that those, on the contrary, who have taken the sanguinary 
62 Marvell, !e Rehearsal Transpros’d !e Second Part, in Prose Works, II, 324.
63 Later in !e Second Part, Marvell expressly excludes such a right: ‘But for the Magistrate, it is 
surely su1cient, that God has forti.ed him with a Divine Law, that he may not be resisted …’ (p. 342).
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course, have been unfortunate to themselves and the people, the conse‐
quences not being separable. … !e wealth of a Shepheard depends upon the 
multitude of his "ock, the goodness of their Pasture, and the Quietness of 
their feeding; and Princes, whose dominion over Mankind resembles in some 
measure that of man over other creatures, cannot expect any considerable 
increase to themselves, if by continual terrour they amaze, shatter, and hare 
their People, driving them into Woods, and running them upon Precipices. … 
A Prince that goes to the Top of his Power is like him that goes64 to the 
Bottom of his Treasure. And therefore it is very unadvisable however to put a 
great stress upon the little things, and where the Obedience will not counter‐
vail the Experiment (pp. 325–6)
Marvell, then, argues forcefully and at length that a prince who in"icts hardship on 
his subjects is acting unadvisedly and to his own as well as to their detriment. !e 
argument is, in a sense, reminiscent of Grotius’s in De iure belli II.XXIV65 that, even 
where one has a just cause of war, the question whether one ought to act upon it 
needs to be considered separately and the answer will o'en be no. Rights are not 
always to be insisted upon. However, the analogy between Marvell’s argument and 
Grotius’s is not exact: for Marvell, the absence of a remedy in the subject is not to be 
equated with the existence of a right in the king:
[Princes] are responsible to him that gave them their Commission for the 
happiness or infelicity of their Subjects during the term of their Government 
(p. 325).
In other words, a monarch who injures his subjects is not merely behaving foolishly 
but is also in breach of his duty. !at duty is owed, not directly to the subjects 
themselves, or to any earthly authority, but to God, from whom the monarch holds 
his ‘Commission’. People who are governed arbitrarily are not themselves entitled to 
take any steps to remedy the situation, apart from leaving the country, but this does 
not mean that the arbitrary ruler acts with impunity. To say that the king has a ‘Power 
which no man can deny him’ is not to say that he has an equally unlimited right. On 
at least one potential reader of !e Second Part, the point is unlikely to have been lost.
64 Marvell replaced ‘shall go’ with ‘goes’ in the second edition (1674): see Prose Works, II, 217–8.
65 ‘Circumstances too may sometimes fall out so, that it may not only be laudable, but an 
Obligation in us to forbear claiming our Right, on account of that Charity which we owe to all Men, 
even tho’ our Enemies’: De iure belli, II.XXIV.II (Rights, p. 1136).
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!e relationship between the question of placing limits on the king’s powers 
and that of a right of resistance is a complicated one. Glenn Burgess has argued 
strongly that, in the early Stuart period (that is, up to the Civil War), there was a 
consensus among Englishmen (with relatively few dissentients, notably Robert 
Filmer) to the e%ect both that the king’s powers were limited and that there was no 
right to resist him should he exceed those powers. According to Burgess, the idea that 
without a right of resistance there was no e%ective limitation on the king’s powers is a 
product of what he calls the parliamentary hermeneutic, something that developed 
only at the time of the Long Parliament.66 In e%ect, Burgess argues that prior to the 
personal rule of Charles I and the reactions to it, few people would seriously have 
considered that a right of resistance was necessary to prevent the king from exceeding 
his legal authority.67
Certainly, if Burgess’s consensus existed, the Civil War and subsequent events 
broke it, and changed — in ways that are complex and di&cult to trace — the English 
view as to limitations on monarchical power. It seems clear, however, that it remained 
possible a'er the Restoration to hold that the king was obliged to act in accordance 
with law, without, at the same time, going so far as to suggest that the subject could 
ultimately resort to a right of resistance if the king failed to meet this obligation. 
Weston and Greenberg say that one of the foundations of the Restoration settlement 
was the recognition that the king’s power to make laws could be exercised only 
coordinately with the two houses of parliament. Whatever had been the position 
before, a'er 1660 the English monarchy was in some senses limited, though the 
existence of a right to enforce that limitation by resistance was not widely accepted.
66 Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, pp. 18–28.
67 Sommerville, on the other hand, argues that the supposed ‘consensus’ was not nearly as widely 
subscribed to as Burgess believes and that, in particular, it did not extend to the Court: J. P. 
Sommerville, ‘*e Ancient Constitution Reassessed: the Common Law, the Court and the Languages 
of Politics in Early Modern England’, in !e Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and Political 
Culture, R. Malcolm Smuts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 39–64.
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Indeed, the position that Marvell adopts in !e Second Part could be charac‐
terized in these terms. While he says that ‘no man’ (in which expression he evidently 
includes all the judges and substantial majorities in both houses of parliament) can 
deny the king the power to act as he thinks #t, and while he seems to include the 
exercise of this unfettered power in the category of things the king may do, he 
nevertheless implies that the restrictions placed on the king by the terms of his 
‘commission’ from God are, in ordinary circumstances, e%ective. (As Burgess points 
out, we should not underestimate the signi#cance of an oath — and that includes the 
king’s coronation oath — for a seventeenth-century Christian.68)
It seems, therefore, that a primary di%erence between the two parts of !e 
Rehearsal Transpros’d on the one hand and !e Account on the other is that, while 
they both propose that the king’s freedom to act is subject to constraints, only in the 
later work are those constraints seen to be a matter of human (which is to say, in this 
case, English) law. !at distinction has implications for the kind of action the king 
may take: acts that do not o%end against the divine will may nevertheless amount to a 
serious infraction of the ordinary law. !at the two works have di%erent conceptions 
of what the king may legitimately do is demonstrated by the di%erent conclusions 
they reach as to the legitimacy of the Declaration of Indulgence (1672). In !e 
Rehearsal Transpros’d, Marvell argues in favour of the Declaration: the king’s original 
declaration of his intention to indulge tender consciences, made at Breda before the 
restoration, is partly the result ‘of his own consummate Prudence and natural 
Benignity’; and his Declaration of March 1672 is praised on the ground that ‘to royal 
and generous minds no stipulations are so binding as their own voluntary promises: 
nor is it to be wondred if they hold those Conditions that they put upon themselves 
the most inviolable’ (p. 90). !is, however, takes it for granted that it was within the 
king’s power to make the Declaration, since he could hardly confer a power on 
68 Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, pp. 19, 153.
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himself simply by promising to do something that he had otherwise no right to do.69
It is probable that Marvell’s main purpose in writing !e Rehearsal Transpros’d 
was to encourage the king to persist with the Declaration of Indulgence in the teeth 
of ecclesiastical and parliamentary attempts (eventually successful) to get him to drop 
it.70 By the time that !e Second Part appeared, the Declaration had been abandoned, 
but Marvell continued to make use of it to ridicule Parker’s self-contradictory 
position: that the king had an ‘unhoopable’ power over religious worship, but that he 
must not exercise that power in favour of toleration, because to do so would suppos‐
edly be damaging to the church. In short, the approach to the Declaration in !e 
Second Part is consistent with that in the #rst pamphlet, notwithstanding the fact that 
the Declaration itself was no longer a live issue.7¹
What Marvell has to say in the Account on this subject is at best ambiguous, 
and in some respects clearly hostile to the Declaration. In the #rst place, he does not 
attribute its introduction to the king personally, but instead describes it as part of the 
‘hellish Conspiracy’ (p. 256) — the same one whose aim is to change the lawful 
government into an absolute tyranny and the established religion to downright 
Popery. However, when immediately a'erwards he describes the Declaration’s e%ect, 
he does so with a sarcasm that seems to mock the parliament’s opposition to the 
provision:
Hereby all the Penal Laws against Papists, for which former Parliaments had 
given so many Supplies, and against Nonconformists, for which this Parlia‐
ment had payed more largely, were at one Instant Suspended, in order to 
defraud the Nation of all that Religion which they had so dearly purchased, 
and for which they ought at least, the Bargain being broke, to have been 
69 It might be argued, though Marvell does not do so explicitly, that by restoring the king, 
parliament (among other things) assented to the terms of the declaration of Breda.
70 ‘In satirizing Parker, Marvell sought to reinforce the gulf which had opened between Charles 
(the intended audience for the piece) and the clerical “politicians” of the Church of England’: Jon 
Parkin, ‘Liberty Transpros’d: Andrew Marvell and Samuel Parker’, in Marvell and Liberty, ed. Chernaik 
and Dzelzainis, pp. 269–289 (p. 270).
71 In !e Second Part, Marvell writes of the king as having ‘ever since pursued’ the Declaration of 
Breda (p. 375, and see n. 777). He thereby implies that, with the withdrawal of the Declaration of 
Indulgence, Charles has been forced into what he hopes is just a temporary retreat.
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reimbursed (p. 257).
Further, he immediately goes on to a&rm that toleration in itself is both enjoined by 
the tenets of religion and necessary to the survival of the church.
For it appears at the #rst sight, that men ought to enjoy the same Propriety 
and Protection in their Consciences, which they have in their Lives, Liberties, 
and Estates: But that to take away these in Penalty for the other, is meerly a 
more Legal and Gentile way of Padding upon the Road of Heaven, and that it 
is only for want of Money and for want of Religion that men take those 
desperate Courses.
Nor can it be denied that the Original Law upon which Christianity at the 
#rst was founded, does indeed expressly provide against all such severity; And 
it was by the Humility, Meekness, Love, Forbearance and Patience which were 
part of that excellent Doctrine, that it became at last the Universal Religion, 
and can no more by any other means be preserved, than it is possible for 
another Soul to animate the same Body. (pp. 257–8)
However, while toleration itself might be a desirable end, the manner in which the 
king (or the conspirators) sought to introduce it was not legitimate, since it meant the 
illegal abrogation by an insu&cient authority of properly constituted laws:
Nevertheless because Mankind must be governed some way and be held up to 
one Law or other, either of Christs or their own making, the vigour of such 
Human Constitutions is to be preserved until the same Authority shall upon 
better reason revoke them; and as in the mean time no privat Man may 
without the guilt of Sedition or Rebellion resist, so neither by the Nature of 
the English Foundation can any publick Person suspend them without 
committing an Error which is not the less for wanting a legal name to express 
it. But it was the Master-piece therefore of boldness and contrivance in these 
Conspirators to issue this Declaration, and it is hard to say wherein they took 
the greater felicity, whither in suspending hereby all the Statutes against 
Popery, that it might thence forward passe like current Money over the 
Nation, and no man dare to refuse it, or whether gaining by this a President to 
suspend as well all other Laws that respect the Subjects Propriety, and by the 
same power to abrogate and at last inact what they pleased, till there should 
be no further use for the Consent of the People in Parliament. (p. 259)
!e requirement that laws must remain in force until repealed by the same Authority 
that made them, together with the implication that the king himself did not have that 
power, locates the Account clearly on the side of those who argued that the king’s 
authority was coordinate with that of the two houses of parliament and that the 
sovereign power resided not in the king alone but in him and the two houses 
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together. As Weston and Greenberg have shown, this position was generally accepted 
a'er the Restoration, when the Cavalier Parliament passed ‘An Act for the Preserva‐
tion of the King’ (13 Car. 2, c. 1) which made it clear that the king could neither be 
excluded from the law-making process nor compelled to grant his assent to measures 
passed by the two houses of parliament, but also tacitly accepted that those two 
houses shared in the legislative power.7² According to Weston and Greenberg, this 
was a signi#cant concession. Before 1642, they say, the dominant constitutional 
theory had been that the king was sovereign and that, while he may have had no 
power to make laws except in parliament, it was his assent, rather than anything else 
that happened in parliament, that gave the laws their validity. !is was the view of Sir 
Matthew Hale, the dating of whose writings poses some di&culty.7³
It may well be that formulations such as Hale’s have been taken too much at 
face value and that the idea of the king as sole exerciser of the legislative power is a 
#ction of the same kind as the one that holds that the blame for any wrongful acts 
carried out in his name should not be laid at his door but instead at those of his 
wicked or misguided ministers. !at is to say, it may have been intended merely to 
glorify the king without necessarily giving an accurate picture of how the lawmaking 
process worked. In e%ect, each house had a veto and a real in"uence over the content 
of legislation, even if, as a matter of constitutional form, the king alone was described 
as the legislator.74 Francis Bacon had regarded the two houses as having an estab‐
lished (though not constitutionally entrenched) role in the law-making process:
72 Weston and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, pp. 150–1.
73 Hale wrote: ‘In him resides the Power of making Laws. *e Laws are his Laws enacted by him.’ 
Only the king could ‘make Laws oblidgeing the Subjects of this Realme’. *ere was a further 
requirement, however, ‘the advice and assent of the two houses of Parliament, without which no Law 
can be made’: Corinne Comstock Weston, ‘Legal Sovereignty in the Brady Controversy’, Historical 
Journal 15,3 (1972), pp. 409–31 (p. 410), emphasis added. See also Weston and Greenberg, Subjects 
and Sovereigns, pp. 204–5.
74 For a brief critique of the views of Weston and Greenberg on the related question of the 
identi.cation of the ‘three estates’, see Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640, 
p. 174–5.
204
205
206
[I]f the parliament should enact in the nature of the ancient lex regia, that 
there should be no more parliaments held but the king should have the 
authority of the parliament, or, e converso, if the King by Parliament were to 
enact to alter the state and to translate it from a monarchy to any other form; 
both these acts were good.75
According to Bacon, there was no fundamental law preventing the removal of 
parliament’s legislative role but, precisely because of that role, the removal could take 
place only with its own consent.
Weston and Greenberg take the view that the theory, which did not survive 
the Commonwealth and Protectorate, that the legislative function belonged solely to 
the king, could easily accommodate the king’s power to dispense with statutes. If it is 
true that the king was the lawmaker, there was no contradiction in his being able to 
order that a law should not apply in particular cases or to particular classes of 
people.76 Once the coordination principle was accepted, the dispensing power 
became a constitutional anomaly.
It is not in itself remarkable, then, that Marvell, a member of parliament, 
writing sixteen years a'er the passage of the Act for the Preservation of the King, 
should have denied that the king has any power to suspend laws. It is remarkable, if at 
all, only because four years earlier, he had argued forcefully and persuasively for the 
existence of such a power, at least in relation to the laws against religious noncon‐
formity and recusancy.77 It is clear, too, that the di%erent positions that Marvell 
adopted as regards the suspension of the laws are consistent with the positions he 
adopted on the broader question of the king’s powers generally.
It was mentioned in passing above (p. 188) that one of the recognized limita‐
75 Francis Bacon, Maxims of the Law in the Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James Spedding, Robert 
Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, VII, 370, cited by Burgess, !e Politics of the Ancient 
Constitution, pp. 22–3. 
76 Weston and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, p. 163.
77 Nicholas von Maltzahn suggests that a0er ‘the failed attempt at Comprehension in 1667-68 … 
Marvell moved from hoping for a parliamentary means of enlarging the national church … to an 
extraparliamentary one a0er the bishops had forestalled the agreement then in the works’: Nicholas 
von Maltzahn, ‘Andrew Marvell and the Prehistory of Whiggism’, in ‘Cultures of Whiggism’: New Essays 
on English Literature and Culture in the Long Eighteenth Century, ed. David Womersley and others 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2005), pp. 31–61 (p. 48).
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tions on the king’s dispensing power was that statutes aimed at preventing a nuisance 
fell outside its scope. It was with this in mind that, in 1666–67, the Commons (with 
the support of Buckingham and the future Lord Sha'esbury in the upper house) had 
attempted to render the Irish Cattle Act insusceptible to dispensation by including in 
it a declaration that the import of cattle from Ireland was a nuisance.78 Marvell refers 
to this in Mr. Smirke (1676), when he rejects Turner’s claim that parliament had made 
the holding of conventicles tantamount to sedition:
Truly, (as far as a man can comprehend by comparing that with other Acts of 
this Parliament,) they did onely appoint that the Penalty of Sedition should 
lye against those that frequent such Meetings: as in the Act against Irish 
Cattle, if it be not in itself a Nuisance, no Law-givers can make it so. Nor can 
any Legislators make that to be Sedition which is not Sedition in its own 
nature. (Prose Works, II, 99)
Here, Marvell expresses a sense of muted outrage that parliament should have 
imposed the same penalties as for sedition on meetings intended for religious 
worship. However, the passage also seems to indicate a tacit acceptance that the 
dispensing power is in accordance with law and that it is not within parliament’s 
power to circumvent it by declaring that things are otherwise than they are.
Despite the ambiguity of tone, the overall conclusion of the Account as to the 
Declaration of Indulgence is clear. !e author may be said to be in favour of indul‐
gence, but against the declaration: he takes a side-swipe at parliament for its own 
hostility to toleration, while condemning, as the work of conspirators who intend to 
undermine the lawful form of government, the machinery which the king had used 
in 1672. It would certainly be easier to adopt this approach — endorsing the end 
while execrating the means — in 1677, when the declaration had for several years 
been a dead letter, than it would have been in 1672, when it provided the best hope 
that toleration might be extended.
!is is not to say, however, that the inconsistencies between !e Second Part 
78 Weston and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, pp. 177–9.
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and the Account are all easily explicable on the ground of changing political circum‐
stances. For example, by insisting that only the legislative body has the power to 
suspend or revoke existing laws, Marvell has moved some distance from the opinion 
he expressed in the earlier work:
And therefore it is very usual to make at #rst Probationary Laws, and for 
some term of years only; that both the Law-giver and the Subject may see at 
leisure how proper they are and suitable to the e%ect for which they were 
intended. And indeed all Laws however are but Probationers of time; and, 
though meant for perpetuity, yet, when unpro#table, do, as they were made by 
common consent, so expire by universal neglect, and without Repeal grow 
Obsolete. (pp. 343–4)
!ere is no readily apparent source for this passage, particularly in a common law 
context.79 It is clear, both because Marvell says that ‘all Laws however are but 
Probationers of time’ (emphasis added), and because he has suggested that any 
reasonable Magistrate, having made such probationary laws, would be ‘glad to 
abrogate them when he #nds them pernitious to his Government’ (p. 343) that he 
includes statutory laws among those that can through desuetude become ine%ective, 
without having been formally repealed. !is is an unusual position for a parliamen‐
tarian to adopt and is clearly opposed to the principle stated in the Account, that only 
the law-making authority can remove the binding force of a law.
Marvell’s adoption of the earlier position is noteworthy also because it is not 
essential to his argument against Parker. !e context in which the passage occurs is 
his taking issue with Parker’s insistence that the breach of any law is a sin as well as a 
crime or civil wrong — in e%ect that God can always be called on to deploy the threat 
of damnation in aid of the temporal power. Marvell emphasizes the absurdity of this 
claim in part by pointing out that human laws typically carry varying degrees of 
79 A fairly close analogue is to be found in Lord Ellesmere’s speech in the Post-Nati case (1608), 
where he said: ‘some lawes, as well Statute Law, as common Law, are obsolete and worne out of use: for 
all humane Lawes are but Leges temporis: And the wisdome of the Judges found them to be unmeete 
for the time they lived in, although very good and necessary for the time wherein they were made.’ 
Louis A. Kna-a, Law and Politics in Jacobean England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), pp. 202–53 (p. 223).
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penalty, and that the penalty may change over time, so that an o%ence that once 
carried the death penalty may later attract only a #ne. If the breach of any such law 
entails damnation, then human lawmakers must be capable of achieving a gradation 
of penalties that eludes heaven (!e Rehearsall Transpros’d: !e Second Part, p. 344). 
!e manner in which the change of law has come about does not a%ect the force of 
Marvell’s argument. !e inclusion of the ‘Probationers of time’ passage reinforces our 
impression that both parts of !e Rehearsal Transpros’d are directed as much against 
the enemies of the Declaration of Indulgence in general, as against Parker in particu‐
lar. Weston and Greenberg cite two members of parliament, Colonel Giles Strange‐
ways and Sir !omas Lee, both opponents of the Declaration, who accepted that 
there might be a problem with obsolete laws, but maintained that repeal by parlia‐
ment was the only correct way to deal with this problem.80 !e passage cited above 
from !e Second Part reads like a direct engagement with this type of argument.
It will be seen, then, that the constitutional implications of what Marvell says 
in !e Second Part are at odds with the more explicit constitutional description that 
he gives in the Account. In the earlier work, he argues that ‘no man can deny’ the king 
the power, under his commission from God, to act just as he sees #t. If he causes his 
subjects to su%er, the king will be answerable, but only to God. In the Account, on the 
contrary, the king’s powers are strictly limited, controllable by courts or parliament, 
and he is ‘under a disability’ to harm his subjects. !e inconsistency should not 
surprise us greatly. Quentin Skinner has warned against an approach to the history of 
ideas that relies, in the #rst place, on a mythology of doctrines — ‘converting some 
scattered or quite incidental remarks by a classic theorist into his “doctrine” on one of 
the mandatory themes’ — and, in the second, on a mythology of coherence — 
‘giv[ing] the thoughts of various classic writers a coherence, and an air generally of a 
80 Weston and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, pp. 166–7
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closed system, that they may never have attained or even been meant to attain.’8¹ It 
would certainly be a mistake to suppose that, in the works being discussed, Marvell 
was attempting to enunciate a coherent doctrine of the English constitution insofar as 
it regulated the powers of the monarch.
It does not follow, though, that because a certain incoherence in the opinions 
expressed by Marvell in 1673 and 1677 is to be expected, that no attempt should be 
made to explain the discrepancies between them. !e two parts of !e Rehearsal 
Transpros’d together constitute a delicate balance. On the one hand, Marvell is 
seeking to persuade the king, and this requires him to use a vocabulary and write 
within a framework of ideas that would avoid alienating the monarch. On the other, 
this attempt at persuasion was necessarily carried on in public, and by the time 
Marvell came to write !e Second Part, it was clear that the #rst had been a publish‐
ing success. To oversimplify somewhat, Marvell was faced with the task of writing in 
language that would appeal to a believer in relatively untrammelled royal power 
(even, perhaps, in absolutism), without at the same time persuading the remainder of 
his readership that such trammels as existed should be removed. We have already 
seen — in the Cromwell poems and in ‘Upon Appleton House’ — Marvell undertake 
the sensitive task of attempting delicately to guide a powerful man in a direction that 
he considered particularly advisable. It is a feature of his earlier attempts that 
Marvell’s achievement in these works, while it justly drew the admiration of readers 
three centuries later, generally did not extend to the attainment of his immediate 
political aims: Fairfax did not resume a leadership role, Cromwell dissolved the 
‘senate free’, his son Richard failed to hold on to the Protectorship.
Similarly, !e Rehearsal Transpros’d did not bring about the revival of the 
Declaration of Indulgence. For all its lack of success in political terms, !e Rehearsal 
81 Quentin Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, in Meaning and 
Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, ed. James Tully (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988), pp. 29–67, 32, 39 (originally published in History and !eory, 8 (1969), 3–53).
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Transpros’d is a remarkable exercise in appealing to a readership that spans an 
ideological (in Sommerville’s sense) chasm. It accomplishes this by playing down the 
relative importance of constitutional questions. What Marvell terms ‘the modester 
Question’ is really nothing of the sort, but rather the more fundamental one, in that it 
has more far-reaching implications for the king’s behaviour. !e legal relationship 
between monarch and subject is not to be considered in isolation. His rights are, for 
the most part, a matter of (human) law; his duties, while not belonging to the arena 
of human law, are in no sense of secondary importance on that account.
For Marvell, at least according to what he says in !e Second Part, monarchy 
is the product of an interaction of divine will and human law:
I say, with submission still to better Judgements, and especially to Superiors, 
that I conceive the Magistrate, as in Scripture described, is the Ordinance of 
God constituting him, and the Ordinance of Man assenting to his Dominion. 
For there is not now any express Revelation, no Inspiration of a Prophet, nor 
Unction of that Nature, as to the declaring of that particular person that is to 
govern. Only God hath in general commanded and disposed men to be 
Governed; and the particular person reigns according to that right, more or 
less, respectively, which under Gods Providence, he or his Predecessors have 
lawfully acquired over the Subject. !erefore I take the Magistrates Power to 
be from God, only in a Providential Constitution; and the nature of which is 
very well and reverently expressed by Princes themselves, By the Grace of God, 
King of, &c. but I do not understand that God has thereby imparted and 
devolved to the Magistrate his Divine Jurisdiction. (p. 342)
!is passage forms part of his argument against Parker’s notion that all disobedience 
to the law is necessarily sinful, but it is informative as to Marvell’s view (in 1673) on 
‘constitutional’ questions. According to him, God commands us to submit to a 
government. In the usual case, where (by divine providence) there is a government in 
place, we must submit to that. But God prescribes neither the form of government, 
nor the identity of the persons who are to exercise it. So, where no government exists, 
as at the beginning of political society, it is the assent of the people, in obedience to 
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God’s will, that constitutes the government.8² In an earlier passage, Marvell has 
suggested that, where the people are oppressed by a bad king, they are likely to revolt. 
Even though the revolt is not justi#ed, either in the eyes of the law or in those of God, 
it can nevertheless be regarded as providential punishment of the bad king, and the 
succeeding government can claim a legitimacy based on divine providence. !is line 
of argument recalls the Civil War claims that victory, as a manifestation of the divine 
will, entailed legitimacy.8³ In the present context, it constitutes also a warning to 
Charles, couched in the form of well meaning advice, that a ‘sanguinary course’ will 
lead to punishment — which could possibly take place in this world, at the hands of a 
populace acting unlawfully, but under provocation.
Patterson and Dzelzainis point out that Marvell’s admonition that ‘the Arms 
of the church are Prayers and Tears’ is a shrewd quotation of the Eikon Basilike.84 
Taken together with the phrase immediately following, ‘the Arms of the Subjects are 
Patience and Petitions’, the passage also echoes the speech to parliament of James I of 
21 May 1610:
If you have a good king you are to thank God, if an ill king he is a curse to the 
people but preces et lachrimae were ever their arms. But may you therefore 
bridle him?85
By these allusions, Marvell suggests that his views on monarchical restraint are 
compatible with the theories of such staunch defenders of the rights of monarchs as 
the #rst two Stuart kings of England. Indeed, his picture of kings answerable to no 
human authority, yet nonetheless bound by a duty to govern in accordance with the 
82 *is places Marvell closer to those contractualists who held that power was originally vested 
in the people than to those (like Sir John Davies) who asserted that it had originally been the king’s 
alone. It was suggested above that the former were more likely to expect any exceptions and 
reservations to favour the people rather than the king.
83 See John M. Wallace, Destiny his Choice: !e Loyalism of Andrew Marvell (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 27–8.
84 Prose Works, I, 192, n. 836.
85 Christianson, ‘Ancient Constitutions in the Age of Sir Edward Coke and John Selden’, p. 96, 
citing Elizabeth Read Foster, ed., Proceedings in Parliament 1610, 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1966), II, 104–5. 
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will of ‘him that gave them their Commission’ may well be a subtle corrective to 
James’s model of a ‘constitutional monarchy created by kings’ (to use Christianson’s 
phrase). Whereas James’s view was that an originally all-powerful monarch had 
voluntarily assumed the obligation to govern in accordance with law, for Marvell the 
requirement of legality had always been inherent in the people’s submission, in 
accordance with the divine will, to government. Marvell’s revision of James might be 
seen as an attempt to reconstruct, in the 1670s, the early Stuart consensus identi#ed 
by Burgess.
We should not, then, make too much of the di%erences between Marvell’s 
‘constitutional’ position in 1673 and that of 1677–78. His views as to what the king 
might justi#ably do had not changed very much: it was the source and nature of the 
justi#cation that he came to see very di%erently. We should not make too little of 
them either. !e Marvell of 1678 was unambiguously a constitutionalist; earlier, he 
appears to have been less concerned with governmental structures than with the 
outcomes resulting from such structures. It is quite possible that Marvell became 
interested in constitutional questions only a'er !e Second Part had been published.
A factor which may help to explain why the question of a constitution had 
become an urgent one for Marvell is the likelihood that he had become much more 
suspicious of the king’s motives in making the Declaration of Indulgence than he had 
been in 1672 and 1673.86 Such considerations may well account for the similar 
distance travelled by the Earl of Sha'esbury, who as Lord Chancellor had urged 
Charles to stick to his guns and who had defended in the Lords the principle that the 
prerogative included the power to dispense with penal laws in ecclesiastical matters.87 
86 See Lamont, ‘*e Religion of Andrew Marvell’, p. 150: ‘… the change in Marvell’s attitude to 
the King a few years later in An Account of the Growth of Popery … is the di/erence in approach to a 
King who, however suspect his motives, seemed to be o/ering to his subjects, with the Declaration of 
Indulgence, an advance in religious freedom … and on the other hand to a King who, because of the 
exposure of those motives, now seemed to o/er to his subjects — by way of the secret Treaty of Dover 
— nothing less than ‘French’ tyranny.’ 
87 Weston and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, pp. 170–71.
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In A Letter from a Person of Quality to his Friend in the Country,88 Sha'esbury had 
changed his position considerably, still contending that a power to dispense with 
statutes was necessary, but conceding that the king could exercise it only when 
parliament was not sitting. According to his argument,
a Government could not be supposed whether Monarchical, of any other sort, 
without a standing Supream Executive power, fully enabled to Mitigate, or 
wholly to suspend the Execution of any penal Law, in the Intervalls of the 
Legislative , which then assembled, there was no doubt that but wherever 
there lies a Negative in passing of a Law, there the address or sense known of 
either of them to the contrary, (as for instance of either of our two Houses of 
Parliament England) to determine that Indulgence, and restore the Law to its 
full execution: For without this, the Laws were to no purpose made, if the 
Prince could annul them at pleasure; and so on the other , without a Power 
always in being of dispensing upon occasion, was to suppose a constitution 
extreamly imperfect and impracticable, and to cure those with a Legislative 
always in being, is, when considered, no other than a perfect Tyranny. (pp. 3–
4)
Sha'esbury’s attitude to the dispensing power has been described as ‘nothing if not 
inconsistent’,89 but his shi's of position in relation to the Declaration of Indulgence 
are by no means inexplicable. !ough he was one of the king’s leading ministers, he 
had been kept in the dark about the existence of the secret treaty of Dover, by which 
Charles had committed himself to declaring his Catholicism at an unspeci#ed future 
time.90 It would seem that the discovery of this circumstance led Sha'esbury to 
reconsider both the king’s motives in issuing the Declaration and the limits of the 
dispensing power. Buckingham, who had likewise been kept in ignorance of the 
secret treaty, had made a similar move from government to vociferous opposition. As 
has already been discussed in chapter 3, recent scholarship has tended to show that 
88 A Letter from a person of Quality to his Friend in the Country (1675). *is anonymous 
pamphlet has at di/erent times been attributed to Locke and to Sha0esbury himself. It is now thought 
to have been the work of both of them: Annabel Patterson and Martin Dzelzainis, ‘Marvell and the 
Earl of Anglesey: A Chapter in the History of Reading’, Historical Journal 44, 3 (2001), pp. 703–726 
(p. 720), citing Maurice Cranston, John Locke: a Biography (1957), Richard Ashcro0, Revolutionary 
Politics and Locke’s ‘Two Treatises of Government’ (1986), pp. 105–8 and John Marshall, John Locke: 
Resistance, Religion and Responsibility (1994), pp. 74–6.
89 Weston and Greenberg, Subjects and Sovereigns, p. 178.
90 Haley, !e First Earl of Sha#esbury, p. 281.
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there existed at this time between Buckingham and Marvell the relationship of patron 
and client.9¹
At the time of the indulgence crisis, Buckingham, like Sha'esbury, was 
working to promote the Declaration. Another peer apparently cooperating with 
Sha'esbury on this issue was the Earl of Anglesey. Annabel Patterson and Martin 
Dzelzainis have shown that Anglesey’s library is the likeliest place for Marvell to have 
found most of the works cited by him in the two parts of the Rehearsal.9² It was 
Anglesey who put pressure on Roger L’Estrange to license the publication of !e 
Rehearsal Transpros’d.9³ !e Account praises both Sha'esbury and Buckingham, and 
aligns itself with the latter’s current political objectives, speci#cally with the call for a 
new parliament.94 It is likely, then, that the shi's in Marvell’s position between 1673 
and 1677 approximate to those of Buckingham and his allies — though the Account 
appears to go further than Sha'esbury in that it would deny that the king alone may 
exercise a dispensing power in any circumstances, whereas the Letter from a Person of 
Quality would merely limit the exercise of that power to times when parliament was 
not sitting.
!e place of the Account in the context of Marvell’s other prose
!e di%erences between the Account and the two parts of !e Rehearsal Transpros’d 
are not limited to their divergent treatment of the question of the king’s powers. 
Many readers have been struck by a dissimilarity in tone between the Account and 
91 See, in particular, Derek Hirst and Steven Zwicker, ‘High Summer at Nun Appleton, 1651: 
Andrew Marvell and Lord Fairfax’s Occasions’, Historical Journal 36, 2 (1993) 247–269 (p. 265): 
‘Service and patronage were surely critical in the unfolding of Marvell’s whole career. … when Fairfax 
removed himself from the stage, Marvell seems to have transferred his loyalties to Fairfax’s son-in-law, 
Buckingham.’
92 Patterson and Dzelzainis, ‘Marvell and the Earl of Anglesey’.
93 Andrew Marvell, !e Rehearsal Transpros’d and !e Rehearsal Trsnspros’d, !e Second Part, ed. 
D. I. B. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. xxii, citing HMC, Report 7, p. 518a.
94 See Account pp. 51–2, 71–2, 152.
214
215
216
Marvell’s earlier works.95 Despite the seriousness of their subject-matter, the tone of 
both parts of !e Rehearsal Transpros’d can best be described as ‘facetious’. Marvell 
tells his opponent that he intends to ‘treat him betwixt Jest and Earnest’ (!e Second 
Part, p. 268), while he has concluded the #rst part with the observation that it 
demonstrates the possibility of being ‘merry and angry as long a time as I have been 
writing, without profaning and violating those things which are and ought to be most 
sacred’ (p. 203).
In contrast, the style of the Account is direct and its predominant tone serious. 
!e author, who describes himself as a ‘Relator’, announces that his ‘intention is only 
to write a naked Narrative of some the most considerable passages in the meeting of 
Parliament the 15. of Feb. 1676’ (p. 241). !e phrase ‘naked Narrative’ may be 
understood to imply a claim of objectivity and detachment that is unlikely to be taken 
at face value — Conal Condren, for example, writes that ‘Marvell is obliged to 
anticipate scepticism [and] to display his credentials of disinterested fairness … His 
statements of modest intention; his disarming praise of old cavaliers and recusants 
and veneration of the King leave a markedly disingenuous air …’96 — but if we leave 
out of account the question of the author’s sincerity, as a description of the style of the 
work, ‘naked Narrative’ at #rst appears remarkably apt. !e author reports, in 
chronological order, the various messages passing between the king and the Com‐
mons, summarizing both sides of the debates in the house, and preserving docu‐
ments — including the remarkable Bishops’ Bill which is mocked in what is probably 
the most e%ective way possible, by reproducing its text in full (pp. 313–23) — that 
would otherwise remain hidden from the reading public.
According to John Wallace, the change in Marvell’s style was occasioned by 
95 *e views of two such readers, John M. Wallace and Annabel Patterson, will be mentioned 
brie-y below.
96 Conal Condren, ‘Andrew Marvell as Polemicist: His Account of the Growth of Popery, and 
Arbitrary Government’, in !e Political Identity of Andrew Marvell, ed. Condren and Cousins, pp. 157–
87 (p. 162).
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the urgency of the crisis that the Account addressed, and the need to be as unambigu‐
ous as possible as to the true state of a%airs:
What the country needed was not fuel for its anxieties but a spokesman for its 
convictions, and !e Growth of Popery is #rst and foremost a speaking-out, an 
attempt to be completely explicit about the dangers and suspicions that had 
already been canvassed individually. … Earnestness, not to say a passionate 
intensity is written into every paragraph of Marvell’s argument; it marks the 
end of his raillery, and virtually the end of his patience. !e jokes and the wit 
have disappeared, and in place of satire is a total seriousness. !ings must be 
said in such a way that there could be no possibility of misunderstanding 
them …97
Annabel Patterson o%ers a similar explanation for the change in style — that the 
threat confronting the country could now be seen to be too serious to be tackled 
e%ectively using satire:
the country now faced, Marvell believed, a well-organized, highly coordinated 
threat to its most cherished institutions, in both church and state; and in place 
of the isolated targets … there was now a powerful group of unknown size, 
with a coherent strategy of muzzling both press and Parliament, of destroying 
history as they gained control over its media. What was needed, therefore, 
was not satirical attack, the weapon of minority opinion, but a style and genre 
that could be readily identi#ed with the constitutional principles and public 
institutions that were now at stake.98
Marvell had made one previous attempt at a straightforward historical narrative in A 
Short Historical Essay touching General Councils, Creeds, and Imposition in Religion 
(1676), which was printed with Mr Smirke. Here, dealing with a subject as serious 
and important as the perversion of Christianity by bishops, he ‘could not help mixing 
levity with gravity’,99 in the manner of his other works. Insofar as the Account 
demonstrates that he was able to resist the admixture of levity, it seems to set itself 
apart from his earlier works.
!e impression may be misleading, however. !e later part of the Account 
(from about page 310 onwards in the Yale edition) is indeed largely lacking in Mar‐
vell’s characteristic humour, but the earlier part is not. !is question has been 
97 Wallace, Destiny his Choice, p. 211.
98 Patterson, Marvell: !e Writer in Public Life, pp. 142–3.
99 Patterson, Marvell: !e Writer in Public Life, p. 139.
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illuminated by the publication of !e Prose Works of Andrew Marvell (2003), contain‐
ing the #rst scholarly edition of the Account. !e Account’s editor, Nicholas von 
Maltzahn, makes it clear that that work is, to a much greater extent than had been 
previously appreciated, an ‘assembled text’. It has always been apparent that the 
Account incorporates the texts of a bill, parliamentary speeches and other documents 
that already existed. Von Maltzahn tells us that the pamphlet also reproduces material 
which is also to be found in two manuscript narratives.100 !ese are journals that 
recount the proceedings in parliament in the detailed and factual manner that one 
might expect of a ‘naked Narrative’. However, the earlier part of the work, amounting 
to more than half its length, is much more consistent with Marvell’s habitual tone and 
style, as well as exhibiting certain continuities of theme (including the theme of 
justice) with some of his earlier works.
We have seen that the author derides parliament’s intolerance (treating 
compulsory religious conformity as a property right for which they have paid dearly), 
even at the expense of weakening the force of his criticism of the ‘conspirators’ for the 
timing and method of their attempt to introduce indulgence for tender consciences. 
!e commencement of the third Anglo-Dutch war provides the opportunity for some 
well-judged sarcasm at the expense of the conspirators and the court, bearing a 
family resemblance to the attacks on the court in !e last Instructions. Marvell 
recounts how a lone ‘sorry Yatch’ (p. 253) had been sent among the Dutch "eet, in the 
expectation that the Dutch would fail to salute the English "ag and so provide a fair 
quarrel that could be carefully preserved in order to justify a war when the time was 
right:
!e Yatch having thus acquitted it self, returned, fraught with the Quarrel she 
was sent for, which yet was for several moneths passed over here in silence 
without any Complaint or demand of satisfaction, but to be improved a'er‐
wards when occasion grew riper. … !ey had now started the dispute about 
100 *e manuscripts are British Library, Add. MS 35865, fols. 135r–56v and Add. MS 72603, 
fols. 48–59 (which is substantially the same as Stowe MS 182, fols. 56–66): Prose Works, II, 211–2.
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the Flag upon occasion of the Yatch, and begun the discourse of Surinam, and 
from somwhat of Pictures and Medalls, but they handled these matters so 
nicely as men not less afraid of receiving all satisfaction therein from the 
Hollanders, then of giving them any umbrage of arming against them upon 
those pretences (pp. 253–5).
!is carefully contrived casus belli is used to justify a surprise attack on a convoy of 
Dutch merchantmen. !e advantage of surprise notwithstanding, the attack is much 
less pro#table than the conspirators had hoped, yielding barely enough to pay the 
surgeons and carpenters. !e conspirators are not discouraged, however.
It was now high time to Declare the War, a'er they had begun it; and there‐
fore by a Manifesto of the seventeenth of March 1672, the pretended Causes 
were made publick which were, !e not having Vailed Bonnet to the Yatch: 
though the Dutch had all along, both at home and here as carefully ende‐
voured to give, as the English Minister avoid the receiving of all satisfaction, 
or letting them understand what would do it, and the Council Clock was on 
purpose set forward, lest their utmost Compliance in the Flag at the hour 
appointed, should prevent the Declaration of War by some minutes. (pp. 259–
60)
As well as exhibiting a Marvellian sense of satire, these passages are consistent with 
what Marvell has written elsewhere on the same topics (the intolerance of the 
Commons and the bad faith of the court in matters of war and peace with Holland). 
In a letter to his nephew of 21 March 1669/70, for example, Marvell describes the 
‘terrible Bill against Conventicles’ in the form in which it had been passed by the 
Commons — where he had spoken against it — as ‘the Quintessence of arbitrary 
Malice’,¹0¹ while !e last Instructions shows the court behaving unconscionably in its 
conduct of the second Anglo-Dutch war.¹0²
In a long passage reminiscent in its theme of parts of !e last Instructions, 
Marvell shows the English court taking its cue, in terms of per#dy and bad faith, 
from France, while completely failing to follow the French example in using this 
dishonourable behaviour to further their own national interest. As in the poem of a 
101 Poems and Letters, II, 314; John Milward notes that Marvell opposed the Conventicles Bill on 
30 March 1668, citing Caroline Robbins, ed. !e Diary of John Milward, Esq. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1938), p. 238.
102 See chapter 2 above, pp. 112–13.
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decade earlier, we have ‘English Plenipotentiaries’ (p. 263), the circumscription of 
whose authority mocks their designation,¹0³ and who may have secret instructions to 
avoid an accommodation, however amenable they may #nd the Dutch (pp. 266–7). 
By insisting that the French demands must be met as a condition of peace with 
England, the ambassadors (who included Marvell’s apparent patron, the Duke of 
Buckingham,¹04 and whom ‘for their honour’ he does not name) forgo an opportuni‐
ty to reach an agreement that would have been advantageous to England. In short, he 
depicts the Court as being a dupe or tool of the French king, disregarding its treaty 
obligations to Holland and Sweden, but doing so to the bene#t of France rather than 
of England.
Marvell’s concern with the requirement to honour one’s freely assumed 
obligations is again evident in his discussion of the second marriage of the Duke of 
York. !e Duke had married the Catholic Princess Mary of Modena by proxy and, as 
Marvell relates, the Commons had petitioned the king to avoid the marriage. 
(Marvell implies that the ‘Conspirators’ had provoked this parliamentary reaction by 
demanding a supply ‘with much more importunity and assurance than ever before’.) 
Marvell highlights the irony inherent in the parliamentary position by pointing out 
that the marriage had already taken place (though by proxy) and that ‘unless the 
Parliament had been Pope, and Claimed a power of Dispensation, it was now too late 
to avoid it’ (p. 273).
He implicitly criticizes the Commons for proceeding ‘Summarily within 
themselves’ against Buckingham instead of impeaching him. Impeachment would 
have meant making a complaint which would have been heard by the House of Lords, 
‘whereby the Crimes might have been brought to Examination, Proof and 
Judgment’ (p. 275). !e implication is that the Commons’ reliance on the notoriety of 
103 Marvell sardonically refers to their being ‘intrusted with a fuller Authority, and the deeper 
Secret’, and regrets that they were not ‘as full of Resolution as of Power’ (p. 266).
104 Prose Works, II, 263, n. 229.
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the ministers’ ‘ill Character’ is a poor substitute for the hearing of evidence and for 
the determination of the complaint by a di%erent body than the one making it. 
Marvell therefore implies that fair procedures should be followed in the cases of 
ministers to whom the Commons object. !is is not to say, however, that Marvell 
dissents from what he takes to be the aim of the lower house: to withhold money in 
order that ‘A Peace would in due time follow’ (p. 275).
A'er the peace has been concluded, and the king has assumed the role of 
mediator between France and Holland, the conspirators, in order ‘that such an 
absurdity as the ordering of A%airs abroad, according to the interest of our Nation 
might be avoided’ (p. 278), ensure that the French forces continue to be augmented 
with English, Scottish and Irish soldiers. In doing so, Marvell suggests, they prevent 
the king from behaving in a way that is consistent with either his role as a mediator 
— which clearly requires some degree of evenhandedness — or his newly con#rmed 
treaty obligations to Holland.
!e opposition in the Lords to the proposed test oath (see above, page 194) is 
presented in terms of a heroic battle, reminiscent of the parliamentary struggle over 
the Excise in !e last Instructions:
!ey fought it out under all the disadvantages imaginable: !ey were overlaid 
by Numbers, the noise of the House, like the Wind was against them, and if 
not the Sun, the Fireside was alwayes in their Faces; nor being so few, could 
they, as their Adversaries, withdraw to refresh themselves in a whole days 
Ingagement (p. 285).
Narrating events that occurred during the prorogation following the jurisdictional 
dispute over Shirley v. Fagg, Marvell refers to the appointment of #ve new judges, two 
each to the King’s Bench and Exchequer and one to the Common Pleas. All, accord‐
ing to their letters patent, are to hold their o&ces ‘Durante Bene Placito, bound as it 
were to their Good Behaviour’ (p. 291). !e question had been raised at least as early 
as Sir Edward Coke’s arguments with James I, whether judges who were removable at 
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the will of the sovereign could be regarded as independent in the performance of 
their judicial functions, given that they could be dismissed if they were to give a 
decision unsatisfactory to the crown.¹05 It can be seen, then, that the issue of judicial 
independence is closely bound up with that as to whether the king is answerable to 
the laws on the one hand, or antecedent or superior to them on the other. Marvell is 
far from heartened by the appointment of these new judges. He complains that ‘the 
Wisdom and Probity of the Law went of[f] for the most part with good Sir Matthew 
Hales, and Justice is made a meer property’ (p. 291). !is judgment as to the judicia‐
ry’s lack of independence is later con#rmed when Sha'esbury applies for habeas 
corpus in an attempt to end his imprisonment for contempt of the House of Lords: 
the judges of the King’s Bench are found to be ‘more true to their Pattents then their 
Jurisdiction’ (p. 372) and refuse to order his release.
Marvell relates a number of instances of the Commons’ unjust treatment of 
individuals. A Doctor Cary was imprisoned in the Tower ‘under that new Notion of 
Contempt, when no other Crime would do it’ (p. 306), and one John Harrington was 
similarly committed when Sir Joseph Williamson ‘insisted upon [Harrington’s] 
strange demeanour toward his Majesty, deciphered his very looks’, although the 
general impression was that ‘his looks might have past any where but with a man of 
Sir Josephs delicacy’ (p. 308).
We have seen that a signi#cant part of the narrative of An Account of the 
Growth of Popery (from the beginning to about page 310 in the Yale edition and thus 
amounting to roughly 56% of the text) is characteristic of Marvell both in its themes 
and in the kind of humour employed. A'er page 310, a shi' in tone occurs so that 
the overall impression that the work leaves on the reader is of one that goes out of its 
105 See Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution, p.153–4, esp. n. 119. According 
to Burgess, in the early Stuart period the king shared in ‘a consensus on the value of impartiality’ 
notwithstanding the absence of judicial security of tenure. In Burgess’s view, James I was not 
concerned to control the judges so much as to ensure that the prerogative did not go undefended in 
cases to which the crown was not a party.
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way to eschew humour, even when it might seem particularly appropriate. !e 
seriousness of tone is evident in the account of the imprisonment of the four lords, 
Wharton, Salisbury, Buckingham and Sha'esbury, for their ‘contempt of parliament’:
!at Contempt, was their refusing to recant their Opinion [that the e%ect of 
the long prorogation had been to dissolve parliament], and ask pardon of the 
King, and the House of Lords. !us a Prorogation without President, was to 
be warranted by an Imprisonment without Example. A sad Instance and 
whereby the Dignity of Parliaments, and especially of the House of Peers, did 
at present much su%er, and may probably more for the future; For nothing but 
Parliament can destroy Parliament, If a House shall once be Felon of it self 
and stop its own breath, taking away that Liberty of speech, which the King 
verbally, and of course allows them, (as now they had done in both Houses) to 
what purpose is it coming thither? (pp. 297–8)
Marvell is quite properly incensed at the arbitrary incarceration for something that 
had not previously been considered an o%ence, and at the setback for the principle of 
freedom of speech in parliament. He had been similarly incensed at many of Samuel 
Parker’s pronouncements on church government, but had found it e%ective to use 
ridicule to express his outrage as, indeed, he had ridiculed the intolerance of the 
Commons, earlier in the Account itself.
!e passage on the four lords’ punishment for contempt comes before the #rst 
of the extensive passages of already existing material to be incorporated into the text. 
Its tone of somewhat po-faced outrage may suggest that, by this time, Marvell was 
less inclined than he had previously been to use humour as his main weapon, so that 
the later incorporation of the narrative material does not distort the overall tone quite 
so much as one might expect. !e fact remains, however, that most of the #rst half of 
the work occupies Marvell’s characteristic position, ‘betwixt jest and earnest’.
Marvell, it has been said, is ‘not at all an easy writer to see whole’.¹06 It may be 
that the controversial prose works are less likely to encompass divergent points of 
view than is his oeuvre taken together. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the Account, 
both in terms of its less humorous tone and its much more restrictive view of the 
106 Everett, ‘Poetry and Politics in Andrew Marvell’, p. 32.
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king’s powers, stands somewhat apart from the other prose works, notably !e 
Rehearsal Transpros’d (and particularly !e Second Part). While an attempt to 
reconcile these works might be misguided, it is surely worthwhile to try to trace the 
greater or lesser degrees of continuity between them. !e e%ort is worthwhile because 
the Account constitutes strong evidence that Marvell had at he end of his life adopted 
a Whig (or, as L’Estrange would have it, republican) position, one in which the king’s 
role was limited and his powers subject to legal control. It has been suggested in this 
chapter that Marvell’s movement towards in that direction went in tandem with an 
increasing interest in constitutional questions, indeed with an increasing recognition 
that a constitution was a necessity, if the king was to be restrained from misusing his 
powers.
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Chapter 5. Marvell and Equity: ‘In rescue of the 
Banquiers Banquerout’?
Edward Nelthorpe and his creditors
!e Chancery records that Fred S. Tupper discovered in 1938 — and from which he 
deduced that the woman who claimed to be Marvell’s widow was in fact an impos‐
tor1— raise at least one intriguing question about the justice of Marvell’s behaviour; 
and a second, if we conclude that Tupper was wrong in his deduction. !e question 
that undoubtedly arises is primarily one of law, but of law in the wide sense, encom‐
passing Equity at least as much as the Common Law. !e second potential question is 
one of personal morality and has to do with Marvell’s treatment of the wife whom, if 
Tupper is right, he did not have. !e second question arises only if we conclude that 
Tupper read a lot more into the Chancery records than they were capable of support‐
ing.
It is evident that, between June 1677 and Marvell’s death in August 1678, he 
helped a bankrupt merchant named Edward Nelthorpe to hide from the latter’s 
creditors. Some commentators have thought it likely that he went further than this, 
and knowingly helped Nelthorpe to conceal not merely his person but some of his 
assets. Whether the evidence in fact indicates that Marvell assisted in or connived at a 
fraud on Nelthorpe’s creditors is a question that, surprisingly perhaps, has not been 
directly considered. Some of those scholars and critics who have mentioned the 
possibility have simply assumed that he would have been justi$ed in helping Nel‐
thorpe, on the grounds that the treatment by their creditors of Nelthorpe and his 
bankrupt partners was itself unjust.
1 Fred S. Tupper, ‘Mary Palmer, Alias Mrs. Andrew Marvell’, PMLA, 53 (1938), pp. 367–92.
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Edward Nelthorpe was a friend and, most likely, a relative of Andrew 
Marvell’s.2 He and Richard !ompson, both merchants from Hull, entered into a 
partnership with two London merchants, John Farrington and Edmund Page, in 1671 
and carried on the business of merchant bankers. !e business survived until 1675, 
when the bankers found that they were not able to meet their obligations as they fell 
due and asked their creditors for time to pay. According to the account published in 
the name of the partnership,3 most of the creditors were prepared to agree to this 
request but an intransigent minority prevented them from concluding the agreement. 
Eventually, a commission in bankruptcy was issued against the bankers.
A commission in bankruptcy was appointed by the Lord Chancellor, sitting in 
Chancery, on the petition of some or all of the creditors.4 Such a commission had 
power to transfer the property in the assets of the bankrupt, and it was usual to assign 
these to an assignee in bankruptcy who would then liquidate them so that the 
proceeds could be distributed proportionately among the creditors. !e main 
purpose of the bankruptcy procedure was to ensure an equitable distribution of the 
available funds among the creditors. !e law was designed for the protection, not of 
the debtor from the creditors, but of the creditors from each other; without it the 
particularly active, aggressive or simply fortunate creditor would be likely to obtain 
preferential treatment, at the expense of his fellows. According to Holdsworth, there 
was not yet any statutory provision for discharge from bankruptcy, ‘except to the 
extent to which the creditors had been paid’.5
2 Tupper, ‘Mary Palmer, Alias Mrs. Andrew Marvell’, p. 363, n. 8, citing Chancery pleadings C6/276/48 
and C7/589/82, which are discussed below.
3 !e Case of Richard !ompson and Company: With Relation to their Creditors. Published for Better 
Information (London: 1678); Public Record O*ce SP 30 G.
4 On the appointment, powers and functions of commissions in bankruptcy, see Sir William 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law 17 vols. (London: Methuen, 1903–1966) VIII, 238–241.
5 Holdsworth, History of English Law VIII, 240, 
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!e defence published in the name of the bankers claimed that the hostile 
creditors procured the supersession (or rescission, in later terminology6) of the initial 
commission in bankruptcy and the appointment of a second, because they were not 
satis$ed that the original commission was doing a good enough job of unearthing the 
bankers’ assets. For the same reason, the second commission was also superseded and 
a third appointed. At some point, probably in the $rst half of 1677, Edward Nel‐
thorpe ‘absconded’, ‘withdrew himself ’ or ‘le, his house and trade’.7 !at is to say he 
went into hiding.
Before June 1677, according to Mary Marvell,8 she and Marvell lived in a 
house in Westminster, he ostensibly as her lodger but in fact as her husband. In that 
month, Marvell told her that he wanted her to give up the house in Westminster and 
take one in Great Russell Street, which she did, on a three-year lease. He said that a 
friend of his would come to live with them there. !is friend would pay the rent and 
housekeeping expenses and would give Mrs. Marvell another £10 a year ‘for her 
Trouble’. Marvell would not at the time tell her the name of this friend, who turned 
out to be Edward Nelthorpe. Nelthorpe lived in the house until his death in Septem‐
ber of the following year, although Mrs. Marvell says that he was out of England at 
the time of Marvell’s death, in August 1678.9
At about the same time as Mrs. Marvell was taking the house, on 9 June 1677, 
Nelthorpe went to the shop of Charles Wallis, who is referred to in several documents 
as a goldsmith but describes himself in a deposition as a merchant tailor. Wallis says 
he had had previous dealings with Nelthorpe with whom he was acquainted. Nel‐
6 Sheila Marriner, ‘English Bankruptcy Records and Statistics before 1850’, Economic History Review 
33 (1980), pp. 351–366, 354.
7 See the depositions of !omas Speede, Edmond Portmans, Gershom Prowd and Charles Wallis, now 
in the Public Record O*ce, at reference C24/1069 [Part 2, No 36]. 
8 !e woman apparently responsible for the publication of Miscellaneous Poems in 1681 is named in 
most of the Chancery documents as Mary Marvell, and is so referred to here. However, she was 
generally known as Mary Palmer at the material time.
9 C6/262/13, answer of Mary Marvell.
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thorpe deposited £500 with Wallis and received in return a bill under seal providing 
for repayment of that sum by 9 December 1677, six months later. In default of 
payment of the principal and interest by the due date, the amount payable under the 
bill was to rise to £1,000. !e person named as payee was not Edward Nelthorpe, 
however, but Andrew Marvell. !e records discovered by Tupper relate primarily to 
Chancery proceedings arising, a,er the deaths of Marvell and Nelthorpe, from a 
dispute as to which of their personal estates was entitled to this bill. !e dispute was 
decided, a,er a hearing, in favour of Nelthorpe’s estate. !ere is no doubt that the 
£500 was Nelthorpe’s money and that the transaction with Wallis was a device to hide 
its existence from the commissioners in bankruptcy. In short, Marvell’s name was 
used in an illegal scheme the aim of which was to defraud Nelthorpe’s creditors of 
£500. For our purposes, the question of immediate importance is whether this was 
done with Marvell’s knowledge or without.
In order to answer this question, it is $rst necessary to look at the nature of 
the documents discovered and considered by Tupper. !ey consist $rstly of the bills 
of complaint exhibited in Chancery by John Farrington, Mary Marvell and Charles 
Wallis respectively and secondly of the answers made by the various defendants 
named in those bills: Farrington, Mary Marvell and Wallis, and also John Greene. 
What I shall call the main bill was exhibited by John Farrington in his capacity as 
administrator of the personal estate of Edward Nelthorpe. Nelthorpe had le, a 
widow, Mary, who had not been resident in the Great Russell Street house.10 Shortly 
a,er Nelthorpe died, on 18 September 1678, Farrington persuaded Mary Nelthorpe 
to waive her own rights to administration of her husband’s estate and to permit him, 
Farrington, to become sole administrator. Farrington based his entitlement to the 
administration on his claim that he had been a creditor of Nelthorpe’s. Farrington 
10 She later says (C10/216/74) that she was kept in ignorance of Nelthorpe’s whereabouts so that she 
could not be compelled to disclose it to the bankruptcy commissioners.
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and Nelthorpe were both subject to the commissions in bankruptcy that had issued 
against the partners. By the time of Nelthorpe’s death, Farrington was imprisoned for 
debt — though he was let out nearly every day to conduct his business — and he 
remained a prisoner throughout the period during which the Chancery proceedings 
were fought.11
Farrington’s claim that Nelthorpe was indebted to him is based on the terms 
of the partnership agreement. According to Farrington, the agreement provided that 
the partners were entitled to draw on the bank’s funds in order to $nance their own 
trading operations, provided that they le, enough funds for the bank to meet its 
obligations and that none of the partners drew a greater share than any of the others. 
Farrington claimed that Nelthorpe had drawn much larger amounts than he had and, 
in 1684, Nelthorpe’s widow swore that her husband had admitted to her that this was 
the case.12 !e Prerogative Court of Canterbury granted letters of administration in 
October 1678, about six weeks a,er Nelthorpe’s death. Although Marvell had died a 
month earlier than Nelthorpe, letters of administration of his estate did not issue until 
March 1679, seven months later.13 !e persons who successfully applied to the 
Prerogative Court of Canterbury to administer Andrew Marvell’s estate were Mary 
Marvell (as widow) and John Greene (as creditor). Greene was an attorney and an 
associate of John Farrington’s.
Once administration of the two estates had been obtained, and notwithstand‐
ing Farrington’s haste in the case of Nelthorpe’s estate, there is no record of the 
administrators having taken any further action for about two years. !en, in 1681, 
the bill that Nelthorpe had obtained from Charles Wallis resurfaced.14 It will be 
11 Tupper, ‘Mary Palmer, Alias Mrs. Andrew Marvell’, p. 370.
12 C7/581/73 (complaint of Farrington against !ompson) and C10/216/74 (answer of Mary Nel‐
thorpe to !ompson’s complaint). See below, p. 245.
13 !e record of Marvell’s administration is at PROB6/54 fol. 25v. Nelthorpe’s is at PROB6/53 fol. 88v.
14 From this point on, this bill will be referred to as a security, to avoid confusion with the various bills 
of complaint in Chancery.
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recalled that this security provided for repayment of the capital and interest by 9 
December 1677 and for a penalty, equal to the original capital amount, to be incurred 
on late payment. !at the debt should still be outstanding nearly four years later is at 
least surprising. Nevertheless, in Midsummer 1681, John Greene brought a common 
law suit against Charles Wallis, claiming that the debt indeed remained unpaid.15 !e 
proceedings were taken in Greene’s own name and in Mary Marvell’s, as administra‐
tors of Andrew Marvell’s estate. Mary Marvell claimed that this was the $rst she had 
heard of the security and that her name was being used without her authority. 
Accordingly, she put a stop to the suit against Wallis. Farrington responded by 
exhibiting a bill of complaint in Chancery, initiating what I have called the main 
action.
John Farrington and Mary Marvell in Chancery
!e defendants named in Farrington’s bill were Mary Marvell, John Greene and 
Charles Wallis. Farrington claimed that Marvell’s name had been used in the security 
‘in trust for’ Nelthorpe and that possession of the security had been retained by Nel‐
thorpe, who had it in his custody at the time of his death. Farrington asked the court 
to compel Marvell’s administrators to allow their names to be used in suing Wallis 
and to order that the money recovered from Wallis should be paid to Nelthorpe’s 
estate — in other words, to Farrington as Nelthorpe’s administrator. Farrington said 
that he intended to use any money that he recovered to pay his creditors.
Mary Marvell and Greene both made answers to Farrington’s bill. Mary 
Marvell denies that there is any evidence, such as a declaration of trust, that Marvell 
had held the security in trust for Nelthorpe. Her answer is largely taken up, however, 
with a narrative in which she alleges that Farrington or persons acting on his behalf 
15 As one would expect, no direct records of the common law suit are extant. !e pleadings of Mary 
Marvell, Greene and Farrington in the Chancery proceedings are in agreement as to the sequence of 
events.
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had taken advantage of her grief at her husband’s death and her inexperience in 
business matters, to persuade her to part with the keys to Marvell’s lodgings at 
Maiden Lane, Covent Garden. She accuses them of having removed from these 
lodgings various ‘Hampers trunks bonds bills & other goods’. In the context of a 
response to the particular claims made by Farrington in his bill, it is clear that the 
purpose of this narrative on Mrs. Marvell’s part is to attempt to raise an inference that 
the security had in fact been in Marvell’s possession, not in Nelthorpe’s. Mrs. Marvell 
was operating under a disadvantage in that she did not have direct evidence to 
contradict Farrington’s assertion that possession of the security was retained by Nel‐
thorpe. If, as Farrington successfully claimed, Nelthorpe had been at least the 
bene$cial — if not the legal — owner of the security, it is unlikely that he would have 
parted with it. To have done so would have been dangerous, since it was not made out 
in his own name and he would have had di*culty in showing title if he had needed to 
recover possession of it. Farrington’s claim was therefore inherently plausible and 
Mary Marvell lacked the means of proving that it was untrue. Her case must have 
looked weak from the beginning, and it is likely that she was so advised.
Greene’s answer contains an admission that he believed the original £500 to 
have belonged to Nelthorpe and it declares his willingness to comply with 
Farrington’s requirements. If Wallis made an answer to Farrington’s bill, it has not 
been found. However, like Mary Marvell, he exhibited a cross-bill. In this bill, he 
alleged that he had repaid his debt to Nelthorpe during the latter’s lifetime and, in 
fact, just a few days a,er the original transaction had taken place. He says that Nel‐
thorpe had come to him, having ‘very great present occasion’ for the money and 
asked to be repaid immediately. Wallis, ‘to pleasure him therein did condiscend 
thereunto’ and let him have his money back. He did not, however, recover the sealed 
security from Nelthorpe, who did not have it with him but promised to deliver it 
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later. So, Wallis was claiming that, although the security remained in the possession 
of Nelthorpe, the debt that it had secured no longer existed. !e credibility of Wallis’s 
account will be discussed below.
Mary Marvell’s cross-bill repeats, but in a more embroidered form, the story 
of Farrington’s alleged ransacking of the lodgings in Maiden Lane. She accuses 
Farrington and Greene of having concealed from her the existence of the Wallis 
security, in order to cheat Marvell’s estate of the bene$t of a debt owed to it. She asks 
the court to order the defendants to disclose on oath what items were removed from 
Marvell’s lodgings and what became of them. Farrington and Greene both made 
answers in which they deny the main allegations against them. In these answers they 
also allege for the $rst time that Mary Marvell was not genuinely the widow of the 
member of parliament (and so not entitled to administer his estate). In making this 
claim, they are attempting to counter the charge made by Mrs. Marvell against 
Greene: that he had no genuine interest in Marvell’s administration, and therefore 
should be treated as acting in trust for her. Farrington repeats his allegation about the 
Marvell ‘marriage’ in a further bill of complaint, directed against Mary Marvell and 
the landlords of the Great Russell Street house, Mr. and Mrs. Morris. However, the 
main thrust of this second bill of Farrington’s is to accuse Mary Marvell and the 
landlords of having misappropriated some of Nelthorpe’s personal belongings a,er 
his death.
!e documents just outlined constitute the main sources that Tupper consid‐
ers. He also makes reference to two orders made in the main action and to the 
pleadings in a number of other Chancery cases involving Farrington. To summarize, 
the main documents that Tupper discusses and that have a direct or indirect bearing 
on Marvell’s estate are the following:
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As has already been mentioned, these documents are all either bills of complaint, 
exhibited by parties wishing to initiate Chancery proceedings, or answers sworn by 
defendants in response to such bills. Documents belonging to these two categories 
are together known as pleadings. Despite the fact that they can be placed in the same 
category, however, they are not of equal evidentiary value. !e purpose of a bill of 
complaint was, $rst, to allege facts which, if true, were su*cient to entitle the 
Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Date
July 1681
November 
1681 
November 
1681
December 
1681
January 
1681/2
January 
1681/2
February 
1681/2
February 
1681/2
April 1682
PRO Reference
C6/276/48
C6/276/48
C6/275/120 
C6/275/120
C7/589/82
C7/589/82
C7/587/95
C8/252/9
C6/242/13
C6/242/13
Description
John Farrington’s bill of complaint against 
Mary Marvell, John Greene and Charles Wallis
Answers of Mary Marvell and John Greene to 
item 1.
Charles Wallis’ bill of complaint against John 
Farrington, Mary Marvell and John Greene
John Greene’s answer to item 3
John Farrington’s answer to item 3
Mary Marvell’s answer to item 3
Mary Marvell’s bill of complaint against John 
Farrington, John Greene and Charles Wallis
Answers of Farrington and Greene to item 7
John Farrington’s bill against Mary Marvell 
(there called Palmer) and Mr. and Mrs. Morris
Mary Marvell’s answer to item 9
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complainant to some equitable remedy against the defendants and, second, to ask the 
court for the appropriate relief.16 In order to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, the bill 
almost invariably charged the defendants with some variety of unconscionable 
behaviour, such as fraud. !e relief sought by the complainant practically always 
included the examination of the defendants on oath as to the truth of the allegations, 
and as to the state of their consciences. !e bill of complaint was to be signed by the 
complainant’s counsel, as con$rmation that he believed that the complainant was not 
acting frivolously or without cause.17 Apart from this, however, there was no enforce‐
able requirement that the allegations in the bill of complaint should be true.
In contrast, a defendant’s answer was expected to be strictly truthful and, 
except in collusive proceedings, was made on oath. !e parties to equity proceedings 
in Chancery were therefore not on an equal footing, largely as a consequence of the 
fact that, in the words of D. E. C. Yale, ‘the $rst object of inquiry in Equity is the 
defendant’s conscience, rather than the plainti1 ’s right.’18 Since it was a sworn 
document, the answer ought not to contain anything that the defendant did not know 
or believe to be true. !at is not necessarily to say that perjury by defendants was 
rare. However, it would be a reckless defendant who, in an answer, made a statement 
of fact that another party could easily disprove. Perhaps more importantly, where one 
person makes inconsistent statements in a bill of complaint and in an answer, it will 
be di*cult to rebut the presumption that the statement in the former is untrue. 
Tupper seems not to have been aware that statements contained in complaints may 
need to be treated with more caution than those contained in answers.19
16 Henry Horwitz, Chancery Equity Records and Proceedings 1600–1800 (Kew, Surrey: PRO 
Publications, 1998), pp. 3–4, 12–14.
17 Horwitz, Chancery Equity Records and Proceedings, p. 14.
18 D. E. C. Yale, Lord Nottingham’s ‘Manual of Chancery Practice’ and ‘Prolegomena of Chancery and 
Equity’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 23.
19 For example, he cites a complaint of Richard !ompson against Farrington (C6/283/87), saying that 
!ompson ‘testi$ed’ as to Farrington’s living conditions. While there is no reason to doubt the truth of 
what !ompson says on this point, it is not testimony but merely an allegation made in a bill of 
complaint.
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It will be seen from the outline of the pleadings above that John Farrington 
and Mary Marvell each exhibited a bill of complaint and swore an answer, at about 
the same time and dealing with substantially the same subject matter. !is a1ords the 
student of this case a valuable opportunity to compare the sworn and unsworn 
statements of the two principal parties, with a view to testing the credibility of their 
various allegations. Tupper failed to take advantage of the opportunity, as did 
William Empson, who attempted to refute Tupper on the question of Marvell’s 
supposed marriage. Indeed, Empson so misunderstood the nature of the documents, 
that he described them all as ‘depositions’.20 In fact, none of the documents that he 
looked at is a deposition — they are all either pleadings or orders. Depositions were 
indeed taken in the case but neither Tupper nor Empson knew about them.21
As has already been noted, Farrington says in his bill of complaint (item 1) 
that custody of the Wallis security was retained by Nelthorpe and that it was in his 
possession when he died. In his answer (item 8) to Mrs. Marvell’s complaint, he says:
And this De,. further saith and doubts not to prove that the said Mr. Nel‐
thorpe tooke a Bill of the said Wallis in the name of the said Andrew Marvell 
for the said [illegible] had the said Bill in his owne custody till the time of his 
death & verily beleives that the said Mr. Marvell did not know thereof but if 
he had knowne thereof this De,. verily beleives he would have bin soe juste as 
to have given a Declaration of trust upon request for that purpose …
So far, what Farrington says on oath is a repetition of what he has already said in his 
complaint: that the security was in Nelthorpe’s possession until his death. Consistent‐
ly with this, he adds that he does not believe that Marvell knew about the security, 
even though it was made out in his name. If these statements are reliable, they clearly 
tend to exonerate Marvell from complicity in the fraud on Nelthorpe’s creditors. 
Moreover, Wallis’s bill of complaint (item 3) may be taken as corroboration of this 
interpretation. If Nelthorpe was the person who brought the £500 to Wallis in the 
20 William Empson, Using Biography (Chatto & Windus, 1984), p. 43. 
21 Art Kavanagh, ‘Andrew Marvell “in want of money”: the Evidence in John Farrington v. Mary 
Marvell’, !e Seventeenth Century, 17 (2002), pp. 202–12 
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$rst place (as is established by Wallis’s deposition, discussed below) and if he was 
careful to keep the security in his possession (as Farrington alleges), then it would be 
necessary to involve Marvell in the scheme only if Wallis required his receipt on 
repayment of the money. But Wallis, it will be remembered, claims that he was 
prepared to repay the money to Nelthorpe not only without Marvell’s receipt, but on 
a mere promise that the security would be returned to him. On the face of it, then, 
there would seem to be no grounds for suspicion that Marvell acted unethically in 
relation to Nelthorpe’s assets.
!e situation is more complicated than it $rst appears to be, however. For a 
start, while Wallis’s story of the repayment to Nelthorpe is plausible, that is not 
necessarily to say that it is truthful. At common law, a covenant under seal to pay a 
debt was treated as conclusive evidence that the debt was due. A borrower who 
claimed (as Wallis did in his bill of complaint) that he had paid the debt, but failed to 
recover possession of the security, had no defence to a suit at common law. As far as 
the law was concerned, the covenant under seal itself gave rise to the obligation to 
pay. It is therefore no surprise to learn that complaints such as Wallis’s, by debtors 
who allege that they are being pursued unconscionably for debts that the creditors 
know to have already been paid, were a regular part of the business of the Equity 
courts.22 Quite apart from this, if the debt was still outstanding in 1681, it must 
follow that Wallis — a merchant for whom accepting deposits at interest was appar‐
ently part of his regular trade — failed to pay the debt when it fell due and so 
incurred the liability to pay a penalty of £500, as well as continuing interest. None of 
the parties o1ers an explanation of this apparent failure. In short, Wallis’s account of 
Nelthorpe’s second visit to his shop appears to be the kind of thing that might well 
22 S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law 2nd ed. (Butterworths, 1981), pp. 86, 
250. In fact, in 1683 Farrington himself was to make a claim of the same kind against James Nelthorpe, 
one of the creditors of the bank: C10/484/71.
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have happened. For all its plausibility, though, there is something suspicious about 
Wallis’s complaint.
As has already been mentioned, no answer by Wallis to Farrington’s main bill 
has been found. !is does not necessarily mean that no answer was sworn: it is quite 
clear that not all of the documents in the case have been discovered and in any case it 
did not always happen that answers were $led with the bills to which they apper‐
tained. !e absence of an answer by Wallis may therefore mean either that he was not 
prepared to state on oath that he had repaid Nelthorpe during his lifetime or  that he 
in fact did so but the document has been lost. However, while it cannot be said with 
certainty that Wallis did not swear an answer to Farrington’s complaint, it is clear that 
only an unsworn version of his story has survived. If Wallis did not swear an answer 
to Farrington’s complaint, then the credibility of the story he tells in his cross-bill is 
greatly undermined, and the cross-bill may be nothing more than a device to put him 
in a better negotiating position with Farrington. At any rate, having exhibited his 
complaint, Wallis does not seem to have taken any further action to pursue it: a 
search through the order books index up to 1686 reveals no mention of Wallis v. 
Farrington and others.
!at is not to say that Wallis played no further part in the case. On 11 July 
1682, he was produced as a witness on behalf of John Farrington and swore a 
deposition.23 In it, he said that he had considerable dealings and trading with Edward 
Nelthorpe. On 9 June 1677, which was a,er Nelthorpe had had to ask his creditors 
for time to pay, Nelthorpe gave him bills or notes to the value of £500 and requested 
him to seal a bill (the security) which was already $lled out in Nelthorpe’s handwrit‐
ing. !e witness believes that this occurred about six months a,er Nelthorpe 
23 Wallis was one of $ve witnesses on Farrington’s behalf, whose depositions are to be found at PRO 
reference C24/1069 [Part 2, No 36]. !e other witnesses included Nathaniel Ponder, the bookseller of 
the two parts of !e Rehearsal Transpros’d: Kavanagh, ‘Andrew Marvell “in want of money”’. Since 
depositions are indexed by witness name, and not by party, it is only because Wallis $lled both roles 
that the depositions in this case were discovered.
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‘absconded’ (though some of the other witnesses put Nelthorpe’s 2ight nearer to 
Midsummer 1677). Wallis also says that he was acquainted with Andrew Marvell but 
did not have any dealings with him, and that Marvell was reputed to be a person of 
little or no estate. He says nothing about having repaid the £500, to Nelthorpe or 
anyone else. (Had he done so, his evidence would have been of no use to Farrington, 
since it would tend to show that the security was valueless and the issue as to its 
ownership — the whole point of the case — moot.)
!e depositions, which (perhaps with exhibits or accounts) comprised the 
evidence in the case, were sworn statements made by the witnesses in response to 
interrogatories drawn up by the parties. (An answer, while also made on oath, was 
binding only on the defendant making it; it did not constitute evidence against 
anyone else.) It can be seen, then, that Wallis’s story to the e1ect that he repaid the 
£500 to Nelthorpe is to be found only in a document that was not made on oath, and 
that when Wallis comes to make the only sworn statement of his that we have, he 
does not repeat the story. !e evidence that Wallis was prepared to repay the money, 
without obtaining Marvell’s receipt, so turns out to be less reliable than it might have 
appeared on its face. It does not follow, though, that we can be sure that Wallis would 
have insisted on a receipt from Marvell. His deposition makes it clear that he knew 
the money was Nelthorpe’s or the partnership’s, that he did not believe that Marvell 
had £500 available for investment and that he was aware of the circumstances that 
might lead Nelthorpe to deposit money in someone else’s name, as a means of 
concealment. It was perfectly clear to him that he was dealing with Nelthorpe, not 
Marvell. Further, he could have protected himself just as e1ectively by taking back the 
security as by obtaining a receipt, which would have to be under seal.24 So, whether it 
would have been possible for Nelthorpe to have recovered the money without 
involving Marvell must remain an open question.
24 Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, p. 250. 
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!ere is a second reason why the inference that appears to arise from Farring‐
ton’s answer, that Marvell did not know that his name was being used, is not so 
straightforward as it might appear. Farrington made a second statement on oath 
which, while not necessarily inconsistent with his claim that the security remained in 
Nelthorpe’s possession at his death, requires further explanation if it is to be wholly 
reconciled with it. We have already seen that, having quickly persuaded Nelthorpe’s 
widow to permit him to administer the estate, and having then taken out administra‐
tion within six weeks of the death, Farrington did not take action against Wallis until 
Midsummer 1681. Greene and Farrington both o1er an explanation of part of this 
delay. In his answer (item 4) to Wallis’s bill of complaint, Greene swears that
… he doth not know nor believe that the said John 1arrington did know nor 
believe that the said Bill was taken in the name of the said Andrew Marvell till 
above a yeare a,er letters of Admstracon was granted to the said Mary and 
this Defendt. ... nor did this De,. know any thing thereof till above twelve 
moneth a,er letters of Admstracon were granted to the said Mary and this 
Defendt. of the said Andrew Marvell’s Estate … (C6/275/120)
If this is to be believed, Farrington discovered the existence of the security in March 
1680 at the earliest. According to Farrington himself, the discovery was made even 
later — though, remarkably, he too $xes the time by reference to the issue of letters of 
administration of Marvell’s estate. He says, in his answer (item 8) to Mary Marvell’s 
complaint
And this De, further saith that that he this De,.did not know of the Bond or 
bill entred into by the other Defendt Charles Wallis till twenty moneths & 
more a,er the said Letters of Admstracon granted to the Complt. and the said 
John Greene And when this De, had knowledge thereof & had gott the same 
into his custody he this De, <did deliver> the same Bill to the other De,. 
John Greene & desired him to putt the same in suite against the other De,. 
Charles Wallis (C8/252/9)
Farrington seems to be conscious that there is an apparent discrepancy between his 
claim that he did not know about the security before November 1680 and the 
admission that he had his agent involve himself in Marvell’s administration more 
than twenty months earlier. What could be the point of his interest in Marvell’s estate, 
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unless it was to get hold of the security? Farrington explains that, at the time when 
Marvell’s administration was being taken out, he believed that some assets of Nel‐
thorpe’s had been placed in Marvell’s name but he did not know what those assets 
were.
Farrington’s statements are evasive and unreliable on the question of the 
security’s whereabouts between Nelthorpe’s death in September 1678 and the 
commencement of the common law suit against Wallis in Midsummer 1681. While 
he says that he learned of its existence more than twenty months a,er the date of 
Marvell’s administration, and that he then had to get it ‘into his custody’, he says 
nothing at all as to how he made the discovery, in whose possession the security then 
was or what steps he had to take in order to obtain possession of it. !ese are 
questions that are obviously relevant, particularly as he had previously sworn baldly 
that Nelthorpe had retained custody of the security during his lifetime, implying that 
it had been found among his possessions a,er his death.
It is probably signi$cant that Greene uses the phrases ‘above twelve moneth’ 
and ‘above a yeare’ when, if Farrington is telling the truth, the period was actually in 
excess of twenty months. It appears that, apart from the security (which was ultimate‐
ly determined to have been Nelthorpe’s), Marvell’s administrators did not $nd any 
assets belonging to his estate. Mary Marvell complains (item 7) that the letters of 
administration were retained by Greene, the lawyer, while she waited to receive some 
bene$t from her husband’s estate, but did not hear anything until Greene commenced 
the suit against Wallis. Farrington was able to produce persuasive evidence to 
substantiate his claim that at no time in the $ve years before his death was Marvell 
worth £100.25 !e administrators were required by law to $le with the Prerogative 
Court of Canterbury an inventory of the estate and an account of the 
25 Kavanagh, ‘Andrew Marvell “in Want of Money”’.
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administration.26 !e inventory was to be $led by the end of the sixth calendar 
month a,er the issue of the letters of administration and the account by the end of 
the twel,h (that is, in Marvell’s case, by 30 September 1679 and 31 March 1680 
respectively).27 Very few such returns for the relevant period have survived and those 
that have do not include any relating to Marvell’s estate. It is probable, however, that 
Greene made a return stating that Marvell le, no assets of any value. If so, an 
admission by Greene that he knew about the security before 31 March 1680 would 
leave him open to a charge of perjury, at least if it should eventually be decided that 
the instrument had really been Marvell’s property.
Farrington’s two di1erent accounts of the history of the security are not 
necessarily mutually contradictory. It is not impossible that the document was in Nel‐
thorpe’s possession on 18 September 1678, and that its existence remained concealed 
from Nelthorpe’s administrator for more than two years a,er that date, and that he 
then found it necessary to take unspeci$ed steps to recover it. It is clear, however, that 
Farrington is not, in either of his statements, making a full and frank disclosure of the 
relevant circumstances. He is holding back relevant information that would make it 
easier to evaluate the truth of what he says. !e assertion, accompanying the $rst of 
his statements, of his belief that Marvell was unaware that his name was being used, is 
of no greater value. In the $rst place, Farrington is swearing as to his belief; whether 
that belief was well-founded — or, for that matter, genuinely held — he gives us no 
means of judging. In the second, Farrington has an obvious self-interested motive for 
asserting Marvell’s ignorance of the scheme. Mary Marvell makes as much as she can 
26 Henry Charles Coote, !e Practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts, with forms and Tables of Costs (Henry 
Butterworth, 1847), pp. 675–6, citing as authority the Statute of Distribution (22 and 23 Car. 2, c, 10), 
itself an amendment of an Elizabethan statute. 
27 !ese dates appear in the right-hand margin of the Prerogative Court record of Marvell’s 
administration, PROB6/54 fol. 25v. Tupper, following Margoliouth, took them as referring to the date 
of issue of the administration. As we shall see below, pp. 257–8, this led him to speculate as to the 
causes of a delay on the part of the intending administrators which in Nelthorpe’s case was non-
existent and in Marvell’s exaggerated.
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of the absence of a declaration of trust or other less formal acknowledgement by 
Marvell that the security in his name represents Nelthorpe’s money. It is in response 
to this argument that Farrington says he does not believe that Marvell knew about the 
security but, if he had done so, he would have been so just as to have made the 
required declaration (see above, p. 234). If Farrington could establish Marvell’s 
ignorance as to the use of his name, he would remove the main plank in the adminis‐
tratrix’s argument.
A consideration of the various documents appertaining to the Chancery 
proceedings does not, then, tend to show that Marvell was a conscious participant in 
the attempt to place some of Nelthorpe’s assets beyond the reach of the commission‐
ers in bankruptcy, but neither does it positively exonerate him. It is likely that Nel‐
thorpe kept the security in his own custody, and it is possible that he could have 
recovered the money without having to produce a receipt signed by Marvell. If both 
of these conditions are true, there was no need for Marvell to know that his name was 
being used. If only the $rst is true, he would not need to know until the time came 
when Nelthorpe wanted to collect his money (and, on that hypothesis, the time did 
not come while either Nelthorpe or Marvell was alive). Notwithstanding this, those 
few scholars and critics who have commented on the case have not examined the 
question of Marvell’s possible complicity but tended to suggest that, if he had been 
involved, then his behaviour may have had some colour of justi$cation. L. N. Wall 
comments:
Marvell’s action in providing a hiding-place for his insolvent friends may well 
have been taken under the conviction that they were the victims of a persecu‐
tion provoked by their stand for the religious and civil liberties of the City; 
and if he connived at the concealment of some part of their personal assets, he 
may have felt justi$ed by what seemed to him the unreasonable vindictiveness 
of a minority of creditors. It is even possible that the money which was the 
subject of the litigation of 1681 was his own, in the sense that he was a 
creditor of the $rm enjoying an illegal preference.28
28 L. N. Wall, ‘Marvell’s Friends in the City’, Notes & Queries 204 (1959), pp. 206–07.
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Similarly, according to William Empson, ‘Marvell decided, we may fairly suppose, 
that his friends were political martyrs, and to break the law in their favour was no 
more than a duty’, adding later that ‘perhaps everyone knew that they [the creditors] 
were not widows and orphans but rich loyalist bankers trampling upon republican 
bankers’.29 Legouis takes his lead from Wall, while doubting, on the ground of 
Marvell’s poverty, the suggestion that he may have had the bene$t of an illegal 
preference.30
!is suggestion, at least, can now be discounted, as the evidence shows that 
Marvell was not a creditor of the partnership. However, Wall’s comment that ‘he may 
have felt justi$ed’, by the vindictiveness of a minority of the creditors, in conniving at 
the concealment of assets, requires further examination. Wall’s phrasing implies that, 
whatever Marvell may have felt, a judicious assessment of the scheme must conclude 
di1erently. On the other hand, ‘conniving at’ seems rather to gloss over the level of 
Marvell’s putative involvement. Either Marvell knew that his name was being used, 
and did not stop it, or he did not know.31 In the $rst case, he was going beyond 
connivance, and assisting Nelthorpe in his actions; in the second, no question of 
involvement arises.
If we assume, for the sake of argument, that Marvell was a willing participant 
in Nelthorpe’s scheme to conceal the £500, part of our di*culty in assessing the 
justice of his behaviour results from the fact that we know hardly anything about the 
creditors: who they were, how much they were owed or even whether they were a 
large or small group of people. Records of the proceedings of bankruptcy commis‐
sions do not survive for the period before 1710 and notices of creditors’ meetings, 
and of various other events such as the supersession of a commission, were not 
29 Empson, Using Biography, pp. 46, 61.
30 Legouis, Andrew Marvell: Poet, Puritan, Patriot 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 
pp. 148–9. 
31 A third possibility, that Marvell’s name was being used with his knowledge but against his will, is 
unlikely, in part because of Nelthorpe’s friendship with Marvell.
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regularly published in the London Gazette until 1684. !e collapse of Richard 
!ompson and Company was an event of major public signi$cance; Wall discusses 
several references to it that occur in the Calendar of State Papers, Domestic.32 
However the main source of information about the collapse, and the origin of the 
idea that a minority of vindictive creditors pursued the partners unfairly, is a pam‐
phlet with the title !e Case of Richard !ompson and Company: with Relation to 
their Creditors. Published for Better Information (London: 1678).33 !is pamphlet was 
evidently published by one or more of the partners, with the aim of in2uencing the 
creditors of the $rm towards leniency and, to that end, defending the partners against 
allegations that had been made against them: principally that they had hidden their 
assets from the commissioners and had failed to hand over their account books, 
thereby frustrating the collection of debts owed to the $rm. !e pamphlet was 
probably not the joint work of the partnership as a whole, since by that time Farring‐
ton had fallen out with !ompson and Nelthorpe, whose inexperience as merchants 
and alleged dishonesty he blamed for the collapse of the business.34
!e main theme of the pamphlet is the vindictive and irrationally self-de‐
structive behaviour of a ‘minority’ of the creditors who, when the majority have 
driven a hard bargain to extract from the partnership all that is possibly to be had, 
undermine the arrangement by having the partners arrested (thereby hindering them 
from complying with their agreement), buying up the debts of their more compliant 
brethren and securing the appointment of ‘no less than three several Commissions of 
Banquerupt … against us’ (p. 19).
While it is di*cult to disagree with Wall’s characterization of the bankruptcy 
laws of the seventeenth century as harsh, it is far from clear from this presentation of 
their case that Nelthorpe and his partners were singled out for especially unfair 
32 Wall, ‘Marvell’s Friends in the City’, p. 206, citing CSPD  1676–7.
33 Public Record O*ce, SP 30 G.
34 C7/581/73: complaint of Farrington against Richard !ompson and Dorothy his wife.
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treatment. While it makes sense for the pamphleteer to appeal to the reasonableness 
of the more amenable creditors, it is not necessarily true that the more aggressive 
ones were therefore acting irrationally. Simply put, an approach that might be 
damaging to the interests of the creditors as a body might nevertheless make sense 
from the point of view of particular individuals.
We learn from Holdsworth that the problems for debtors caused by uncoop‐
erative minorities of creditors were a common feature of bankruptcy proceedings 
a,er 1641. Up to that date, when a majority of creditors agreed to a composition with 
the debtor, but a small number refused to accept it, the King’s Council could e1ec‐
tively override the objections of the minority.35 In 1641, the Council’s jurisdiction 
was abolished, and it became impossible to enforce a composition unless all the 
creditors agreed. Creditors in the minority were able, not only to withhold their 
agreement, but to arrest the debtor and take other enforcement measures, so hamper‐
ing his ability to perform his agreement with the majority. !is, indeed, is one of the 
charges that the author of the pamphlet makes against the vindictive minority in the 
case of the !ompson partnership. Holdsworth makes it clear, though, that such 
behaviour by creditors was not at all unusual and the failure of the bankruptcy laws to 
regulate it one of the obvious 2aws in the legislation. !ompson, Nelthorpe and their 
partners seem to have su1ered from the harshness to which recalcitrant debtors were 
generally subjected, rather than from a vindictiveness directed speci$cally at them.
!ere are other reasons to question the pamphlet’s account of the history of 
the partnership, with its emphasis on the vindictive behaviour of the minority of 
creditors. Farrington, in his complaint against !ompson and his wife (C7/581/73) 
gives an account that is quite di1erent from the !ompson version.
35 Holdsworth, History of English Law, VIII, 233–4, 244–5.
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Farrington’s persistence
Again, one must be cautious about accepting without question the truth of 
Farrington’s statements. In the $rst place, they are made in a bill of complaint the 
immediate aim of which was to secure the examination on oath of Richard !omp‐
son and his wife Dorothy. In order to achieve this aim, it was necessary that the bill 
should allege that they had behaved in a manner contrary to conscience and equity. 
In the second place, we have already seen that Farrington is capable of being an 
evasive and unreliable witness and that he had his agent Greene pose as a creditor of 
Marvell’s in order to obtain administration of his estate.
In his complaint against the !ompsons, Farrington blames Nelthorpe’s 
adventurousness and !ompson’s negligence for the failure of the bank. While the 
former withdrew large amounts of the depositors’ funds to $nance ‘Woollen & silke 
manufactures in the most uncultivated parts of Ireland’, a factory in Moscow, and 
other risky and expensive undertakings, the latter ‘was dayly at Co1ee houses and 
other publick places & that he spent his time in publick matters & in heareing & 
telling news’ while he was supposed to be managing the business (C7/581/73).
Farrington’s version of events is supported, on oath, by Nelthorpe’s widow, 
Mary. At about the same time as Farrington brought his bill of complaint against 
!ompson, the latter brought a bill in which Farrington, Greene and Mary Nelthorpe 
were named as codefendants.36 !ompson complained that Mary Nelthorpe had 
wrongfully agreed to Farrington’s becoming Nelthorpe’s administrator, without 
!ompson’s consent. Mrs. Nelthorpe replied that she permitted Farrington to take 
out the administration because she had heard her husband admit that he had drawn 
out much more money from the bank than had Farrington. She had trusted !omp‐
son at $rst, and believed that he intended to deal honestly with her because, for about 
36 !ompson’s bill is at C6/283/87. Farrington and Mary Nelthorpe tried to avoid answering on the 
grounds of !ompson’s outlawry but this plea was evidently unsuccessful. !e substantive answer of 
Mary Nelthorpe is to be found at C10/216/74.
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three years a,er Nelthorpe’s death he paid her quarterly sums for her children's 
maintenance, amounting to about £600 in total. However, she was advised that she 
might be in trouble for meddling with money from Nelthorpe's estate, which was 
insolvent, and paid this money to Farrington as her husband’s administrator, for 
distribution among the creditors.
It is worth noting in passing that Mary Nelthorpe’s answer is cited by William 
Empson as evidence that Farrington had tricked Mary Nelthorpe into granting him 
the administration of her husband’s estate.37 In fact, it tends to show something 
altogether inconsistent with this: that Mrs. Nelthorpe understood quite well, and 
approved, the basis on which Farrington claimed to be a creditor of her husband’s, 
and that Farrington still retained her con$dence six years later. Empson’s error is 
partly based on his misinterpretation of Mrs. Nelthorpe’s statement ‘for that the 
Complainant being a Bankrupt & a prisoner in the Kings Bench hath exhibited the 
said Bill agt this De, to vex and torment this De, and to extort from this De, some 
considerable sume of moneys as this De, doth verily believe’. Empson takes ‘the 
Complainant’ to mean Farrington but in this context the phrase refers to Richard 
!ompson, by then a prisoner in the Rules of the King’s Bench; Farrington, in 
contrast, is Mrs. Nelthorpe’s fellow defendant. Empson’s misconstruction of Mary 
Nelthorpe’s answer leads him to form an inaccurate impression of her relation to the 
other parties. He suggests, for example, that Mary Marvell changed her mind and 
decided to claim the Wallis security for Marvell’s estate because she intended that 
Mrs. Nelthorpe, rather than Farrington and the creditors, should have the bene$t of 
it.38
Mary Nelthorpe’s answer concludes by saying that has been informed — she 
does not say by whom — that !ompson has taken a house in the Rules of the King’s 
37 Empson, Using Biography, pp. 60–61.
38 Empson, Using Biography, p. 61.
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Bench for himself and his family and has declared that he will not pay a penny to the 
creditors. She believes that the books, bonds, bills and securities belonging to her 
husband’s particular estate as well as the books of the bank have been and still are in 
the custody or power of !ompson or his wife. She believes that !ompson intends 
to remain a prisoner for the rest of his life, and to defraud her late husband’s 
creditors.
One further question remains to be considered, the answer to which might 
tend to mitigate, if not to justify, Nelthorpe’s behaviour. In comparison with more 
than £100,000 that the $rm claimed to have paid out between November 1675 and 
the beginning of 1677, the sum of £500 is relatively insigni$cant and so the fraud on 
the creditors was arguably too minor to attract serious censure. !e obvious objection 
to this line of defence is that there may have been more than the £500 involved. 
Empson, commenting that ‘it would seem pathetic to $ght so long over £500 a,er 
losing £60,000’, assumes that there must have been other concealed assets, and that 
the proceedings brought by Farrington were a test case, on the outcome of which the 
disposal of those other assets depended.39 While this is a plausible assumption, there 
is no direct evidence to support it. Nobody — not Farrington, not Wallis, not Mrs. 
Marvell, all of whom have divergent interests — gives any hint that ownership of 
anything more than the single security for £500 was at issue. At the same time, 
Farrington and Greene insist that the former intends to use the money, should he 
recover it, to ‘comply with his Creditors’, which suggests that the amount that might 
be recovered was such as would make a di1erence to the creditors, and to whether 
Farrington remained in prison.
39 Empson, Using Biography, p. 47.
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At the time when the partners $rst summoned their creditors, the $rm’s 
liabilities were probably about £140,000.40 Subsequently, the partners claimed, they 
paid out almost £50,000. !e second of these $gures was not supported by produc‐
tion of the partnership’s books and can hardly be considered reliable. Nevertheless, it 
comes from a source that seeks to present the partners’ case in the most favourable 
light possible, so probably does not overstate the extent of the liabilities. It is unlikely 
that the commissioners in bankruptcy, without access to the account books, can have 
made a substantial reduction in the amount outstanding. Faced with debts of up to 
£90,000, then, one wonders what kind of ‘compliance’ Farrington could have hoped 
to make with a mere £500 — or, if Wallis could be compelled to pay the penalty due 
under the security, even with twice that amount.
!e answer is that Farrington really did not know where the money had gone, 
and was presumably quite disappointed to have achieved so little in his administra‐
tion of Nelthorpe’s estate. He pursued the assets piece by piece as he became aware of 
them. He appears to have assumed initially that Nelthorpe was the partner who was 
most likely to be hiding both the books and assets of the partnership, and to have 
begun to pursue !ompson only a,er he had extracted such meagre results as were to 
be had from Nelthorpe’s estate. It will be recalled that his $rst set of proceedings that 
we know about was the common law suit against Wallis, taken by Greene at Farring‐
ton’s instigation in 1681. When Mrs. Marvell prevented him from pursuing that 
action, he resorted to Chancery. Mrs. Marvell brought a cross-bill against him, in 
which she sought to have him examined on oath as to what assets he had removed 
from Marvell’s lodgings in Maiden Lane, and how he had disposed of them. As well 
as swearing an answer to this bill, Farrington responded with a further bill of his 
own, in which he accused Mrs. Marvell and her landlords of making o1 with Nel‐
40 At the creditors’ meeting, it was noted that the books showed a surplus of £35,000: !e Case of 
Richard !ompson and Company, p. 7. !e amount of the partners’ assets is stated as having been 
£175,000 at the time of that meeting (p. 30).
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thorpe’s personal e1ects. Perhaps the most unfortunate error that Tupper and 
Empson have made in their consideration of the Chancery material, is their misun‐
derstanding of the nature and purposes of these two bills (items 7 and 9). A correct 
understanding of Farrington’s bill (item 9) will help us to say something about 
Farrington’s state of mind — that is, both the state of his knowledge and what his 
aims were. !is is Tupper’s account of item 9:
He presents his charges with an anger that even the sedate formalities of legal 
phraseology cannot conceal. Mrs. Palmer, he declares, stole property of Nel‐
thorpe’s; with the complicity of Morris [her landlord] and his wife, she paid 
rent at less than the agreed $gure and pocketed the di1erence; she did by 
‘underhand dealing cause … !ompson to be arrested by one Collins.’ Much 
of this may be dismissed as Farrington’s attempt to sling mud in the hope that 
a 2eck or two would happen to stick. More important is the reiteration of his 
scepticism regarding the marriage …41
In fact, Farrington’s bill is both more calculated and more to the purpose than Tupper 
supposes. !e tone of anger that Tupper detects is all the more remarkable given that 
the bill was dra,ed and signed by counsel. Admittedly, at $rst glance the bundle of 
miscellaneous charges that Farrington prefers seems to be di*cult to explain, except 
on the hypothesis of anger or mudslinging. However, in attempting to assess what 
Farrington was trying to achieve, Tupper would have done better to examine the 
relief that he was seeking. Farrington prays the court as follows:
And for that yor. Oratr. cannot discover the truth of the prmisses but by the 
oath of the said confederates whom yor. Oratr. hopes will discover the truth 
when upon their oaths to the intent therefore that they may true Answer 
make to all & only the matters before <menconed> … (C6/242/13)
He goes on to list a series of questions that he wishes to have put to Mary Marvell, to 
be answered on oath: whether she was not received by Nelthorpe into his service as 
housekeeper; whether he paid her £10 a year; whether she did not take the lease of 
the house in Great Russell Street on Nelthorpe’s instructions, followed by several 
other questions about the lease and the rent; whether Nelthorpe did not entrust some 
41 Tupper, ‘Mary Palmer, Alias Mrs. Andrew Marvell’, p. 379.
249
250
251
of his goods and chattels to her custody and, if he did, what were they and what 
became of them; whether Marvell did not frequently borrow money from Nelthorpe, 
and whether or not there is some record of this borrowing in books or papers of 
Marvell’s in her custody or power. He further asks that she set out on oath a list of all 
the books or papers of Marvell’s that she has in her custody, produce them for his 
perusal, and state whether she has made any alterations to them.
As has already been mentioned, it is usual for the complainant in Chancery 
proceedings to ask as a matter of course for the examination of the defendant on 
oath, but the detailed and varied list of questions that Farrington puts forward for the 
examination of Mary Marvell strongly suggests that his primary aim is to unearth 
information about what happened to Nelthorpe’s property a,er his death, whether he 
may have been cheated over the lease of the house, and whether there was evidence 
that Marvell owed him money. We have already seen that there is a disparity between 
the positions of the complainant and the defendant in Chancery proceedings, in that 
the former is in practice permitted to make allegations that need not necessarily be 
true, whereas the latter is required to answer those allegations truthfully and on oath. 
One important consequence of the inequality of the parties’ positions is that 
Chancery proceedings were a very 2exible instrument in the hands of complainants, 
and could be used for a number of purposes apart from securing justice in a particu‐
lar case. Henry Horwitz lists $ve additional objectives that might motivate com‐
plainants, the last two of which are of interest in the present context:
(4) using Chancery process as a means of making his opponent disclose his 
own position or situation or putting him under a compulsion to $le an 
answer under oath; and/or
(5) securing discovery via the taking of depositions that might be used in 
cases in other courts.42
Farrington’s bill reveals that he had very little information about the estate of Edward 
42 Horwitz, Chancery Equity Records and Proceedings, p. 8.
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Nelthorpe, which he was supposed to be administering, and his bill is best seen as an 
attempt to discover such information from the woman who appeared to him to have 
been Nelthorpe’s housekeeper.43 In order to subject Mrs. Marvell to the required 
examination, he had to make out a case by accusing her of unconscionable behaviour 
— in this case, of abusing the trust that Nelthorpe had placed in her. It is this 
circumstance, rather than anger or a desire to sling mud, that accounts for what 
Tupper perceives as the tone of Farrington’s bill.
In much the same way, Mrs. Marvell’s bill (item 7) is an attempt to $nd out 
more information about the estate which she is meant to be administering. !is is the 
bill in which she accuses Farrington of removing Marvell’s property from his lodgings 
at Maiden Lane. She also taxes him with concealing from her the existence of the 
security for £500, abusing her trust and taking advantage of her ‘too easy credulity’. 
She asks the court for the examination of the defendants on oath ‘to ye intent 
therefore that the sd confederates may sett forth & <discover> ye truth of ye <prmiss‐
es> & pticularly what jewells bonds bils writings [interlined: <moneys>] & other 
goods in pticular were taken away as aforesd out of the lodgings of the said Mr 
Marvell in Mayden Lane & by whom …’. 
!e main thing we learn from these two bills, then, is just how much in the 
dark Farrington and Mrs. Marvell were as to the estates of Nelthorpe and Marvell 
respectively. Farrington’s ignorance, which his bill was designed to relieve, was in part 
a result of the secrecy in which Nelthorpe had had to operate, to avoid arrest and the 
seizure of his assets, and in part of the fact that, though they were partners in the 
failed business, they were not in each other’s con$dence. Mrs. Marvell’s evidently 
arises from her never having discussed Marvell’s $nancial circumstances with him, 
something about which more will be said in the $nal section of this chapter.
43 As we have already seen, Mrs. Marvell answered that it was on Marvell’s instructions, not Nel‐
thorpe’s, that she had taken the lease, though Nelthorpe was responsible for the rent and housekeeping 
expenses as well as her £10 a year.
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Having gained what he could from the pursuit of Nelthorpe’s assets, Farring‐
ton then turned his attention to !ompson. In his 1684 complaint, Farrington 
averred that he
… did by the Assistance of this court recover & receive part thereof [that is, of 
the partnership property] tho with greate trouble costs & charges all which 
yor oratr hath iustly divided amongst the said Creditrs besides yor oratrs 
owne estate And yor oratr is in pursuit of other part of the said estate by bills 
in this court & otherwise in which the said !ompson doth give yor oratr all 
the hindrance he can …(C7/581/73)
Farrington was obviously persistent, and did not allow his lack of information to 
prevent him from seeking out money that could be used to pay the creditors and 
secure his own release. !is is the answer to Empson’s comment that it would seem 
pathetic to $ght so long over £500, a,er having paid out £60,000. Farrington believed 
that there must be more money to be recovered, and was prepared to do his best to 
$nd it, and was presumably willing to take as much time as was necessary to recover 
even such a relatively small sum as £500. !ere is no reason to accept Empson’s 
theory that Farrington v. Marvell was a ‘test case’ — that there were more bills in 
Marvell’s name of which the parties were aware. !ere were other ‘concealed’ assets, 
but the di*culties attending their recovery were not the same as those in the case of 
the Wallis security. !e removal of the partnership books, and of the bonds and 
securities entered into by debtors, had the e1ect of obstructing the collection of the 
debts owed to the bank, thus hiding those debts from the commissioners in 
bankruptcy. We cannot, in any case, conclude that Nelthorpe’s concealment of the 
£500 was a minor and excusable irregularity, of little consequence in the context of 
the large amounts that the partners had paid out, and that they still owed.
So, Wall, Empson and Legouis are taking the wrong approach when they 
argue that Marvell may have believed himself to be justi$ed in furthering Nelthorpe’s 
scheme to hide at least £500 from the commissioners in bankruptcy. If Marvell had in 
fact taken part in the scheme, it would be di*cult to $nd persuasive arguments 
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tending to legitimize or excuse his actions. However, any suspicion that persists as to 
his participation in the fraud is not supported by, for example, the necessity of his 
cooperation to the success of the scheme. At its strongest, such suspicion is grounded 
on the inference that might possibly be drawn from his friendship with Nelthorpe, 
that the latter ‘must have’ told his friend what he was doing, before using his name.
Marvell’s debt to the partnership
Farrington’s Chancery proceedings raise another question as to the justice of 
Marvell’s behaviour in relation to Nelthorpe, his partners and their creditors. 
Farrington’s main argument was that the Wallis security did not belong to Marvell’s 
estate because it secured the deposit of money which was provided by Nelthorpe. To 
prove that the money could not have been Marvell’s, he produced witnesses — 
notably the bookseller, Nathaniel Ponder — who swore that they had known Marvell, 
that he was reputed to be a poor man and that he had not been worth £100, ‘besides 
his books and furniture’, at any time in the $ve years before his death.44 In addition, 
Farrington claimed that Marvell was in any case indebted to Nelthorpe for money 
lent to him out of partnership funds. To prove the debt, he produced three former 
employees of the business, Edmond Portmans, !omas Speede and Gershom Prowd. 
Portmans, in his deposition dated 1 July 1682, when he was aged 59, says that he had 
been cashier and book-keeper to the partnership in 1675, at the time when Nel‐
thorpe, like the other partners, was ‘declining in his credit’. He says that the partner‐
ship’s books showed Andrew Marvell as a debtor in an amount between £100 and 
£200. Speede’s deposition is dated 24 June 1682, at which time he was 38 years old. 
He says that he was ‘servant to the sayd Edward Nelthorpe’ in March 1675, when Nel‐
thorpe was ‘declining in his credit’. He adds that Nelthorpe lent Marvell money from 
time to time and at the time of Nelthorpe’s death, Marvell owed him more than £140 
44 C24/1069 [Part 2, No 36].
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as appeared from Nelthorpe’s books shortly before he died. Prowd swore his deposi‐
tion, in which he is described as a haberdasher, aged 29, on 4 July 1682. According to 
his deposition, he was a servant to Nelthorpe and his partners in 1675. He says:
!at the sd Edward Nelthorpe in ye present Interro named did lend unto 
[deleted: the sd] Andrew Marvell in ye Interro named money from tyme to 
tyme and this Dept saith that the sd Andrew Marvell did stand Debtor in ye 
sd Edward Nelthorpe & ptners bookes at the time when they [deletion: 
<$rst>] broke ye sume of one hundred and $,y pounds or thereabouts which 
sd debt ye sd Edward Nelthorpe did desire might bee taken from ye sd Mr 
Marvells account & placed to his ye sd Mr Nelthorpes debet which hee did as 
this Dept beleeves that the sd Andrew Marvell might not receive any trouble 
from ye Coms of Bankrupt concerning such debt which hee the sd Andrew 
Marvell soe owed as aforesd to the sd Nelthorpe & ptners …
Prowd is the only one of the three former employees who mentions this piece of 
allegedly irregular accounting on Nelthorpe’s part but the silence of the others does 
not necessarily re2ect badly on his credibility. Nelthorpe would obviously not want 
any more witnesses to the kind of actions that Prowd describes than were necessary. 
While Speede is able to give evidence as to Nelthorpe’s declining credit in 1675, his 
evidence as to Nelthorpe’s books relates to the later period, just before his death. 
Prowd’s evidence, then, though uncorroborated, may well be credible. Farrington, on 
whose behalf Prowd was called as a witness, does not appear to have had any interest 
in disparaging Marvell’s character,45 and it is hard to imagine that Prowd himself had 
any. It is clear in any case that, far from being a creditor enjoying an illegal 
preference, as Wall suggested, Marvell was a debtor and, if Prowd is to be believed, 
one who was the intended bene$ciary of some false accounting on Nelthorpe’s part.
On the assumption that Prowd’s evidence is credible, it is clear that, whatever 
may have been Nelthorpe’s motives and intentions, Marvell did not especially bene$t 
from this action. Since the books were never produced, it is likely that all or most of 
the debtors were spared the attentions of the bankruptcy commissioners — though 
45 On the other hand, he had a clear interest in showing that Nelthorpe or !ompson had assisted 
debtors in evading their liabilities.
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some, like Wallis, found themselves having to deal with Farrington instead. More to 
the point for our purposes, we have no basis on which to assume that such an attempt 
to bene$t Marvell could have been made only at his instigation or with his 
knowledge. As in the case of the Wallis transaction, Marvell’s name is associated with 
an action that is both technically illegal and ethically questionable. In each case, the 
hypothesis of Marvell’s complicity is supported neither by evidence nor by its 
following of necessity from the established facts, but his close friendship with the 
principal actor, Edward Nelthorpe, means that some suspicion nevertheless attaches 
to his conduct.
Marvell ‘pleased to have the marriage kept private’
Marvell scholarship has reason to be grateful to Fred S. Tupper, for his discovery of 
the Chancery records that have been the basis of this discussion. It has less reason to 
be grateful to him for his interpretation of those records which, as we have seen, is 
based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the documents. He concluded that 
‘Mary Marvell’ was an impostor, who initially made a false claim to be the poet’s 
widow in order to assist Farrington in his attempt to recover the £500, and later fell 
out with Farrington when she saw that she might be able to keep the money to 
herself.
If Tupper is wrong about this and Marvell was indeed a married man, a 
further question arises as to the justice of his behaviour, though this time it is a 
question of justice in a broader sense than that relating to law and equity. It would 
seem that, apart from leaving his wife unprovided for, he kept her in the dark as to 
the state of his a1airs, leaving her ill prepared to cope with widowhood. !is was an 
imputation that disturbed Empson: his anxiety to acquit Marvell of failure to consid‐
er Mrs. Marvell’s future needs is one of the factors that leads him to concoct — on the 
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basis of no evidence at all — the story of Marvell’s annuity.46 No doubt some of those 
who have accepted Tupper’s theory of the widow’s imposture have done so because it 
serves to avoid an imputation against Marvell that would otherwise have to be 
excused. Whether Marvell was married, apart from being of obvious biographical 
interest, is also relevant to the justice of his behaviour.
Tupper (pp. 384–387) places explicit reliance on four arguments in support of 
the case against Mrs. Marvell. !e $rst of these is that, some three years a,er 
Marvell’s death she seemed uncertain as to its precise date (16 August 1678), once 
wrongly stating that it was 10 August. Such uncertainty as to the date of her bereave‐
ment is, according to Tupper, di*cult to reconcile with her claim to have been 
overcome with grief. Second, in a letter of 5 February 1681, to his brother-in-law 
Major Braman, Robert !ompson referred to her as ‘Mrs. Palmer’, whereas if she had 
really been married to Marvell, !ompson would have known it.
Tupper’s third argument is both more substantial and more complicated. 
Mary Marvell knew that the world in general, including Marvell’s sisters, Mrs. 
Blaydes and Mrs. Popple, thought that he had died a bachelor. !e sisters, as Marvell’s 
next of kin, must therefore have believed themselves to be the persons $rst entitled to 
take out administration of his personal estate.47 !ey might have applied for this at 
any time, yet Mary Marvell seems to have delayed for several months before taking 
any steps to protect her interests. In Tupper’s account, her belated decision to apply 
for administration was taken only a,er Farrington had come to the conclusion that 
he was going to have to sue Wallis to recover the £500 deposited by Nelthorpe. Before 
action could be commenced, somebody would have to take out administration of 
46 Empson, Using Biography, pp. 75–6.
47 !e Prerogative Court of Canterbury had jurisdiction over personal estate only, and references 
below to the estates of Marvell and Nelthorpe should be taken as including only personal property. 
Real property (that is, estates in land and buildings other than leaseholds) fell within the jurisdiction 
of the courts of Common Law and Equity. Marvell and Nelthorpe both died intestate, so any real estate 
which they may have had would have devolved on their respective heirs at law.
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Marvell’s estate. A widow, if one could be found, would be the person $rst entitled. 
Failing that, the sisters would be next. Farrington’s confederate, the attorney John 
Greene, was willing to make the application as a creditor of Marvell’s estate. However 
a creditor could obtain administration only a,er citing the persons entitled in 
priority to him, that is to say, giving them the opportunity to administer the estate 
$rst. !e inference to be drawn from Mary Marvell’s sudden and belated interest in 
the case, and the coincidence of that with Farrington’s need for a cooperative admin‐
istrator of Marvell’s estate, is that Mrs. Marvell $rst advanced her pretence at Farring‐
ton’s instance. By taking out administration jointly with Greene, she could provide 
the attorney with a means of leap-frogging the sisters or other next of kin.
Tupper’s fourth reason for disbelieving Mrs. Marvell’s claim is the fact that 
Greene joined her in the administration of Marvell’s estate. Greene’s answers make it 
clear that he was acting throughout in Farrington’s interest, and that, in so far as any 
active steps were taken in the administration of Marvell’s estate, he was the one who 
took them. !e fact that Mrs. Marvell tolerated such interference shows, Tupper says, 
that she too was under Farrington’s control.
!e weightiest of Tupper’s four arguments, if taken at face value, is the third, 
the one relating to the timing of Mrs. Marvell’s $rst allegation of a secret marriage 
and her $rst taking steps to secure administration of Marvell’s estate. However, 
Tupper’s theory is undermined by the fact that he is mistaken as to the dates on 
which the letters of administration in both Marvell’s and Nelthorpe’s estates were 
taken out. In Marvell’s case, he tells us that ‘under date of September 30, 1679, and 
March 31, 1680, more than a year a,er Marvell’s death, the administration was $nally 
granted to Mary Marvell and John Greene …’ (p. 377). Nelthorpe’s administration, he 
says, ‘was granted somewhat tardily under the dates of April 30 and October 31, 
1679, to Farrington’ (p. 375). He does not ask, $rst, why the letters of administration 
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should have been dated in this double fashion or, second, why the Prerogative Court 
of Canterbury should apparently have issued such grants only on the last day of the 
month.
!e two dates that Tupper cites appear in the right-hand margin of the entry 
in the records of the Prerogative Court.48 !e month of issue of the grant is not, by 
contrast, referred to in the entry itself. Nelthorpe’s entry, for example, begins ‘tricesi‐
mo die’ (on the thirtieth day) but the month, October, is to be understood, the entries 
being grouped together by month. !e two dates in the right margin, the last days of 
the sixth and twel,h calendar months a"er the grant, are the dates by which the 
administrators were to exhibit an inventory and an account respectively of the 
deceased’s estate.49 Administration of Nelthorpe’s estate, then, was granted to John 
Farrington as a creditor of the deceased, in October 1678, within six weeks of his 
death. In a similar way, Tupper dates Marvell’s administration more than six months 
a,er it in fact issued in March 1679.
When Tupper writes of the letters of administration to Nelthorpe’s estate 
being granted ‘somewhat tardily’ (p. 375) to Farrington, and speculates as to the 
reason for the delay, he presents a highly inaccurate picture. To have obtained 
administration in less than six weeks, for which he needed the cooperation of Nel‐
thorpe’s widow, Farrington must have acted with all possible speed. Mrs. Marvell did 
not act quite so quickly. Seven months, rather than the thirteen suggested by Tupper, 
elapsed between Marvell’s death and the issue to her of letters of administration. 
However, while Mrs. Marvell’s delay was not as long as Tupper thought, it neverthe‐
48 PROB6/53 fol. 88v. and PROB6/54 fol. 25v. Empson provides an explanation of the double dates 
that is quite wrong, groundlessly asserting that the grant took e1ect only six months a,er it was issued: 
p. 58). See the Appendix below for copies of the entries.
49 Henry Charles Coote, !e Practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts: with Forms and Tables of Costs (Henry 
Butterworth, 1847), pp. 712–13, citing the Statute of Distribution (22 and 23 Car. 2, c. 10) as imposing 
the duty to exhibit the inventory and account in cases of intestacy. See also Miriam Scott, Prerogative 
Court of Canterbury: Wills and Other Probate Records, Public Records O*ce Readers’ Guide No. 15 
(Kew, Surrey: PRO Publications, 1997), p. 22, on the interpretation of Probate and administration 
records.
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less requires explanation. !e timing of her application suggests that it may have been 
determined by the expiry of a caveat that had been entered at the Prerogative Court 
to prevent administration of Marvell’s estate being taken out without Farrington’s 
knowledge.50
!e caveat was entered on Farrington’s instructions, but in the name of 
Marvell’s sister, Mrs. Blaydes who, as next of kin, had an obvious interest in his 
administration. It is clear that Farrington was acting without Mrs. Blaydes’s authority, 
using her name as a cover in order to avoid making public his own interest.51 Mrs. 
Marvell alleges as much (item 7), and Farrington fails to deny it, though he does deny 
that he believed that Mrs. Blaydes had told Mrs. Marvell that she would have the 
caveat withdrawn (item 8). We do not know exactly what the e1ect of Farrington’s 
caveat was.52 It would have been in the form of a notice, in Latin, to the Prerogative 
Court of Canterbury, that it should let nothing be done in the goods of Andrew 
Marvell unknown to the proctor for the caveator.53 We know that by the $rst half of 
the nineteenth century, a caveat remained in force for six months, a,er which it could 
be renewed. While it was in force, a person applying for administration could not 
pursue the application without ‘warning’ the caveator. !e warning $xed a date when 
50 !e record of the caveat has not survived. Details are given by Mary Marvell in her bill and John 
Farrington in his answer (items 8 and 9).
51 It would not have been necessary for him to employ this subterfuge in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, when it was normal for caveators to hide their identities behind the $ctitious name ‘John 
!omas’: Coote, Practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts, pp. 439–40. 
52 Clerke’s Praxis, originally published in manuscript in about 1596 and a corrupt copy of which was 
printed in 1666 as Praxis Francisci Clarke, Tam jus dicentibus quam alijs omnibus qui in Foro 
Ecclesiastico versantur apprime utilis (Dublin: Nathaniel !ompson 1666), is the only practice manual 
published by a practitioner in the ecclesiastical courts prior to Oughton’s Ordo Judiciorum (1728): J. H. 
Baker, Monuments of Endlesse Labours: English Canonists and their Work, 1300-1900 (London: 
Hambledon Press with the Ecclesiastical Law Society, 1998), pp. 75–6. Clerke does not mention the 
caveat procedure.
53 !is is the form used in PROB40/1, the caveat book for 1666, which is the only caveat book earlier 
than 1744 that has not been destroyed.
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the caveator and the applicant attended the court with their evidence.54 Whether the 
procedure was similar in 1679 is impossible to say.
However, since neither Mrs. Marvell nor Farrington says that Mrs. Marvell 
‘warned’ the caveat, or took any formal step to have it removed, it is likely that she 
waited until the caveat had expired before she pursued her application. !e fact that 
she waited for about seven months is suggestive, but even if the period for which the 
caveat was in force was not six months, it is probable that its existence accounts for at 
least part of her delay. !is delay might indicate that she was not able to produce 
independent evidence of her claimed marriage to Marvell. Equally, however, it is 
possible that she was unwilling to incur the costs of the contested hearing that would 
have been necessary if she had insisted on proceeding while the caveat remained in 
e1ect.55 Although she swore that she believed that Marvell had assets, in the event no 
assets were found and we now know that Farrington was able to produce persuasive 
evidence of Marvell’s poverty in the $ve years before his death.56 It follows that the 
putative assets were not immediately visible and there was no reason for her to think 
that they would be easily recoverable. In these circumstances, a reluctance on her part 
to incur expense is to be expected.
While Mrs. Marvell seems to have taken no formal steps to challenge the 
caveat, she says that she did contact Mrs. Blaydes about it with the aim of having it 
withdrawn.
Mr. 1arrington having some secrett designs privately caused a caveat to be 
entred in the prerogative Court of Canterbury & other places in the name of 
one Mrs. Blades sister to the said Andrew Marvell whereof yor. Oratrix 
informing the said Mrs. Blades shee told yor. sd Oratrix that shee had not 
54 Coote, Practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts, pp. 439–40; Philip William Dodd and George Henry 
Brooks, !e Law and Practice of the Court of Probate, Contentious and Common Form: with the Rules, 
Statutes and Forms (London: V. & R. Stevens, Sons, and Haynes, 1865), pp. 2–4.
55 A hearing might not have been very expensive, as all proceedings before the Prerogative Court were 
summary in form: H[enry] C[onsett], !e Practice of the Spiritual or Ecclesiastical Courts: To which is 
added, A Brief Discourse of the Structure and Manner of forming the Libel or Declaration (1685), 23. 
However, it would inevitably have been more expensive than an uncontested application.
56 Kavanagh, ‘Andrew Marvell “in want of money”’, pp. 209–11.
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entred nor was there by her ordr. any Caveat entred to hinder yor. Oratrix 
Admsracon to her husband as aforesd … (Item 7, C7/587/95). 
Tupper (p. 387) is inclined not to believe Mrs. Marvell on this point because she does 
not o1er to produce Mrs. Blaydes’s letter, though if it had existed she would surely 
have appreciated its importance as evidence and preserved it. Once again, though, 
Tupper is not paying attention to the nature of the documents. Mrs. Marvell makes 
this claim about Mrs. Blaydes in her bill, which is concerned with allegation rather 
than proof and where an o1er to produce an exhibit would be entirely out of place. 
Several times in his various answers, Farrington says that he ‘doubts not to prove’ or 
‘hopes to prove’ some statement the truth of which is not within his direct 
knowledge. Even then, however, he does not say what evidence he intends to 
produce. None of the parties uses a similar formula in a bill of complaint and there is 
no reason why they should be expected to. No conclusion, therefore, can be drawn 
from the fact that Mrs. Marvell does not o1er to produce a letter from Mrs. Blaydes.
Tupper misinterprets the e1ect that the caveat had on the timing of Mrs. 
Marvell’s application, because he is hopelessly confused about the date when the 
caveat was entered. He believes that Farrington $led it only a"er he had obtained the 
administration of Nelthorpe’s estate, which by his reckoning was on 30 April 1679. 
Accordingly, he thinks that there was a window of about eight months, in which Mrs. 
Marvell could have made an application for administration, unobstructed by a caveat. 
It is this confusion on Tupper’s part that provides the correct explanation of what 
appears to him to be a contradiction in Farrington’s account of events, as to when 
Mrs. Marvell $rst claimed to have been married to the poet:
On one occasion Farrington implies that she advanced her claims immediate‐
ly a,er Marvell’s death … [cites C6/242/13]. At another time, Farrington 
declares: ‘About the time of the death of the said Andrew Marvell this De,. 
understood the Complt. pleaded that the said Andrew Marvell had marryed 
her.’ [C8/252/9] But twice Farrington quite de$nitely asserts that Mrs. Palmer 
did not claim to be Mrs. Marvell until a,er he had $led the caveat against 
taking out administration on Marvell’s estate … [cites C6/242/13]. Did Mrs. 
Palmer $rst claim to be Mrs. Marvell soon a,er Marvell’s death or months 
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later, a,er the caveat had been $led? For the present the question must remain 
unanswered. (pp. 375–6)
!e answer is that it was not ‘months later’ that Farrington $led the caveat; in all 
likelihood it was shortly a,er Nelthorpe’s death, and little more than a month a,er 
Marvell’s. !e second statement by Farrington that Tupper cites reads in full as 
follows:
But about the time of the Death of the said Andrew Marvell this De, under‐
stood the Complt ptended that the said Andrew Marvell had marryed her and 
this De, beleiveing that the said Mr. Nelthorpe by reason of his greate 
intimacy with the said Andrew Marvell had taken some bills bonds or notes 
in the name of the said Andrew Marvell And this De, being Administrator of 
the goods & chattels of the said Mr. Nelthorpe he this De, did cause a caveat 
to be putt in to pvent the Complt or any other persons takeing Admstracon 
without this De,s knowledge (Item 8, C8/252/9).
Tupper evidently takes the phrase ‘this De, being Administrator of the goods & 
chattels of the said Mr. Nelthorpe’ to mean that Farrington had already secured letters 
of administration of Nelthorpe’s estate at the time he entered the caveat in Marvell’s. 
However, Farrington may be using the word ‘Administrator’ in the loose sense of 
‘intending administrator’ or ‘person entitled to the administration’.57 !e Chancery 
records show that Farrington was aggressive and persistent in defence of his interests. 
We have seen that he acted very quickly to obtain control of Nelthorpe’s estate. It is 
not credible that he would for several months have neglected to take the complemen‐
tary step of entering the caveat in Marvell’s. Empson suggests (p. 47) that both 
applications could have been made in the course of a single visit to the court.
!ere is a second element to Tupper’s third argument — that it was only when 
Farrington realised that he was going to have to sue Wallis that Mrs. Marvell made 
her application — which also requires further examination. It was not until Midsum‐
mer 1681 — nearly two years a,er he became one of Marvell’s administrators — that 
Greene commenced suit against Wallis. Greene and Farrington both assert that they 
57 On the other hand, he may simply have got his dates mixed up: in his complaint in the main action 
(item 1) Farrington says that Marvell had died in October 1678, about a month a,er Nelthorpe, 
instead of a month before. October was, of course, the month in which he o*cially became Nelthorpe’s 
administrator.
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did not know about the existence of the security at the time that Marvell’s administra‐
tion was taken out. It has to be said that, though these assertions were made on oath, 
they are highly suspect for the reasons explored above, pages 238 to 240.
We cannot, in short, discount the possibility that notwithstanding his sworn 
assertion to the contrary, Farrington already had the security in his possession when 
application was made, at his expense though not in his name, for administration of 
Marvell’s estate. About six months earlier, he had entered the caveat, so that nothing 
could be done in the administration of Marvell’s estate without his knowledge. What 
could be the point of his actions, unless it was to get hold of the security? We have 
seen (page 239 above) that Farrington attempted to account for this apparent 
discrepancy by saying that he suspected that Nelthorpe had placed unspeci$ed assets 
in Marvell’s name. So, even if Farrington did not know in March 1679 exactly what 
he was pursuing, it is conceivable that he persuaded Marvell’s landlady to make a 
false claim of widowhood, in order to facilitate his gaining control of Marvell’s estate. 
However, Tupper is wrong to say that ‘the logic of events clearly demonstrates’ that 
this is what happened. !e timing of the application is equally consistent with the 
proposition that Mrs. Marvell was acting honestly.
So, the third and apparently the weightiest, of Tupper’s four arguments does 
not establish his case with ‘a high degree of probability’, as Legouis thought.58 !e 
other three will have to be dealt with more brie2y. First, there is the uncertainty as to 
the date of her bereavement. Here, as elsewhere, Tupper is not paying attention to the 
nature of the documents. !e answers and bills alike were all settled by counsel and 
not, as Empson (p. 43) imagines, directly dictated by the parties to court clerks. It 
would not be surprising if counsel were to take greater care to avoid inaccuracy (and 
58 Originally, Legouis was evenly balanced on the question of Marvell’s marital status. By the time he 
came to produce his abridged and revised English translation, he had been persuaded by Tupper’s 
researches that Mrs. Marvell was a fraud: Pierre Legouis, André Marvell: poète, puritain, patriote 1621–
1678 (Paris: Henri Didier, 1928), p. 228; Pierre Legouis, Andrew Marvell: Poet, Puritan, Patriot, 2nd 
ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 121.
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inadvertent perjury on the part of their clients) when drawing answers than they 
were when drawing bills. When Mrs. Marvell gives the correct date, 16 August 1678, 
it is in an answer (item 2); the incorrect one, 10 August, is in her bill (item 8). In 
other places, she does not specify the precise date. Several of the parties and witnesses 
in the action are remarkably vague about dates, so Mrs. Marvell’s uncertainty is a 
tenuous ground on which to base any conclusion as to her credibility. Second, there is 
Robert !ompson’s reference to her as Mrs. Palmer. !e marriage, if it occurred, was 
a clandestine one, and she continued to be known by the surname of her previous (or 
only) husband. !erefore, the inference is surely not warranted that because !omp‐
son called her Mrs. Palmer, he must have known that she was not Mrs. Marvell.
Tupper’s fourth and $nal reason is Mrs. Marvell’s acceptance of Greene as her 
fellow administrator. Greene was Farrington’s agent, and was prepared to claim that 
he was Marvell’s creditor when in fact the real creditor was Nelthorpe’s estate. Might 
not his fellow administratrix have been likewise prepared to pose as Marvell’s widow, 
and for the same reasons? !e possibility cannot be excluded, but an equally plausible 
and less discreditable explanation of her cooperation with Greene can be suggested. 
As we have seen, there were good reasons for Mrs. Marvell’s apparent reluctance to 
bear the expenses of taking out administration. Farrington was prepared to pay her 
costs, but on the condition that she accept Greene’s ‘assistance’. !at, combined with 
the slight danger that he might renew the caution, is enough to account for her 
agreement that Greene should act as joint administrator.
If Tupper fails to provide ultimately persuasive reasons why we should regard 
Mrs. Marvell as a fraud, it is equally the case that positive evidence for the marriage is 
lacking. According to her, the marriage took place at Holy Trinity Church, in Little 
Minories, on 13 May 1667 (item 10, C6/242/13). Holy Trinity claimed to be entitled 
to conduct marriages without the prior publication of banns or the issue of a licence. 
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Although such marriages were conducted in breach of the legal formalities, the 
irregularity did not invalidate them. As a result, the church attracted a truly astonish‐
ing amount of marriage business.59 While a single volume was enough for all the 
births that were registered in the parish from 1553 to 1710 and all the burials from 
1566 to 1713, the marriages from 1579 to 1713 take up eight surviving volumes (six 
of those covering the period 1644–1692, when the church was a major centre for 
clandestine marriages) and several are missing.60 !e longest gap in the surviving 
registers is from 8 April 1663 to 26 March 1676. !e gap covers the date on which 
Mrs. Marvell claimed to have been married. Tupper, who did not appreciate just how 
busy Holy Trinity was, assumed that only one volume of the register had been lost 
(p. 380). In 1661 and 1662, the last two full years before the hiatus, there were 532 
and 397 marriages respectively; in 1676, when the register resumes, there were 759.61 
!e surviving volumes are of di1erent sizes, but the largest contains about 1,500 
entries. If marriages continued at the previous rate, it is probable that at least three 
volumes are missing. Unfortunately, we have no way of determining whether these 
were already missing in 1682, when Mrs. Marvell made her claim.
!e evidence, then, is inconclusive but on balance tends to favour Mrs. 
Marvell. Her sworn answer at C6/242/13 carries more weight than the self-interested 
allegations of Farrington and Greene. Lies that could be proven to be false would 
leave her open to a charge of perjury, and the stakes at issue — the security that 
predictably was determined to belong to Nelthorpe’s estate — were too small and 
uncertain to justify the risk. !en again, if the marriage register for May 1667 was 
already missing, the risk of getting caught in a lie might have seemed worth taking. 
For these reasons, and because any attempt to examine whether Marvell treated his 
59 Edward Murray Tomlinson, A History of the Minories (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1907), pp. 226–
40; R. B. Outhwaite, Clandestine Marriage in England, 1500-1850 (London and Rio Grande, Ohio: 
Hambledon Press, 1995), p. 24.
60 Tomlinson, A History of the Minories, p. 389.
61 Tomlinson, A History of the Minories, pp. 232–3.
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wife shabbily is complicated if we cannot be sure that he actually had a wife, it will be 
assumed in the remainder of this section that Mary Marvell was what she claimed to 
be. !ere is no need to spend time on Farrington’s allegation that she was required to 
eat her meals separately from the others in the household, like a servant (item 8). 
Mrs. Marvell denies it on oath, and it is improbable that Farrington was a frequent 
visitor to Great Russell Street. He was certainly, by this time, not on good terms with 
Nelthorpe.
!e charge against Marvell, insofar as his behaviour towards Mary Marvell is 
concerned, is that he le, her without information as to the state of his a1airs and that 
he failed to make any provision for her a,er his death. She claims that Nelthorpe told 
her that Marvell had assets (item 10, C6/242/13). Apart from the trunks of gold and 
jewels which she alleges were in Marvell’s lodgings in Maiden Lane (but which she 
does not claim to have seen for herself), this is the only substantial ground she can 
advance for her asserted belief that Marvell had le, some personal estate. Evidently, 
then, Marvell never discussed his circumstances with her. (Alternatively, it is conceiv‐
able that he told her the truth — that he had nothing — but that Farrington’s interest 
in the administration of the estate led her to suspect that her husband had exaggerat‐
ed his impecuniosity.) No doubt, this re2ects badly on Marvell but he may have felt 
that, since there was nothing, there was nothing to discuss. Equally, he may have 
hoped that his circumstances would improve, and that he would, eventually, leave 
behind an estate worth the trouble of administration.62
Biographical conclusions
Tupper comments that ‘it would not be di*cult to derive the impression that 
62 It may be that, having already been widowed, Mrs. Marvell was well used to fending for herself 
economically. On 10 June 1681, one Mary Marvell of the Parish of St. Giles in the Fields swore a 
deposition in the case of Love v. Jevon in which she testi$ed that in 1674 the Complainant Love had 
owed her a debt of £25: Town depositions Bundle 1057. At the time of the deposition, this Mary 
Marvell was aged about 50. If she is the same woman, she would have been aged 36 (to Marvell’s 45) at 
the date of the claimed marriage.
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!ompson and his friends — including Marvell — were unmitigated scoundrels’,63 
and seeks to correct that potential impression, at least in relation to !ompson, by 
citing his correspondence with his brother-in-law, Major Braman. !is correspon‐
dence, Tupper says, reveals !ompson as ‘a person of re$nement and insight’. Wall 
agrees, remarking that the correspondence with Braman shows !ompson to have 
been ‘a man of great dignity of mind and deep religious feeling’.64 Yet, according to 
what Mary Nelthorpe had been informed, !ompson had resolved to live out his life 
in relative comfort in the rules of the King’s Bench, while making no e1ort to 
discharge his substantial liabilities. Farrington, who ‘was obviously a liar’,65 at least 
appears to have been dogged and untiring in his endeavours to pay o1 the creditors, 
if only at the rate of 2s. in the pound.66 Obviously, Farrington was motivated by self-
interest: he was not content to spend the rest of his life under arrest, even if !omp‐
son was. If it is di*cult to determine which of these two was the less blameworthy, 
Edward Nelthorpe is a still more elusive $gure. Farrington accuses him of a combina‐
tion of fraud and incompetence but — in the same document, C7/581/73 — com‐
plains that !ompson’s neglect of his duties in managing the bank had caused 
additional burdens to fall on Nelthorpe as well as on Farrington. None of the most 
damaging accusations that Farrington levels at Nelthorpe is made on oath, though it 
is possible that this is just an accident of pleading (or, perhaps, of the survival of 
Chancery records). In particular, we do not know whether Nelthorpe managed to 
hide away a much greater volume of assets than the £500 that he deposited with 
Charles Wallis.
63 Tupper, ‘Mary Palmer, Alias Mrs. Andrew Marvell’, p. 373, n. 40.
64 Wall, ‘Marvell’s Friends in the City’, p. 207.
65 Wall, ‘Marvell’s Friends in the City’, p. 207.
66 !ompson, in his complaint against Farrington and Mary Nelthorpe, accuses Farrington of settling 
with some creditors at 2s. in the pound, taking assignment of their bonds, in which !ompson is 
jointly liable, and then threatening to sue !ompson for the full amount: C6/283/87.
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As for Marvell, all the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that he did 
no more to help Nelthorpe than to arrange a place for him to live where he could 
avoid arrest by his creditors and examination by the bankruptcy commissioners. 
Marvell was partly dependent on Nelthorpe, at least to the extent of living, when he 
did not stay in Maiden Lane, in the house for which Nelthorpe paid the rent and 
other expenses. Irrespective of the evidence, then, many will $nd implausible the 
proposition that Marvell did not know about the activities of his close associate. Our 
di*culty arises in part from the fact that we do not know how guilty the associate 
was. In these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that we should not be able to 
determine how guilty that makes Marvell, by association.
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Conclusion
It was suggested in the Introduction that, when we examine the various treatments of 
justice in Marvell’s poetry and prose, our composite impression is one of 
ambivalence. !is should not be in itself surprising: there are reasons to think that 
ambivalence is a very widespread response to the idea of justice. A strong feeling that 
rights should be respected, duties enforced, transgressions punished and damage 
redressed in a context of fairness (both procedural and substantive) is likely to coexist 
with a belief that such an ideal state is rarely likely to be achieved; that the necessary 
balancing act is, for the most part, beyond our abilities as a species. However, while 
ambivalence about justice may be widespread, it a"ords a writer of Marvell’s skill, 
subtlety and peculiar characteristics of mind an opportunity to make the common‐
place fresh and surprising. If the freshness and surprise cause us to examine our 
ambivalence and perhaps to dissect it into its con$icting impulses, we may have 
reason to be grateful.
We have seen that, in a poem that is certainly in some sense an encomium of 
Cromwell, Marvell shows Justice pleading in vain against one of the general’s most 
signi%cant actions, while the description of him as ‘just’ comes from a defeated 
enemy. A few months later, accompanying Marvell’s rousing defence of ‘the poet’s 
time’, we %nd the shade of Ben Jonson pronouncing an exquisitely just but entirely 
fanciful sentence on that of !omas May (chapter 1). !e lyric poetry, notably ‘!e 
Nymph complaining’ and ‘Upon the Death of Lord Hastings’ explore the contradic‐
tions in the concept of justice from di"ering if complementary perspectives, neither 
of which leaves the reader feeling sanguine. Here, arguably, scepticism predominates 
(chapter 3). In contrast, in the prose works (chapter 4) and the longer satires (chapter 
2), we encounter anger and raillery at the failure of the Court and of powerful men to 
act justly, thus implying that justice ought to have been attainable.  Here too, though, 
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there is ambivalence: it appears that Marvell’s opposition to the religious intolerance 
of his fellow parliamentarians and of Church leaders prompts him to support, while 
his suspicion of the king’s motives and awareness of the likelihood of abuse prompts 
him to oppose, the royal power to dispense with statute law.
It is arguably his writings about Grotius and belligerence between the Dutch 
and the English that best exemplify his ambivalence, however. In 1653, we %nd him 
deploying Grotian ideas against the Dutch, while apparently preferring Selden’s 
critique of the doctrine of Mare liberum (and thus, by implication, the Englishman’s 
more traditional conception of natural law and the law of nations). Some fourteen 
years later, however, he seems to be willing to relinquish the claim to English domin‐
ion over the sea without much expression of regret. He lacerates the Court of Charles 
II for its habitual failure to negotiate in good faith but the ground of his criticism 
seems to shi' between dismay at the government’s per%dy and anger at the unwilling‐
ness or inability to use it to further English interests. It is not, on the basis of his 
writings, possible to decide with certainty whether it is the injustice of the Court’s 
behaviour or the futility of that injustice that he %nds more reprehensible.
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Appendix
Prerogative Court of Canterbury entries recording the grants of 
Administration in the estates of Andrew Marvell and Edward Nelthorpe
Marvell’s administration
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Nelthorpe’s administration
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